

BUREAUCRATS, ENTREPRENEURS, AND STEWARDS:
SEEKING LEGITIMACY IN CONTEMPORARY GOVERNANCE

by

Margaret Rose Stout

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by

Margaret Rose Stout

has been approved

April 2007

Graduate Supervisory Committee:

N. Joseph Cayer, Chair
Thomas J. Catlaw
James H. Svara

ACCEPTED BY THE DIVISION OF GRADUATE STUDIES

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this theoretical inquiry was to understand the meaning of legitimacy encoded in various public administration role conceptualizations. It was prompted by differences in what is considered “legitimate” to elected officials, public administrators, and engaged citizens in various local governance activities. A robust theoretical foundation was desired for future empirical study of such phenomena. A Weberian ideal type model was developed from theories explicated in principal texts of public administration and related fields. The findings argue that role conceptualizations are linked to different meanings of legitimacy, and that there is a relationship between role conceptualization and a variety of concepts and social structures deemed important to public administration. Based on mutually exclusive logics of legitimacy, three theoretical traditions emerged: Constitutional, Discretionary, and Collaborative. Following this ‘genetic code,’ varying meanings of culturally significant elements were described for each tradition, including: the assumed governance context; political ontology; political authority and scope of action; formulations of responsibility and accountability; decision making rationality; and organizing style. In combination, each coherent set characterizes a specific role conceptualization: Bureaucrat, Entrepreneur, or Steward. The ideal types were then considered as problems of legitimacy in the contemporary governance context, using critical analysis, case vignettes, and secondary research to formulate arguments. Conclusions were drawn regarding the most promising role conceptualization: the Collaborative tradition’s Steward. This tradition views public administration as a facilitative convener of self-governance. It assumes that governance occurs through overlapping, fluid networks comprised of all sectors of society in an increasingly local to global configuration. It accommodates the uniqueness of each individual, while enabling co-creation through egalitarian relationship. It dissolves boundaries between politics and administration, and the individual and society. It transcends dysfunctional modes of relating based on contract and self-interest, fostering the social bond of mutual obligation. It merges

instrumental and substantive rationality, supporting long-lasting and effective decisions. It generates the trust required for effective networks. Because of these implications for practice, pursuit of this role conceptualization will require substantive changes to pedagogy. But before making such a recommendation, empirical research should be completed to determine its desirability and feasibility for contemporary governance.

DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to my darling daughter, Celina. Everything I do that attempts to bring goodness into the world, I do for you and your future. It has been that way since before you were even a twinkle. What you do from there will, I'm quite certain, be nothing short of amazing!

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I could not have completed this course of study and scholarly production without the support of my family and friends. Whether it was child care, a pep talk, meal, bottle of wine, household chore, or respite get-away visit, your help was *invaluable*. I would be remiss without a note of thanks to my ex-husband, Jim Tchida, for much needed financial support in order to maintain good parenting along with academic and related community pursuits.

Without meaning to overestimate the outcome, Nietzsche captures the doctoral experience perfectly: “One must have chaos within oneself to give birth to a dancing star.” Many thanks to all of my “midwives!”

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this inquiry is to better understand the meaning of legitimacy according to various public administration role conceptualizations. First, using a Weberian approach, an ideal type model based on mutually exclusive logics of legitimacy is developed using statements presented in key theoretical texts of the field. From this “genetic code” of ideal type legitimacy logic, varying meanings of important theoretical elements are identified and aligned, thus creating coherent sets of concepts, or “traditions.” Each tradition of public administration produces a unique role conceptualization that can be used in the professional socialization of practitioners, particularly through graduate degrees in public administration, but also for all who use the literature of public administration theory and the research it inspires. Given changes in the contemporary governance context, these role conceptualizations may even extend beyond a specialized social role called “public administrator.” Through a variety of critical analyses, including illustrations from case observation, recommendations are offered regarding the fit of these varying role types to the contemporary governance context. The implications of these recommendations for theory, empirical research, pedagogy, and practice are considered.

Impetus for the Study

The presenting empirical concern that prompted this theoretical inquiry is the observed differences in what is described as “legitimate governance” among elected officials, public administrators, and engaged citizens in a variety of local governance activities, including land use and transportation policy making, and contracting partnerships with both for-profit and nonprofit firms. These participant observations were made over the course of approximately fifteen years in Tempe, Arizona. My role during these years included: neighborhood organizer; neighborhood association and coalition founder; founder and executive director of a community development corporation; subcontractor to the City of Tempe for various planning and program implementation activities; and commissioner serving on a municipal policy advisory body.

Community development activities included: policy making, planning, and implementation of neighborhood and land use related initiatives, including citizen participation, urban design, affordable housing, economic development, transportation systems, and City facilities. Vignettes from these experiences will be included as illustrations for discussion in later chapters of this inquiry.

Tempe is an All-America City (2003, National Civic League) that is home to about 160,000 people in the heart of the Phoenix metropolitan area. Being the only land-locked community in the state, Tempe is under tremendous pressure to maintain economic growth to keep up with rising quality of life costs without geographic expansion or increased taxes. As a result, land use policy and development in Tempe has changed dramatically over the past two decades. Reactions to conflicts generated by zoning ordinance changes, intensification of land use, municipal use of eminent domain, location of problematic uses, gentrification, historic preservation, and myriad related issues vary in what might be considered predictable ways depending upon the identity of the individual. The actors involved include elected officials, professional administrators, private developers (both for-profit and nonprofit), volunteer associations of various types, and individual citizens and property owners. The attitudes displayed and strategies preferred appear to represent differing ideological interpretations of democratic legitimacy in governance decisions and actions.

An important difference centers on “who should do what” to create legitimate governance outcomes. In other words, disagreements are evident in regard to the appropriate role of elected officials, public administrators, private land owners/developers, and citizens. These disagreements raise the question, “*Why* would these different actors believe they are each more rightfully imbued with political authority than the others?” In other words, “Where might these different attitudes come from?”

Appleby believed that government is comprised of “the public employees themselves, their conceptions of their positions, and the attitudes of the public about what is required in and from our civil servants” (1945, p. 3). Preliminary thinking about how best to study these varying attitudes and actions led to the notion of assessing role conception according to several models already offered in the literature (Box, 1998; Brewer et al., 2000; J. V. Denhardt & Denhardt, 2003; R. B. Denhardt & deLeon, 1995; Lofquist, 1989; Selden et al., 1999). However, discussions of role conception and public service motivation role typologies do not necessarily link explicitly to associated theories of democratic legitimacy, or discuss in depth the theoretical differences between representative and participative democracy. Therefore, rather than running the risk of launching too quickly into an analysis of the attitudes and role conceptions held by these various groups and producing under-theorized results, the decision was made to develop a more robust theoretical foundation to help inform such empirical study in the future.

Framing the Focus of Inquiry

This chapter frames the principal research question and why it is important to public administration: *How can we reformulate the public administrator role conceptualization to provide a better theoretical fit for democratic legitimacy in the contemporary governance context?* Before even beginning to answer this question, it is important to give some background on the concept of *role* and its relationship to the underlying question of democratic legitimacy.

This inquiry explores the crisis of legitimacy in contemporary democratic governance from the perspective of public administration theory, rather than from the perspective of practitioners, elected officials, or citizens themselves. By “crisis of legitimacy,” I mean the citizenry’s lack of trust in government, both in terms of its political and administrative activities (C. S. King et al., 1998). As Waldo (1980) suggests there is an “authority problem” in our culture, whereby all claims to authority are held in suspicion. This is closely linked to the loss of a locus of legitimacy or agreement on who confers legitimacy.

The scope of inquiry on this problem typically comes down to the individual level of analysis, because individuals within the governance process are ultimately the actors producing, or not producing legitimacy (McSwite, 1997; Stivers, 2000b). Therefore, the crisis of legitimacy is often linked to concepts of administrative *responsibility* and *accountability*; administrative responsibility to the citizenry as the democratic sovereign, and administrative accountability demonstrating such responsibility in action. This concern is related to theoretical discussions regarding political authority and the appropriate scope of action delegated to public administration. Furthermore, there has been a corresponding emphasis in the field on practices such as performance measurement, program evaluation, and codes of ethics as means to ensure administrative accountability.

Most of these discussions do not explore specifically how these types of accountability achieve public responsibility in terms of democratic legitimacy in either its representative or direct forms. "Often missing in literature and discourse is recognition that reformers of institutions and civic philosophies must show how the capacity to effect public purposes and accountability to the polity will be enhanced in a manner that comports with our Constitution and our republican institutions" (Lynn, 2001, p. 155). While Lynn refers here to one specific approach to legitimacy, the sentiment is applicable more generally. Instead of questioning the meaning of legitimacy itself, it is *assumed* that if administrators can show appropriate accountability as described and promoted by the theory at hand, then they have achieved democratic legitimacy. Some theories may promote techniques aligned with our republican system of government. Others may promote techniques which are either completely divorced from this system, or silently assume its presence. However, some theories of public administration directly challenge the assumption that democratic legitimacy can be achieved through *any* means designed within the context of the representative political system or the Constitution. Such theories call for a new form of public responsibility directly to citizens. This shift requires a completely new formulation

of democratic legitimacy, as well as reformulations of key elements of administrative theory and practice.

Indeed, this crisis of identity in the field of public administration has been identified as one of the most pressing concerns for the field in the new millennium, noting that it flows “in large part from different, often conflicting, *ideas* in American political philosophy” (Kettl, 2000, p. 14). Lowi (1993) suggests that the legitimization of public administration is something every political regime must do, noting various attempts through the course of United States History. Even strict positivists understand “...legitimacy is at root not a legal but a psychological matter. A legal or any other system of authority is legitimate only to the extent that those persons to whom it is directed feel that they ought or must accept it” (Simon et al., 1974, p. 86). The current identity crisis has been conceived as academic and existential concerns which affect both the study and practice of public administration (Raadschelders, 1999). This inquiry considers theoretical answers to: what is the position of public administration within the state and society; why do we do what we do as practitioners; and why is there a perceived lack of legitimacy?

Beyond a relatively small “legitimacy question” literature, most theoretical discussion in public administration remains at the level of *means to* legitimacy in terms of formulations of public responsibility and accountability, rather than *meanings of* democratic legitimacy in either its representative or direct forms. In other words, the corollary theory of the state, politics, or governance is rarely discussed. As an important example, alternative role conceptualizations are commonly offered in response to the noted crisis of legitimacy in government. Theories about the appropriate role of public administrators most commonly describe a set of characteristics designed to achieve responsibility and accountability, rarely questioning or fully explicating the underlying logic of legitimacy they are designed to realize. Furthermore, many other theories that focus on related matters of administrative practice fail to consider the issue of democratic

legitimacy, leaving issues like decision making rationality and organizing style in large part divorced from the legitimacy question.

In order to understand how theories of democratic legitimacy are manifested in practice without losing sight of the underlying issue of legitimacy itself, this inquiry considers theoretical conceptualizations of the public administrator role and how different types might be mutually exclusive when considering their logic of legitimacy. There is a need to develop typologies of public administration action that are linked to theories of legitimacy at the deepest levels possible—the underlying political philosophies and assumptions about the nature of human being. As noted sociologist Max Weber observed, “Action, especially a social action which involves a social relationship, may be guided by the belief in the existence of a legitimate order” (1968, p. 31). Therefore, beliefs about democratic legitimacy and one’s given social role are closely related to whether or not an administrator’s motivations, attitudes, and resulting actions will be deemed “valuable or worthwhile for society” (Brewer & Selden, 1998). This suggests that role conception must be oriented toward achieving democratic legitimacy in a manner that is deemed appropriate by the community. The present inquiry is meant to explore this “deeper problem of the legitimacy of the public administrative role” (Cooper, 1984, p. 148).

The role of public administration is in large part considered to be a profession. In the classical view, professions are believed to have a number of characteristics: (1) it is a full time *occupation* or principal source of income; (2) it requires a commitment to a *calling* or enduring set of normative and behavioral expectations; (3) various signs and symbols differentiate the *profession* from the laity; (4) it requires specialized training or *education*, including both esoteric and useful knowledge; (5) it *serves* clients competently; and (6) its members proceed by their own judgment and authority, enjoying *autonomy* restrained by responsibility to the other characteristics of professionalism (Moore & Rosenblum, 1970). While some do not believe public administration to be a profession “in the strict sense” (Waldo, 1980, p. 61), if we perceive our

enterprise to be something *like* a profession, then perhaps it is time for us to consider the manner in which we reproduce it, and to what degree we accept this type of definition of “profession” given our democratic context. For example, if the activities of governance are increasingly delegated to those not affiliated with the *profession* of public administration, a new understanding of what professionalism means may be needed.

Indeed, this appears to be a growing concern in the field. Professional identity in public service was the topic of a recent symposium in the *International Journal of Public Sector Management*. Specifically, there has been a shift in focus on governance processes rather than government organizations, along with the transformation of government agencies themselves in the model of business principles and practices. This shift is described as an “identity project” in which the vocational ethos of public service is changing (Du Gay, 1996). Each ethos has a specific logic, ethical framework, and corresponding role identity for public administrators (Horton, 2006). Denhardt notes that teaching theory is like helping students learn “the ‘logic’ of the field” (2001, p. 527). Where this becomes tricky is when there are multiple and competing logics used in the field—which logic is taught and learned? The two ethos described in the symposium articles are the traditional bureaucratic model and the managerialist model promoted by the New Public Management and similar initiatives such as reinventing government. However, the identification of other models is also noted (Considine & Lewis, 1999). For example, competition between the managerialist ethos and democratic ethos has been shown to produce competing professional identities such as entrepreneur versus activist (Sachs, 2001). Research conducted in Norwegian government agencies shows that the changing public administration ethos requires more than surface behavioral changes—its “new values and demands require a new mind-set” (Berg, 2006, p. 567). To a large extent, these references to alternative ethos, alternative professional identities, and alternative role conceptions in public administration are just different ways to say “alternative interpretations of democratic legitimacy.”

The administrative role is often described as a “cohesive set of job-related values and attitudes that provides the public administrator a stable set of expectations about his or her responsibilities” (Selden et al., 1999). However, role is more than the traditional structural analysis or behavioral interpretation of role “as the sets of stabilized expectations that organizations comprise” (McSwite, 1997, p. 185). *Role* is a form of social identity. “This has also been called “persona,” which highlights the notion that there is more to role than behavior (Stivers, 2000a). La Porte suggests, “The role is a source of psychic satisfaction or pain, often a mark of social status, and sometimes the measure of a person’s sense of significance” (1971, p. 42). As noted by sociologists, anthropologists, and psychologists, social identity derives from various group memberships, including that of profession (Hogg & Vaughan, 2005). *Role conception* is an *internalized* set of beliefs and ideas a person holds about her place and purpose in society, which defines how one may act. Thus, role conception is associated with legitimacy as obtained through rules, standards, and principles.

“Put rather generally, *a role is a way of behaving associated with a defined position in a social system*” (Selznick, 1957, p. 82). Citizens, practitioners, and legislators are the roles of which the governance social system is made (Box, 1998). Each of these roles can be explored to better understand the problems of governance. Such study of specialized social roles is sociological in the sense of understanding the relationship between the individual and the social milieu—“how his activities are viewed with reference to the cultural setting in which they are performed” (Znaniecki, 1940, p. 13). From sociological research on human behavior in organizations, we know that roles frame people’s attitudes, actions, and interactions with others. Every social role presupposes values that participants in the social milieu agree upon. The role’s actions produce these values, so long as those in related or interacting roles act according to *their* role expectations. To ensure this role performance, role patterns are sometimes “explicitly formulated as a system of legal or ethical norms” (Znaniecki, 1940, pp. 19-20). In the case of

public administration, the field promotes specific *role conceptualizations*, which are sets of beliefs and ideas *external sources* have about a given role's place and purpose. As noted by Box (1998), public administration theories prescribe conceptualizations of the appropriate role for citizens, politicians, and public administrators alike. However, there are multiple conceptualizations of legitimate roles, making social enactment complicated and problematic.

The literature pertaining to the public administrator role tends to conflate *conception* and *conceptualization*, or at least fails to differentiate between the two. The nexus between internalized role conception and externally imposed role conceptualization could be described by the notion of *praxis*—"thought emerging from deed and deed evoking thought" (Hall, 1990). First, there is a link between ethos and politics in the notion of *praxis*: "Ethics and politics as disciplines concerned with *praxis* are aspects of a unified practical philosophy" (Bernstein, 1991, p. 9). *Praxis* has been further described as "a more theoretically informed practice, which, in turn, is consciously reflected upon" (M. R. Warren, 2001). Such reflections impact future choices. Together, these ideas suggest that the ethical and political implications of role conception are intentionally and reflectively adopted, at least partly due to theoretical conceptualizations of appropriate roles. The results of role performance are then reflected upon, possibly adjusting the interpretation or acceptance of theory in an ongoing cycle.

For example, *stewardship* is a theoretical role conceptualization that describes an individual's vocational role conception which "begins on the inside, governing the way a person thinks, sees, and feels—including his or her motivation, and then it ultimately works itself out into external physical structures, assets, and opportunities" (Graves & Addington, 2003). It is a theory that is internalized and then acted upon, causing effects in the social world. The social world then reacts to those effects, in part through academic theorizing about how future actions should be shaped through different role conceptualizations.

The literature's common reference to a professional ethos that guides role conception is linked to the notion of *vocation*, in the sense of calling. Indeed, a "profession" refers to that which one professes or avows publicly (Neufeldt, 1996). This indicates a deeply affective element to professional identity. This interpretation is evident in comments from a wide range of scholars in the field. Vocations are professions that are imbued with a particular ethos, or "collective psychological connection between people" (McSwite, 2002, p. 20). "Acceptance of a professional identity implies acceptance of the ethical principles associated with professional practice" (Weidman et al., 2001, p. 51). "'Identification' is used in psychoanalytic literature to denote a particular kind of emotional tie" (Simon, 1976, p. 205). Public service is a "calling" to become a "steward" (J. V. Denhardt & Denhardt, 2003).

Because of this widely shared sense of the importance of vocation in public administration, significant efforts have been made to operationalize vocation as *public service motivation*, or PSM (Brewer et al., 2000; Perry, 1997; Selden et al., 1999). Three of the five antecedents to PSM are religious socialization, professional identity, and political ideology (Perry, 1997). All three are linked to the present inquiry as sources of the ontological, professional, and political rationales given for the legitimacy of various role conceptualizations.

It has been argued that identity is in large part an evaluation based on what a person understands to be Good (C. Taylor, 1989). Furthermore, notions of the Good and associated cultural identities change across time and place (McSwite, 2002). For example, in the 1960s, the ethos attached to the vocation of public service was characterized by valuing human relationship, cooperation, and collective action. However, that ethos has been in many ways supplanted by one which values market exchange principals (McSwite, 2002). Some suggest that performance-related meanings of professionalism challenge those based on serving the public interest. Thus, the very meaning of "professionalism" in public administration has changed over time, and what it means in the postmodern context is in large part unknown, particularly because it has both

political and epistemological dimensions (Adams, 1992). This suggests that ongoing changes in political and administrative theory will demand shifts to the professional identity of public administrators.

For example, there has been an invitation to the field itself to “foster a collaborative approach to government, where experts are simply part of a cooperative process in which they have no superior role” (McSwite, 2002, p. 77). Similarly, the doctrine of the New Public Service calls for a redefinition of the professional identity of public administrators. We are called to “rediscover our desire to serve our fellow citizens and to think about our public service work in a way that celebrates its ‘soul’ and meaning” (J. V. Denhardt & Denhardt, 2003). This would engender yet another ethos, a new type of vocation, and an alternative role conception. This new type of role conceptualization is meant both to respond to the contemporary social context and to restructure the social context toward a “pure” democratic ideal, in the sense of direct democracy.

The notion that the ethos and corresponding role conception of public administrators can and perhaps *should* change suggests the need to make informed choices. A better understanding of what comprises these role conceptions should benefit this effort. Research on public service motivation is one approach being used. This area of inquiry explores the question of what leads individuals to adopt the role of public administrator, and provides typological conceptualizations of the role conceptions of individual administrators. Related literature about vocation or calling also explores the motivation to enter the public service, assuming a role conceptualization related to some type of moral purpose. For example, public service has been described as “a concept, an attitude, a sense of duty—yes, even a sense of public morality” (Staats, 1988). Yet, this role conception has been differentiated as a *democratic* ethos, as opposed to a *bureaucratic* ethos, which warrants a different type of role conception (Pugh, 1991). This inquiry suggests that different role conceptualizations of “public administrator” may draw different types of people to public service and produce different types of public service results.

Because of these varying administrator role conceptions and theoretical role conceptualizations, public service motivation (or PSM) has been identified as one of the “big questions” in public administration (Behn, 1995). Thus far, PSM has been studied through two distinct approaches. One has examined the differences between public and private sector employees along dimensions of PSM (Crewson, 1997; Gabris & Simo, 1995). In the past, the tasks of governance were assigned primarily to public administrators within public organizations. Therefore, role conceptions in public administration theory were conceived as sectorally-linked. In this context, it makes sense to define role conceptions by comparing the job of *public servant* in a government agency guided by elected representatives, as opposed to *employee* in a private organization guided by profit motives. The problem is that role conception cannot be assumed simply by virtue of sector, particularly in light of the contemporary blurring of sectoral boundaries. If governance is an intersectoral process, then participants in its activities are fulfilling a particular *societal role* that has recently been performed predominantly by government. Thus, the role of public administrator has become problematic in and of itself.

The other approach has considered the multifaceted dimensions of PSM itself, regardless of sector of employment. The first stream has failed to produce consistent findings due to the fact that it may not be a sectorally linked concept. But more importantly, earlier approaches failed to appreciate differing conceptualizations of the term “public service.” Thus, the second stream of research has sought to clarify these conceptualizations (Brewer et al., 2000; Rainey, 1982). Initial research on the dimensions of PSM first found that public service motives may be rational, norm-based, and affective (Perry & Wise, 1990). Rational motives are grounded in interest-based concepts of human and organizational behavior. Norm-based motives are linked to a sense of patriotism, duty, and loyalty to the public interest. Affective motives reflect the pro-social desire to help others based on feelings of empathy, altruism, or moral conviction.

This theory of PSM was later operationalized in a measurement scale that included attitudes about the attraction to public policymaking, commitment to the public interest, social justice, civic duty, compassion, and self-sacrifice, finding that there are mixed bases for these motivations (Perry, 1996). Application of this measurement scale has provided evidence of the construct's validity, as well as identifying antecedents to PSM, which include parental and religious socialization as well as professional identification (Perry, 1997).

Q-methodology was used to fine-tune Perry's findings about PSM (Brewer et al., 2000). The research found that Perry's approach fails to capture differences in individual conceptions of PSM as well as the presence of mixed motives. Thus, a study was crafted to extend the theory of PSM to provide a more systematic and comprehensive view of PSM and its various components. In so doing, four distinct role conceptions based on PSM were identified: Samaritans, Communitarians, Patriots, and Humanitarians. These findings are not completely dissimilar to the role typology of climbers, conservers, zealots, advocates, and statesmen (Downs, 1967).

Another role typology was developed using a theoretical framework developed by Robert Denhardt and Linda deLeon (1995). The construct considered types based on a grid created by two attitude continua: managerial efficiency and social equity versus political responsiveness and proactive administration (Selden et al., 1999). The resulting role types included: stewards of the public interest; adapted realists; businesslike utilitarians; resigned custodians; and practical idealists. Due to the prevalence of the steward role conception, the findings recommended further exploration of this particular role type from a normative perspective of improving democratic accountability.

Yet another role typology is offered by Svava (2006b) based on a review of the literature as well as empirical research on top appointed executives in Denmark: the Guardian, the Autonomous Administrator, the Responsive Administrator, and the Sparring Partner. He sees these models representing characteristics in two dimensions of the relationship between politics

and administration: (1) the nature of the hierarchical relationship and (2) the differentiation of roles, distance between spheres, and choice of norms. Guardians are experts guided by established standards of the field. Autonomous Administrators are innovators who are independent actors who display initiative in achieving results. Responsive Administrators are controlled by accountability to the law and political system. Sparring Partners are independent actors who offer advice to political leaders in policy making.

In sum, these varying conceptualizations of the role types engendered by public service motivation include categorizations by cognitive type, social level of concern, type of personal affect or commitment, orientation toward technical and democratic concerns, and relationship to politicians. However, there is evidence that there is crossover among types in practice, suggesting that they are not mutually exclusive. This may be because there is another way to conceptualize public service motivation that might avoid this difficulty in categorization, or because of mixed motives, it is impossible to capture true types in practice. It would seem that these approaches are valuable in linking individual value systems to specific functions, organizational missions, or job classifications. Furthermore, they are useful in describing different approaches to the administrator's relationship to elected officials. However, they may not be sufficient to explain differing theories of legitimacy. The present inquiry seeks to remedy this deficiency by devising ideal role types based on theories of democratic legitimacy in the public administration literature.

As suggested at the beginning of this discussion, different bases of democratic legitimacy call for a new meaning of professionalism and a new professional identity for public administrators (Cooper, 1984). Furthermore, changes in administrative theory and recommendations for practice demand new professional identities (van Bockel & Noordegraaf, 2006). It has been argued that contemporary conditions call us to redefine the meaning of public service designed to achieve social self-governance, responsible economic organizations and markets, and facilitative government (Newland, 2003). Comparative research in Canada and

Switzerland found that the changes to the identity of public administrators are achieved through socialization into new professional values (Caron & Giaque, 2006). “A professional’s socialization to his or her ethical responsibility should positively influence public service motivation” (Perry, 1997, p. 185). It has been shown to do so in terms of characteristics such as civic duty and self-sacrifice.

The mutually exclusive ideal role types produced in this inquiry are intended to facilitate the evaluation and selection of role conceptualizations to be promoted by the field of public administration through theory and pedagogy both in academia and the workplace. The manner in which professional identities are believed to change can be described as a general causal relationship of indeterminate starting place, whereby: (1) a person is motivated by a variety of personal and social factors to adopt a particular role conception, which produces; (2) a specific set of attitudes and actions, which in turn are; (3) described by theory as role conceptualizations, which are; (4) imparted through the professional socialization process, which in turn; (5) impacts motivation and role conception. This inquiry pertains only to specific elements of professional socialization—*those which are impacted most directly by theory*. For the most part, theory impacts professional education and academic mentorship. However, it must be noted that professional socialization also occurs through experiences in the workplace and professional associations, including informal and formal methods of mentorship, training, and indoctrination. These experiences may be quite distant or even disconnected from public administration theory. Furthermore, because public administration is embedded in the political process, role conception is further impacted by numerous other factors, often described as personal motivational antecedents such as religious beliefs, political ideology, and other cultural ideas.

Looking to the more limited scope of formal, academic professional socialization, several components have been identified in a vast sociological and psychological literature. “Professional socialization involves acquiring the requisite knowledge and skills and also the sense of

occupational identity and internalization of occupational norms typical of the fully qualified practitioner” (Moore & Rosenblum, 1970, p. 71). *Knowledge acquisition* is a cognitive process focusing on the skills needed for effective role performance. *Investment* is a process through which an individual commits to the role identity itself. This is particularly related to faculty mentorship and “transmission of more accepted values of the discipline or profession” (Weidman et al., 2001, p. 18). *Involvement* is an element pertaining to practice that affects both technical skill and adoption of the profession’s ideology, motives, and attitudes through the mechanism of role taking.

The Academic Professional Role Conceptualization Process

From this perspective, administrators are conceptualized as “role-takers” in that they take on a relationship that has been predetermined in terms of a set of expectations, both organizationally and socially (Harmon & Mayer, 1986). As noted by sociologists, there is an interdependence of social organization and personality formation, and personality traits can be modified (Merton, 1957). For this reason, professional socialization is thought to influence role taking and performance. Taking on a role “connotes an adaptive process, a mode of unconscious self-structuring. It is this significance of role-taking—as against the formal and external assignment of roles—that can help us here” (Selznick, 1957, p. 83). Research, theory, and pedagogy are all used to plan and implement the professional education and socialization process that engenders role-taking. The general flow of this process is depicted in Figure 1. *To reiterate, this model excludes all other impacts to identity formation, role conception, and role taking beyond activities informed by theory. The focus is purely on the relationship between theoretical role conceptualization and role taking.*

Step 1: Theory Promotes Role Conceptions

Scholars assume the task of constructing and instilling a role conceptualization for the public administrator that will be deemed legitimate by the citizens they serve, including elected

officials. As noted in the preceding discussion, there are many competing role conceptualizations in public administration theory that have changed over time. This issue is of critical importance to the field and its pursuit of democratic legitimacy.




Figure 1: The Academic Professional Role Conceptualization Process

Step 2: Pedagogy Transmits Role Conception

New role conceptualizations require changes to the professional socialization process, much of which occurs through the curricula of educational programs (C. S. King, 1998). “What we offer as a formal definition of professionalism should be supported by our curricula” (Cooper, 1984, p. 148). These role conceptualizations are foundational to how professional socialization is conducted. This normative claim bears out in research on both public policy and public

administration programs: both socialize students into professional identities (De Soto et al., 1999; Lowery & Whitaker, 1994).

While it must be noted that socialization and identity formation are affected by many factors such as one's personality, upbringing, work experiences, and many other cultural sources, professional socialization occurs in large part during academic preparation (Heck, 1995). Graduate professional programs carry legitimate power and authority (French & Raven, 1959) to prescribe behavior and influence psychological change regarding a given social role or position. Both the process of prescription and the prescribed attitudes and behaviors themselves carry a feeling of internalized "rightness." Higher education in general is imbued with cultural legitimacy, and authorization from legitimizing agents such as accrediting bodies further strengthens that legitimacy.

From what comes up in a library database search, professional socialization during the academic experience (as well as during work experience) is of great concern in other professions, including nursing, social work, education, medicine, and law. It also appears in business, management, accounting, and even public relations literature. It would seem that those pursuing such degrees are being socialized into a profession, but not necessarily into the profession of public administration, even if they intend to go into public service. On the one hand, only a small percentage of public administrators receive degrees in the field, and even fewer during pre-service years. So, one might suggest that professional socialization in the academy has a minimal impact on the field. On the other hand, a very high percentage of public administrators in the upper echelons of government agencies do acquire degrees in the field. These professionals *model the identity of the field*, even if indirectly, because the status of a profession is judged by its ideal or highest and most skilled representatives (Moore & Rosenblum, 1970).

Unfortunately, the topic of *professional socialization* receives little attention in public administration, despite the facts that the principal degree in the field is described as a professional

degree, the Masters in Public Administration (MPA), and many of its doctorates are the Doctor of Public Administration (DPA) rather than the Doctor of Philosophy (PhD). Furthermore, the field endeavors to ensure consistent professional quality through certifications like Certified Public Manager programs (CPM), or at the very least, through accreditation of professional degree programs through the National Association of Schools of Public Affairs and Administration (NASPAA). “Specialized & professional accrediting bodies in the United States operate to ensure that students in educational programs receive an education consistent with standards for entry into practice or advanced practice in each of their respective fields or disciplines” (ASPA, 2006). “Accreditation fostered the impression that the practice of public management could be boiled down into a generic core of knowledge; if so, this ‘essence’ could be imparted through education and assessed through examination” (Hays & Duke, 1996, p. 425). As a result of such efforts, MPA programs across the country are fairly uniform in their admission requirements, curricula, and teaching approaches (R. B. Denhardt, 2001).

NASPAA’s peer review accreditation process ensures that MPA programs are very similar by employing a combination of standards, self-study, and site visits (NASPAA, 2006a). According to its code of good practice, each member organization (educational institutions offering MPA degrees, for the most part) “focuses on the preparation of students for *professional* careers in public service, emphasizing both the values and ethics of public service, and the development of professional skills and knowledge” (NASPAA, 2006b). For example, the University of Georgia describes its MPA curriculum thus: “A socialization sequence and five core courses introduce the student to the various fields of public administration and the economic foundations of public policy” (Georgia, 2006).

Professional socialization can occur through both implicit and explicit teaching (Schein, 1968; Van Maanen & Schein, 1979). Faculty members in a variety of fields describe their socializing role as both implicitly and explicitly transmitting the culture and values of their

profession (du Tort, 1995; Pescosolido & Hess, 1996; Sachs, 2001; Teschendorf & Nemshick, 2001). “Although ethics may be relegated to the hidden curriculum in graduate school, students learn to follow sound ethical judgment in research, teaching, and clinical practice by observing role models and mentors” (Weidman et al., 2001, p. 51). In fact, professional socialization is considered to be a formative experience that is significant to inculcation of public service motivation (Perry, 1997). For example, professional values are promoted through formal education such as Masters of Public Administration (MPA) degree and Certified Public Manager (CPM) programs. Graduate programs in public administration have been found to instill the ethical standards of both the bureaucratic ethos (efficiency, competence, expertise, loyalty, and accountability) and democratic ethos (public interest, social equity, constitutional values, and citizenship), or what might be called deontological and teleological ethos (Heijka-Ekins, 1988).

“Socialization in graduate school refers to the processes through which individuals gain the knowledge, skills, and values necessary for successful entry into a professional career requiring an advanced level of specialized knowledge and skills” (Weidman et al., 2001, p. iii). In other words, it has both cognitive and affective dimensions. Socialization is a nonlinear process in which external sources of evaluation and internal sources of reflection combine in an evolving developmental cycle (Weidman et al., 2001). Of the four identified stages of professional development, the graduate school experience impacts at least the latter three: (1) anticipatory; (2) formal; (3) informal; and (4) personal. The graduate program seeks to change students in specific ways in their preparation for postgraduate careers. Throughout these overlapping stages, the professional internalizes role expectations.

This developmental process of professional socialization is linked to the development of role identity and commitment (Thornton & Nardi, 1975). “Professional identity also comes from successfully negotiating the key rites of passage and securing recognizable status symbols”

(Weidman et al., 2001, p. 48). In master's programs, this includes specialized certifications and the coveted MPA professional degree. In doctoral programs, this includes screening exams, comprehensive exams, advancement to candidacy, graduation, and publication of research. Ongoing training and education can be important "rites of passage" used in the socialization process for experienced professionals adjusting to change (Trice & Beyer, 1993). Further regulation of the profession comes in the form of codes of conduct and state licensure. The rationales for regulating admission to a profession are "to protect the potentially gullible client from incompetent and unscrupulous 'experts,' and to protect the qualified practitioner against unfair competition" (Moore & Rosenblum, 1970, p. 111). The former rationale is regarded as particularly important in public administration, as its professionals operate with the power of the state behind them.

Step 3: Practitioners Act as Role-takers

Administrators, responding in part to scholarly role conceptualizations, adopt and perform roles in a unique but largely patterned manner of the profession as acquired and internalized during education, training, and subsequent experience. There are two basic approaches to the construction of such intrinsic motivation. Some psychologists posit that it is part of personality and universal drives, similar to the notion of an *a priori* public service motivation (one without antecedents). Study of specialized social roles like vocation can be psychobiological in nature, focusing on the individual and her experience (Znaniecki, 1940).

Social theorists, on the other hand, focus on how socialization and cultural practices shape the meaning and value an individual attaches to attitudes and actions (Fuller & Dornbusch, 1988). "The transformation process of a novice to a professional is essentially an acculturation process during which the values, norms and symbols of the profession are internalized" (du Tort, 1995, p. 164). This "inculcation of motives" can occur at both pre-entry and entry stages to an organization (C. Barnard, I., 1938). In fact, socialization occurs in all the major social

institutions—family, religion, school, community, and profession. For example, the importance of socialization processes has been found in the formation of both moral development and public service motivation (Kohlberg, 1969; Perry, 1997). “Professional identity takes precedence in organizing the professional’s worldview... channeling the individual’s conception of self” (Brown, 1991, p. 159).

Socialization efforts are designed to change convictions through the internalization of new ideas. In other words, socialization produces internalized or intrinsic motivation (deCharms, 1968). This can be a result of internalized values, norms, or morals (Etzioni, 1975; Katz & Kahn, 1966). Whether these internal motivators come from external or authentically internal sources such as personality traits, competencies, or values, they combine in what have been called “self-theories of motivation” (Leonard et al., 1999). From this perspective, the perceived self, the ideal self, and sets of social identities combine to generate self-conception. This self-conception augments intrinsic motivation and responds to external sources of motivation. It follows that professional socialization seeks to impact intrinsic motivation, as well as create a predilection to external reinforcement of that motivation.

Step 4: Role Performance is Assessed through Research

As noted in the discussion above, research on the relationship between perceived legitimacy and role performance abounds in the field of public administration. Many studies trying to understand this problem have focused on role performance and its relationship to public service motivation. Others consider the manner in which role performance is related to theories of democratic legitimacy. These types of inquiries find that administrator role performance may or may not be aligned with the role conception adopted or the role conceptualization preferred. If role performance is in accordance with the prevailing role conceptualization, but is still perceived to be illegitimate, theorists may make assessments of its legitimacy in two general ways. First, the theorist may prefer a different meaning of legitimacy, and reject the role performance even if it is

accurate according to the prevailing views. Alternatively, even if the theorist supports the prevailing view of legitimacy and associated role conceptualization, these sentiments may be altered based on the social reaction to performance of that role. As is evident in national opinion polls and media reports, the current perception of government legitimacy is very low, which includes public opinion of both elected representatives and appointed administrators (C. S. King et al., 1998).

Step 5: Adjustments Are Made to Theory

Based on the results of theoretical and empirical inquiry, adjustments are made to theory in hopes of developing role conceptualizations which will better meet citizen expectations in the future. In essence, scholars continually seek new answers to the question, "Can professionals be developed in ways that are conducive to democratic responsibility?" (Perry, 1997, p. 191). This inquiry seeks to provide new ways of answering this question by better understanding the legitimacy logics underlying different conceptualizations of the public administrator role.

Summary

From this process view, role conception is envisioned, at minimum, as a problem of dynamic interactions among scholarship, practice, and public perception. It can be studied from the perspective of those constructing the role (scholars), those taking the role (practitioners), or those interacting with the role (citizens, including elected officials). While role conception (internal perception) and role conceptualization (external prescription) are clearly interrelated, this inquiry focuses on the latter and the manner in which theory describes and promotes roles for the public administrator. In other words, this inquiry focuses on the starting point in the model depicted in Figure 1: the theories that promote specific role conceptions. It seeks to understand the constitutive elements of unique role conceptualizations, how they are mutually exclusive in terms of legitimacy logic, and how the field attempts to promote them through theories of various elements of practice. Finally, the inquiry will explore ways theorists have combined, integrated,

or reconciled these ideal types—or potentially could—ultimately considering whether or not any of these approaches have promise for improving democratic legitimacy in the contemporary governance context.

Based on this framing of the issue of legitimacy, the principal research question for this study is: *How can we reformulate the public administrator role conceptualization to provide a better theoretical fit for democratic legitimacy in the contemporary governance context?* Nested within this exploratory inquiry are several problematic issues, each of which brings forward important questions in the field of public administration. *Assuming that there is a legitimacy crisis in public administration in the United States*, there is a need to identify: (1) mutually exclusive legitimacy logics; (2) the elements of public administration theory that are related to role conceptualization; (3) differentiating characteristics of varying role conceptualizations and key attempts to integrate them; and (4) the conceptual fit of these role conceptualizations to empirical accounts of the contemporary governance context.

Role conceptualizations stem from “legitimizing myths”—images of the identity of the public administrator or the enterprise of public administration as a whole within our political system (Kass, 1990a). As noted by Morgan (1986), images and metaphors of this type are used not only as descriptors, but as prescriptive guides for attitudes and action. Role conceptualizations formulate what we wish to *be*, not just *do*: “This is partly a matter of *self-conception... self-knowledge... and... self-summoning*” (Selznick, 1957, p. 143). In fact, a historical review of the field “shows that the debate over defining the role of the administrator in governance has actually been a struggle of political ideology concerning who has discretion over policy and how this discretion is to be exercised” (McSwite, 1997, p. 229-230). Thus, role conceptualization has been linked to conceptions of democratic legitimacy.

Numerous role conceptualizations have been put forward by the theorists of the field (Kass & Catron, 1990). At least three very different role conceptualizations can be identified as:

bureaucrat, entrepreneur, and steward. As defined in this inquiry, very basically, in the role of Bureaucrat, actions are framed by the rules and procedures commanded by the separated powers of representative government through the organizational hierarchy to ensure legitimacy. In the role of Entrepreneur, actions are framed by the independent pursuit of various performance criteria as stand-ins for the legitimate public good. In the role of Steward, legitimate actions are framed by the standards of direct democracy, answerable to the citizens impacted by the decision or action.

An important theoretical problem with role conceptualizations is that they often offer paradoxical or conflicting normative guidelines when considering various logics for achieving legitimacy. For example, in some role conceptualizations, administrators are charged with being both discretionary and obedient to external masters (e.g. managers, politicians, and law). These two characteristics are based on two very different interpretations of legitimacy, and it is questionable whether they can be successfully integrated. Perhaps certain elements of various approaches to public administration can be combined into one role conceptualization, while others cannot. These role conceptualizations require full formulation across associated key dimensions before they can be applied theoretically, compared normatively, or tested empirically. This is the first task of the present inquiry.

In order to better understand these problems of theoretical logic, this inquiry explores a number of elements of administrative theory and practice that are thought to impact how roles are conceptualized. Role conceptualization is considered to be a summative description of a prescribed pattern comprised of a number of elements of public administration theory, including: the assumed governance context; political ontology; political authority and scope of action; formulations of responsibility and accountability; associated decision making rationality; and associated organizing style. These elements are described in Chapter 3 to provide an understanding of how each one impacts role conceptualization. It might be said that these factors

are similar to independent variables that influence role conceptualization as a dependent variable. However, it is more accurate to describe them as logically coherent sets of *interacting* variables. This relationship will be explored in more detail in the approach to inquiry discussed in Chapter 2, as well as in the preliminary findings in Chapter 3.

Chapter Overview

This first chapter has presented an Introduction to the inquiry, framing the research question and why it is important to public administration.

Chapter 2 presents the Methodology or approach to inquiry, which is designed to answer the principal research question: *How can we reformulate the public administrator role conceptualization to provide a better theoretical fit for democratic legitimacy in the contemporary governance context?* This chapter explicates the particular approach being used to answer the principal and supporting research questions through an interpretive deconstruction of the public administration theory literature in order to produce an ideal type model, followed by a critique of these findings in light of the contemporary governance context. Furthermore initial findings will be presented in order to frame the following chapters explicating the ideal types.

Chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6 represent the Literature Review for this inquiry. However, given the design of this inquiry, these chapters also comprise the first portion of the Findings of this inquiry: the ideal types themselves compose a theoretical model for understanding public administrator role conceptualizations and their relationship to legitimacy. In combination, these chapters present the results of the interpretive deconstruction of the literature and ideal type construction steps of the analysis. Chapter 3 describes the concepts that impact theoretical role conceptualizations and explains why each concept is important and how they fit together in several coherent sets or “traditions” of public administration. Chapters 4, 5, and 6 present the ideal types of the three traditions that emerged in this re-reading of the literature, along with their corresponding role conceptualizations of *Bureaucrat*, *Entrepreneur*, and *Steward*.

Chapter 7 presents the second portion of the Findings of this inquiry in the form of critical analyses of the three ideal types. In this chapter, the ideal types are compared to one another using mutual critiques found in the literature, with case study vignettes to illustrate.

Chapter 8 presents the third portion of the Findings of this inquiry. First, the manner in which the ideal types have been integrated or conciliated by key theorists in the past is discussed. Reflecting on the limitations of this approach, the possibility that the ideal types represent either a developmental path or dialectical synthesis is then explored.

Chapter 9 presents the fourth and last portion of the Findings of this inquiry in the form of Conclusions about how a reformulated role conceptualization might better achieve legitimacy within the contemporary governance context. The meanings of legitimacy used throughout this inquiry include: “reasonable; logically correct; justifiable; or conforming to or in accordance with established rules, standards, principles” (Neufeldt, 1996, p. 772). It is not meant to infer its legal meaning. Therefore, hypothetical fit considers what is most likely to be deemed reasonable and appropriate given the structural and normative demands of the contemporary governance context. A description of this context is drawn from secondary empirical studies exploring network governance, globalization, policy networks, privatization, and the like.

Chapter 10 presents Implications, exploring how the Findings and Conclusions of the inquiry might impact public administration theory, empirical research, pedagogy, and practice.

CHAPTER 2: APPROACH TO INQUIRY

This chapter explicates the particular approach being used to answer the principal and supporting research questions. As an introduction, it must be noted that this is an unconventional inquiry in a number of ways, which will be reiterated along the way to emphasize the approach being used in hopes of avoiding misunderstanding. As an overview, the inquiry first completes an interpretive deconstruction of the public administration theory literature in order to understand in detail the various meanings attributed to the concept of legitimacy and the appropriate ways in which to achieve it. This means that the body of work of particular scholars (e.g. Simon, Waldo, or Farmer), collected approaches (e.g. New Public Management, New Public Administration, or New Public Service), and theories (e.g. managerialism or professionalism) are all broken down into parts in order to re-conceptualize how important concepts are related using legitimacy as the organizing idea. These “parts” are statements found within texts that pertain to achieving legitimacy through various prescriptions for practice and role conceptualizations. While these quotes are taken out of the context of a particular text, they are not taken out of the context of public administration theory. In this way, specific authorship is not the focus in the initial interpretation. Rather, the language used in the field to describe and prescribe is under consideration.

This is a rather unconventional manner in which to review literature, and yet it is one which enables disaggregation of ideas from preconceived labels such as author or doctrine in order to reorganize them according to mutually exclusive understandings of legitimacy. This approach was chosen to meet the challenge to “make sense of this seemingly littered landscape of intellectual fragments that, taken together, today calls itself ‘public administration theory’” (Stillman, 1991, p. 174). Indeed, from the complexity of functions alone, Waldo asserts, “What kind of enterprise is education for public service? The answer must be, above all, that it is a

confusing and controversial enterprise... No single, agreed, and authoritative definition of Public Administration is possible” (Waldo, 1980, p. 58).

The means of achieving legitimacy described in the literature point to a variety of elements that contribute to role conceptualization: the assumed governance context; political ontology; political authority and scope of action; formulations of responsibility and accountability; associated decision making rationality; and associated organizing style. Together, these elements formulate a prescribed pattern or *tradition* of public administration. For each element, a variety of meanings are attributed to the concept, along with varying prescriptions for what is best employed to achieve legitimacy. The interpretations of these meanings are used to construct logically coherent sets or *traditions*, each of which prescribes an *ideal type* role conceptualization. As Waldo suggests, “No doubt something is gained in understanding by ‘ideal-typing and classifying” (Waldo, 1988, p. 931). Specifically, this typology is used as the basis for a critical analysis of role conceptualizations in the contemporary governance context. Within this critique, several analyses are used to consider: (1) the traditions and their ideal type role conceptualizations; (2) varying approaches by scholars to integrate or conciliate these traditions and ideal types; and (3) novel ways to interpret the traditions and their ideal type role conceptualizations in developmental or dialectic relationship. It should be noted that in the second step, the ideas of specific scholars are re-integrated from their previous disaggregated form used to develop the traditions and ideal types.

Each of these steps within the inquiry is explicated in more detail below. But first, the epistemological foundation on which this approach sits is described.

Methodological Perspective

The fate of an epoch which has eaten of the tree of knowledge is that it must know that we cannot learn the meaning of the world from the results of its analysis, be it ever so perfect; it must rather be in a position to create this meaning itself. It must recognize that general views of life and the universe can never

be the products of increasing empirical knowledge, and that the highest ideals, which move us most forcefully, are always formed only in the struggle with other ideals which are just as sacred to others as ours are to us. (Weber, 1949, p. 57)

It is well-noted in public administration and throughout the social sciences more generally that the methodology and methods chosen for an inquiry should be driven by the research question itself (Bailey, 1992; Fischer, 2003; Lieberman, 1992; Trochim, 2004; Waldo, 1984). *What* and *how* questions tend to be deductive and output related, whereas *who* and *why* tend to be inductive input questions. These two types of questions tend to differ in favored ontological and epistemological approaches, with the former lending themselves more to the positivist model of science (Raadschelders, 1999). In application to research, ontology infers methodology while epistemology pertains to methods. Methodology is prior to method and more fundamental; it provides the philosophical and ontological foundation for specific methods of inquiry or knowledge acquisition. For example, the *methodology* of phenomenology conceives reality to be a social construction formed through intersubjective meaning. Associated *methods* include: conceptual analysis; linguistic or discourse analysis; hermeneutics; historical method; critical method, literary philosophy; and formal logic. To determine the appropriate methodology and method for this inquiry, its purpose must first be considered.

The purpose of this inquiry is complex. It has been noted that there are a number of different types of scholar: the *discoverer* of truth (using insight and power of reason); the *systemetizer* (producing frameworks and textbooks); the *contributor* (fine-tuning, testing, and generalizing theory); the *fighter* for truth (competing for truth claims using rational evidence); the *eclectic* and the *historian* of knowledge—“a mere gatherer of the results of other people’s thinking and observation, usually interspersing his information with ‘impartial’ evaluative judgments” (Znaniecki, 1940, p. 149). Finally, there is the *disseminator* of knowledge who works through education or the popularization of knowledge.

This work is ultimately one of systematization intended to impact knowledge dissemination through pedagogy and professional socialization. “Systematization is the most important prerequisite of the scholar’s teaching role, an essential condition without which he could not adequately perform his duty as... ‘professor’ toward his ‘students’” (Znaniecki, 1940, p. 125). However, it is also eclectic in that it gathers the thinking of others and offers critique. Finally, it seeks to consider existing information in a new way, which is a process of discovery that challenges “every kind of dogmatism” (Znaniecki, 1940, p. 179).

The notion of discovery leads to an important characteristic of this inquiry. This inquiry uses the logic of discovery rather than the logic of proof to formulate theoretical constructs that will be useful to public administration research, among its other purposes. It is designed to *build* theory, not to *test* it for validation or revision. This differentiation emphasizes that theory is a critical element of social science in that it frames what is placed under inquiry as well as the manner in which is considered. Theories bring together information or knowledge about a chosen phenomenon in a systematic fashion, providing a starting point for research. Theories may be derived from philosophical reasoning or imagining about the world, or from empirical evidence actually observed (Waldo, 1984). From either source, theory identifies constructs that will be useful to scientific inquiry, specifies relationships among constructs, and establishes the ability to falsify anticipated implications (Doty & Glick, 1994). While these characteristics may sound positivist in nature, they also pertain to interpretive and critical research, particularly when theories are used as a basis for comparison to empirical cases, or used to develop propositions for empirical observation. Because constructs, the building blocks of theory, are conceptual abstractions of empirical phenomena, they are useful in explaining, predicting, understanding, and critiquing what is observed in scientific research. They are “nets cast to catch what we call ‘the world’” (Popper, 2002, p. 65). However, as could be interpreted from Popper’s phrasing, they are socially constructed nets designed to capture the world in a particular way.

Theory, rather than being something that is merely academically interesting or perhaps even entertaining, is *needed* when practitioners get stuck (Forester, 1999). When confronted with new situations, new conditions, new definitions, new standards, and the like, new knowledge is necessary (Znaniecki, 1940). In other words, diagnosis and problem solving rely on theory. Yet, as noted in a well-known sociology of knowledge, “especially vague are still most studies dealing with the intellectual activity of theoretic exploration, although every important step in the progress of modern science is ascribed to it...” (Znaniecki, 1940, p. 168). This inductive and imaginative process is crucial to the development of scientific study, yet there are few guidelines on how to conduct non-empirical theoretical investigation. Therefore, development of an approach for this inquiry and even the appropriate chapter organization and naming conventions for its presentation were not rote. It required searching in other disciplines and the identification of methodologies that came long before the contemporary focus on empirical hypothesis testing.

The theory being built in this inquiry is designed to help answer questions about *why*, rather than *what*. The data used to inductively generate answers to these questions is not empirical evidence of social phenomena, but rather cultural evidence found in the theoretical texts of public administration. The meaning of such texts has been interpreted in previous inquiries, such as those presented in *The Language of Public Administration: Bureaucracy, Modernity, and Postmodernity* (Farmer, 1995) and *Legitimacy in Public Administration: A Discourse Analysis* (McSwite, 1997). This approach has also been used to generate typologies of organization, public administrator role conception, and legitimacy (Kass & Catron, 1990; McSwite, 1997; G. Morgan, 1986).

This inquiry interprets much of the same literature to construct a typology that is inclusive of these elements as well as others. A re-reading of this literature is not meant to be arrogant or audacious in any manner, but rather to obtain a first-hand understanding of the characteristics and assumptions being made about the appropriate role of public administration

and its practitioners in society in order to generate a comprehensive typology. Typification is a key process in sense-making (Husserl, 1982). Types differentiate and group phenomena based on some kind of criteria or frame. “It is only by means of demarcation or framing that the human mind can isolate phenomena and acquire knowledge about them” (Rutgers, 2001, p. 5). In fact, *what is*, is in large part constituted by such frameworks and the concepts that compose them. As noted in a classic public administration text, “The truth is, there is no such thing as ‘pure fact’ divorced from all concepts and theory” (Waldo, 1984, p. 170).

This stance clearly infers a post-positivist, social constructionist ontological position. In other words, this inquiry assumes that what we perceive to be reality is a social construction (Berger & Luckmann, 1966). This does not deny the existence of an objective reality, but rather accepts that we can only perceive it, describe it, and make sense of it in ways that are framed by socially-assigned meanings and interpretations (Glassner, 2000). This is mutually exclusive to the positivist claim that theory-free observation of an objective truth is possible. Furthermore, it assumes that social meanings tend to function as provisional end points in any given time or place, and therefore compete for primacy in an ongoing process of revision (Glassner, 2000). In this way, epistemology and ontology are mutually reinforcing—reality is formed by the making of meaning, and the making of meaning is the formation of knowledge.

Positivism requires a level of certainty that constructionist assumptions deny is possible, particularly in the social context. “Strictly and exclusively empirical analysis can provide a solution only where it is a question of a means adequate to the realization of an absolutely unambiguously given end” (Weber, 1949, p. 26). Public administration is quite to the contrary: “Administrative study... is concerned primarily with human beings, a type of being characterized by thinking and valuing. Thinking implies creativeness, free will. Valuing implies morality, conceptions of right and wrong. It is submitted that the established techniques of science are inapplicable to thinking and valuing human beings” (Waldo, 1984, p. 171).

In an empirical context where multiple role conceptions exist and compete for primacy, it is clear that there is no way to simply record what *is* and try to make sense of it. Even empirical studies of public service motivation among public administrators deduce role conception from pre-determined concepts. Furthermore, it is impossible to determine which role conception is best or should be adopted from a strictly positive empirical stance. “Normative standards of value can and must be the objects of *dispute* in a discussion of a problem of social policy because the problem lies in the domain of general *cultural* values... The broader its cultural significance, the less subject it is to a single unambiguous answer on the basis of the data of empirical sciences and the greater the role played by value-ideas” (Weber, 1949, p. 56). Certainly, the issue of democratic legitimacy has the very broadest cultural significance, and demands consideration of multiple normative values.

Chosen Methodology

As might be predicted from the quote offered above to capture the methodological perspective of this inquiry, the approach chosen is not only post-positivist in nature, but is modeled after Max Weber’s approach to both methodology and method. Weber provides a methodology for the social sciences and a method for theory building that is well-suited to the topic at hand. Recognizing that his approach to inquiry and theory building does not necessitate his findings, it remains worthwhile to note that his object of study is quite similar to that of the present inquiry. In one of his most well-known sociological studies, Weber asserted that “according to the kind of legitimacy which is claimed, the type of obedience, the kind of administrative staff developed to guarantee it, and the mode of exercising authority, will differ fundamentally. Equally fundamental is the variation in effect. Hence, it is useful to classify the types of domination according to the kind of claim to legitimacy typically made by each” (1968, p. 213). While this inquiry is not focused solely on types of domination and obedience, the spirit of Weber’s study of *Economy and Society* is clearly echoed. An argument is being constructed

that asserts public administration role conceptualization is linked to different meanings of legitimacy; that there is a relationship between role conceptualization and a variety of concepts and social structures deemed important to public administration; and ultimately that there is only one logic of legitimacy being described that transcends domination. Therefore, it makes sense to use a contemporary formulation of Weber's approach.

As noted in the brief discussion of the impetus of this study in Chapter 1, the purpose of this inquiry is to develop a theoretical foundation for future empirical study of the public administrator role conception and its relationship to democratic legitimacy in the contemporary governance process. This object of inquiry was chosen based on participant observation of conflicting meanings of legitimate role conception among various social actors in local government. Rather than jumping directly into empirical study, a more robust theoretical foundation was desired. By robust, it is meant that the model should be as comprehensive as possible, well-explicated, and result from a well-designed, logical, and systematic approach rather than simplistic or assumed normative preferences. Furthermore, this theoretical foundation is based on ideations of democratic legitimacy as the organizing concept for ideal type role conceptualizations. This linkage to political philosophy promises to enable future empirical study to exceed what have been called "under-theorized" ideas about the social role of public administration (Catlaw, 2006a). It creates a view that considers both the individual role of the administrator and the role of public administration in society.

The manner in which administrator role and the social structures of governance interrelate requires an approach that considers both social *action* and social *structure*, in addition to the manner in which both are *socially constructed*. Weber's ideal type approach accomplishes just this sort of integration. Considering first the notion of social construction, Weber's methodology "synthesizes aspects of the social-scientific analysis that are central to the critiques of positivism which dominate today's discussions" (Hekman, 1983b, p. 1). In fact, social

constructionist thought has roots in Weberian sociology, phenomenology, and pragmatism (Maines, 2000). It also shares characteristics with hermeneutics and critical theory. Hermeneutics, phenomenology, and critical theory are three notable attempts to restructure social and political inquiry by challenging the positivist claim to value-free knowledge (Bernstein, 1976).

Hermeneutics and other forms of linguistic analysis enable “discourse where we are much more profoundly aware of the complex ways in which linguistic practices, concepts, and institutions shape political and social reality” (Bernstein, 1976, p. 113). Phenomenology provides an epistemology for existential and constructionist ontological challenges to positivism. It suggests a different vision of being-in-the-world as a subjective, related, interpretive experience that cannot be disaggregated to create independent objectivity. Critical theory seeks to not only unveil assumed or hidden meanings of social practices, but to stimulate change that will achieve emancipation from all forms of domination. Together, these approaches to inquiry suggest that through combined subjective experience and theoretical critique of the meanings of social practices and texts, we can produce knowledge and add to a discourse that can stimulate social change for the better. They attempt to generate more robust theory by synthesizing the many dialectics of knowledge: objective/subjective; theoretical/practical; behavior/meaning; empirical/normative. While findings are ultimately expressions of a normative preference, it is an opinion formed through complex theoretical inquiry.

In an extensive analysis of Weber’s methodology, it has been cogently argued that he succeeds in synthesizing important subjective and objective critiques of positivism. In the subjective camp are phenomenology and ordinary language analysis. In the objective camp are structuralism and critical theory. While theorists in both camps fault Weber for a variety of failures, Hekman argues that Weber’s methodology and *ideal type* method meet many of the expectations of these critiques of positivism, providing a unique synthesis of subjective and objective approaches:

Examination of the subjective critiques leads to the conclusion that these approaches provide a clear understanding of the nature of the subjective meaning in social analysis, and thus that these approaches contribute substantially to the construction of a postpositivist synthesis. However, both approaches fail to provide a basis for structural analysis. The conclusion derived from analysis of the objective critiques, on the other hand, is that although they expose the needs for structural and/or critical analysis of social forms, which is rooted in an understanding of what constitutes objectivity in the social sciences, the basis for that objectivity presented by each approach is logically flawed. Thus, rather than provide substantive contributions to the postpositivist synthesis, these approaches succeed only in defining a necessary element of that synthesis. (1983b, p. 64)

In synthesizing the various critiques of positivism, Weber simultaneously succeeds in designing an approach that is useful in both the study of social action and social structure. Action is thought to be linked to subjective meaning, and structural forms are a consequence of social action (Hekman, 1983a). On the one hand, ideal types enable consideration of things like alternative meanings of important theoretical concepts or alternative motivations of social actors. On the other hand, they enable analysis of associated or resulting social structures. In this way, an ideal type can describe a role conceptualization as well as an approach to governance or an organizational form. Such a unified approach to the complex problems of social science provides a desirable connection between interpretive and critical logics. As an example, Anthony Giddens is an advocate of a theoretical synthesis of the structural analysis of social formation and explanation of the subjective meanings of human action (Giddens, 1977). This tandem usefulness is a uniquely qualified approach to inquiry in public administration, enabling a simultaneous consideration of social action, social structures, and their interrelatedness.

Weber's methodology is aligned with that described in the Methodological Perspective of this inquiry above. In his view, the role of theory in science is to help make sense of what is observed (Weber, 1949). In other words, it is used to frame observation and analysis and to evaluate what is found. Weber insists that theory cannot be derived simply from empirical

observation of facts. It must be built using value judgments. He notes that sociology and political science arose in response to practical considerations based on value judgments about social conditions. Even while promoting logic and systematic approaches in the social sciences, Weber critiques positivism as an impossible goal, planting seeds of what would later be called the social constructionist school of thought. He concludes that an “objective” analysis of cultural events is meaningless: “We are *cultural beings*, endowed with the capacity and the will to take a deliberate attitude towards the world and to lend it *significance*. Whatever this significance may be, it will lead us to judge certain phenomena of human existence in its light and to respond to them as being (positively or negatively) meaningful... All knowledge of cultural reality, as may be seen, is always knowledge from *particular points of view*” (Weber, 1949, p. 81).

One of the difficulties of pinning down Weber’s methodology is that his language often sounds quite positivist in nature. He seems to vacillate in his thoughts about scientific objectivity. On the one hand, he believes practical value judgments are *fundamental* to science. “An *attitude of moral indifference* has no connection with *scientific ‘objectivity’*” (Weber, 1949, p. 60). On the contrary, he asserts values direct scientific inquiries and the evaluation of findings, and exist as unavoidable presuppositions: “The *objective* validity of all empirical knowledge rests exclusively upon the ordering of the given reality according to categories which are *subjective* in a specific sense, namely, in that they present the *presuppositions* of our knowledge and are based on the presupposition of the *value* of those *truths* which empirical knowledge alone is able to give us” (Weber, 1949, p. 110). In fact, he suggests “the discursive nature of our knowledge, i.e., the fact that we comprehend reality only through a chain of intellectual modifications... demands the use of such concepts” (Weber, 1949, p. 94).

Furthermore, Weber almost prophetically points toward an important element of the post-positivist critique. Long before the term *reification* came into use, he noted that phenomena perceived through value judgments masquerade as facts and must be analyzed with a critical

view: “The specific function of science, it seems to me, is... to ask questions about these things which convention makes self-evident” (Weber, 1949, p. 13).

This concern seems to lead Weber to later assert that the point of “objectivity” in science is to endeavor to achieve clarity on what is *value* and what is an empirical *fact*, reporting both as different things. “Neither of these two types of the analysis of reality has any necessary logical relationship with the other” (Weber, 1949, p. 77). Given the limitations of scientific language at the turn of the last century and the predominance of constructivist commentary by Weber, it is reasonable to conclude that when he refers to the “truths of empirical knowledge” and “facts opposed to values,” he is acknowledging that there is a “real” experience of the world, and that phenomenological experience is crucial to knowledge building. However, he is fully aware that we are only able to perceive that experience and think about these experiences in socially mediated ways.

On balance, Weber seems to take a moderate epistemological position, insisting that the task of science must include empirical experience understood through interpretive and critical analysis: “Philosophical disciplines can go further and lay bare the ‘meaning’ of evaluations, i.e., their ultimate meaningful structure and their meaningful consequences...” (Weber, 1949, p. 18). The role of theory in science is to help make sense of what is observed. Yet all analytical ideas used in theory building are presuppositions; they are abstract syntheses of traits common to numerous concrete phenomena. Abstract ideas about phenomena offer ideal pictures of these events. Conceptual patterns of these ideas describe complex relationships, but in a manner that is “arrived at by the analytical accentuation of certain elements of reality” (Weber, 1949, p. 90). That which is accentuated is determined by values. Weber believes that such theoretical discussions are useful to social science when they include the following functions:

1. Clarification and explication of value positions in internally consistent axioms, similar to logic.

2. Deduction of implications that follow from value axioms, using logic and empirical observations.
3. Determination of the factual consequences of a particular practical evaluation based on the value axiom.

This type of analysis identifies culturally relevant social problems for investigation, and evaluates socially relevant findings as measured by ethical principles, cultural ideals, and philosophies.

Chosen Method

Based on this phenomenological, constructionist methodology, Weber devises a particular interpretive and critical method for the social sciences and applies it to sociological inquiry. This method is called *ideal type*, but in its explication, he goes to some lengths to express what it is *not*. He asserts that sense-making conceptual structures are frequently used by social scientists without clear and intentional formulation. To do so unconsciously is unacceptable for a scientist: “the inevitable consequence is either that he consciously or unconsciously uses other similar concepts without formulating them verbally and elaborating them logically or that he remains stuck in the realm of the vaguely ‘felt’” (Weber, 1949, p. 94). In Weber’s view, this approach to theoretical constructs is less than adequate. Typologies are useful only to the degree that they are inclusive of many conceptual relationships that are of cultural significance, as well as comprehensive and systematic in their exposition.

This concern about thin theoretical typologies is common. Another sociologist elucidates this assessment of conceptual categorizations in a hierarchical classification of typologies. Sorokin believes integration means more than merely placing together. He identifies four approaches to the grouping of concepts: (1) spacial characteristics, including time and place; (2) externally applied or insignificant characteristics; (3) causal/functional relationships; and (4) internal logico-meaningful similarities (Sorokin, 1957). These approaches form a hierarchy, with only the latter two forming true integrated systems, providing the “*means of ordering into comprehensible systems infinitely numerous and complex phenomena of the sociocultural world*”

(Sorokin, 1957, p. 9). Applying this model to classifications of public administration theory, the historical approach is spatial and includes many types of difference in any given grouping by decade or era. Classifications such as traditional, orthodox, New Public Management, New Public Administration, and New Public Service are groupings without mutual exclusivity as well as with internal contradictions, and are therefore more external in nature. Dichotomies like politics/administration describe a causal/functional relationship. Classifications such as Federalist and Anti-federalist that group ideas based on fundamental assumptions about democratic legitimacy or Rationalist and Non-Rationalist that group theories based on fundamental ontological assumptions are logico-meaningful.

Many “typologies” continue to receive contemporary critique because such parsimonious frameworks cannot hope to capture the full complexity of social phenomena (Doty & Glick, 1994). In this view, they can be useful only as taxonomical guides for classification. Indeed, *taxonomies* and *classification* schemes only serve to categorize phenomena into mutually exclusive and exhaustive sets based on defined characteristics. There may be little or no theoretical relationship among the characteristics themselves. *Typologies*, on the other hand, offer a theoretical argument about the internal consistency of a set of relationships among conceptual characteristics or constructs. Each ideal type in the model represents a unique combination of characteristics that are believed to be linked to various outcomes. In sum, typologies meet the three criteria of theories: (1) identification of constructs; (2) specification of relationships among constructs; and (3) the ability to falsify anticipated implications (Doty & Glick, 1994). Therefore, the typology becomes useful for theory building and later empirical testing.

In regard to theory, typologies offer both grand and middle range theoretical arguments (Doty & Glick, 1994). On the grand scale, the typology in this inquiry makes a theoretical argument that role conceptualization is linked to democratic legitimacy as it is understood by the field of public administration. At the middle range, this typology argues that a number of

concepts or elements deemed important to public administration are related to how role conceptualization is formulated. Varied meanings of each concept interact to produce unique role conceptualizations. These unique role conceptualizations are believed to produce different types of legitimacy, each of which has implications for public administrator role performance. The nature of those implications can be imagined hypothetically, but ultimately should be considered through the formulation of hypotheses that can be explored empirically. For example, if a citizen expects a type of legitimacy that is different from the type being performed by the administrator, then a negative assessment of performance will likely result—does this play out in experience?

Thus, the theoretical arguments provided by the role conceptualization typology provide a theoretical foundation for future research. Ideal types are used “not as an end but as a *means*” (Weber, 1949, p. 92). The ideal type can be used as a means to deduce implications of its presence (or lack thereof) using both mental experiments of logic and empirical observations. Weber asserts, “This procedure can be indispensable for heuristic as well as expository purposes. The ideal typical concept will help to develop our skill in imputation in *research*: it is no ‘hypothesis’ but it offers guidance to the construction of hypotheses” (Weber, 1949, p. 90). Once such research hypotheses are formulated, ideal types provide strong “conceptual instruments for *comparison* with and the *measurement* of reality” (Weber, 1949, p. 97). These comparisons help us to see what is different in order to ask questions like “*Why?*” and “*What are the implications?*”

Weber’s ideal types are conceptual abstractions of empirical reality: “It is not a *description* of reality but it aims to give unambiguous means of expression to such a description... In its conceptual purity, this mental construct (*Gedankenbild*) cannot be found empirically anywhere in reality. It is a *utopia*” (Weber, 1949, p. 90). In fact, many such utopias can be described and claim to be a representation of the meaning of a thing. Many meaningful traits from empirical reality can be brought together into a unified ideal construct based on different points of view, “For those phenomena which interest us as cultural phenomena are

interesting to us with respect to very different kinds of evaluative ideas to which we relate them” (Weber, 1949, p. 91).

Both what are considered to be interesting phenomena and their essential tendencies are socially constructed. However, they must have reference to the empirical world and subjective experience of it: “It is a matter here of constructing relationships which our imagination accepts as plausibly motivated and hence as ‘objectively possible’ and which appear as *adequate* from the nomological standpoint” (Weber, 1949, p. 92). For example, in the present inquiry, ideas about legitimacy are thought to have implications for a variety of concepts public administration holds to be important according to its theoretical literature. The relationships among these concepts must be well-argued, plausible in comparison to experience, and adequately comprehensive in expressing causal relationships.

Ideal types focus attention on the most significant features of social phenomena according to a specific frame of reference in order to make sense of them even given their vast complexity. Therefore, an ideal type has three distinguishing characteristics: (1) it must be focused on a specific social phenomenon; (2) it must have a specified frame of reference; and (3) the elements of the phenomenon considered must be of cultural significance. In this inquiry, the social phenomenon in question is public administration role conceptualization; the frame of reference is democratic legitimacy; and the elements considered are those that are presented in the literature as significant to role conceptualization in the culture of public administration theory: the assumed governance context; political ontology; political authority and scope of action; formulations of responsibility and accountability; associated decision making rationality; and associated organizing style. While this may seem like an overwhelming set of elements, any “end” that is pursued and the activity used in its pursuit should “be incorporated into an axiological and normative system organizing conceptually all the values and activities which are

or will be connected with it in the active experience of all the people who are or will be involved in the realization of your plan” (Znaniecki, 1940, p. 86).

Because the term *type* is used in common language, Weber makes note that there are many terms used in the conceptual characterization of things, including *typical*, *type*, and *kind*. In Weber’s terminology, the *generic* refers to concepts that are considered essential or causally linked to a given phenomenon, and are categories of *kind*. The *genetic* refers to the specific meaning of those elements in a given type. For example, Hood and Jackson (1991) create a typology for the “DNA,” or genetic code of administrative arguments, which includes philosophies, doctrines, and justifications for administrative principles. Thus, an ideal type is composed of generic kinds of elemental concepts which have a genetic meaning unique to the type itself. “Every *individual* ideal type comprises both *generic* and ideal-typically constructed conceptual *elements*” (Weber, 1949, p. 100). A model of two or more ideal types would share *generic* elements (kinds or categories of concepts), but not genetic meanings of those elements. Empirically, only the *generic* can be “typical” as in being present in most instances of the phenomena under consideration. The *genetic* characteristics are utopian or ideal in nature.

As applied in the present inquiry, the elements of each role conceptualization are *generic* across all three: the assumed governance context; political ontology; political authority and scope of action; formulations of responsibility and accountability; associated decision making rationality; and associated organizing style. As noted by MacIntyre, “It is not then that competing traditions do not share some standards” (1988, p. 351). It is the *meanings* given to the concepts in those elements that are *genetic*, and therefore substantively unique in each. Therefore, “that upon which they agree is insufficient to resolve those disagreements” (MacIntyre, 1988, p. 351). In other words, the meanings assigned to each element of the role conceptualizations identified in this inquiry represent a competing genetic code for each one. Thus, there is a genetic code for Bureaucrat which is fundamentally different from the genetic codes for Entrepreneur and

Steward, based on accentuation of the point of view on legitimacy. This is similar to Sorokin's ideas about logically coherent meanings. He suggests that the most complex sort of integration, *logico-meaningful*, is based on consistency of identity, which is formed by the "*central meaning, idea, or mental bias that permeates all the logically related fragments*" (Sorokin, 1957, p. 11).

Further explication of this notion of "logical" relationships is helpful, given a tendency to link logic with the formal logic and syllogisms of positivism. First, we must recall Weber's idea that value positions can be grouped in internally consistent axioms, similar to logic. The point here is the notion of consistency or coherency. Such coherence "refers to the internal consistency and full articulation of the value judgments and action principles of an ideology" (Bobrow & Dryzek, 1987, p. 153). This approach to typification coherently links normative principles, values, and action (Dryzek, 1990; Fischer, 1995; Paris & Reynolds, 1983). As noted earlier, it further enables linkage to social structures. Therefore, to construct ideal types, value judgments are used to perceive, clarify, and explicate internally consistent value axioms or principles characteristic of various elements (Weber, 1949). In this use, *logic* is systematic reasoning which describes relationships among ideas or the system of principles underlying any art or science (Neufeldt, 1996). Logic does not necessarily separate fact from value: "The task of philosophy is not stubbornly to play the one against the other, but to foster a mutual critique and thus, if possible, to prepare in the intellectual realm the reconciliation of the two in reality" (Horkheimer, 1947, p. 174).

Given this explanation of what an ideal type and typology *is*, attention must turn to how they are constructed. First, the elements from which an ideal type is constructed must be considered culturally significant according to the social actors involved. "An ideal type is formed by the one-sided *accentuation* of one or more points of view and by the synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete, more or less present and occasionally absent *concrete individual* phenomena, which are arranged according to those one-sidedly emphasized viewpoints into a unified

analytical construct (Gedankenbild)” (Weber, 1949, p. 90). It is the *idea* of a possible reality expressed as a generic conceptual pattern of essential characteristics and their genetic meanings. Recalling from above, by *generic*, Weber means important, culturally significant, essential characteristics. By *essential*, he means that they pertain to causal relationships among characteristics. By *important* and *culturally significant*, he means something that matters to the social actors themselves. By *genetic*, he means unique to the type. Second, the manner in which these elements are related is explicated. These relationships must be relevant to the topic of inquiry, and logically connected according to the meanings derived from the social actors.

Unfortunately, neither my own reading nor a more informed sociological study of Weber’s methodology can discern the method by which cultural significance is determined. “Weber is not clear on how ‘cultural significance’ is defined within a given society. Is it defined in terms of what a majority of the members of the society consider to be significant or by what the social scientist who studies the society deems significant? Should social scientists, studying a foreign or historical society, define ‘cultural significance’ in their own terms or in the terms employed by the society under investigation? Weber offers no satisfactory answers to these questions” (Hekman, 1983b, p. 28). Given Weber’s overwhelming focus on the meaning held by social actors, this inquiry interprets cultural significance to mean the concepts chosen by the culture of public administration, as revealed in its theoretical texts, noting that such “revelation” is mediated by the interpreter’s subjective understanding. Because part of this perspective has been formed in participant observation of practice, this interpretation is a work of practical theory, taking place “at the tangled overlap” of a practitioner’s thoughtful reflection on action and a scholar’s deconstruction and critique of recursive social life (Miller & King, 1998, p. 57).

This approach to interpretation is aligned with the method recommended by Alfred Schutz, a prominent phenomenological sociologist who extends Weber’s methodology. For example, he “details and organizes the steps in construction of the social scientist’s ideal-typical

construct; and in doing so he fills one of the most significant gaps in Weber's account: specification of the role of the theoretical and methodological presuppositions of the social-scientific community" (Hekman, 1983b, p. 76). Specifically, the ideal types should be based on the common sense understandings of the social actors. The social scientist then uses these meanings in the construction of types. Thus, the ideal types are second-order constructs that are impacted by three factors: (1) the personal values of the scientist who defines the problem and parameters of investigation; (2) discriminating inclusion from the web of relevant ideas and facts; and (3) the constraints of the dominant presuppositions of the social-scientific community (Schutz, 1967).

To illustrate how the entire ideal type method plays out, it is useful to use an existing example. One of Weber's most well-known application of the ideal type method is to the notion of the state (Weber, 1954). He asserts that concepts of the state "are all bound together by an idea, namely, the belief in the actual or normative validity of rules and of the authority-relationships of some human beings towards others" (Weber, 1949, p. 99). In his view, on the question of the state, authority is the most important and culturally significant characteristic. Of course, we are uncertain how he arrives at this determination. Regardless of this deficiency of explication, he uses authority as his organizing concept. To construct his ideal type model, he went on to identify the unique or genetic manifestations of authority and the manner in which authority relates to other important characteristics or essential elements of the state—the type of legitimacy which is claimed, the type of obedience, the kind of administrative staff developed to guarantee it, and the mode of exercising authority. Upon completion of the ideal type model, Weber uses both mental experiments of logic and empirical observations of actual cases to consider the divergence and convergence with the ideal types and the implications of these relationships. In essence, he thinks through "what a behavior pattern or thought pattern (e.g., a philosophical system) would be like if it possessed completely rational, empirical and logical 'correctness' and 'consistency'" (Weber,

1949, p. 42). In his study, he considers what a completely bureaucratic society looks like, carried to its logical ends, describing the likely implications for humanity. This inquiry will conduct a similar but less extensive mental experiment, considering the implications of various approaches to legitimacy found in the culture of public administration theory.

This description suggests a two-step approach to complete the method. In the first step, the ideal types are constructed. In the second step, their application to the world is considered either conceptually or through empirical “hypothesis testing,” albeit in a phenomenological mode. In the case of this inquiry, a Weberian ideal type model of public administrator role conceptualizations are first constructed through the analysis of culturally significant elements. Following this process, the ideal types are considered as problems of legitimacy in the contemporary governance context. In the second step, both theoretical analysis and empirical information in the form of case vignettes and secondary descriptions from literature are used. In combination, the two steps answer the principal research question:

How can we reformulate the public administrator role conceptualization to provide a better theoretical fit for democratic legitimacy in the contemporary governance context?

Step 1: Generating Ideal Types

For the first step of generating ideal types uses a *logico-meaningful* interpretive approach to construct *ideal- types* from the role conceptualizations described in public administration theory literature (Sorokin, 1957; Weber, 1949). In this method, the central meaning or mental biases of each role conceptualization are sought in order to craft a consistent and integrated whole from logically related elements (Sorokin, 1957). In other words, the *generic* elements of the type are identified and the *genetic* codes of various role conceptualizations are explicated (Weber, 1949). This step of the methodology answers the following research questions:

What are the key elements of public administration theory that contribute to role conceptualization? [What are the culturally significant generic elements?]

How do these elements coalesce into varying coherent sets based on the concept of democratic legitimacy? [What are the logically consistent genetic meanings of those elements?]

These questions are answered by exploring theories of public administration as explicated in principal texts of the field, as well as ventures into related fields of political philosophy and economy, public policy, planning, organizational behavior, management theory, sociology, theology, and the sociology of religion. This breadth is needed as democratic legitimacy is one of those “borderland problems” like a sociology of a discipline or concept whereby mutual dependencies between social systems and forms of philosophy, art, or science need be considered (Znaniecki, 1940). While in no way suggesting that he would agree with the approach of this inquiry, La Porte (1994) notes that higher level theoretical frameworks are needed for descriptive understanding, analytical insight, and prediction in the intensifying postmodern condition. Even though mid-range theories may be improving, relative ignorance seems to be growing. Indeed, it has been noted that relying on one specific theory or text is insufficient. “Relying on literature is not altogether satisfactory: Authors are not always clear or consistent, and differing interpretations of their views are possible. A thorough reconsideration ought to include a sociological analysis of thought and practice” (Lynn, 2001, p. 145). This approach pulls the viewfinder back to consider broad cultural patterns (Luton, 1999). To accommodate a higher level of analysis as well as a more sociological approach, the topical literatures explored include: political economy; contemporary governance; administrative legitimacy; responsibility and accountability; decision making rationalities; organizing style; and administrator role conception.

Similar re-readings of the field’s literature have been offered in public administration before (Catlaw, in press; McSwite, 1997; Stivers, 2000a, 2000b). Such re-interpretation is an important critical function of philosophy (Bernstein, 1991). However, in the spirit of conducting “a sociology of...,” *this step* of the inquiry endeavors to present what a given theory regards as true, without making validity judgments (Znaniecki, 1940). To do so, the hermeneutic technique

is used. "Hermeneutics concerns texts; it is concerned with interpreting, with specifying significance, with achieving intelligibility" (Farmer, 1995, p. 21). It seeks an interpretation of texts which reaches as far as possible toward the writer's meaning. This is a difficult task, as "a person who is trying to understand a text is always projecting. He projects a meaning for the text as a whole as soon as some initial meaning emerges in the text. Again, the initial meaning emerges only because he is reading the text with particular expectations in regard to a certain meaning" (Gadamer, 2004, p. 269).

To be as clear as possible given these constraints, original texts are read carefully to capture complex and sometimes contradictory meanings; the fore-projection of legitimacy is clearly presented; and allowance for an evolving understanding is given throughout text interpretation. For example, rather than accepting a second-hand interpretation of Herbert Simon's views, Simon's texts are read directly. Rather than distilling his thinking into a simple majority perspective, nuances of his stated assumptions are captured to first disaggregate mutually exclusive ideas in terms of legitimacy logic, and then gain a clearer understanding of how he blends legitimacy logics. Therefore, narrative findings are rich with quotes directly from texts, often offering exemplars that are surprising based on the source. Rather than accepting a Constitutional definition of legitimacy as the fore-projection, an open stance to multiple interpretations of legitimacy is adopted by considering it one tradition among a possible many, while still using the concept of legitimacy as an organizing framework to avoid arbitrary interpretations. Furthermore, rather than adopting typical categorizations of public administration theory as technical versus normative, for example, a very different understanding of shared conceptions of legitimacy is allowed to emerge. Finally, I endeavor to present traditions of which I am not fond in their own terms, while acknowledging my own bias in my conclusions. I am a proponent of one specific tradition, but that should not stop me from seeking to understand and explicate the others. "It is not at all a matter of securing ourselves against the tradition that speaks

out of the text then, but, on the contrary, of excluding everything that could hinder us from understanding it in terms of the subject matter” (Gadamer, 2004, p. 272).

Texts can come in the form of written texts, social practices, social institutions, or “other arrangements or activities...” (Farmer, 1995, p. 21). In this case, principal written texts are the object of hermeneutic consideration. Principal written texts are considered to be those which are widely used in graduate courses, frequently cited in text books and articles, commonly described as “foundational” or “re-founding” in nature, or offered by those considered to be leading theorists in the field. For example, shortly following Woodrow Wilson’s famous essay calling for the study of public administration, the field became “self-aware” as Waldo notes, producing a number of introductory texts for the endeavor (Finer, 1935, 1941; Gaus et al., 1936; Goodnow, 2003; Gulick & Urwick, 1937; Waldo, 1984; L. D. White, 1926; W. F. Willoughby, 1927; W. Wilson, 1887). In the following decades, many challenges and extensions to these early texts were offered (Appleby, 1945, 1949, 1952; Dahl, 1947; Dimock, 1936b, 1937; Friedrich, 1940; Herring, 1936; Levitan, 1943; Waldo, 1984). During the 1970s and 1980s, attempts were made to re-found the field with a New Public Administration. In an effort to respond to decades of “bureaucrat bashing,” there was a sense that to reclaim its legitimacy, both the 1968 Minnowbrook I conference and the following Blacksburg Manifesto attempted to reclaim public administration’s founding democratic principles, with echoes repeating thereafter (Frederickson, 1971; Goodsell, 1990; Hart, 1974; Kirkhart, 1971; Krislov, 1974; Marini, 1971; Marshall & White, 1990; Rohr, 1986; Wamsley et al., 1990a; O. F. White & McSwain, 1990). Similarly, a focus on ethics for discretionary action of public administrators blossomed in the 1980s (Cooper, 1991, 1994, 1998; K. G. Denhardt, 1988; Dobel, 1990; Etzioni, 1988; Fox & Cochran, 1990; Golembiewski, 1989; Gutmann & Thompson, 1997; Hart, 1984; Rohr, 1989; Terry, 1995).

Perhaps more prevalent, at least in practice, than this proposed reconfiguration has been the call for even greater scientific rigor and business-like operations, culminating in the New

Public Management movement of the late 1980s and 1990s (Hood, 1991; Lynn, 1996; Osborne & Gaebler, 1992; Simon, 1946, 1947, 1976). Most recently, theories of the New Public Service and a related transformational or facilitative role for public administration have emerged as a reaction to the New Public Management, extending the original challenges to the traditional bureaucratic and scientific approaches to public administration with postmodern and critical theory (Box, 1998; J. V. Denhardt & Denhardt, 2003; R. B. Denhardt & Grubbs, 1999; Dryzek, 1990; Forester, 1999; Fox & Miller, 1995; Harmon, 1981; C. S. King et al., 1998; C. S. King & Zanetti, 2005; McSwite, 1997, 2002; Stivers, 1994; Timney, 1998; O. F. White, 1990b; Zanetti & Carr, 1997).

By considering this broad set of literature, this inquiry adds to the body of knowledge in both major strands of administrative theory: (1) organizational theory, behavior, and management; and (2) political theory and philosophy (Simon et al., 1974; Waldo, 1984). In short, the former looks inward at the internal workings of government organizations while the latter looks outward to the external implications of its processes (Box, 2004; Frederickson, 1971). Or in other terms, a focus on organization implies government, while a focus on the public implies governance (Frederickson, 1997). Yet the two concerns are intertwined. While focusing principally on the organizational arena, a classic text from 1950 emphasizes the importance of the relationship between administration and politics, particularly in terms of the role of the administrator in the formation of policy, or “the politics of administration” (Simon et al., 1974, p. 381). Another principal text focuses primarily on these issues of political theory and philosophy, noting, “Students of public administration have visions of a Good Society, despite their occasional denials and their professional dedication to a scientific inquiry” (Waldo, 1984, p. 68). Sayre suggests that “public administration is ultimately a problem in political theory: the fundamental problem in a democracy is responsibility to popular control” (1958, p. 105).

Another perspective suggests that in considering public administration theory, one could choose to focus on any of three fundamental questions: (1) how public organizations are managed

and administered; (2) what are the sources of [governance] authority and how decisions are made; and (3) what constitutes knowledge and reality (R. B. Denhardt, 2000). The first and last issues are both valuable lenses through which to view public administration. Organizational theory and behavior is an important element of administrative theory because “it is widely assumed that the structural characteristics of organizations... influence the behavior of individuals—whether clients or bureaucrats—who interact with them” (Shafritz et al., 2004, p. 6). Thus, these structures are important both internally to public organizations and externally in the public environment. In particular, there are inherent contradictions between bureaucratic organization and democracy that many scholars seek to understand and alleviate (Lane, 1999). Management theory is also important because public organizations function in a trustee role that is similar in certain characteristics to a corporate board of directors’ responsibility to its stockholders (Cleveland, 1913).

In regard to the constitution of knowledge and reality, as a field of study, both organizational and governance arenas of inquiry are explored and shored up by various philosophies of science (J. D. White & Adams, 1994). Furthermore, how one envisages knowledge and rationality is fundamental to decision making theories used in practice (Paris & Reynolds, 1983). Thus, varying notions of rationality are key elements of practice.

For the purpose of this inquiry, my focus is on the democratic legitimacy issues surrounding authority and decision making in public administration—an approach taken by others in the past (Waldo, 1984). In fact, Appleby (1952) is emphatic that the study of public administration should have at its core the pursuit of a theory of government, noting that Wallace Sayre believes this to be the most significant drive for students in the field. “In that theory, political responsibility must find new emphasis and refinement” (Appleby, 1952, p. 254). This approach fits with the study of public administration’s role of managing processes through which societal values are defined and pursued (R. B. Denhardt, 2000). However, while this inquiry

enters into the field's discourse through the issue of democratic legitimacy, it necessarily makes forays into the other two areas because ontology and epistemology undergird decision making rationality and sources of authority and legitimacy are implicated in the structuring of governance contexts, organizations, and role conceptualizations. Therefore, the inquiry has benefit to all three areas of theoretical concern noted.

While sharing similarities in method, my approach to this literature differs from the goal in *The Language of Public Administration* to "produce a consistent and coherent account of the language of public administration" (Farmer, 1995, p. 26). I disagree that *one* language of public administration can be described. More realistically, one *approach* (in Farmer's case, discourse analysis) can hope to identify the varying and multiple languages within public administration. Indeed, I agree that "when members of the public administration community and the public policy community refer to public management, they are *not speaking the same language*, [italics added] or [sic] are they pursuing the same intellectual agenda" (Lynn, 1996, p. 86). At any given point of history in the field of public administration, a heterodoxy has existed (Lynn, 2001). Therefore, the present inquiry seeks to identify the multiple languages of public administration associated with varying logics of democratic legitimacy, thus seeking a nuanced understanding of several meanings that may have previously been grouped under various rubrics.

However, there is more to public administration theory than its logic of legitimacy. Indeed, a given logic is manifested in an array of concepts and social structures. Therefore, these varying logics of legitimacy are the basis for what I refer to as competing *traditions* of public administration. Here, a note on the use of the term *tradition* is warranted, as the usage in this inquiry is *unconventional and is likely to cause confusion for the reader during discussion of findings*. In *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?* Alasdair MacIntyre uses the term *tradition* to capture the notion of conflicting conceptions of justice and rationality that are derived from "an amalgam of social and cultural fragments inherited both from different traditions from which our

culture was originally derived (Puritan, Catholic, Jewish) and from different stages in and aspects of the development of modernity (the French Enlightenment, the Scottish Enlightenment, nineteenth-century economic liberalism, twentieth-century political liberalism)” (1988, p. 2). He argues that to choose among the claims of rival and incompatible accounts of justice, we need to understand the fullness of their meanings. This requires a revelation of the fundamental disagreements which most often “go unacknowledged, disguised by a rhetoric of consensus” (MacIntyre, 1988, p. 2).

MacIntyre organizes ideas associated with these fundamentally incommensurate claims under the banner of *tradition*, describing its particular understanding of justice and rationality, along with its originator. He argues that it may be possible to resolve the competing claims of such traditions only “after a prior understanding of the nature of such traditions has been achieved” (MacIntyre, 1988, p. 10). Thus, he sets out to describe his understanding of three traditions of justice and rationality, linked respectively to Aristotle, Augustine, and Hume, noting that there are others linked to Kant, Islam, and the traditions of India and China to name a few. He considers the manner in which each conception of justice and rationality is associated with specific virtues, conceptions of selfhood, and metaphysical cosmologies. He then analyzes modern liberalism in a manner similar to the others, suggesting “liberalism, which began as an appeal to alleged principles of shared rationality against what was felt to be the tyranny of tradition, has itself been transformed into a tradition whose continuities are partly defined by the interminability of the debate over such principles” (MacIntyre, 1988, p. 335). Indeed, liberalism as a tradition is one which believes those holding incompatible conceptions of justice and rationality can “live peaceably within the same society, enjoying the same political status and engaging in the same economic relationships” (MacIntyre, 1988, p. 336). By claiming liberalism to be a tradition competing with others, MacIntyre places it on the same challengeable ground, effectively de-reifying it.

This inquiry suggests that this metaphor is applicable to public administration theory and its competing logics of that which is considered to be legitimate. While the Constitutional order of the United States may depict one approach to legitimacy, competing claims are made for alternative approaches or interpretations of the Constitution's meaning. To fully understand these competing claims, we cannot simply accept one tradition's interpretation of the Constitutional order and its approach to legitimacy as a given. We must place it on equally challengeable ground by depicting competing claims in the same light. Thus, all approaches to legitimacy described in public administration theory are considered to be components of a tradition which can be identified through its logical differences with other approaches to legitimacy. Theoretical texts are thus read in a manner meant to capture competing meanings of legitimacy.

To complicate this notion of heterodoxy, virtually no theories or conceptualizations of public administration are pure in the sense of ideal types or consistent logic. Most typically, any given piece of literature refers to more than one logic of legitimacy. A given theory or scholar will usually make forays into other theories that share its logic, or to the logics of other traditions altogether in an effort to address the paradoxical or dysfunctional implications of its core approach. This is an important point to emphasize that will become clearer in the analyses presented in Chapters 8 and 9. A conventional approach to interpretation is to seek an understanding of a given scholar's predominant theoretical perspective, and to categorize his or her work within commonly held categories, such as Orthodoxy, Traditional, New Public Management, New Public Administration, New Public Service, or Postmodern. As an example, Simon is often held up as the exemplar of the rationalist, scientific approach to administrative theory. Supposedly, in his view, legitimacy is achieved through technical rationality leading to efficiency, because the preponderance of his writing focuses on this aspect of administration. Yet in reality, Simon relies on the assumed necessity of political and legislative oversight and guidance to such decision processes to achieve democratic legitimacy. In this way, he relies on

two distinct logics of legitimacy—one associated with rational expertise protected from what he considered to be the meddling of “irrational” politics, and one associated with the Constitutional order of representative democracy. With such combinations of logic, it is very difficult to categorize any theory or theorist purely within any one tradition of legitimacy. Furthermore, it is difficult to draw out of such mixed theories their core elements and meanings without a careful hermeneutic reading.

Therefore, rather than trying to fit either historical periods or specific theories into various traditions of public administration, the reverse is done here: important theories of public administration offered since the inception of the field are deconstructed and used to build descriptions of traditions based on the shared meanings of core elements. These core elements are the principal ideas around which theories cluster. Deconstruction in this sense refers to identification of the constitutive elements within a tradition in order to reveal their assumptions and rhetorical strategies (Barker, 2000), rather than an approach to de-reify or de-legitimize them through critique (Farmer, 1995). As noted above, this deconstruction uses *logico-meaningful* interpretation, whereby the central meaning or mental biases of a given cultural perspective are identified and used to craft a consistent and integrated whole from logically related elements (Sorokin, 1957). This process utilizes both interpretive and critical reasoning in order to make category assignments (J. D. White, 1999). In fact, the use of critical reason enables the deconstruction of previously held taxonomies of the field in order to reveal gaps in their logic according to underlying theories of legitimacy. Once deconstructed, the implications for democratic legitimacy are revealed, and a new taxonomy can be constructed that avoids such gaps in logic (Lynn, 2001).

From these critical interpretations, traditions of public administration are identified by connecting “coherent sets” of core elements and key characteristics (Dryzek, 1990). Rather than focusing on distinct parts, or linear cause and effect, the process reveals an “interplay of forces, as

the functioning of a self-creating coherence” (Follett, 1995i, p. 51). In this way, elements of the traditions are mutually reinforcing. In essence, this approach *produces* ideal types of traditions in public administration theory.

The ideal types are constructed based on the language used in public administration theory, because this language generates “ideas, approaches, intuitions, assumptions, and urges that make up our world view; it shapes us” (Farmer, 1995, p. 1). In fact, an important premise of this inquiry is that the language and meanings that are used to construct role conceptualizations ultimately impact the role taking of public administrators in some manner. However, there are multiple role conceptualizations described in the literature. It follows that the language of various traditions provides alternative meanings for many concepts of administrative theory and practice. Therefore, the meanings of specific concepts are analyzed in order to describe the competing traditions (MacIntyre, 1988). The purpose of this method is akin to recommendations for “exploring the possibilities and potentialities for ‘rearranging’... an important hermeneutic activity that should be a guiding component of a reinvigorated public administration theory” (Farmer, 1995, p. 2). Another way to describe this might be *bricolage*, a term from postmodern cultural studies that refers to “the rearrangement and juxtaposition of previously unconnected signifying objects to produce new meanings in fresh contexts. A process of re-signification by which cultural signs with established meanings are reorganized into new codes of meaning” (Barker, 2000, pp. 381-382).

Using the lens of legitimacy as the “sorting” concept, a preliminary review of the literature revealed three “traditions” of public administration: (1) Constitutional or classical bureaucracy; (2) Discretionary or autonomous professionalism; and (3) Collaborative or facilitated self-governance. Based on the prescriptions found for the theoretical elements noted above, these traditions are linked respectively to three ideal type role conceptualizations of Bureaucrat, Entrepreneur, and Steward. However, it must be noted that these labels are given

slightly different definitions than may be typical for the field—yet another departure from convention. A diagram of how these ideas relate is shown in Figure 2. Preliminary findings in regard to the notion of tradition being used, as well as each of the traditions and their ideal type role conceptualizations are presented in Chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6.




Figure 2: Ideal Type Role Conceptualization Construction

Step 2: Theoretical Critique

Referring back to Weber’s method, once the ideal type is constructed, it provides a value-based structure that can be used to make evaluative judgments of the consequences of its expression. In other words, if the ideal type were to be realized, what would be its consequences based on a particular value axiom? In Weber’s view, exposition is meant, at least in part, to *expose* underlying presuppositions that are commonly taken as self-evident. When reality is compared to the ideal type in some manner (e.g. case study or hypothetical consideration), it is analyzed according to an accentuation of its essential tendencies in order to understand the idea that is being expressed. “This procedure would accentuate certain individual concretely diverse

traits of modern material and intellectual culture in its unique aspects into an ideal construct which from our point of view would be completely self-consistent” (Weber, 1949, p. 91).

It is important to note that this process does not infer normative statements of “best” or “right.” On the contrary, the ideal type is a tool used to think through what the expression of the ideal type would be like if it were brought to its logical conclusion, and to compare that imagined condition to actual experience. As an example of this application, many are familiar with Weber’s critical analysis of bureaucracy and its associated legal-rational form of authority (Gerth & Mills, 1946; Weber, 2004). Playing out this ideal type’s implications for society to their logical end (the iron cage metaphor) is the analytical process indicated here.

However, the next analytical step *does* assume a normative position. In this sense, values are reinserted into the analysis in an evaluative manner. In this move, an ideal type may become either utopian or dystopian in the normative sense. “In this sense, however, the ‘ideas’ are naturally no longer purely *logical* auxiliary devices, no longer concepts with which reality is compared, but ideals by which it is evaluatively *judged*” (Weber, 1949, p. 98). Continuing with the example, Weber’s own evaluative assessment of the ultimate results of the bureaucratic ideal type is anything but complimentary in nature. This normative use of the ideal type continues in contemporary use. “For example, typologists may identify ideal types of organizational structures or strategies that do not currently exist, but that, if reached, would improve organizational effectiveness. Further, if these new ideal types are carefully described, practitioners can use the descriptions of these new ideal types as design guidelines for new or existing organizations” (Doty & Glick, 1994, p. 245).

Ultimately, this inquiry makes such claims by suggesting a role conceptualization that may be more appropriate for contemporary governance. Weber describes this type of claim as being based on either a critical or dialectical judgment “of the ideals according to the postulate of the internal *consistency* of the desired end” (Weber, 1949, p. 54). According to Weber, these

types of claims are and must be normative in nature. “The distinctive characteristic of a problem of social *policy* is indeed the fact that it cannot be resolved merely on the basis of purely technical considerations which assume already settled ends. Normative standards of value can and must be the objects of *dispute* in a discussion of a problem of social policy because the problem lies in the domain of general *cultural values*” (Weber, 1949, p. 56).

Yet, even these claims are moderated by the methodological assumption of social construction. Ideal types of role conceptualization are representations of differing foundations for legitimacy. But the meanings assigned to these types are temporary and evolving ideas within the culture of public administration. Like Harmon’s images of responsibility, “they are, and can be based on nothing more than, plausible yet possibly imaginative interpretations of the irreducibly ambiguous and historically contingent languages through which we constitute ourselves and by which, for better or worse, we are constituted” (Harmon, 1996, p. 606). Therefore, it is anticipated that should this same inquiry be repeated by another person, or at another point in history, different results would obtain.

In the present inquiry, democratic legitimacy is the desired end, and various ideal types have different interpretations of what this means, along with internally consistent principles used to achieve it. A series of analyses are completed in order to ultimately conclude what role conceptualization might have the most theoretically logical fit to the contemporary governance context. Multiple critiques are made in keeping with the notion that an “ensemble of analyses” produces a more useful understanding (Adorno, 1973, p. 27).

First, the manner in which each ideal type, or *tradition* and its associated *role conceptualization* in this case, succeeds or fails in achieving legitimacy is considered based on existing critiques made either from within or outside of the tradition. Each tradition is evaluated in terms of its *own* assumptions—that is, whether or not it achieves that which it promotes (MacIntyre, 1988). It is also evaluated in terms of *competing* assumptions—that is, whether or not

what it promotes achieves legitimacy. The analysis in Chapter 7 answers the following research questions:

How do the resulting ideal types and their elements relate to one another in terms of mutual exclusivity and crossover characteristics?

Why are multiple theories of legitimacy offered?

Second, it has been suggested that mutually exclusive ideas can be integrated or “conciliated” (Snellen, 2002). Chapter 8 presents the manner in which key scholars attempt to combine multiple traditions of legitimacy in one theory of public administration. This is commonly done through prescriptive mixes of elements from the different traditions. This review of the literature ensures that important prescriptions for achieving legitimacy offered in the field thus far are considered prior to offering a new critique.

Third, to propose something new to the field, the possibility that the ideal types represent either a developmental path or dialectical synthesis is explored. Dialectical critique of logical sets of ideas is used to highlight true paradoxes, rather than characteristics of irony, ambiguity, or conflict (Harmon, 1995). This enables understanding of the whole as a form of dialectical synthesis. The possibility and implications of dialectical relationship is considered both within each tradition as well as among traditions as a possible dialectical synthesis.

It has been noted that there are so many interpretations of dialectic that it is a problematic method to use (Popper, 1940; L. Schneider, 1971). However, it has long staying power due to its perceived value by many. The notion of dialectic has been present in Western thought since the time of Socrates, and is noted in Plato’s *Republic*. Dialectic has been the topic of writing by leading contemporary philosophers, scholars, and scientists, including Hegel, Engels, Marx, Horkheimer, Adorno, Marcuse, Gadamer, Lacan, Popper, and Gouldner. As a form of critical logic, it is a manner of thinking or thought process in which contrasting perspectives are used to reveal important insights that would not be apprehended otherwise (Padgett, 2002). One need

only think of the Socratic method of questioning to arrive at conclusions, or the notion of a “third way” out of ethical dilemmas to grasp the meaning of dialectical logic and its value in transcending binary oppositional thinking (Kidder, 1995). As such, it is very useful in understanding the development of philosophical thought (Popper, 1940).

A variety of meanings have been attached to dialectic as a method of interpreting social phenomena, particularly those associated with change: (1) an explanation of the problem of unintended consequences as stemming from paradox or ironic reversals in the course of events; (2) a way to understand goal shifts and displacements; (3) a method of revealing how an existing structure prevents transformation to a more effective one, or how its success paradoxically brings about its downfall; and (4) a lens that reveals development or progress through conflict, oppositeness, paradox, contradiction, and dilemma (L. Schneider, 1971). These approaches to interpretation may be equally valuable to this inquiry, and are considered based on the findings in the formulated ideal types and previous attempts to integrate or conciliate them.

Specifically in terms of understanding goal shifts and displacements, one way to conceptualize dialectic is through its source concept, the “yin/yang” symbol, or *T'ai-chi T'u* (Diagram of the Supreme Ultimate), as shown in Figure 3. In this concept, two components are unified into a complementary whole, each having the seed of the other within itself (Capra, 1975). The two elements are engaged in a symmetrical rotation in which they alternate in primacy only until an imbalance is realized, in which case the “seed” of the other within the primary element, represented as the alternate color dot, engages rotational movement until balance is restored through its increased presence. This motion is ongoing in nature, ensuring that all situations are in an ongoing pursuit of balance. Thus, the dichotomous elements are mutually necessary, interdependent, and opposing, but not contradictory or hierarchical.




Figure 3: T'ai-chi T'u Symbol

This view is not unheard of in public administration. For example, it has been noted that the inference of domination is not the result of the nature of dichotomies themselves, but rather the social practice of dichotomizing (Rutgers, 2001). Therefore, supposed contradictory dichotomies like politics and administration can actually be complementary parts of the whole of governance (Svara, 1999). However, the more common Western interpretation of this relationship does involve conflict and hierarchy, “in that the existence of such binaries suggests a struggle for predominance. If one position is right, then the other must be wrong” (Carr & Zanetti, 1999, p. 324). Furthermore, Western thought is uncomfortable with contradiction and ambiguity, and thus seeks to eliminate such conditions by vanquishing one pole, or transforming dialectic into linear scales ranging from one extreme pole to another, disallowing fundamental differences in their ontological assumptions (Carr & Zanetti, 1999).

Perhaps it is for this reason that the application of the yin-yang concept to sociology and political theory by the critical theorists of the Frankfurt School produces a more linear logic. Stemming from Hegel’s interpretation, dialectical logic has three moments: thesis, antithesis, and synthesis (Adorno, 1973; Popper, 1940). In short, the notion is that contradictory concepts (thesis and antithesis) exist in essential conflict, rather than complementarity. In some views, antithesis emerges based on the unintended consequences of the thesis (L. Schneider, 1971). Awareness of these contradictions promotes the recognition of the unity. This unity can either be an understanding of how an existing unity is actually produced by the apparent opposites, or through

a transcendence of the originating unity to a new totality. In this way, dialectic is useful in catalyzing both enlightenment and emancipatory change (Carr, 2000). Many feel this is the true purpose of dialectic: “it implies interaction leading to an improved synthesis” (Stever, 1988, p. 82). In other words, “The struggle between the thesis and the anti-thesis goes on until some solution develops which will, in a certain sense, go beyond both thesis and anti-thesis by recognizing the relative value of both, *i.e.* by trying to preserve the merits and to avoid the limitations of both. This solution, which is the third step, is called ‘synthesis.’ Once attained, the synthesis may in turn become the first step of a new dialectic triad...” (Popper, 1940, p. 404).

At least two main conceptualizations of this type of developmental dialectic are possible: one that is historical and another which is systematic in nature (Arthur, 1998). The historical interpretation views the process as linear or developmental in nature, suggesting that the conflict produces the resolution in the same manner a cause produces an effect. A systematic view suggests that a given whole, or synthesis, reproduces itself through a mutually interdependent dialectic of thesis and antithesis, regardless of linear historical events. The focus in this view is on the interconnectedness of elements within the whole, and the manner in which they necessitate one another in a logical sequence that can be understood both forward and backward. Thus, both approaches conceive of synthesis as being in some manner the developmental outcome of dialectic, and that dialectic is a force of ongoing change. Indeed, “dialectic is in favour [*sic*] of a revolutionary rather than of a conservative and apologetic political theory” (Popper, 1940, p. 426). There are two dialectical syntheses possible in the ideal type framework envisioned: synthesis of conflicts *within* a tradition or synthesis of conflicts *among* traditions. Both possibilities are considered in the critical analyses, because any constellation may have tension or contradiction within it (Padgett, 2002). Even while sharing a logic of legitimacy, there may be nuanced disagreements about how best to pursue it. For example, those who share the logic of autonomous professionalism in the Discretionary tradition may disagree regarding the specific

nature of that professionalism (e.g. technical versus normative). A more traditional Eastern reading of the possible dialectics are also considered.

Altogether, the analyses in Chapter 8 answer the research questions:

How have ideal type role conceptualizations been integrated or conciliated by key theorists of the field to date?

How do the ideal types and their elements relate to one another in terms of dialectical synthesis?

The final critical analysis is provided in Chapter 9 in the form of Conclusions. To draw conclusions, the ideal types, key combination theories, and possible dialectical synthesis role conceptualizations presented are assessed in terms of their theoretically logical fit to the contemporary governance context. Ultimately, arguments are made regarding: (1) which form of democratic legitimacy is more desirable; and (2) whether or not it is consistent with the contemporary context. A description of this context is drawn from secondary empirical studies exploring network governance, globalization, policy networks, privatization, and the like. Furthermore, case vignettes from participant observation of local governance are used to illustrate elements of the contemporary governance context and conclusions drawn about role conceptualizations. The first purpose of this “evidence” is purely illustrative. “In the interest of the concrete demonstration of an ideal type or of an ideal-typical *developmental* sequence, one seeks to *make it clear* by the use of concrete illustrative material drawn from empirical-historical reality” (Weber, 1949, p. 102). The second purpose is to consider theoretical implications. This method of critique is commonly used in typological analysis; “mental experiments” apply the question “*what if?*” to real or hypothetical scenarios (Sjoberg & Nett, 1968, p. 250). However, it should be noted that “the danger of this procedure, which in itself is entirely legitimate lies in the fact that historical knowledge here appears as a *servant* of theory instead of the opposite role” (Weber, 1949, p. 102). The fact that historical events illustrate the usefulness of an ideal type or the existence of its generic and genetic components does not infer that it is a proven or

predictable fact or a necessity of law. Weber uses Marxian theory as an example of a conflation of the two. He does not mean to discount Marxian theory in any manner, but rather to reinterpret its usefulness as an ideal type rather than a predictive historical law or fact.

In this case, the mental experimentation considers legitimacy as a problem of theoretical role conceptualization in the contemporary governance context. One of the most interesting aspects of typologies is the question of why doctrines gain currency and are accepted as truths at specific moments in history (Maynard-Moody, 1995). Using case examples, Hood and Jackson (1991) suggest that successful administrative arguments fit the times, rely on metaphor and rhetorical cloaking of private interests, use selective evidence, and are sufficiently ambiguous to allow diverse interpretations. Ideal types may help identify not only contextual fit, but how these other tactics play out in specific theoretical prescriptions. The questions posed in this step of analysis include: “What if this role conceptualization were used in this context? Do its characteristics fit? Is it likely to be perceived as democratically legitimate?” In this sense, the ideal types are temporarily imbued with normative, evaluative value. That is, they are identified as “ideal” in the normative sense. In this manner, they can be useful in making value judgments, but it is important to note that “the ‘ideas’ are naturally no longer purely *logical* auxiliary devices, no longer concepts with which reality is compared, but ideals by which it is evaluatively *judged*” (Weber, 1949, p. 98).

The goal of this exploration is to reach beyond normative claims to primacy based on competing interpretations of legitimacy to assess the logical fit of these interpretations to the contemporary governance context. In other words, if the legitimacy logic is incoherent with this context, what is the value or purpose of perpetuating the associated role conceptualization? Is it a realistic model for social change? Specifically, this step answers the following research questions:

What type of role conceptualization should be used and why?

How is the contemporary governance context described in recent empirical research? How is it reflected in case experience?

What is the relative ability of the various ideal type role conceptualizations to achieve administrative legitimacy if defined theoretically as contextual fit?

Do any of the key integrations or conciliations noted achieve a theoretically better contextual fit?

Can a transcendent dialectical synthesis be envisioned to achieve a theoretically better contextual fit?

For the purpose of *this* inquiry, mental experimentation with the ideal types using empirical vignettes represents the end of the inquiry. But *as a matter of method for future consideration*, an ideal type model can be used to draw conclusions through empirical application in the form of single or comparative case study. In fact, Weber suggests the ideal type as the preferred method for case study. “Only through ideal-typical concept-construction do the viewpoints with which we are concerned in individual cases become explicit. Their peculiar character is brought out by the *confrontation* of empirical reality with the ideal-type” (Weber, 1949, p. 110). An ideal-type is used in comparison to reality to point out in what ways reality differs from expectations. This enables an investigation to understand why the situation differs. For example, if a claim has been made by a citizen that the actions of a given government or individual public administrator are not legitimate, the ideal types allow an evaluative assessment and precise characterization of both the actions and the attitudes of the citizen. This analysis may find that either the actions or the attitudes do not fit any type. Or, it may find that the administrative actions do not match the citizen attitude in regard to type. Either of these findings provides the information needed to formulate a hypothesis about why this is the case, framing further inquiry.

Finally, while not a formal component of the approach to inquiry, a final research question is addressed in the discussion of implications presented in Chapter 10:

How might the results of this inquiry impact theory, research, pedagogy, and practice?

Evaluation of the Approach

The following chapters present the results of the approach described here. While it is up to each and every reader to make her or his own judgments about its worthiness, due to the somewhat unconventional nature of this study, it may be helpful to offer some criteria for this effort. Methodologically appropriate evaluative criteria can serve as guidelines that help to improve the relevance and quality of research in public administration (Orosz, 1997). Furthermore, it is incumbent upon the researcher to explicate how the project meets these criteria in a well explicated research design (J. D. White et al., 1996).

As noted by Weber, the adequacy of this method will not be accepted by those holding a strictly positivist position: "Whoever accepts the proposition that the knowledge of historical reality can or should be a 'presuppositionless' copy of 'objective' facts, will deny the value of the ideal-type" (1949, p. 92). However, if the premise behind the ideal type method is accepted, the reader must evaluate the adequacy of the execution to determine "*whether* we are dealing simply with a conceptual game or with a scientifically fruitful method of conceptualization and *theory-construction*" (Weber, 1949, p. 92). In such evaluation, Weber insists there is only one ex-post criterion, namely, "that of success in revealing concrete cultural phenomena in their interdependence, their causal conditions, and their *significance*" (Weber, 1949, p. 92). The following chapters explicate three ideal types representing unique theories of legitimacy and role conceptualizations for public administration. This explication is followed by an analysis of those types and how they are observed both in public administration theory and in empirical phenomena. The ideal types themselves should succeed in explicating significant phenomena and their interdependence in the culture of public administration in the United States. Whether or not they will prove useful in revealing causal relationships must be left in large part to future

empirical research. However, the plausibility of such use should be revealed in the illustration of ideal types in observed case vignettes.

To help in this evaluation, the following guidelines have been offered to evaluate the development of typologies (Doty & Glick, 1994):

1. Theoretical assertions should be made explicit.
2. A complete set of ideal types must be defined, including anticipated hybrids.
3. Each ideal type must be described along the same set of dimensions.
4. The theoretical importance of each construct used should be explicitly stated.
5. Conceptual and analytical models consistent with the theory should be used for testing of typologies.

Again, it must be noted that the final guideline would not be applicable to this inquiry, as it will not include an empirical application to case study.

More generally, evaluations of public administration research at the doctoral level critique the quality of purpose, substantive focus, research design, and execution (Adams & White, 1994; Cleary, 1992, 2000; J. D. White, 1986). The purpose of this inquiry is to build theoretical knowledge that will support future empirical research. Its substantive focus is on noted “big questions” of the field. Its design is rooted in the post-positivist, constructionist school of thought; uses an interpretive and critical epistemology; relies on an inductive methodology; and employs both ideal type and value critical methods. In regard to evaluating execution, while little is offered in regard to evaluating theory, a host of criteria can be used to evaluate qualitative research (P. Atkinson et al., 2003; Brower et al., 2000; Erlandson et al., 1993; Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Miles & Huberman, 1994; Moustakas, 1994; Yanow, 2004). From these, the following summative list has been considered.

Authenticity requires thick description, reflexivity, and integrity of reporting. This inquiry relies on direct quotation of the literature to support the ideal types developed and richly

descriptive accounts of illustrating vignettes from participant observation. My role in the case used has been explicated to ensure the reader's awareness of my possible biases in interpretation.

Transferability requires that an appropriate methodology has been used for the question at hand. The question at hand could not be answered through a primarily empirical approach, either quantitative or qualitative in nature. Certainly, the construction of ideal types from theoretical literature is an approach that could be repeated by others.

Transparency requires that a systematic approach has been used and adequately explicated. This chapter itself is devoted to explicating in detail the interpretive and critical approaches being used in its two-phased approach. Both phases are systematic in nature, and the approach could be replicated by another scholar.

Intersubjective agreement requires evidence that the participants in the study support the findings. This criterion is not as relevant to the theoretical and conceptual nature of this inquiry as it would be in the case of a case study, interview, or survey method. Yet, any type of interpretation is subject to this type of assessment. Sorokin suggests the only way we can have a *correct* understanding of a culture is to see it "*exactly in the same way as it was regarded by its creators or modifiers*" (Sorokin, 1957, p. 21). For this, one must look for the meanings as described by those principals. In this case, a hermeneutic reading of the meanings implied by theorists' writings replaces interviews. It would be difficult to request the support of the theorists whose writing has been used to construct the ideal types. In fact, many of them are no longer among the living. This is the purpose of using quotes to emphasize important points, and referencing many specific sources rather than using a more essay-like argument. However, it could be imagined that future peer review will reveal the level of agreement. In regard to the critical analysis, the use of illustrative vignettes is not meant to suggest that the participants observed and described agree with the critique. These vignettes do not stem from interviews, surveys, or observation directed toward a specific topic. Rather, the point is for the reader to

determine if the illustration realistically represents possible scenarios, and if it accurately fits the claim being made.

Relevance requires that the substantive focus is of use to the field. Based on the field's ongoing discussion of its "big questions," it is safe to claim that the role conceptualizations promoted by the field through theory and pedagogy are relevant and useful. Furthermore, the overarching concern with democratic legitimacy is arguably one of the fundamental concerns of governance, regardless of whether one is focused on its political or administrative functions.

Criticality requires that underlying assumptions are explored and revealed. Both phases of the approach employed seek to unveil and discuss underlying assumptions. The logico-meaningful approach to identifying the "genetic" or essential and differentiating characteristics of an ideal type is a critical interpretive process. Furthermore, the value-critical analysis phase which considers the applicability of ideal types and various alternatives to the contemporary governance context is an inherently critical or evaluative process.

CHAPTER 3: THREE TRADITIONS EMERGE

Chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6 represent the Literature Review for this inquiry. However, given the research design, these chapters also comprise the first half of the Findings: the ideal types themselves compose a theoretical model for understanding public administrator role conceptualizations and their relationship to legitimacy. In combination, these chapters present the results of the interpretive deconstruction of the literature and ideal type construction steps of the analysis. Chapter 3 describes the concepts that impact theoretical role conceptualizations, explains why each concept is important to public administration theory and legitimacy, and describes how they fit together in several coherent sets or “traditions” of public administration. Chapters 4, 5, and 6 present the ideal type meanings of these concepts for each of the three traditions that emerged. The research questions considered in these chapters are:

What are the key elements of public administration theory that contribute to role conceptualization?

How do these elements coalesce into varying coherent sets based on the concept of democratic legitimacy?

In this re-reading of the literature, three coherent sets of ideas emerged associated with three mutually exclusive meanings and sources of legitimacy: accountability to the Constitutional structure and its elected officials; Discretionary administrative responsibility for outcomes; and Collaborative mutual obligation among citizens. These three traditions espouse corresponding role conceptualizations of *Bureaucrat*, *Entrepreneur*, and *Steward*. Each of these labels is defined here in a slightly different manner than might be found elsewhere, none of them intending to carry variously conceived pejorative meanings. Indeed, taken as an expression of a unique conception of democratic legitimacy, each label is meant to carry a very positive connotation among those subscribing to that tradition.

Elements of Role Conceptualization

As noted in Chapter 1, the elements thought to be significantly related to role conceptualization are: the assumed governance context; political ontology; political authority and scope of action; formulations of responsibility and accountability; associated decision making rationality; and associated organizing style. The elements chosen are not dissimilar to Box's crucial issues in *publicness*: "who is involved in problem solving, procedures for decision making and who the decision makers will be, to whom and in what ways organizations are accountable for their performance, whose interests shape organizational goals, and what appropriate roles are for practitioners" (Box, 2004, p. 7). This group of issues deals with key dimensions of the field's literature addressing both the internal operations of public administration as well as external concerns regarding its relationship to the polity (Box, 2004; Frederickson, 1971). They encompass many of the topics claimed as "big questions" of the field by others (Agranoff & McGuire, 2001; Behn, 1995; A. C. Brooks, 2002a; Callahan, 2001; Cleary, 1992, 2000; Cooper, 2004; Kirlin, 1996, 2001; Lan & Anders, 2000; McCurdy & Cleary, 1984; Neumann, 1996; Perry & Kraemer, 1986; Raadschelders, 1999; Review, 2004; Rohr, 2004; Stallings & Ferris, 1988; Streib et al., 2001). They include many of the elements believed to define both the forces of bureaucracy and democracy: ideas, emotions, philosophies, ideologies, myths, practices, procedures, institutions, technologies, and more (Waldo, 1980). Thus, these are the elements considered in identifying distinctive traditions of public administration theory.

As ideal types, the traditions and their role conceptualizations are constructed in a mutually exclusive manner *in terms of theories of legitimacy* in order to support critique. By this caveat, I mean that it is possible that some elements may have shared characteristics across traditions, but *not* in terms of the meaning of legitimacy. Through this lens, the traditions and their associated role conceptualizations are mutually exclusive because they base legitimacy on different rules, standards, and principles. Autonomous administrative expertise and performance

is not acceptable as an ultimate proof of legitimacy in either representative or direct democratic models of governance because it places political authority in the hands of public administrators. Similarly, representative and direct approaches to democratic governance are mutually exclusive, placing political authority in different hands—political representatives in the former, and affected citizens in the latter.

The following subsections describe each generic element of a tradition of public administration and explain why the concept is important to democratic legitimacy. These discussions answer the research question:

What are the key elements of public administration theory that contribute to role conceptualization?

Assumed Governance Context

Public administration in the United States has become increasingly focused on the notion of *governance* as opposed to administration within a *government* agency. Governance is more than the practice of just administration, policy, or management (McSwite, 1997). It is a *process*, not an *organization*. It refers to the entire process of collective action, from ideas and decisions to implementation and evaluation, regardless of sector. It includes all activities and actors involved in creating and implementing public policy—“all those who act on behalf of the public—on behalf of society in a legally mandated way—and those whose actions have consequences for the members of society, singly or as a group” (Harmon & Mayer, 1986, p. 6). In a very pragmatic manner, one could ask the question, “What *isn't* governance?”

The term *governance* has been popularized perhaps because it potentially encompasses both politics and administration, as well as all sectors of society. “It describes a wide range of types of organizations and institutions that are linked together and engaged in public activities” (Frederickson, 1997, p. 84). This is particularly convenient given the difficulties in drawing boundaries and distinctions in the contemporary social context. However, it may be that not all

role conceptualizations in public administration theory are fitted to this understanding of the contemporary governance context. In fact, many theories describe, assume, or promote a very different governance context.

For example, during the first two hundred years in the United States, with exception to contracts for simple services or products and the work of charitable volunteers and organizations, the current tasks of public administration were performed fully within the context of government agencies. Thus, the role of public administrator was associated and even equated with the public sector of the economy. Increasingly over the course of recent decades, and explosively since the shrinking and reinventing government initiatives of the 1980s and 1990s, public work has become a decision making and collective action process that extends across sectoral boundaries through privatization efforts, policy networks, and other co-production methods. Some of these arrangements are formal and legally sanctioned, while others are informal and outside the boundaries previously considered as “government.” Therefore, the assumed governance context must be identified, including all social sectors and actors.

Taken together, the elements of each coherent set or tradition produce a unique metaphor for governance that is both descriptive and normative in nature. In contemporary terms, *governance* has become a “generally accepted metaphor for describing the patterns of interaction of multiple-organizational systems or networks” (Frederickson, 1997, p. 85). “Images and metaphors are not only interpretive constructs or ways of seeing; they also provide frameworks for action” (G. Morgan, 1986, p. 343). Indeed, some feel public administration theory *should* be a normative theory of governance (Stivers, 1990a). But if the context of public administration is no longer exclusively the government agency, but rather an *intersectoral process*, this change has profound implications for both theory and practice that have only begun to be explored—in not only public administration, but in business and nonprofit management as well. One could feasibly assert that in the contemporary context, anyone who is engaged in the work of creating public

policy or pursuit of the common good can be conceived of as a “public administrator.”

Conceptual models are needed to analyze, understand, and improve this emerging intersectoral process.

Although the evidence of these practices is compelling, it must also be noted that previous forms of governance coexist. There are still hierarchical government agencies at all levels of jurisdiction. Furthermore, there are at least two very different types of networks apparent in governance activities—those made up of organizational representatives and even formal collaboration agreements, as well as those made up of individuals representing themselves (Stivers, in press). Therefore, the differences among theoretical assumptions about governance context must ultimately be compared to empirical descriptions of that context to understand either the logical fit or the changes necessary to accommodate. Therefore, each tradition is introduced with a brief sketch of the assumed governance context linked to its notion of legitimacy.

Political Ontology

The term “political ontology” has been used to describe complex assumptions about the nature of human being, identity, and social life (Catlaw, in press). In short, the relationship between the two is reflexive: political form infers specific ontology and ontology infers political form. Political philosophies adopt specific ontological assumptions, offering prescriptions for political forms. These political forms become the primary venues for manifestation, thus reproducing that which is assumed. Similarly, ontology suggests the possibility of only certain political forms. A classic ontological dualism argued by Parmenides and Heraclites can be described as the One versus the Many,ⁱ or unity/is versus unifying/becoming. Simultaneously, political ontology depicts both what *is* and what *should be*. The underlying assumptions of political ontology are therefore critical to understanding the source of legitimacy in different theories of public administration. Furthermore, public administration is one venue through which political ontology is materialized. But because political ontology is taken as given in most of the

public administration literature, one must look to a variety of other sources to identify and describe the assumptions in use, including political philosophy, psychology, theology, and sociology.

Arguments along these lines have not been completely absent from public administration theory. It has been argued that any modern theory of public administration has to be a theory of politics, implying any modern theory of politics has also to be a theory of administration (Gaus, 1947). As Rosenbloom chastises, we cannot leave politics out of administrative prescriptions—“If we want better government, we better talk about politics” (1993, p. 506). Some scholars believe that specific administrative structures are embedded within particular political socioeconomic systems. “If the result desired is an inclusive, democratic polity, then these organizations ought to be grounded in theories, assumptions, and understandings of reality that advance knowledge of, and give direction toward, attaining such a polity” (Kelly, 1998, p. 201). Theories about legitimate political authority are further grounded in notions of human nature (Caldwell, 1988). The meaning we attach to the languages of public administration are “tied to our traditional notions of morality and what we think of as being human” (Spicer, 2004, p. 354). As was noted in the Approach to Inquiry chapter, this effort is situated within a political theory and philosophy view of public administration. Waldo suggests, “Any political theory rests upon a metaphysic, a concept of the ultimate nature of reality” (1984, p. 21). Thayer (1981) notes that we can no longer afford to accept the philosophical or ontological assumptions of political theory as axiomatic. Instead, we must bring such assumptions into the domain of public administration inquiry. For this reason, Spicer argues that “consulting political philosophy can clarify the political and moral implications of the administrative ideas we espouse and the administrative practices we choose to follow” (2004, p. 360). Putting these ideas together, political philosophy is based on beliefs about how to achieve the Good, based on the nature of human being. For these

reasons, a political philosophy view on public administration should not simply overlook or assume the ontological underpinnings from which it cannot be severed.

In sum, public administration is concerned with the nature of human being in relation to one another as it relates to society and its governance. This has been referred to as the problem of the social bond (McSwite, 2006). However, another way public administration theory has explored this problem is by using conceptions of the relationship between human beings and the divine as a metaphor for the relationships between human beings and society. For example, the hierarchical relationship of citizens to the authority of the state has been likened to the externalization of divine authority into a conception of God, which creates the necessity of determining who is authorized to speak for God (Thayer, 1981). Or from another view, it is the problem of who is authorized to speak for The People (Catlaw, in press). As another example, the thinking of theologian H. Richard Niebuhr has been applied to public administration theory (Harmon, 1995). His typology of Christian ethical stances seeks to understand the relative authority of humankind and God (Niebuhr, 1963). In this typology, authority and responsibility are realized in three distinct ways: Man-the-Citizen; Man-the-Maker; and Man-the-Answerer [*sic*]. Each type has a unique way of being in the world that can be related to political philosophy as well as administrator role conceptualizations.

The idea of a connection between religious metaphysical belief has also made its way into research on antecedents to public service motivation (PSM), in that religious socialization is thought to have an impact on PSM (Perry, 1997). However, as noted by the researcher himself, a great deal more thinking and study needs to go into these relationships. Rather than using indicators of religious socialization that include ideas such as “closeness to God” and “church involvement,” it may be more appropriate to consider broader religious worldview or ontology. For example, religious worldviews may hold communal versus individualistic ideals (Benson & Williams, 1982). Individualistic worldviews believe problems and solutions are between the

individual and God, while communal worldviews consider how problems are shared and solved through relationship with one another as directed by God.

Some theoretical discussions of the public administrative role consider the problem of alterity—of the perceived differences between Self and Other, and the dynamics this relationship generates. In a democratic society, the associated roles of citizen, elected representative, and appointed administrator create a complex form of alterity which impacts role conceptualization at an ontological level—is the nature of being the same or different? Alterity concerns the de-centered “moral other” as opposed to an objectified and cognitive other (Johnson, 1990). The question alterity considers is, “How should an administrator behave in relationship to others?” (Farmer, 1995, p. 227). The possibilities of alterity include relationships of dominance and submission, as in the Master/Servant metaphor, as well as difference without domination among governance actors (Carr & Zanetti, 1999). Again, these can be referred back to the metaphorical relationship between the human being and the divine.

While these varied concerns about human being, human nature, and the nature of human relationship are not the sum of an ontological or metaphysical study, it is quite difficult to find an adequate label that will accommodate ideas associated with spirituality and theology, psychology, sociology, and philosophy. While this inquiry is using a “catch-all” term of *political ontology*, it is certainly open to alternatives.

More easily captured and linked to public administration are theories of political economy. As also noted in the research on antecedents to public service motivation, political ideology is thought to have an impact on PSM (Perry, 1997). However, rather than simple self-identification on a continuum of “liberal to conservative,” labels which have differing meanings over time and in popular vernacular, it may be more effective to consider broader notions of political philosophy and political economy. This is an approach that has been used to describe fundamental differences between representative and direct forms of democracy, in addition to

how science and rationality are used as replacements for democratic theory altogether (Catlaw, in press; Harmon, 1995; McSwite, 1997). This inquiry will consider the manner in which Classical Liberalism, Conservatism, Modern Liberalism, Radicalism, and Anarchism are expressed through varying traditions of public administration.

To preview what will be presented in Chapters 4, 5, and 6, Bureaucrats are most like Man-the-Citizen [*sic*]; a *deontological* being who comes into being “under the rules of the family, neighborhood, and nation, subject to the regulation of our action by others” (Niebuhr, 1963, p. 53). These rules are necessary to control human nature as a self-interested being that tends toward war. Therefore, external authority is required to mandate such rules. Man-the-Citizen [*sic*] exists primarily in relationship to society as a whole, thus responsibility is achieved by following the rules or commandments it dictates. These rules are made by elite leaders and are codified in the Constitution, law, and rulings from legislative, judicial, and executive political sources. It is through these leaders that democratic values are identified and chosen. Therefore, Bureaucrats pursue legitimacy through adherence to Constitutional principles and mandates that are interpreted and enforced through agency rules and procedures. The role conceptualization of Bureaucrat is therefore focused on concerns such as agency conservation and neutral competence in carrying out directives. It is most closely linked with a combination of Classical Liberalism and Conservatism.

Entrepreneurs are most like Man-the-Maker [*sic*]; an empowered, *teleological* being “who, acting for an end, gives shape to things...” (Niebuhr, 1963, p. 49). Human beings exist primarily in relationship to ideas and ideals rather than people or God, so responsibility is achieved by accomplishing goals. Discretionary public administrators pursue legitimacy through achievement of performance criteria, including various combinations of efficiency, effectiveness, equity, and ethical standards. It is through these objectives that democratic ends are ensured. These standards or goals are required, because human beings are still assumed to be self-

interested, albeit with a generally more beneficent character than assumed by the Constitutional tradition. The role conceptualization of Entrepreneur can therefore be either market-like or social in nature, but the discretionary autonomy of expert agent or trustee is shared. Therefore, it is most closely linked with Modern Liberalism and its views on pluralism. However, heightened concerns about the unjust outcomes of markets and the social outcomes of fierce individualism cause contemporary Conservatism to attempt insertion of specific values through performance criteria.

Stewards are most like Man-the-Answerer [*sic*]; “engaged in dialogue, man acting in response to action upon him” (Niebuhr, 1963, p. 56). This describes the “fundamentally social character of selfhood” (Niebuhr, 1963, p. 71). Humans are assumed to be social in nature, placing the interests of the whole alongside their own in both moral and instrumental reflection. Human beings are in relationship to all others, and therefore responsibility is achieved by first understanding the meaning of what is happening and then asking, “What is the fitting response to what is happening?” (Niebuhr, 1963, p. 67). Therefore, Stewards pursue legitimacy through a participative process of citizen deliberation among those impacted by the decision or collective action being taken. It is the affected citizens themselves who define and interpret democratic values. The role conceptualization of Steward is viewed as a facilitative participant in social process. This approach is most closely linked to Radicalism and some forms of Anarchism through its ideas of emancipation through direct democracy.

These competing conceptualizations of human being, relationship, and associated political philosophy create *mutually exclusive logics of legitimacy*. Each may be necessary but insufficient to meet the public’s expectations, or all may be missing the characteristics necessary for a conceptually logical fit to the contemporary governance context. Understanding this problem is, in essence, the purpose of this inquiry. As Catlaw (in press) points out, questioning the legitimacy of public administration brings underlying philosophies into view. Only if these assumptions are fully revealed can the field hope to resolve or move past its most common

debates. We cannot simply take for granted legitimacy based on a particular configuration of a liberal democratic sovereign called “the People.” Therefore, the ideal type must seek to describe the political ontological assumptions logically aligned to its genetic makeup.

Political Authority and Scope of Action

Political authority defines who has rights and who has responsibilities, thus it must be founded on a recognized source of legitimacy to be effective (Simon et al., 1974). Determining the source of legitimacy in a democratic context is not a simple matter. At least three possible sources are discussed in the literature: elected representatives, administrators, and affected citizens. Therefore, the legitimization of public administration is something every political regime must do (Lowi, 1993). As noted in Chapter 1, the meanings of legitimacy used throughout this inquiry include: “reasonable; logically correct; justifiable; or conforming to or in accordance with established rules, standards, principles” (Neufeldt, 1996, p. 772). It is not meant to infer its legal meaning in our liberal democratic state in order to accommodate alternatives to that legal meaning. However, it must be noted that public administration in the United States is charged with acting on behalf of the political system as well as its sovereign citizenry, the People. This social role brings into focus the problem of distributing *political authority* and defining the administrative *scope of action*. In this way, “legitimacy is about power” (C. S. King, 1999, p. 261). The challenge of allocating power has been recognized since the founding of the field: “The study of administration, philosophically viewed, is closely connected with the study of the proper distribution of constitutional authority” (W. Wilson, 1887, p. 213). This issue includes theoretical discussions of the crisis of legitimacy and the relationship between politics and administration. It also crosses over into discussions of administrative responsibility and accountability as well as ethics, but for the purpose of this inquiry, these issues are considered to be operationalizations of the legitimacy issue for practice, and are thus placed in another category.

The crisis of legitimacy in the United States is well-noted in many disciplines as well as in the popular press. There are increasing demands for democratic legitimacy within public administration. However, these demands are not singular in nature, and come from diverse theoretical perspectives. Public administration is a field with several competing theoretical traditions, each holding differing views on how administrative legitimacy is achieved. Furthermore, the legitimacy issue is actually a two-fold or nested problem, because political and administrative legitimacy are mutually implicated and are not separated in the minds of citizens—government is both. Therefore, administrative legitimacy is conflated with democratic political legitimacy. “To be legitimate is to be right, correct, good, or acceptable” (Stever, 1988, p. 7). If someone believes that the political system is illegitimate, then no amount of administrative responsibility or accountability *to* that system will make government legitimate. If someone believes that the administrative system is illegitimate, given common interpretations of our Constitution, they are apt to believe it is the fault of the political system that is meant to guide or control the administration. Thus, both political and administrative theory must be considered when questioning democratic legitimacy in public administration. Both are caught up in the question of political authority and democratic sovereignty (Catlaw, 2003).

Wilson suggests that there are three important ways in which “political authority may be gathered undesirably into bureaucratic hands: by the growth of an administrative apparatus so large as to be immune from popular control, by placing power over a governmental bureaucracy of any size in private rather than public hands, or by vesting discretionary authority in the hands of a public agency so that the exercise of that power is not responsive to the public good” (J. Q. Wilson, 1975, p. 80). The first problem has been associated with the Constitutional tradition, while the latter two are risks associated with the Discretionary tradition. Yet others challenge both, suggesting that only through direct democracy can political authority be kept in its proper place—within affected citizens themselves.

The legitimacy issue has also linked an intellectual crisis within the study of the field to a crisis of practice in which confidence in government has been lost (Ostrom, 1989). “There is a crisis of legitimacy in public administration, in which the agreed-upon bases of theory fail to reflect or respond to the needs of actors in the field—theorists, practitioners, and citizens” (R. B. Denhardt, 2000, p. 158). Mary Timney describes our less than ideal democratic condition as: “citizen as outsider, the practitioner as expert, and the legislative body as representative of elite interests” (in Box, 1998, p. x). This state of affairs has been described as a dysfunctional relationship between citizens and their government (C. S. King et al., 1998). As a result, the challenge to political authority has manifested itself in all social spheres at least since the civil rights movement: “the family, the university, business, public and private associations, politics, the governmental bureaucracy, and the military services... Authority based on hierarchy, expertise, and wealth all, obviously, ran counter to the democratic and egalitarian temper of the times, and during the 1960s, all three came under heavy attack” (Crozier et al., 1975, p. 75).

In response to this sense of crisis, it could be said that all theories and traditions of public administration seek to *improve democracy* by enhancing legitimacy; that they are “ardently seeking a scheme to save it” (Waldo, 1984, p. 75). However, they differ in their specific approach in doing so. There is conflict and contradiction between legitimization strategies, each of which come from a different “tradition of theory and practice” (Stever, 1988, p. 16). Each theory attempts to achieve what Terry describes as “institutional integrity,” drawing from the work of Philip Selznick: “...public bureaucracies acquire much of their presumptive moral authority through the incremental social process of developing unifying values that meet the needs and expectations of the community” (1995, p. xi). However, I should note that I assume that such socially constructed notions of legitimacy *include* Terry’s other categories of legal/constitutional and managerial/efficiency bases for legitimacy. At core, the purpose of such a sociological approach to democratic legitimacy is very pragmatic: “finding an effective relationship between

the individual and the society” (R. B. Denhardt, 2000, p. 37). This relationship experiences tensions in a democratic society that respects individual political authority, yet delegates it to government. “When good government is in place, the relationship of the individual to the collective is resolved, and the aims of each are rendered compatible” (McSwite, 2002, p. xvi).

Accordingly, some theories of public administration consider the relationships among elected representatives, administrators, and citizens. For example, “citizen governance” is an idea that reformulates the scope of action and redistributes authority among elected officials, practitioners, and citizens (Box, 1998). One of the big questions for the field in the new millennium is to understand these complex relationships: “Understanding public administration requires a careful analysis of how administrative behavior links with political institutions, as well as an analysis of how civil society has become hard wired into the process of managing government programs. What new faces will the policy-administration dichotomy present—and how should public administration best resolve it?” (Kettl, 2000, p. 30). In other words, what are the roles of administrators, politicians, and citizens in contemporary governance? Thus, the issues of political authority and scope of action are implicated in both democratic legitimacy and role conceptualization.

More frequently discussed in public administration theory is the dualistic relationship between politics and administration, which centers on the appropriate scope of action and authority legitimately held by each function or set of actors in government, leaving citizens out of direct consideration. In other words, there are concerns about *administrative discretion*. The question is one of who is trusted to produce the Good and who should have the authority to decide what it is. To most theorists of public administration, the telling feature of the “orthodox” or Constitutional tradition is its conscious and purposeful split between the political authority vested in politics versus administration (R. B. Denhardt, 2000). This idea has been retrospectively labeled the “politics/administration dichotomy” (Sayre, 1958). An excellent argument has been

made to abolish all assumptions about the politics/administration dichotomy from public administration theory in order to expose its implications to democratic legitimacy (Svara, 1999). As noted by Rosenbloom, these ideas about role differences are “not happenstance. There is an underlying comprehensive logic to it” (2000a, p. 153).

One review of the field’s literature identifies four models conceptualizing the relationship between politics and administration based on the nature of the hierarchical relationship and the differentiation of roles, distance between spheres, and choice of norms: (1) a strict separation of roles; (2) administrative autonomy; (3) politically responsive administration; and (4) interactive roles (Svara, 2006b). Joining elements of all, an alternative model of *complementarity* has been present in the literature from Wilson onward, which “stresses interdependency, reciprocal influence, and extensive interaction between elected officials and administrators along with recognition of the need for distinct roles and political supremacy” (Svara, 1999, p. 676). This is a much more accurate depiction of “the habits of thought that are attributed to traditional public administration” (Lynn, 2001, p. 145).

Formulations of Responsibility and Accountability

Based on its conceptualization of political authority and democratic legitimacy, a given theory of public administration will typically formulate ideas about how to achieve *responsibility and accountability* within the political and administrative governance system, or suggest some form of ethical standard without necessarily using those terms. “In the political context, one’s conception of accountability is tied to beliefs about the nature of a just government, the role of the citizenry in setting policy, and the interaction between elected officials and career civil servants. Thus, the operative definition of accountability reflects one’s understanding of the place of bureaucracy in a democratic state” (Koppell, 2005, p. 95). As noted in the preceding section, public administration in the United States is charged with acting on behalf of the political system as well as its sovereign citizenry, the People. This political philosophy creates a potential tension

in responsibility and accountability—is administration accountable to the political system and *through* it to the People, or to the political system and also *directly* to the People? In the latter case, what happens when there are differences between the two?

A concern for administrative responsibility and accountability has remained present throughout the formative and contemporary years of public administration thinking (Shafritz et al., 2004). For example, in a comparison of the career, civil service, and political system approaches to public administration, it was noted that “each has its own distinctive view of responsibility, of representativeness, and of what constitutes the public interest” (Mosher, 1968, p. 174). Lynn notes several approaches to accountability: legislative, legal, executive, and popular (Lynn, 2006). Legislative authority requires accountability to things like detailed statutory prescription, regulation and monitoring, and transparency requirements. Legal authority requires accountability to codes and rules, the courts, and the Constitution. Executive authority is the type that is delegated to the individual, which allows for accountability to principles, standards of performance or expertise, demographic characteristics, and outcome measures. Popular authority relies on direct forms of democracy, either through tools like elections and referenda, or participative deliberation. In the ideal types created in this inquiry, legislative and legal authority are both linked to the Constitutional tradition; executive authority is linked to the Discretionary tradition; and Popular authority is linked to the Collaborative tradition.

Romzek and her collaborators have focused attention on various formulations and applications of accountability in public administration (Radin & Romzek, 1996; Romzek, 1996; Romzek & Dubnick, 1987; Romzek & Ingraham, 2000). The resulting categories pertain to issues such as level and source of control: hierarchical, legal, professional, and political—each of which is associated with a different value emphasis. As noted by Koppell, this approach “seems to mix together types of accountability that are substantively different” (2005, p. 96). He offers an alternative typology of the dimensions of accountability, seeking to create mutually exclusive

conceptions of accountability that can be applied in singular or combined formulations in a given context, including: transparency, liability, controllability, responsibility, and responsiveness.

Transparency pertains to openness, access, and revelation of important information about actions and decisions. Liability refers to vulnerability to punishment or consequences to action.

Controllability refers to the capacity to be controlled by another party, as in the case of principal and agent. Responsibility refers to answerability to a number of things such as laws, rules, and norms. Responsiveness refers to all types of external actors, including both constituents and elected officials. As will be explicated in the ideal types themselves, each of these meanings suggests particular formulations of legitimacy, some of which overlap. Perhaps this is the reason why such combinations produce what he calls “Multiple Accountabilities Disorder” in practitioners (Koppell, 2005).

Harmon notes that three types of responsibility are called for by various camps within public administration theory: political, professional, and personal (Harmon, 1990). Each type embodies a different meaning of the virtue of responsibility: accountability, agency, and obligation (Harmon, 1995). However, each formulation generates two pathologies in the absence of the others as countervailing forces. Responsibility is paradoxical because it embodies opposing terms, entailing both agency and obligation, or autonomy and answerability. Neither can have primacy and achieve democratic legitimacy. Instead, they must exist in balanced combination to avoid dysfunctions and achieve democratic legitimacy, with primacy given to personal responsibility over professional and political forms because it “is grounded in the preferred, more encompassing frame of analysis of action (including its unconscious as well as conscious aspects) rather than in rational decision” (Harmon, 1990, p. 175).

Harmon suggests that the paradoxes generated by these forms of responsibility should not be eradicated. Instead, important paradoxes must be understood to grasp their purpose and value as creative dialectical tensions (Harmon, 1995). In fact, he submits that the *lack* of such

understanding is the *true* source of the continuing crisis of legitimacy in government and administration stems. Because we hold flawed conceptions of responsibility, our accountability systems continue failing to meet expectations. Thus, we must understand how to achieve legitimacy using a complete understanding of all its dialectical elements: accountability, agency, and obligation.

Others believe that the crisis of legitimacy cannot be resolved simply through reformulations of administrative responsibility and accountability, because it is grounded in problems inherent to our system of representative government itself. Catlaw challenges the ontological possibility of representation as well as political sovereignty, calling for a public administration and theory of governance altogether beyond our administrative state conceptions of the political (2003, in press). McSwite challenges the legitimacy of representative democracy, describing it as a dysfunctional system of governance that creates an untenable tension in administrators between agency and obedience that can only be transcended through “a reconfiguration of consciousness, one that produces a new and different sense of subjectivity” (1997, p. 14). It is suggested that this alternative has actually been present since the founding of the United States in the thinking of the Anti-Federalists. Their theory of more decentralized, participative governance “would have obviated the legitimacy problem” (McSwite, 1997, p. 16).

In more familiar terms, the feeling that “government isn’t us” has been growing in recent decades (C. S. King et al., 1998). Citizens may in fact be challenging our entire system of governance via elected representatives and appointed administrators because they have come to expect *direct* accountability from all those in government. E. E. Schattschneider summarizes this situation nicely:

For more than a century we have been *giving the government to the people* until the people have come to believe us; they think that they own it. The public no longer identifies itself with the House of Representatives and its special agency in the government, as it ought to in constitutional theory. Americans

now think that their title covers the whole government, lock, stock and barrel, not merely a piece of it... In other words, *they believe that they have a general power over the government as a whole and not merely some power within the government*. This is a profoundly revolutionary change in the concept of power which cannot be fitted into anything written in the *Federalist Papers* or in the literature of constitutional law. (1960, pp. 115-116)

Thus, how the various traditions of public administration theory perceive the issue of responsibility and accountability are closely linked “back” to associated theories of political authority and democratic legitimacy, and “forward” to assumptions about how decisions are made for collective action.

Associated Decision Making Rationality

The concept of *decision making rationality* includes discussions of knowledge production, reason, and the relationship between values and facts. The term *rationality* is used here to mean *a process of reason* whereby something is thoughtfully intended, designed, or analyzed (Gerth & Mills, 1946; MacRae & Wilde, 1979; Paris & Reynolds, 1983; Wildavsky, 1979). Rationality refers to the relationship between thought and action (Harmon & Mayer, 1986). However, rationality has various meanings, and therefore, “the idea of reason itself must be unpacked and examined” (McSwite, 1997, p. 237). Even Simon notes that rationality may be objective, subjective, conscious, deliberate, organizational, or personal in nature (1976, p. 76-77). Thus, the term “rational” should always be qualified with an adjective. Harmon & Mayer point out that “the meanings of rationality largely determine the particular manner in which organizational effectiveness and efficiency are construed and ranked in relation to other normative criteria of organizational performance” (1986, p. 410). By calling for the use of different forms of rationality, multiple forms of knowledge from different sources (e.g., technical experts, elected officials, and citizens) can be recognized and deemed useful (Schmidt, 1993).

Decision making rationality is important because all organizations are decision making contexts (Raadschelders, 1999; Simon, 1976). Furthermore, the problems of the public demand decisions about needed action (Dewey, 1957). “Decisions are the core around which all other acts of the public administrator revolve” (Harmon & Mayer, 1986, p. 35). Specifically, the decision making process is *public* when decisions: (1) affect people’s lives; (2) are made in the name of the public; and (3) use public resources for implementation. As noted earlier, this can include “all those who act on behalf of the public—on behalf of society in a legally mandated way—and those whose actions have consequences for the members of society, singly or as a group” (Harmon & Mayer, 1986, p. 6). Based on this definition, it is difficult to imagine decisions that do *not* have implications for the public.

Perhaps most importantly, as scholars such as Foucault and Flyvbjerg argue, “power defines what constitutes knowledge and rationality; indeed, power ultimately defines ‘what counts as reality’” (M. P. Brooks, 2002b, p. 91). Distinctive patterns of decision making may be based on “embedded assumptions and social constructions of reality” (A. L. Schneider & Ingram, 1997, p. x). Therefore, issues of inclusion, authority, legitimacy, and justice are of concern in the study of public decision making (Lasswell, 1956). “The most important thing about any democratic regime is the *way* in which it *uses* and exploits popular sovereignty, what questions it refers to the public for decision or guidance, how it refers them to the public, how the alternatives are defined and how it respects the limitations of the public” (Schattschneider, 1960, p. 140). In this way, decision making rationalities also follow from different conceptualizations of political authority and democratic legitimacy, and are implicated in the organizing style used to create decision making contexts.

Associated Organizing Style

Organizing style includes discussions about not only structure, but leadership and authority concepts, which also flow from theories of democratic legitimacy. As noted by futurist

management consultant Warren Bennis, as an evolutionary principal, “every age develops an organizational form appropriate to its genius” (1967, p. 6). “The formation of an institution is marked by the making of value commitments, that is, choices which fix the assumptions of policymakers as to the nature of the enterprise—its distinctive aims, methods, and role in the community” (Selznick, 1957, p. 55). These are character-defining choices in organizing style. Some theorists confront the dilemma of organizational purposiveness directly: “The core of Gawthrop’s message is that organizational design should be couched in terms of an ontological construct as the basis for thinking about and performing organizational action” (Harmon & Mayer, 1986, p. 188). Based on such differences, three different organizational types have been empirically differentiated: procedural, corporate/market, and network (Considine & Lewis, 1999). These types are linked to different administrative logics similar to law, business models, and nonhierarchical organization. Another typology describes a continuum from: (1) hierarchical bureaucracy; (2) horizontal bureaucracy (flat organizations); (3) complex self-managed (representative democracy); and (4) collectivist (direct democracy) (Rothschild-Whitt, 1982; Rothschild & Whitt, 1986). Along this continuum, decision structures move correspondingly from authoritarian to consensus models, and the areas of decision that are delegated increase.

Organization, organizational behavior, and management theories have been very influential in public administration theory because “much of the work of delivering public services occurs at the behavioral level, where people are motivated and led to do what they need to do” (Shafritz et al., 2004, p. x). Harmon and Mayer (1986) find eight definitions of “organization” in the literature, each with six distinguishing theoretical dimensions: (1) cognitive interests; (2) dominant metaphors; (3) primary units of analysis; (4) the relation of the individual to the organization; (5) the meaning of rationality; and (6) the primary values embedded in the theory. The assumptions in these dimensions have implications for how problems are viewed, solutions are designed, and recommendations for organization are made. In this inquiry, differing

organizing styles are linked coherently with similar companion elements, as well as notable additions within each tradition. For example, an organizing style also affects the role conception of each member, having “profound effects upon what he knows, believes, attends to, hopes, wishes, emphasizes, fears, and proposes” (Simon, 1976, p. xvi).

Formulating “Traditions”

The following section explains how these elements fit together in coherent sets, or “traditions” of public administration and governance. This discussion provides an initial answer to the research question:

How do these elements coalesce into varying coherent sets based on the concept of democratic legitimacy?

However, the manner in which *specific* meanings of these elements coalesce into different coherent or genetic sets will be explicated in chapters 4, 5, and 6; one for each tradition and its associated ideal type role conceptualization.

To recapitulate, the integrated elements of each tradition include: the assumed governance context; political ontology; political authority and scope of action; formulations of responsibility and accountability; associated decision making rationality; and associated organizing style. Each tradition has a unique perspective and description of the governance context that is assumed in its theorizing. The world seen from this perspective is taken as the reality to which theory either attempts to respond or promote. Ontology and political philosophy frame the underlying meaning of democratic legitimacy being promoted by a given tradition. In turn, each unique political philosophy prescribes how political authority should be distributed to government and the appropriate scope of action delegated to administration. In order to ensure that neither authority nor scope is being overstepped, each tradition prescribes specific ways to achieve responsibility and accountability. These limitations on scope of action and paths to responsibility and accountability further dictate the type of decision making rationality that

should be used. Furthermore, these combined elements dictate the type of organizing style best suited for the tradition's implementation. All together, these elements infer a specific role conceptualization for public administration and administrators in a democratic society. Given all of these constraints, the behavior of the administrator is channeled into a specific role pattern. In sum, differing interpretations of the core elements formulate distinct traditions of public administration, theories of governance, and public administrator role conceptualizations.

The ideal type descriptions of the traditions that follow in chapters 4, 5, and 6 are provided in order to become conversant in "the idiom of each in order to describe and evaluate the other or others by means of it" (MacIntyre, 1988, p. 398). Thus, we turn to the "language of public administration" as it has been presented by the field's principal literature (Farmer, 1995). From this review of the literature, there is not *one* language of public administration, nor even two that can be characterized as simply modern versus postmodern; traditional versus post-ist; or traditional versus post-traditional (Farmer, 1995, 1999, 2005a, 2005b, 2006). Nor are there two that can be characterized as technical versus normative, orthodox scientific versus democratic and humanistic challenge, traditional versus New Public Administration, hard-core rationalist versus soft-core rationalist, rationalist versus nonrationalist, or any other dichotomous presentation (R. B. Denhardt, 2000; Harmon, 1995; C. S. King et al., 2000; McSwite, 1997). Instead, *three* traditions of public administration emerge, each with their own language that can be called: (1) Constitutional; (2) Discretionary; and (3) Collaborative.

The notion of a trichotomous model is not substantively different from the many dichotomies used in public administration theory, in that they can both be understood as ideal types (Rutgers, 2001). Trichotomies can be composed of similar categories, but can also be expressed as two elements in dialectic opposition along with its synthesis. In essence, the synthesis represents a third opposite. Of course, the notion of more than two approaches to public administration is not new. Kass & Catron (1990) describe a heterodoxy versus an

orthodoxy/traditionalist period. White & McSwain (1990) differentiate between Classical, Traditionalist, and Scientific approaches. Yet, these categories are quite muddy in nature, with crossover characteristics and timelines which can be difficult to follow. Another trichotomous model is related to three prescriptions for reform identified in public administration rooted respectively in: (1) public law; (2) market economics; and (3) democratic politics (Olsen, 2004). However, these categories are too simplistic, not acknowledging the complexities of technical and normative dimensions within each approach to legitimacy. These types of limitations will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 8.

Finally, the field's focus on dichotomies has even had the effect of reducing trichotomous models into dichotomies. For example, Harmon's extensive use of Niebuhr focuses solely on Man-the-Maker and Man-the-Answerer, eliminating the image of Man-the-Citizen altogether [*sic*] (Harmon, 1995). More importantly, the meaning of Man-the-Citizen [*sic*] gets collapsed into and in large part substitutes for the meaning of Man-the-Answerer [*sic*], ignoring the possibility of a transcendent third position beyond the dualistic dichotomy. Therefore, the exercise of creating a trichotomous ideal type model is intended to add value to prior categorizations in terms of clarification and better utilization of the dialectic possibilities.

These initial findings reveal what I see as an important bit of semantics in public administration that has bearing on the hermeneutic nature of this inquiry. It seems to me that in the interest of adopting and adapting postmodern thinking to our field, we have artificially created an altogether new set of dualisms, layered onto the vast store already generated. Together, they serve to further obfuscate important differences among public administration theories. Furthermore, we have excommunicated the word "tradition" from our lexicon, assigning it characteristics which rob it of its usefulness in understanding macro-level social concerns. This process has been ongoing for some time now, starting with a renaming of rationalist theories as "traditionalist" and the adaptation of the modern/postmodern dualism as "traditional/post-ist"

(Farmer, 1999; O. F. White & McSwain, 1990). “The term post-ist is a neologism that refers to our post-ist intellectual context, a condition that is variously characterized, in part or in whole, by descriptors such as post-positivist, post-industrial, post-patriarchal, post-structural, post-modern, post-Freudian, post-colonial, post-metaphysical and other post-ist terms” (Farmer, 1999, p. 300). In short, *traditional* views are narrow and harmful to individuals and society, while *post* views are broad, long-term, and socially beneficial (Farmer, 1999).

This dualism was later transformed into the traditional/post-traditional branding, organizing two journal symposiums coordinated by David Farmer (2005a, 2006). He suggests that this terminology does not carry the same baggage as the debate between modern and postmodern theory, or as the “culture wars” between liberal and conservative ideologies (Farmer, 2005a). In these two sets of articles, *traditional* public administration theory is depicted in a quite negative light. In a blanket condemnation, our *tradition* makes no room for spirituality, feminine perspective, multiple epistemologies, or diverse cultural identities (Cunningham, 2005; McGinn & Patterson, 2005; Thadhani, 2005). The *traditional* views individuals in terms of social or professional role; adopts a business paradigm; pre-determines and enforces norms; considers government and markets as largely unchanging things; and pursues understanding through impractical positivist science (Farmer, 2005a). It is authoritative, and makes no room for a social bond or social role based on love (Catlaw, 2006b; McSwite, 2006). In the most scathing interpretation, *tradition* is seen as occurring “*at the moment* of capitulation to invidious influences. Tradition *is* complicity; tradition does not *precede* such action in a strict ontological sense” (Witt, 2006, p. 231). In this meaning, tradition implies force—an authoritative cooptation of individual autonomy.

Alternatively, the post-traditional is a macro level consciousness which is practical in nature and has affiliations with postmodernism, critical theory, feminism, critical legal theory, post-colonial theory, and other emerging ways to understand the contemporary condition

(Farmer, 2006). It encourages an emancipated and democratic social condition through thinking as play, justice as seeking, and practice as art (Farmer, 2005b). Without debating the substantive critique offered in these discussions, I do take issue with the pejorative meanings being attached to the word *tradition*—that is, the clear inference that tradition is bad; not-tradition is good.

Perhaps these meanings have been colored by a Weberian interpretation of *traditional* authority and social organization, or interpretations of traditional public administration as being all things bureaucratic in nature. The problem with this simplistic division is that the nuanced combinations of technical and normative emphases within various modernist approaches tend to become conflated, as do some discretionary and collaborative approaches to legitimacy. In other words, what is captured in “traditional” may be more than what is intended, and what is left out of “traditional” is perhaps more than what should accurately be called “post-traditional.”

Challenging the meaning of the term “tradition” makes room for clearer distinctions among groupings in trichotomies and beyond.

To sum up, I use the term *tradition* in a purposeful manner that infers a more general sociological concept. A tradition is the repository of truth as it is understood (Bernstein, 1991). Rather than using the term *paradigms* of public administration, which might infer scientific methodologies, *approaches* which might infer techniques, *theories* which can be so complex and idiosyncratic as to be incomprehensible at a macro level, or *doctrines* which infers unchangeable rigidity, *tradition* refers to social and intellectual presuppositions about activities and inquiries which are for the most part unchallenged by those inhabiting the tradition, but that evolve through time (MacIntyre, 1988). This appears to fit an evolving understanding of the enterprise of public administration as a profession. “A profession is characterized by an interlocking set of values, not by rigid doctrine, certainly by nothing resembling a scientific paradigm...” (Waldo, 1980, p. 77).

These constellations of ideas about how best to practice public administration have been described as “conflicting traditions” in the past (Balfour, 1997, p. 459). They have also been

referred to as competing theories of the state. “Imbedded within each vision of the good state... are implicit or explicit views of what constitutes the good administration essential to turn that particular ideal state vision into reality” (Stillman, 1991, p. 174). Through the metaphor of tradition, liberal democratic ontology can be placed onto the same *challengeable* ground of traditions such as Aristotelian or Augustinian thought (MacIntyre, 1988). Therefore, I believe that conflation of the term *tradition* with bureaucratic or entrepreneurial forms of public administration disables an important critical lens.

My use of the term tradition thus clarified, as noted in one deconstruction of Herbert Simon’s *Administrative Behavior*, those within a tradition reference one another and identify themselves with shared ideas in a manner that even blurs the boundaries between authorship (Farmer, 1995). “Indeed, much of the vocabulary we use in public administration acquires meaning only in the context of the particular mental frameworks or categories of thought that we have come to use over time in thinking about and making sense of government actions” (Spicer, 2004, p. 354). Yet, individual scholars may reject “assignment” to a tradition because the academy only rewards individual contribution. This is one impetus behind idiosyncratic interpretations and prescriptions. However, when scholars are seeking to actually *change* the predominant approach, it would behoove them to understand the power of synergy and solidarity. Recognizing one’s tradition empowers individual ideas as it empowers the tradition through mutual validation. Public administration traditions “provide a stable, structured, yet open context (because of their general and symbolic nature) within which the ‘dialogue of governance’ can generate *new* and *legitimate* responses to the ever evolving issues of social life” (O. F. White & McSwain, 1990, p. 26). Indeed, I use the term to refer to “a constellation of essential characteristics” as tradition has been depicted (Witt, 2006, p. 231). To emphasize, I do *not* use Adorno’s use of the term *constellation* as a “juxtaposed rather than integrated cluster of changing

elements that resist reduction to a common denominator, essential core, or generative first principle” (Jay, 1984, pp. 14-15).

I submit that when using the lens of legitimacy logics as a genetic common denominator, there are at least *three* coherent sets of elements within public administration; one of which meets many of the criteria set by “post-traditional” scholars. Indeed, it has been suggested that there is a “new ethical-political constellation” around which many contemporary theorists cluster (Bernstein, 1991). Specifically, this constellation of ideas draws from postmodern philosophy and social critique, albeit a set that is both idiosyncratically selective and diverse across specific theorists. One common denominator is that collaborative scholars refuse absolutes, universals, foundationalism, and essentialism, sharing the pursuit of a “philosophical and ontological intellectual practice that is nondogmatic, tentative, and nonideological” (Rosenau, 1992, p. 16). However, the position is rather moderate in the postmodern theoretical realm; the ideas adopted by these public administration theorists are “affirmative” as opposed to “skeptical” because they believe social change and collective action are possible, even within postmodern conditions (Rosenau, 1992). They embrace discourse theory and the notion that intersubjective understandings and shared value commitments can be created, and that social construction allows institutional change. In this, the tradition draws heavily from Pragmatism.

Exemplifying this stance, Bernstein (1991) accepts a practical commitment to communicative reason as being a reasonable a postmodern conditions. Stever (1988) describes it as a legitimating ideation for the polity profession based on pragmatist philosophy. The pragmatism adopted by postmodern public administrationists has been characterized as “collaborative pragmatism,” which was at the heart of the Confederation, was present in populism and progressivism at the beginning of the 20th century, and is now present in postmodernism (Bogason, 2001; McSwite, 1997). In short, “our perception of the world is socially conditioned, and we need to state our sense of purpose to be able to “measure” our world; we do not perceive

in limbo. Such purpose is created in relationships with other people—in community. The relationship is reached by pragmatic collaboration between administrators and citizens, based on an understanding of process theory” (Bogason, 2001, p. 176). I submit that the theorists promoting a new collaborative, transformative, and emancipative approach to public administration are similarly committed to this new-yet-old tradition, which will become more evident in its explication in Chapter 6. Indeed, I see it as engaged in the development process depicted by MacIntyre: “A tradition becomes mature just insofar as its adherents confront and find a rational way through or around those encounters with radically different and incompatible positions which pose the problems of incommensurability and untranslatability” (1988, p. 327).

Tradition also infers a particular time and place, which to some degree follows in the historical prevalence of different traditions in public administration. If starting with the field’s beginnings following Woodrow Wilson’s essay, it is tempting to suggest that this order is relatively chronological, corresponding to general trends in administrative theory of Traditionalist/Orthodoxy, New Public Administration/New Public Management, and New Public Service. However, a close review of the literature shows a different historical pattern, with seeds of all three traditions being evident at the field’s inception, but with varying historic prioritizations. This is not dissimilar to the notion that pre-traditional, traditional, and post-traditional thought coexist in terms of time (Farmer, 2005b). In Kaufman’s analysis of three doctrines of public administration (representativeness, neutral competence, and executive leadership), he noted that “at no point was any of them pursued to the complete exclusion of one or both of the others; evidence of interest in all three can be found at any stage of our history, sometimes in a single document by a single author... The story is thus one of changing balance among the values, not of total displacement” (Kaufman, 1956, p. 1067). Thus, traditions are complex in the historical sense. Therefore, using a meaning of tradition as a form of *ideal type* is appropriate.

In closing, the ideal types generated by the first step of this inquiry are presented as mutually exclusive role conceptualizations on the basis of differing interpretations of democratic legitimacy. However, certain elements within its associated tradition will have crossover shared meanings. In other words, the entire coherent set is not fully mutually exclusive in the genetic sense. For example, the decision making rationalities and organizing styles associated with the Constitutional and Discretionary traditions are in large part identical, although with differing emphases and degrees. Furthermore, both are based on liberalism, but of substantively different types. Some notion of professionalism is shared across all three traditions, albeit quite different in nature within each. That is, the role of public administrator is in some manner differentiated from that of citizen or elected official in a manner described by many of the characteristics of the term “professional” (Moore & Rosenblum, 1970). These similarities are further considered in the critical analysis of Chapter 7.

The following Table 1 provides a snapshot of what is to come in Chapters 4, 5, and 6. It is structured to capture the coherent sets of elements as described for each of the three traditions of public administration and their corollary role conceptualizations. In two cases, the tradition is split into two “camps”—one technical in focus and one normative in focus. I am intentionally avoiding use of the term “instrumental” because both technical and normative thinking are *purposeful* in nature, but the manner in which they pursue their purpose and the very purposes chosen are quite different. Each pair combines in a whole tradition, with neither being presented in the typical Western manner which interprets “opposing virtues exclusively in terms of their pathological or ‘shadow’ side” (Harmon, 1990, p. 155). Instead, I have attempted to present them as they have been put forth by their proponents rather than by potentially “revisionist” interpretations (Lynn, 2001, p. 145). Critiques from outside the tradition are offered separately in Chapter 7 to support this intention. The third tradition attempts to synthesize the dialectic of technique and values, thus the tradition is not split within any of its elements.

Table 1

Traditions of Public Administration Theory

<i>Tradition</i>	<i>Constitutional</i>		<i>Discretionary</i>		<i>Collaborative</i>
Role Type	Bureaucrat		Entrepreneur		Steward
<i>Element</i>	<i>Technical Side</i>	<i>Normative Side</i>	<i>Technical Side</i>	<i>Normative Side</i>	<i>Technical/Normative Synthesis</i>
Principal PA Theory	Orthodoxy or Traditionalist	Traditionalist or New Public Administration	Managerialist or New Public Management	Discretionist or Agential New Public Administration	New Public Service or Emerging Transformational
Legitimacy Problems (within tradition)	Failure to follow hierarchical rules and procedures	Failure to reflect political direction and obtain authority via hierarchy	Failure to perform efficiently and effectively	Failure to achieve democratic outcomes	Failure to educate and empower citizens in self-governance; oppression and exclusion based on a specific normative position
Key Role Characteristics	Politically neutral competence; following management directives	Conservator of agency and regime values as interpreted by legislature, judiciary, and executive; public servant	Effective and efficient entrepreneur; technician; the American version of NPM—privatization, reinvention, etc.	Discretionary professional; virtuous administrator; Agent; trustee	Facilitator of local value formation; technical advisor only; social emancipator; steward of citizen self-governance
Administrative Role Conception	Administrator as Man-the-Citizen [<i>sic</i>]; the Servant role in representative government; Bureaucrat who sees Citizens as abstract objects or passive recipients—interaction is guided by political mandate and hierarchical procedure		Administrator as Man-the-Maker [<i>sic</i>]; the Master role in representative government; Entrepreneur who sees Citizens as active customers or clients—interaction based on principles of competition and exchange		Administrator as Man-the-Answerer [<i>sic</i>]; the Co-Creator role in direct democratic government; Steward who sees Citizens as collaborators—egalitarian interaction in all political and administrative activity

<i>Tradition</i>	<i>Constitutional</i>		<i>Discretionary</i>		<i>Collaborative</i>
Role Type	Bureaucrat		Entrepreneur		Steward
<i>Element</i>	<i>Technical Side</i>	<i>Normative Side</i>	<i>Technical Side</i>	<i>Normative Side</i>	<i>Technical/Normative Synthesis</i>
Assumed Governance Context	Political State—representative democracy; governance is conducted through government organizations		Administrative State—representative democracy; governance occurs through a complex blurring of boundaries between public and private sectors and pluralist activity		Democratic State—direct democracy; governance occurs through a deeply nested federalism down to the neighborhood level
Political Ontology	Classical Liberalism and Conservatism; the Political elite represent the One		Modern Liberalism; the Administrative elite represent the Many to produce the One		Radicalism and Communitarianism; the Many and the One are co-created
Political Authority and Scope of Action	Use a functional dichotomy to ensure legitimacy via the representative political system—hierarchical control answering to legislators, judiciary, and the executive ensures legitimacy		Ignore, eliminate, or shift the dichotomy because administrators <i>are</i> involved in policy making—outcomes prove legitimacy (efficiency, effectiveness, equity, or other chosen values in the form of ethics)		Synthesize all dichotomies by bringing administrators, politicians, and citizens together—egalitarian democratic participation from all is the path to legitimacy
Source of Legitimacy	Elected representatives		Administrative experts		Affected citizens
Responsibility and Accountability	Trusts politics to produce the Good; administrators serve the system through hierarchical procedures and rules; bureaucratic accountability		Does not trust politics to produce the Good; administrators produce the Good through chosen criteria (e.g. efficiency, effectiveness, equity, ethics); performance evaluation		Trusts all mature individuals to produce the Good together; administrators ensure process and empowerment (e.g. egalitarian)
Administrative Decision Making Rationality	Deontological: instrumental rationality (administrative)—strict procedural rules ensure the best result		Teleological: instrumental rationality (both technical and strategic)—whatever gets the best results given the situation, with “best” defined by expertise		Phenomenological: collaborative rationality; intersubjective agreement and communicative action
Organizing Style	Bureaucratic hierarchy (deep)		Humanistic and entrepreneurial hierarchy (flattened; empowered); networking among organizational representatives		Fluid networking among individuals

CHAPTER 4: THE CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION

This chapter describes elements comprising the Constitutional tradition of public administration, which promotes the ideal type role conceptualization of *Bureaucrat*. The research questions considered in this chapter are:

What are the key elements of public administration theory that contribute to role conceptualization?

How do these elements coalesce into varying coherent sets based on the concept of democratic legitimacy?

The core elements of the Constitutional tradition of public administration are most often described as “traditional” or “orthodox” (R. B. Denhardt, 2000; O. F. White & McSwain, 1990). They are also most typically associated with earlier historical time periods within public administration (Ostrom, 1976; Stivers, 2000a). Peters calls it the “old-time religion” (1992, p. 3), noting six characteristic ideas about the public service and its role in governance: (1) a neutrally competent, apolitical civil service; (2) organizational hierarchy and rules of procedure; (3) permanence and stability of organizations and employment; (4) an institutionalized civil service that functions as one body; (5) internal regulation by political oversight; and (6) equality of outcomes. All but the last characteristic fit this tradition’s underlying Constitutional logic of legitimacy—answerability through a hierarchical organization to the separated powers of government, and through it, to the People. In other words, this tradition is designed according to representative democracy.

Similarly, it has been suggested that the tradition advocates: a politics/administration dichotomy; a science of administration; efficiency as a primary goal; centralized power as most responsible; hierarchy to ensure good administration; and the Constitution as an overarching guide to all activity (Ostrom, 1989). This description points to the dual concerns of the Constitutional tradition: “The early leaders in public administration sought efficiency, but they were also deeply committed to political democracy as they saw it” (Mosher, 1968, p. 75). This

depiction is supported by this and other re-readings of the original rather than “revisionist” interpretations of the field’s early literature: it has been convincingly argued that the bureaucratic tradition is the only approach that duly addresses the concerns of Constitutional values, law, and the republican political system (Lynn, 2001). It is not simply about efficient, neutral administrative competence.

Assumed Governance Context

In the Bureaucratic tradition, governance is considered to happen within *government organizations*, which includes the three separated powers and their associated administrative agencies. Society is considered to be divided into several sectors of activity: government, the market, and community or civil society. The rules of engagement within each sector are patently different in order to enable the appropriate social function of each. Therefore, public administration should “be a field of study not about a function or an enterprise, but rather about an entire major sector” (Shafritz et al., 2004, p. 5). This is often described as a perspective of the “orthodoxy” of public administration (Henry, 2001; Ostrom, 1989; Waldo, 1984). *Governance is performed by government*. However, as will be explored below, the functions of government are differentiated between political and administrative activities. Planning, decision making, and rule making are political, while implementation of political and legal direction is administrative.

In this view of government, federated jurisdictions are the locus of governance, and these institutions are the focus of administrative study. “The general image was one of a nation of linked policy communities, communities that expressed some values idiosyncratic to them and some values that reflected the minimal standards defining a humane and just life in America. The centers of the subcommunities, the public administrative agencies forming the arena where policy was initiated and implemented, were to be the stable repositories of these two sets of meanings and the enactors who brought them both to life” (O. F. White & McSwain, 1990, p. 28).

Political Ontology

The term “political ontology” has been used to describe complex assumptions about the nature of human being, identity, and social life and the reflexive relationship between ontology and the political (Catlaw, in press). Because political ontology is taken as given in most of the public administration literature, one must look to a variety of other sources to identify and describe the assumptions in use, including political philosophy, psychology, theology, and sociology.

Public administration emerged as a “self aware” field of practice and academic study in the midst of the late nineteenth century modern societal shift toward industrialization, professionalization, and political reform (Waldo, 1984). However, it could be argued that in its Constitutional formulation, it embodies much older premises of Classical, rather than Modern Liberalism, in addition to elements of Conservatism. Today, Conservatism is hardly distinguishable as a separate perspective, but rather a subset of Classical Liberalism as juxtaposed to Modern Liberalism (Clark, 1998). The manner in which they are linked yet distinct will be explored here in brief.

The architects of Classical Liberalism include philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), Francis Bacon (1561-1626), and Rene Descartes (1596-1650) (Clark, 1998). From their foundations, the political philosophy was further developed by John Locke (1632-1704), David Hume (1711-1776), and Adam Smith (1723-1790) (Solomon & Murphy, 2000). These thinkers shared the Enlightenment belief that the world is an objective *given*, with humankind’s place in it guided by laws of both nature and society. In other words, their shared ontology is positivist, with universal claims to truth. The world simply *is*, and displays a unity through natural laws to which all things, including human beings, answer. This has been described as the ontology of the One, which is unchangeable. The laws of the One dictate both what is and what should be. As such, this political ontology borrows from a theory of legitimate authority from

metaphysical or transcendental theories in which the State exists separate from its citizens, pursuing its own ends, as with the Catholic Church or Hegel's idealized unity (W. W. Willoughby, 1930). More conventionally, this would be described as a Conservative interpretation of Classical Liberalism.

Classical Liberals envision a fixed, highly rational, scientific, mechanistic world where individuals are driven by self-interest. They believe in rational choice, the privileged position of the individual, and the primacy of equality of opportunity and property rights as a result of this individualism. Individualism asserts that individual actors are sovereign by natural right and autonomous in their thoughts, preferences, opinions, and choices. Political authority is created only through a chosen relinquishment of autonomy whereby rational individuals enter into a voluntary "social contract" in order to protect their individual rights and ensure the greatest personal benefit possible. Thus, the core liberal notions of self-interested rationality, individualism, equality of political and property rights, and social contract are forged. The centrality of these components within a free market for economic exchange has imbued much of Western social and political theory, making its way into the United States Constitution and its amendments. While self-interest, private property, and free markets are not specifically called out in the founding documents, they are clearly assumptions to the "inalienable Rights... Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness" (States, 2000).

Guaranteeing these natural rights is where some elements of Conservatism enter in, most notably from the thinking of the Scottish philosophers Hume and Smith. In short, natural rights must be guaranteed by the laws of society due to unavoidable problems of human nature. In *Leviathan*, originally published in 1651, Hobbes (1968) describes what he considers to be the natural state of humankind as a justification for establishing laws to ensure just conduct. While quite detailed in its description of nearly a dozen "laws of nature," the gist of the Hobbesian view is quite simple: it is only through fear that humankind's self-interested behavior is curtailed for

certain. First, human beings perceive themselves to be equal by nature, with an unalienable or un-transferable right to preserve his own life and to live without external impediments in his pursuit of the Good. However, because some benefits such as material resources, power, or glory are limited, human beings will inevitably desire the same thing, and become diffident. This lack of security leads to war and distribution is determined by “might makes right.” Thus, the natural state of humankind “is always war of every one against every one” (Hobbes, 2000, p. 64).

Based on this view of the human condition, Hobbes justifies the need for civil states and laws. Through voluntary agreement, individuals give some of their political authority to society via the state in exchange for protection of rights and the promise of better obtaining the good things of life. Humankind will abstain from a state of war only through a common fear of a power that is above all of them, and with the assurance that all others have agreed to do the same. This is the basis of the social contract, or more appropriately, generalized covenant. To be sufficient, a society must agree to cast out those who break their covenants. However, in the spirit of the Enlightenment, this law must be based on nature, and cannot be mediated by religious institutions.

Locke, Hume, and Smith all extended Hobbesian theory, even while moderating it (Clark, 1998). Smith (2000a) posited that while driven by self-interest, human beings are capable of viewing situations from the perspective of an “impartial observer,” and would therefore restrain socially destructive behavior. For the most part, human beings co-exist peacefully (Locke, 2000). But because of scarcity, society must agree on what is left in the commons and what is taken out as private property. Therefore, these philosophers spoke in great detail on the issue of property rights, firmly believing that “every man [*sic*] has a property in his own person... The labor of his body and the work of his hands... Whatsoever then he removes out of the state that nature has provided and left it in, he has mixed his labor with and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property” (Locke, 2000, p. 134). But *at times*, an individual may overstep

liberty into “license” and do harm to another’s “life, health, liberty, or possessions,” thus causing a state of war (Locke, 2000, p. 75). Therefore, “Property must be stable, and must be fixed by general rules” (Hume, 2000, p. 142).

Given these foundations, the political ontology of the Constitutional tradition holds that human behavior is self-interested by nature and that pure self-governance is not possible. Therefore, attempts must be made to create controls that limit self-interested behavior, and authority must be given to those sources of control. In fact, this tradition accepts authority “as an inescapable aspect of human society” (Wamsley, 1990b, p. 22). The purpose of imbuing civil states with authority is to avoid war, restore peace, and facilitate individual pursuits. Through Locke’s vision of the social contract or covenant, sovereign citizens grant political authority to the state in a juristic fashion through voluntary consent (W. W. Willoughby, 1930). While the Enlightenment goal of secularizing authority is achieved, the need for forms of social control is not eliminated by Classical Liberalism. Some form of authority still resides *outside* of the individual, and in fact, may be split in two for many: the self must be seen not only in relation to divine authority (whether conceived as internal or external), but also to external social authority in the form of a secular state. This is another linkage point to various elements of Conservatism. Conservatism adds ideas about traditional authority (as described by Weber) to the shared foundation of individualism. Traditional authority represents and defines natural law (the One) through civil laws to which all must acquiesce, or be considered deviant in some manner. These ideas are evident in many of the views espoused by the founding fathers of the United States, both in the *Federalist Papers*, as well as in the Constitution itself. For example, some of the key concepts advocated by the federalists included:

It is natural and desirable for the elite classes to form the representative government (e.g. Nos. 35 and 36);

A pure democracy is practically impossible and theoretically undesirable because of poor outcomes (e.g. No. 10);

Democracy must be constrained to ensure reason and to avoid both the “tyranny of the masses” and problems of faction (e.g. Nos. 10, 49, 55, and 59);

A system of representative checks and balances was required for efficiency (e.g. No. 48, No. 51, and No. 9); and

A centralized government is good for the economy (e.g. No. 11, 12, 13, 34, and 35). (Rossiter, 1999)

In sketch, the masses are considered to be irrational, and to protect society from their tyranny, those who are more rational and able than others to interpret and represent natural law should lead. While acknowledging their desirability and basis in divine individual right, Conservatism believes that both political and economic markets undermine morality and social order. If society is driven only by a rationality of self-interest, society will decline into a chaos of conflicting greed for power and resources. In other words, conservatives fear both democracy and capitalism. Conservatives like Edmund Burke (1729-1797) and Thomas Carlyle (1795-1881) saw society as a fragile organism created by passionate human beings who need institutions, customs, and rules to control desires and form personal identities (Clark, 1998). Therefore, governments must strengthen traditional values and institutions to balance out the effects of the rational action. Furthermore, an intellectual elite should perpetuate those institutions through both a hierarchical church and state vested with traditional authority. In short, society must be ruled by guardians. The compromise with Classical Liberalism is that these guardians are chosen through election by sovereign individuals, because it is assumed that those with natural abilities will rise to the level of legislators among which to choose.

With these collective ideas about political economy, the Constitutional system of government seeks a combination of market efficiency and cohesive civil society to support the market. Government’s role is to ensure a legal and moral climate that is conducive to social stability and economic growth. These goals are the rational basis for the social contract, through which limited individual freedoms are foregone in exchange for the benefits gained. The proper

balance of market freedom and social control is not easy to achieve, but it is the role of government to define and pursue such balance. In no case is the role of government to achieve specific outcomes without regard to this delicate balance. Rather, its role is ensure fair procedures and control extremes that would cause social disorder. Furthermore, the representative system of governance holds that some people are more rational or have higher morals than others, and therefore should hold positions of political authority to ensure the pursuit of truth and virtue. Such moral leaders are needed to protect rights and maintain order through an impartial administrative system.

It is helpful to have a picture of how this understanding of social order came to be from ontological assumptions to political philosophy. Classical Liberalism can be traced to Aristotelian thought, which emerged from a Homeric crisis of the gods' desertion of humankind (MacIntyre, 1988). Without divine law, people were left to determine how to organize themselves as members of *society*—the replacement for the gods. In such a society, selfhood is defined in relation to the polis. On the other hand, Conservatism can be linked to the Augustinian tradition in which the ideas of Greek Stoicism were infused with Christian meaning by 16th and 17th century philosophers (MacIntyre, 1988). In this worldview, the self is seen in relation to God and divine authority as decreed by the Church. Its modern interpretation is more like its originating Stoic ideas, replacing divine authority with natural law. The unique blend of Classical Liberalism and Conservatism in the United States allows both interpretations by separating the institutions of church and state—the church is free to represent divine authority while the state assumes representation of natural law. However, divine authority is assumed to be given to the individual, who in turn passes *some* of it on in the form of political authority to the state via social contract.

It is important to note that both Classical Liberalism and Conservatism place authority *outside* of the individual either through social contract or natural/divine law. Thus, either society or God may function as the ontological One that exists outside or beyond the individual.

Alternatively, indigenous societies believe the divine resides internally within each human being and all of creation, retaining the principal source of authority within each unique being in a manner that simply *cannot* be externalized (Stone, 1976). It has been suggested that in more complex societies, in order to create systems of social control, whether religious or secular in nature, such authority had to be extracted from the individual (Thayer, 1981). Furthermore, it creates the concept of a position of objectivity, to which subjectivity becomes the counterpart. This move forces the question, “Who is authorized to speak for God?” (Thayer, 1981, p. A-14).

The resulting competition for authority sets into motion the need for centralization, to which hierarchies of all types seek to respond. Early forms of civil states linked religious and civil authority, against which the Enlightenment movement emerged. One of its first mandates was to seek the separation of religious and state institutions, reinstating divine right and authority to the individual and natural law. From this perspective, modernization and the scientific revolution can be interpreted as an attempt to recapture individual divinity by helping humankind assume more fully the objective position of the divine. However, the Enlightenment doctrine that replaces divine law with natural law maintains external authority and atomistic or particularist formulations of individualism do not resolve the issue of authority, because if each individual has the authority to speak as a sovereign, then competition emerges that perpetuates decentralized chaos (Thayer, 1981).

This chaos is the source of the Hobbesian view of human nature that demands the social contract (Hobbes, 1968). Furthermore, a fear of tyranny of the irrational masses demands that authority be placed in the hands of elite representative who will ensure maintenance of the social contract. To this, our Constitutional order responds with a representative system of governance—one that has been described as the “political ontology of representation” (Catlaw, in press). This political ontology attempts to manage the ontological dualism of the One and the Many. Unity is ordered by a government authorized by the sovereign People. In other words, the One is created

by the Many through the representatives they choose. In this way, individuals are represented metaphysically as a People and politically through elected leaders. This draws from the Conservative notion that values should be shared, unless one is deviant, while allowing for the individualist Classical Liberal notion that the Many exist, but through social contract form the One. While we are still sovereign individuals, we are unified through the social contract with the state.

The Constitutional tradition's understanding of an externalized secular source of authority over the individual is expressed in what Niebuhr calls Man-the-Citizen [*sic*]: "This man lives as moral self in the presence of the law first of all, not of other selves. What is over or against him as that which limits and attracts him is a commandment, a demand, a requirement. His relation to other selves is a relation under the law" (1963, pp. 70-71). Laws create rules of conduct that are deontological in nature—they are imbued with authority that demands acquiescence. As noted by Isaiah Berlin, civil association is a form of rule-based governance reflective of the Constitutional order (Spicer, 2004). This creates a political reality that dictates what is possible. "We come into being under the rules of the family, neighborhood, and nation, subject to the regulation of our action by others" (Niebuhr, 1963, p. 53). In this view, the law represents the generalized Other (or in other terms, the One)—that to which we feel responsible. It is a demand that is anticipated in a predictable pattern although Niebuhr admits it is constantly amended through ongoing social interaction and interpretation. Furthermore, the law represents an ultimate social cause, which might be political ideology, religion, or both. Even in the United States, references to a divine Creator are included in founding political documents. Through divinely endowed individuals, representatives are chosen to formulate the rules by which we will live. The rules coming from this authority are expressed through the civil state, which is comprised of both political and administrative components. Therefore, how authority is assigned to these elements and the scope of action they legitimately claim is the next element of concern.

Political Authority and Scope of Action

In the Constitutional tradition of public administration, the source of legitimate political authority is the Constitution itself and the political-administrative system and rule of law it describes. A compelling argument has been made that the Federalists envisioned a “democratic bureaucracy” for the United States with a role for both elected representatives and their administrative assistants (Ostrom, 1989). However, as Lowi firmly asserts, “in constitutional principle and logic, the authority to use discretion rests with elected officials, primarily Congress, and the power to grant discretion to others and to limit the discretion of others rests with the legislature” (1993, p. 263).

Its logic is reflected in the republican tradition of governance depicted in the Constitution and the Federalist papers that argued for its ratification. Following Locke’s optimism, the nation’s founders *hoped* that the nation’s best would rise to the role of legislator, and would be guided toward a notion of the public interest through a sense of *noblesse oblige*. As Jefferson suggested, “There is a debt of service due from every man [*sic*] to his country, proportioned to the bounties which nature and fortune have measured to him [*sic*]” (Caldwell, 1988, pp. 184-185). But just in case they did not, the structural safeguards designed into the Constitution and its institutions of government ensure that these representatives cannot get out of hand, at least not to the degree of tyranny. In fact, the assumption that human beings do not live up to the better angels of their character underlies the Constitutional system of political representation, majority rule, separated powers, and checks and balances, of which public administration is an extension.

This Constitutional system has been called the “representative democratic accountability feedback loop model” (Fox & Miller, 1995, p. 4). In this system, political authority is given by individual citizens to representatives elected by majority rule. These elected representatives oversee a political system of power that is separated and delegated among legislative, judicial, and executive branches of government. Each branch of government is operated by appointed

administrators who are made answerable to the elected officials through a hierarchical system of organization and distribution of authority. Political authority is distributed throughout this system, with a specified scope of action being given to each component according to the prevailing interpretation of what is legitimate. Feedback on the relative success of this distribution of authority is given by citizens, ideally through the following election cycle.

Based on this idealized vision of the political system, many of the “orthodox” public administration theories pertaining to the question of political authority are associated with the Constitutional tradition: the use of hierarchy and political oversight to control abuses of power and ensure authorized action; the functional specializations of politics and administration; and the belief in rational-legal forms of authority (R. B. Denhardt, 2000). These ideas frame the Constitutional tradition’s interpretation of legitimate political authority and scope of action, and will be considered in turn.

Bureaucracy centralizes and controls political authority allocated to the administration through a hierarchical system of supervision (Gerth & Mills, 1946). To ensure that the administration uses political authority appropriately, the Bureaucratic tradition is conservative in the classical sense (O. F. White, 1990b). It seeks legitimacy through a notion of political authority stemming from the traditions and community norms embodied in the Constitution. As such, the purpose of public administration is to ensure stability, order, security, and loyalty both within the organizations of government and society itself. Otherwise, the world will revert to a chaotic place where people are prone to acts of war, thus the state must be ever vigilant and cautious regarding all matters of social life (Thayer, 1981). In this view, authority plays an important role in social life. Obedience to authority reflects good citizenship and leadership.

This conception of legitimate political authority has been conceived of as a Hamiltonian approach to public administration (Caldwell, 1988). Hamilton envisioned a large, active public administration to support the nation’s economic growth (Stillman, 1996). The Constitutional

safeguards embedded in the institutions of government would allow such an administration without fear of political tyranny. Specifically, a “traditionalist” working principle is that administrative agencies will be held in check by the political executive (O. F. White & McSwain, 1990). Thus, through the instrument of a bureaucracy that answers to the Executive, administrators answer to the political representatives chosen by the People through election processes, who are then checked and balanced by one another and the judiciary. In the end, political authority is held by the People through their elected representatives, and democratic legitimacy is assured through this complex system of delegation.

Therefore, the Constitutional tradition envisions legitimate political authority *residing within the government agency* and its structural placement within the Constitutional system of governance. This perspective is exemplified in the notion of administrative conservatorship: “Because (a) the role of public bureaucracies in the American political system is consistent with original constitutional principles, (b) public bureaucracies perform an important role in sustaining such principles, and (c) public bureaucracies help form the character of the citizenry as well as contribute to the continuous process of shaping a political way of life that is unique to the American regime, I argue that public bureaucracies must be preserved so that they can serve the public good” (Terry, 1995, p. 24). In government, these *regime values*, are the cultural values, moral principles, and political philosophy embedded in governing institutions as dictated by the Constitution (Rohr, 1989; Will, 1983). Thus, “the *primary function of bureaucratic leaders is to protect and maintain administrative institutions in a manner that promotes or is consistent with constitutional processes, values, and beliefs*” (Terry, 1995, p. 24). Lowi (1979) is another contemporary exponent of the Constitutional tradition, seeking a juridical reform of public administration in order to counteract the systemic dysfunctions that have allowed interest group pluralism rather than the Constitution to rule legislative decision making.

But there is more to this tradition's view of democratic legitimacy in terms of *what* political authority bureaucratic agencies are vested with in terms of their scope of action. An "important doctrine is the politics-administration formula; the notion that the work of government is divisible into two parts, decision and execution, and that execution (administration) is or can be made a science" (Waldo, 1984, p. 199). To recapitulate, bureaucracies function within the hierarchy of the government's separated powers. The political authority of the Constitution and elected officials is transferred to the agency itself, but not to the individual administrator or independent performance measures. To emphasize, the Constitutional tradition envisions political authority *residing within the government agency* and its structural placement within the Constitutional system of governance. Thus, if legitimacy in public management is sought, it must come to the administration *through* the political system (Lynn, 1996). The driving political idea behind this tradition is that politics is trusted to produce the Good—administration need only implement the directives from elected officials. In other words, politics is the expression of the public will and administration is the execution of that will (Goodnow, 1900). "Defined in broadest terms, *public administration consists of all those operations having for their purpose the fulfillment or enforcement of public policy*" (L. D. White, 1926, p. 3).

This limitation on administrative political authority is what gives rise to the notion of a difference in function between politics and administration. At the crux of this relationship is the question of *administrative discretion*, of which there are two poles: so much that administration inappropriately determines the will of the state, or so little that administration is merely an instrument of political leaders (Goodnow, 2003). The American form of government is actually somewhere between these two poles because it relies on the judiciary to exercise control over a hierarchical system in order to ensure the law is carried out appropriately. Goodnow (2003) identified three types of authority involved in public administration: judicial; executive; and administrative. The judicial and executive authorities reside with political expressions of the will

of the state, while administrative authority rests with the execution of that will. He promoted a complete separation of the two *functions* of government—the making of policy and the execution of policy. This approach was designed to avoid confusion between the separation of *powers* among the legislative, judicial, and executive arms of government, each of which have their own “administrative” components. In this way, “politics must have a certain control over administration” (Goodnow, 2003, p. 24). Administration was considered to be “the scientific, technical, and, so to speak, commercial activities of the government” (Goodnow, 1900, p. 17).

Goodnow was not alone in his thinking on the limited scope of action given to administration. To many theorists, the telling feature of the “orthodox” or Constitutional tradition is its conscious and purposeful split between the political authority vested in politics versus administration (R. B. Denhardt, 2000). L. D. White suggested, “In the highest reaches the administrative art touches the political, but it grows out of different soil” (1926, p. 8). In short, “administration lies outside the proper sphere of *politics*” (W. Wilson, 1887, p. 210). This idea has more recently been labeled the “politics/administration dichotomy” (Sayre, 1958). However, the line of demarcation has never been thought to be clear, particularly in the case of the distinction between constitutional and administrative issues (W. Wilson, 1887). It is not as simple as it appears to separate law making from law execution.

One model that categorizes theories about the relationship between politics and administration considers several considerations along two dimensions: (1) the nature of the hierarchical relationship; and (2) the differentiation of roles, distance between spheres, and choice of norms (Svara, 2006b). Two types emerge that share a hierarchically conceived relationship: Separate Roles and the Responsive Administrator. The Separate Roles model is likened to a straw man [*sic*] or ideal type that is not fully prescribed or found empirically, but rather is more likely to be manifested as the Responsive Administrator model. In other words, the possibility of both high and low levels of differentiation of function exists within a hierarchical relationship. But

using the lens of democratic legitimacy, the two types share a logic that relies on hierarchy to achieve legitimacy. The Constitutional tradition promotes a rather strict hierarchical relationship with the administration subordinate to the political realm, with differentiation between the two functions being important, regardless of debates regarding degree.

Some say this notion of functional separation within a shared hierarchy was clearly part of the field's founding, but was questioned increasingly in the 1930s and abandoned by mid-century (Waldo, 1984). Despite decreasing evidence of its empirical presence, many vestiges of this ideal remain: "not all students, or public officials, or citizens, accepted the demise of the policy-administration dichotomy, nor have they today" (Mosher, 1968, p. 84). Even in re-founding discussions, there have been calls to learn more about the distinctions of purpose and competencies between roles in politics and administration within the governance process (Wamsley et al., 1990b, p. 42). Most recently, it has been argued that there is yet value to the mutual noninterference and subordination of administration to political representatives ensured by the constitutional doctrine of the politics/administration dichotomy (Overeem, 2006).

However, a counter-argument has been made to abolish all assumptions about the politics/administration dichotomy from public administration theory in order to expose its implications to democratic legitimacy (Svara, 1999). From a close review of the literature prior to the late 1950s, Svara finds that the term dichotomy was rarely used before that time and never by those to whom it is attributed. An alternative model of *complementarity* has been present in the literature from Wilson onward, which stresses "interdependency, extensive interaction, distinct but overlapping roles, and political supremacy and administrative subordination coexisting with reciprocity of influence in both policy making and administration. To be answerable to the bureaucratic-political hierarchy does not suggest that administrators do nothing but implement. Complementarity means that politics and administration come together to form a whole in democratic governance" (Svara, 1999, p. 678).

From this and other readings of the literature, complementarity is a much more accurate depiction of “the habits of thought that are attributed to traditional public administration” (Lynn, 2001, p. 145). Yet, it must be emphasized that *even a less rigid functional division still maintains the logic of political authority residing with elected officials*. As noted early on, one body would have to be subordinated in order to maintain harmony in government, therefore “politics must have a certain control over administration” (Goodnow, 2003, p. 24). This may even be one idea that perpetuates the notion that dichotomies inherently promote domination.

In sum, regardless of how it is labeled or conceptualized, the Constitutional tradition honors the differing roles of politics and administration within government, suggesting that the defining difference is the *making* of policy versus its *implementation*, although the line of demarcation is not always clear (Barzelay & Armajani, 1992; Blau & Meyer, 1999; Finer, 1935; Goodnow, 1900; Gulick, 1937b; L. D. White, 1926; W. F. Willoughby, 1927; W. Wilson, 1887). Because it cannot be depicted as a stark boundary, Appleby suggested that the functional separation excluded administration from “any important—policy-making functions” (1949, p. 3). Such political authority must be limited within administration in order to ensure democratic legitimacy, while politics must be limited to ensure that it does not influence administration in its details and thus reduce efficiency and fairness. In short, a functional separation of politics and administration is thought to improve democratic legitimacy, and efficiency and due process are evidence of the appropriate delegation of political authority and scope of action.

Formulations of Responsibility and Accountability

As noted in the discussion of political ontology, the Constitutional tradition’s ideal role type of Bureaucrat can be described as Man-the-Citizen [*sic*]. “In this situation the rise of the new symbolism of responsibility is important. It represents an alternative or an additional way of conceiving and defining this existence of ours that is the material of our own actions (Niebuhr, 1963, p. 56). The responsibility of the Bureaucrat is therefore *accountability*, in which the

response to one's actions is considered prior to action (Harmon, 1990). Accountability is defined as "those methods, procedures, and forces that determine what values will be reflected in administrative decisions. Accountability is the enforcement of responsibility" (Simon et al., 1974, p. 513). Accountability assumes an authoritative relationship in which one party is entitled to demand answerability from another (Harmon, 1995). In this case, administrators are accountable to political masters. Therefore, the Constitutional tradition envisions the administrator as Servant. Administrative accountability is achieved through political and judicial oversight of administrators through a bureaucratic hierarchy, ensuring accountability to legal authority as well as fulfillment of a moral obligation to democratic values, including efficiency.

Morstein Marx argued that the four elements of bureaucracy are "(1) the essential of rationality, (2) the essential of responsibility, (3) the essential of competence, and (4) the essential of continuity" (Morstein Marx, 1957, p. 34). Universalistic administrative norms that advance the public interest have been described as fairness, impartiality, consistency, and objectivity (Svara, 2006b). Each of these values figures prominently in how the Constitutional tradition seeks to achieve accountability to political authority. In fact, it is in these formulations that it becomes apparent that what has been described by contemporary interpretations of the "traditional" and "orthodox" literature of public administration is commonly stilted and misread (Lynn, 2001). In truth, alongside concerns for technical rationality, neutral competence, and a focus on efficiency stand respect for law, politics, citizens, and democratic values. Thus, both technical and normative interpretations of accountability must be accommodated to meet the test of legitimacy in the Constitutional tradition. This is the unique characteristic of professionalism in the Constitutional tradition.

Given the Constitutional sources of political authority and democratic legitimacy, the functional division of politics and administration, and the reliance on hierarchical controls to ensure political control in this tradition, accountability must be shown to elected officials and to

the organization's legally embodied practices. This is a complicated endeavor due to the separation of powers and unclear boundaries between politics and administration—both functions are present in all elements of government, whether considered as the standard tripartite, the three arms plus the addition of administration, or a complex of five systems: executive, legislative, judicial, administrative, and electoral (Rohr, 1986; Terry, 1995; Waldo, 1984; L. D. White, 1926; W. F. Willoughby, 1927). “A system of responsibility is the sum total of the constitutional, statutory, administrative, and juridical rules and precedents and the established practices by means of which public officials may be held accountable for their official actions” (L. D. White, 1926, p. 574). Our system of administrative responsibility is actually two-fold: to the law via the courts; and to the people via elected representatives and citizens (L. D. White, 1926). Both have responsibility for the control of public officials as an integral part of the Constitutional system. Therefore, administrative conservators must continually balance “the inherent tension in the political system between the need to serve and the need to preserve” (Terry, 1995, p. 60). In the political arena, citizens empower elected officials to represent their interests through the formulation of public policy and law. Those policies and laws are then implemented by professional administrators and enforced by the judiciary.

To ensure accountability, political control can occur either through direct legislative oversight or through reliance on the administration to handle the details in a principal-agent relationship via the executive in a manner similar to the relationship between a board of directors and the Chief Executive Officer of a corporation (W. F. Willoughby, 1936). Stever (1988) points to two strategies in the pursuit of legitimacy that fit within the Constitutional tradition's formulation of responsibility as accountability: procedures and supervision. Procedures ensure competence and efficiency, as well as adherence to legal and policy principles established through the political process. Supervision by elected officials implements the representative democratic formula for indirect popular control via the hierarchy. The first is aligned with a more

technical approach, while the latter relies principally upon the administrative hierarchy, while both rely, to some extent, on Constitutional values. These two approaches reflect two formulations of responsibility and accountability within the Constitutional tradition: neutral competence and agency conservation. At face value, these could be linked to different forms of political authority and democratic legitimacy. For example, non-executive authority is given by knowledge in a field or competence in performance, while executive authority is given by law (DeGeorge, 1985). However, in the Constitutional tradition, both legal and technical sources of authority are assumed to be delegated *through* the political-administrative hierarchy, revealing the shared legitimacy logic of both technical and normative concerns. Indeed, Weber (1968) even named the rationality of the bureaucratic approach “legal-rational.”

Responsibility and Accountability through Neutral Competence

Before explaining this approach to responsibility and accountability, it is important to note what is meant by the term “neutral competence.” As in most uses, competence refers the ability to do a given task well. However, in public administration, the term “neutral” is used in different ways. One meaning infers that an opinion is formed or action is taken without political influence (Svara, 2006b). Another meaning suggests that administrators are not involved in partisan politics, while possibly being involved in policy politics (Overeem, 2005). The meaning used here infers that an administrative opinion is formed based on values that have been given by political masters. In other words, neutral administrators decide and act based on the values given to them by their political superiors rather than based on their own value choices. “Bureaucrats are essentially contractors in lieu of the public. They are not necessarily the initiators, but rather the purveyors of the public mandate as may be captured in the constitutional (legitimate) authority of the government under which they operate” (Kalu, 2003, p. 541). In the legitimacy logic of the Constitutional tradition, this form of neutrality—subordinating personal opinions to direction from the Constitutional political order—is a good thing when it comes to end values. However,

political influence becomes negative if applied through inappropriate (e.g. unconstitutional) means of influence. Preventing this type of corrupt influence was one of the founding motivations for the field itself. This is why the functional division of the scope of authority is so important in this tradition. In sum, “neutral competence” refers to the administrative ability to do a given task well, assuming that the task itself has been chosen by the politicians through appropriate Constitutional procedures without corruption. This type of neutral competence has also been called “responsive competence” (Svara, 2006b).

At the time when public administration became a unique focus of study, the Western world in general was captivated by positivist science as applied to technical fields such as physics, biology, and engineering. Expertise itself implied authority (Stivers, 2000b). Perhaps because of this overwhelming social sentiment, Wilson made the early call for a science of administration that would produce a highly trained corps of civil servants (W. Wilson, 1887). These sentiments are explored in detail in two reconsiderations of the field’s literature, one based on feminist theory and one based on a critical account of the legitimacy question (McSwite, 1997; Stivers, 2000a). Both find a guiding presence within the field of those who are characterized as “Bureau Men” and “Men of Reason,” respectively. These men [*sic*] initiated the desire for a science and business of administration and promoted it through their research, textbooks, and training approaches for practice. In their view, the administrative system should embrace “semi-scientific, *quasi*-judicial and *quasi*-business or commercial activity—work which has little if any influence on the expression of the true state will... Such a force should be free from the influence of politics because of the fact that their mission is the exercise of foresight and discretion, the pursuit of truth, the gathering of information, the maintenance of a strictly impartial attitude toward the individual with whom they have dealings, and the provision of the most efficient possible administrative organization” (Goodnow, 2003, p. 85). This notion of competence stems

from two related ideas of competence: one stemming from business and one coming from science.

The business approach to competence is based on the criterion of efficiency and the application of scientific method (W. F. Willoughby, 1927). The key measure of competence from this perspective is therefore *efficiency*. “The immediate objective of the art of public administration is the most efficient utilization of resources at the disposal of officials and employees. Good management seeks the elimination of waste, the conservation and effective use of men [*sic*] and materials, and the protections of the welfare and interests of employees” (L. D. White, 1926, p. 5). Thus, the very point of L. D. White’s original text was to produce systematic analysis of our administrative system from a management rather than a legal perspective. He asserts that the basis of the study of public administration should be management, rather than law, pulling together two decades’ worth of material written about the “business side of government” (L. D. White, 1926, p. xiii).

The scientific approach to competence is slightly different, although it utilizes the same criterion of efficiency. As administrative study progressed, principles of efficient administration were sought that would provide standards for organizational design and management as well as technical guidelines for discretionary decisions during operations (Gulick & Urwick, 1937). The field was urged to develop a more scientific approach to the identification of these principles through hypothesis, verification, and proposition (Simon, 1976; L. D. White, 1936; W. F. Willoughby, 1927). “Administration is still primarily an art but attaches importance to the significant tendency to transform it into a science” (L. D. White, 1926, p. xiii). Closely aligned with this scientific conceptualization of expertise is the notion of *neutrality*, which is an operationalization of positivist scientific claim that objective positions exist from which one can perceive the truth. In this position, personal biases and subjectivity cannot interfere with

judgment. Thus, a neutral Bureaucrat can be guided purely by the procedures given to him rather than by his own moral compass, ensuring accountability to the organization (J. Q. Wilson, 1975).

The early thinking about the functional separation of politics and administration was that it offered a way to eradicate the spoils system from government and improve professionalism through merit-based systems (Goodnow, 2003; W. F. Willoughby, 1927; W. Wilson, 1887). The legislature, as a board of directors, is not professional: “From the policy-determining and order-giving standpoint, the direction of governmental affairs is, and probably always will be, in the hands of a nonprofessional class” (W. F. Willoughby, 1927, p. 2). If legislators can stick to their job of establishing only broad goals and allow the professional administration to focus on efficient execution, governmental efficiency can be achieved without diminishing political authority. Rohr suggests this was an important weapon in the reformers’ arsenal of ideas: “It permitted them to argue that a merit system was indeed compatible with democratic government” (Goodnow, 2003, p. xvi-xvii). In sum, merit would guide administrative selection and professional practice while maintaining the legitimate authority of elected officials in the making of policy (Goodnow, 1900; W. Wilson, 1887).

Ideas about achieving legitimacy through efficiency were quite prevalent among the early thinkers in public administration. While this linkage may seem odd, the syllogistic logic is revealed in its ontological and historical origins. As noted in the previous section, the principal purpose of civil states is to ensure utilitarian results—the pursuit of happiness. Efficiency is a measure of utilitarian success. Therefore, authority in a legal-rational society is conferred to institutions that are efficient (Weber, 1954). At the establishment of the field, Progressive reformers linked political corruption and abuses to waste, fraud, and other forms of inefficiency caused by self-interest and personal beliefs (Stivers, 2000a). If such individual biases are implicated in the political abuses the Progressives sought to reform, then democratic ideals are best served by separating administrative fact-based practices from the influences of political value

discussions and processes (W. Wilson, 1887). This meant that a separation of political and administrative functions would best serve democracy, even though most of those who promoted this ideal recognized that it was rarely achieved (Barzelay & Armajani, 1992; Blau & Meyer, 1999; Finer, 1935; Goodnow, 1900; Gulick, 1937b; L. D. White, 1926; W. F. Willoughby, 1927; W. Wilson, 1887). *Legitimate* government would not tolerate incompetence and inefficiency, because that would not be in the public interest, nor would it be fair. Therefore, efficient government would be legitimate government, and the scope of authority granted to administration would be limited to efficient implementation of political mandates.

In sum, through principles of administration scientifically identified in the efficient hierarchical organizational structures of business, the Bureau Men [*sic*] and Men of Reason [*sic*] sought to systematize, centralize, and neutralize administration. These were the techniques chosen to “gain and maintain control over their bureaucracies so they function for the benefit of the commonweal rather than for that of bureaucrats themselves or of special interests...” (Blau & Meyer, 1999, p. 4). However, they did not seek to remove administration from its political oversight. Rather than challenging the political system directly, they were using somewhat of a back door to political reform by sequestering the power of execution in the hands of professional administrators while still answering to the hierarchical political order. This is the defining characteristic of the Constitutional approach to scientific administration: *expertise remains under the guidance and control of the organization, which itself must answer to political masters*. The foundation of authority must be a combination of the administration’s knowledge and responsibility to the legislators who are in turn responsible for making policy and answering to the sovereign people (W. Wilson, 1887). This formulation of responsibility ensures accountability to the political system of oversight that is assumed to ensure democratic legitimacy. While public administration might operate in large part like a business, it remains part of *government*. Therefore, Bureaucrats adopt an expert persona, but one that is ultimately in the service of the

citizenry via the three branches of government. Finer's position promoting hierarchical controls and opposing a reliance on some form of internalized or personal moral responsibility exemplifies this approach to political responsibility (Finer, 1941).

Responsibility and Accountability through Agency Conservation

The notion that responsibility and accountability must be achieved through the government organization itself has a more normative face that complements the technical approach described as neutral competence. This approach is based on the notion that because the business of government is publicly rather than privately oriented, it is different in important ways that can either make or break democracy (Allison, 1979; Wamsley, 1990a; W. Wilson, 1887). Allison (1979) considers these variations to stem from a fundamental constitutional difference in which private organizations are meant to pursue efficiency using any means available, while governments are designed to do so *while preventing the exercise of arbitrary power*. In this way, the complementary pairing of administration and politics ensures democratic results. Therefore, more than technical competence is needed to achieve responsibility and accountability. Competence must be tied to the Constitution and its regime values because "public administration is detailed and systematic execution of public law" (W. Wilson, 1887, p. 212).

The Constitutional tradition deems this link to the Constitution critical to democratic legitimacy: "The principles on which to base a science of administration for America must be principles which have democratic policy very much at heart" (W. Wilson, 1887, p. 220). In fact, Wilson was one of the first to call for comparative studies to determine whether or not "administration stands upon an essentially different basis in a democratic state from that on which it stands in a non-democratic state" (1887, p. 218). This idea continues in contemporary discussions of the importance of re-founding public administration because constitutions represent the social constructs by which we seek to govern ourselves, and public administration

was founded along with the Constitution, not when it emerged as a field of study (Wamsley, 1990b).

The Constitutional or legal approach to accountability is based on three sources: administrative law; judicialization of administrative procedure and decision making; and Constitutional law (Rosenbloom, 1983). As such, it is particularly focused on procedural due process and fair treatment as well as Constitutional rights guaranteed through the Bill of Rights and Fourteenth Amendment. This focus in large part mirrors the neutral competence approach; accountability to the Constitution and regime values is ensured through the hierarchical system of authority and control. In what has been called a Burkean approach to administration, after the 18th century political philosopher, Bureaucrats must “accept that their discretion, like the discretion of citizens in general, be governed by rules and procedures and informed and constrained by a respect for past practice and tradition” (A. U. Haque & Spicer, 1997, p. 94).

The Constitutional view envisions the institutions of government themselves as *embodying* the nation’s traditional regime values. “In their broader context, the ends of administration are the ultimate objects of the state itself... in short, the attainment of the good life” (L. D. White, 1926, p. 5). One traditionalist working principle is that if the agency is the nexus for public interest determination, then “those in agencies could regard the well-being, even the growth, of their agency as equivalent to the public weal” (O. F. White & McSwain, 1990, p. 30). Thus, conservation of those institutions represents *de facto* political responsibility and accountability. Perhaps the most erudite explication of this idea is offered in Terry’s (1995) normative theory of “conservatorship.” Most of his theory is focused on preservation of organizational mission, values, and support. In conserving mission, administrative conservators are preserving the formative mandates of the organization that have come from the constitutional masters. “Properly conceptualized, administrative conservatorship is the willingness of *administrative elites*, out of traditional loyalty and moral principles, to preserve authority and

distribution of power with regard to the propriety of an *institution's* existence, its functional niche, and its collective institutional goals” (Terry, 1995, p. 26). This same logic underlies the deontological, or rule- and duty-based view of achieving legitimacy that is held by the Constitutional tradition. In essence, the institution itself holds political authority, thus its agents are accountable to the institution, and obedience or duty to that institution’s rules fulfills their moral obligation (Harmon, 1995).

To clarify the boundaries of the Constitutional logic, it should be noted that this notion of agency conservation has evolved in much of the New Public Administration discussion. However, most of those theories assume or promote significant administrative discretion, which is *inconsistent* with the legitimacy logic of the Constitutional tradition (Rohr, 1990; Terry, 1995; Wamsley, 1990a). Therefore, many of these ideas are discussed in more detail in explication of the Discretionary tradition. To illustrate and emphasize this point, Rohr (1990) reinterprets the meaning of the Constitutional role of public administration. First, he defines the role of public administration as described in *The Federalist Papers*: an administration vital in maintaining the regime of liberty. As such, public administration is given constitutional authority based on three points: “(1) that administrative institutions are not inconsistent with the constitutional principle of separation of powers; (2) that the higher reaches of the career civil service fulfill the framers’ original intent for the Senate; (3) that the entire career civil service provides a remedy for a serious defect in the Constitution—the inadequate representation that so distressed the Anti-Federalists of 1787-1788” (Rohr, 1990, p. 55). Thus, it is not only aligned with the Constitution, but remedies one of its major defects. The notion that the administration achieves its legitimacy by virtue of being an integral component of the political system is aligned with the Constitutional tradition. But to suggest that the administration plays a *representative* political role that supplants the three arms of government is not. This assertion directly violates the logic of legitimacy in the Constitutional tradition.

Associated Decision Making Rationality

In the Constitutional tradition, due to the desired functional split between politics and administration, *two* decision making rationalities are implied. In the political sphere, *strategic rationality* prevails, while in the administrative sphere, *technical rationality* is promoted. Both are instrumental in nature, and together, they make “the collective brain that somehow thinks or emotes a government policy” (Long, 1996, p. 149). According to Weber, non-technical rationality can be framed as *affective* or *substantive* in nature, relating respectively to *charismatic* and *traditional* forms of authority (Gerth & Mills, 1946). However, substantive rationality can also be described as purposive in its pursuit of values, and divided into *instrumental* and *strategic* forms (Erikson & Weigard, 2003). Instrumental rationality seeks utilitarian ends in the most *efficient* manner. Strategic rationality seeks substantive ends in the most *effective* manner. The term *technical* is often used instead of *instrumental* in order to avoid the confusion caused by the shared teleological nature of the two types of purposive rationality.

Strategic rationality is instrumental in nature, but its principal goal is to win. Habermas asserts that strategic action is the ideal of social interactions *oriented to success* (Erikson & Weigard, 2003). In other words, a particular value or objective is held firmly throughout a competition of interests until decisions are reached through either victory or other form of agreement. Strategic rationality pursues instrumental ends under uncertain social conditions. Therefore, in this approach to rationality, people and processes are treated as means to an end. Strategic rationality is grounded in the liberal political philosophy of pluralism. Its key applications can be found in group and pluralist interpretations and contextual interpretations of public policy making and its outcomes. Such interpretations emphasize: (1) the search for common concerns; (2) reasonable trade-offs among conflicting values; (3) mutually beneficial outcomes for diverse groups; (4) compromise and the acceptance of modest net gains; and (5) bargaining and log-rolling (Dye, 2002). As an instrumental approach, the political process may

seek utility maximization, but with consideration of many variables in a complex and often unpredictable social environment riddled with power and controversy. Therefore, rather than maximized utility, strategic rationality seeks compromise and agreement, allowing for strategic trading and negotiation among parties (Rein & Schon, 1993).

Technical rationality is a form of purposive rationality which pursues the “methodical attainment of a definitely given and practical end by means of an increasingly precise calculation of adequate means” (Gerth & Mills, 1946, p. 293). As such, it is linked to the legal authority and jurist procedures of the Constitutional tradition. However, Habermas asserts that the individually utilitarian perspective of instrumental rationality is the ideal of nonsocial action (e.g., market exchange) (Erikson & Weigard, 2003). In simpler terms, *technical rationality seeks efficiency in instrumental pursuits*, either individually or in aggregated form. Beyond efficient process and results, it seeks no other value, and is not capable of evaluating any other value.

Technical rationality assumes a difference between facts and values, and excludes all values but efficiency. It seeks a high degree of comprehensiveness and objectivity or value neutrality. Technical rationality is philosophically and ideologically based on liberal utilitarian theory (Bentham, 1988; Mill, 1999; Weimer & Vining, 1999). Simply put, human beings pursue that which is in their self-interest. Many scholars support the utilitarian model because it is aligned with individualism and the democratic prioritization of the rights of individuals (Buchanan, 1966). It is founded on the utilitarian pursuit of efficiency, assuming rational actors in the model of *economic man [sic]* (Jenkins-Smith, 1990; MacRae & Wilde, 1979). Decisions are made based on calculations and assessments of those interests. At a collective level, the utilitarian principle “requires that social welfare be maximized” (Paris & Reynolds, 1983, p. 157). A technically rational process would have comprehensive knowledge of: (1) all criteria that should govern the choice; (2) all means of achieving those criteria; (3) all probable consequences of those means; and (4) a choice of means that is made based on an acceptable level of efficiency

(Braybrooke & Lindblom, 1963). This comprehensive rational decision making approach is based on Descartes's *Discourse on Method* (Forester, 1989). It has also been called a Euclidian model of thought and practice (Freidmann, 2003).

The influence of political strategic rationality on administrative technical rationality creates a hybrid form of rationality for governance. Herbert Simon described this as "bounded rationality" whereby rather than acting as the ideal *economic man* [*sic*], people in organizations tend to act as *administrative man* [*sic*] (Simon, 1956, 1966). Specifically, rationality is limited by not only human capacity, but by organizational controls and political considerations as well (Lindblom, 1965; Simon, 1947, 1976). This process is described as a middle way or moderate approach to instrumental rationality that lies somewhere between pure economic or technical rationality and pure affective rationality. Building off this decision making theory, Lindblom (1965) similarly views public administration in a place of tension between administrative and political goals. The policy making process more typically makes incremental changes in a trial and error fashion within the limits of political feasibility (Braybrooke & Lindblom, 1963; Lindblom, 2003; Simon, 1956, 1966). A variation called "mixed scanning" has also been offered (Etzioni, 1967). From the perspective of the Constitutional tradition, this hybrid form of decision making rationality is appropriate because it allows consideration of utilitarian objectives moderated by rules and procedures established through the negotiation processes of the legitimate political system.

Such an epistemological blend is possible because both strategic and technical rationality share the positivist ontology. As has been noted, many elements of what constitutes knowledge and reality in "the orthodoxy" belong to the Constitutional tradition of public administration (R. B. Denhardt, 2000). Specifically, there is an aspiration toward positive knowledge that will enable certainty in the ability to describe, predict, and control behavior both within administrative systems and society. The scientific method is used to acquire factual knowledge, test theory, and

design models. Inductive and deductive reasoning supports such study, and instrumental reasoning is a process that follows rules of deductive inference (J. D. White, 1990a). There is an assumption that objectivity can be achieved by controlling subjective or biased tendencies. The ideal is to achieve the greatest degree of rationality within an often irrational political context. While still in the academy, Woodrow Wilson called for a science of administration to determine what government can “properly and successfully do... with the utmost possible efficiency and at the least possible cost either of money or energy” (W. Wilson, 1887, p. 197). His purpose was clearly to “make its business less unbusinesslike” (W. Wilson, 1887, p. 201).

However, Wilson was equally concerned about the relationship to politics and constitutional law and its substantive values. The Constitutional tradition accepts that just as the line between politics and administration is unclear, so is the line between fact and value. Thus, one traditionalist working principle is that administration should be pragmatic and experimental (O. F. White & McSwain, 1990). Administrative science must be pragmatic because it is questionable “whether means can be divorced from the ends they serve” (Waldo, 1984, p. 38). Even the fiercest proponent of rational decision making notes the cascading nature of means-ends chains, where one end becomes the means for another (Simon, 1976). Of course, rather than challenging his own fact-value split, Simon merely stated that one cannot equate means with facts and ends with values due to this interrelation. But the point remains that these divisions are not clear-cut, if they are possible at all. Therefore, decision making rationality in the Constitutional tradition of public administration falls back on proven principles and authoritative agency rules (Harmon & Mayer, 1986; Ostrom, 1976). These rules determine where administrative ends leave off and political ends begin in order to maintain legitimacy in governance.

Because of this unique blend of rationalities, the Constitutional tradition has been differentiated by its reliance on an administrative logic of procedural law (Considine & Lewis, 1999). Ostrom considers four decision making arrangements that are available to collective

action, one of which is bureaucratic organization. In this arrangement, “Decision rules as prescriptive propositions stated in a language of authority relationships are used to allocate and control the exercise of decision-making capabilities” (Ostrom, 1976, p. 10). In other words, the decision rules of bureaucracy are based on contractual requirements (Harmon & Mayer, 1986). The ultimate ends are given by the legislative or judicial arms of government to the executive, and from the executive to the administrative hierarchy. Therefore, decisions are made only in regard to the means and intermediary ends required to achieve the given goals. Harmon calls those using a strictly deontological approach to decision making “hard-core rationalists” (Harmon, 1995). However, this terminology could be contested because in terms of microeconomic theory, a pure rationalist approach would be *teleological* in nature, seeking only the consequence of efficiency. On the contrary, in the deontological decision making of the administrative context, rationality is moderated by its compliance with rules and procedures.

Appleby (1952) describes political decision making, some of which is delegated to the political rather than the administrative functions. He suggests that to achieve democratic morality, decision making must have three characteristics: (1) conformance to established processes and symbols of freedom; (2) open-ended public approval, modification, or reversal; and (3) embodiment of popularly felt needs (Appleby, 1952). The criteria of efficiency or factual correctness do not show up on this list because they “have no meaning in relation to the purely valuational elements in decision. A democratic state is committed to popular control over these value elements, and the distinction of value from fact is of basic importance in securing a proper relation between policy-making and administration” (Simon, 1976, p. 197).

However, the problem with substantive values is that any attempt to definitively identify the public will can fall prey to tyrannies of both majority and minority either in the political or administrative sphere. To protect against these risks, “Their realization is dependent upon detailed processes and arrangements” (Appleby, 1952, p. 36). This is why law is one of the foundations of

public administration. “The cornerstone of due process, in other words, is laid in the politics of popular control of representative government” (Appleby, 1952, p. 99). In this way, while administration is accountable to the established processes, politics is the means through which public approval and popular opinion finds its impact.

As a result of procedural constraints, bureaucratic decision making is often critiqued as less than perfectly rational and efficient. However, in the Constitutional tradition, efficiency more appropriately means *effectiveness* rather than a pure economic ratio of cost to benefit (Simon, 1976). “At the heart of ‘orthodox’ ideology is the postulate that true democracy and true efficiency are synonymous, or at least reconcilable... Another important doctrine is the politics-administration formula notion that the work of government is divisible into two parts, decision and execution, and that execution (administration) is or can be made a science” (Waldo, 1984, p. 199). This formulation melds the concept of economic efficiency promoted by neutral competence with the conservation of established regime goals ensured through externally-imposed decision rules. It is practical in nature, but formal and procedural. It is neither the instrumental rationality of science and its derivatives, nor is it the strategic rationality of markets and competitive pluralism.

Associated Organizing Style

As discussed in some detail in previous sections, the Constitutional tradition assumes a hierarchical distribution of political authority and accountability. Therefore, it cannot achieve its interpretation of democratic legitimacy without a matching hierarchical organizing style. In fact, the bureaucratic hierarchical form itself is associated with “the orthodoxy” (R. B. Denhardt, 2000). Bureaucracy emerged as the principal organizational design in public organizations because it accommodates the recommended approach to responsibility and accountability demanded by this tradition’s legitimacy logic. First, hierarchy was considered to be the most

efficient form of organization, thus facilitating the notion of responsibility and accountability through competence, and the Classical Liberal ideal of rational self-interest.

However, to achieve its more Conservative values, bureaucracy provides the hierarchical mechanism through which to allocate political authority, ensure responsibility, and demand accountability (Barzelay, 1992). Hierarchy is considered by many to be essential throughout society to: (1) utilize differences in ability; (2) define and guide smooth social interaction; (3) provide elite role models for motivation; and (4) support identity formation through clear social status distinctions (Clark, 1998). “The organization is conceived as largely a control mechanism. The emphasis is on formality, rules and regulations. People are regarded as atomistic, passive and rational in their responses; and assessments of results/outcomes are to be based on technical efficiency.... Those well-versed in social theory would readily recognize this technical orientation as ultimately derived from a structural-functionalist vision of the world” (Carr, 2000, p. 289). In short, the Constitutional tradition is focused on the administrative value of security (Hood, 1991).

Reliance on proven principles of administration and the instrumental pursuit of efficiency are associated with “the orthodoxy” (R. B. Denhardt, 2000). Administrative principles were first developed based on studies of the bureaucratic model and its efficiencies (Gulick & Urwick, 1937; W. F. Willoughby, 1927). For example, Max Weber developed an ideal type of bureaucracy through the sociological study of numerous military and European state organizations. He identified what he believed to be the distinctive characteristics of bureaucracy, in addition to making a critique of its potential negative implications to society. The defining features of bureaucracy are outlined in six characteristics:

1. Fixed jurisdictional areas are established and ordered by rules, laws, or administrative regulations.
2. Authority is distributed in a hierarchical system of supervision.

3. Management relies upon written documents kept on file by the organization.
4. Managers are thoroughly trained experts.
5. The office itself demands full time commitment of the manager, regardless of time obligations in the workplace.
6. The office dictates stable, exhaustive rules that can be learned, including technical knowledge, jurisprudence, and administrative management. (Weber, 2004)

According to Weber's ideal type, bureaucracy is characterized by hierarchical authority and control; division of labor; and formal rules, policies, and procedures (Gerth & Mills, 1946). Following, the principles of administration believed to be necessary for efficient production in large scale, highly technical activities are: specialization or division of labor; hierarchy of authority and systems of control; rules and procedures to ensure uniformity; neutrality or disinterestedness; and placement based on merit or skill (Blau & Meyer, 1999). The classic explication of bureaucratic organization in public administration can be found in the edited volume, *Papers on the Science of Administration* (Gulick & Urwick, 1937). In addition to the principles mentioned, the functions of the executive within this system based on Fayol's theory of administration are: planning, organizing, staffing, directing, coordinating, reporting, and budgeting (POSDCORB) (Gulick, 1937a).

Most of these early principles were devices used to guide operations such as organization, budgeting, accounting, purchasing, and personnel management. Many scholars that followed opposed the tendency to accept heuristic principles as opposed to empirically verified laws or deductive axioms derived from the application of scientific methods (Stene, 1940; W. F. Willoughby, 1919). Simon also challenged the use of *principles*, insisting that only through *scientific study* can administrative theory hope to provide guidance as to how to achieve the proper balance of these principles in a given organization. Simon deconstructs each principle,

showing that they can call for contradictory actions, but are nonetheless “equally applicable to the administrative situation” (Simon, 1976, p. 35). In the end, he is not really challenging the principles: “almost everything can be salvaged” (Simon, 1976, p. 35). Rather, the principles become criteria for description and diagnosis to improve administrative efficiency. In all, scientific approaches to management sought to identify and prescribe the one best way to accomplish tasks, not only in terms of production technique, but also in terms of social organization and management (Shafritz et al., 2004). These early forms of scientific management made an analogy between organizations and machines. “The bureaucratic ‘machine model’ was developed as a reaction against the personal subjugation, nepotism, cruelty, and capricious and subjective judgments that often passed for managerial practices during the early days of the Industrial Revolution. Bureaucracy emerged out of the need for more predictability, order, and precision” (Bennis, 1967, p. 6).

However, the problems identified are of even more concern in the context of public organizations. In addition to technical efficiency, *government* bureaucracies are also designed to achieve goals of reliability and fairness (Considine & Lewis, 1999). To fit the legitimacy logic of the Constitutional tradition, bureaucracy must be based on the vision indicated in the Federalist papers rather than on Weber or Wilson’s interpretation of French and Prussian institutions which were much more technical and autocratic bureaucracies (Ostrom, 1976; Tullock, 1965). The form and functions of administrative affairs were discussed during the founding of the United States government (Shafritz et al., 2004). Looking to those founding documents provides a better explanation of this tradition’s dual focus on efficient administrative hierarchy and the overarching concern of Constitutional values. Simplistic measures of efficiency are not considered sufficient to ensure legitimacy. Both technical and normative goals must be ensured by hierarchical authority. Thus, a behaviorally-oriented management approach is used to ensure “an *expectation of obedience* by the one and a *willingness to obey* by the other” (Simon, 1976, p. 126).

Implications for Role Conceptualization

In sketch, Bureaucrats views citizens as constituents to be guided according to legal and procedural standards that ensure the just treatment of individuals as well as the public interest as a whole. Because citizens are at risk of becoming overly self-interested or an “irrational mass,” the state and its administrators must make the right decisions on their behalf. One way to describe the Bureaucrat role conceptualization is to envision prescriptions for practice using a familiar model. The topical principles of action considered in the *New Public Service: Serving, Not Steering* can be used to identify key administrative prescriptions by using their generic form (J. V. Denhardt & Denhardt, 2003). Many of these principals have been described in the various elements of the tradition, but are recapitulated in Table 2 in a form that may be more common to role descriptions.

Table 2

Constitutional Tradition Prescriptions for Practice

<i>Administrative Principle</i>	<i>Bureaucrat Ideal Type</i>
Defining the Public Interest	The public interest should be defined by elected officials. Public administrators determine how best to achieve it.
Source of Guidance	Public administrators should look to the leadership of elected officials for policy direction as interpreted by management.
Primary Allegiance	Public administrators are primarily responsible to management.
Scope of Action	Public policy should be implemented by expert public administrators.
Accountability Approach	Public administrators are sufficiently accountable to the public by meeting guidelines established by their agency.
Path to Productivity	Productivity is best reached through adherence to agency rules and procedures.
Principal Task	Public administrators best contribute to the public good by providing unbiased, expert guidance to policy-makers and implementation of the policies they make.

Because the Bureaucrat's role is in large part confined to the bureau itself, much discussion of role in the Constitutional tradition is focused on the administrator's role within the *organization* rather than within society or the system of governance. "The art of administration is the direction, coordination, and control of many persons to achieve some purpose or objective... An administrator is consequently one who directs, coordinates, and controls the activities of others" (L. D. White, 1926, p. 4). As might be predicted based on the bureaucratic organizing style, Denhardt (1981a) uses Eugene Genovese's Master/Slave relationship as a metaphor for the dialectical tension created by relationships of power and authority in bureaucratic organizations. When responsibility and accountability are formulated in terms of the institution itself, the hierarchical organizing style establishes a series of Master/Servant relationships extending to the top of the organization, and from the organization to political overseers in the three branches of government. Individuals within those organizations are at once Masters in their roles as sovereign citizens, but Servants in their roles as public employees.

The Master/Servant metaphor holds when considering the Constitutional role conceptualization of the public administrator to society. The importance of the attitude of service as subordination is emphasized in the early textbooks of the field. While public administrators should be substantive experts capable of organizational diagnosis and recommendations for action, they should avoid deciding which values to pursue. These decisions should be left to the political process because "a person primarily interested in doing a job *efficiently* may make a recommendation different from that of a person interested in doing the job so as to preserve *democratic responsibility*, and different again from a person interested in doing it in a manner that will interfere as little as possible with the property or other *rights of individuals*" (Simon et al., 1974, p. 21).

In combination, all the elements of the Constitutional tradition combine to deemphasize administrator's role as an *individual*—"as ego or career oriented, as objective rational decision

maker, or as independent willful political actor” (O. F. White & McSwain, 1990, p. 35). For example, the Constitutional tradition creates a “freedom-responsibility dichotomy... because administrators are not chosen by the electorate they are not free to act as advocates of policies or to allow their personal values to influence significantly the manner in which policies are implemented” (Harmon, 1971, p. 176). Therefore, one traditionalist working principle is that an appropriate sense of humility was a key skill for administrative action. Instead of an active role conception, the notion of the public interest provides “a transcendent vocational symbol” (O. F. White & McSwain, 1990, p. 34). In the Constitutional tradition, the elected leaders of the hierarchical system of authority and organization are the ones to determine precisely what is in the public interest.

It has been suggested that the orthodox approach to public administration takes a purely instrumental view, in which practitioners are merely *tools* of the elected representatives of the citizenry to accomplish public goals (Box, 2004). They are value-free implementers who follow procedures as dictated by elected officials (Box, 1998). One of the role conceptualizations noted in the Blacksburg Manifesto is that of *servant*, which infers both responsibility to the Constitution and professional (e.g. neutral) competence (Wolf & Bacher, 1990). Other metaphors include: (1) a *functionary* who is fully subordinate and instrumental to politically defined ends; (2) a professional or expert who is a competent analyst and *implementer*; or (3) an interest broker or market manager who mediates among interest groups as a disinterested arbiter or *neutral civil servant* (Catron & Hammond, 1990). In other words, the role of Bureaucrat is one of *passive public servant* (Reich, 1990). To ensure this role conception, in bureaucratic organizations, power, authority, and management techniques such as training and indoctrination are used to ensure appropriate role-taking on the part of administrators (Simon, 1976).

However, none of these descriptors necessitate a pejorative connotation. From the perspective of the Constitutional tradition, government *for* the people is precisely what the

Constitution demands of the administrative agencies of government. In a harmonizing complementarity of functional roles, the Constitution itself ensures government *of* the people, political representatives ensure government *by* the people, and neutral, competent administrators produce what is desired *for* the people. In the Constitutional tradition, the government controls decision making processes, including who will be involved, the parameters of choices, and the decisions themselves. In summary, the characteristics of the ideal type role conceptualization of *Bureaucrat* are presented in Table 3.

Table 3

Bureaucrat Role Conceptualization Summary

<i>Role Type</i>	<i>Bureaucrat</i>	
<i>Element</i>	<i>Technical Side</i>	<i>Normative Side</i>
Principal PA Theory	Orthodoxy or Traditionalist	Traditionalist or New Public Administration
Legitimacy Problems (within tradition)	Failure to follow hierarchical rules and procedures	Failure to reflect political direction and obtain authority via hierarchy
Key role characteristics	Politically neutral competence; following management directives	Conservator of agency and regime values as interpreted by legislature, judiciary, and executive; public servant
Administrative Role Conception	Administrator as Man-the-Citizen; the Servant role in representative government; Bureaucrat who sees Citizens as abstract objects or passive recipients—interaction is guided by political mandate and hierarchical procedure	
Assumed Governance Context	Political State—representative democracy; governance is conducted through government organizations	
Political Ontology	Classical Liberalism and Conservatism; the Political elite represent the One	
Political Authority and Scope of Action	Use a functional dichotomy to ensure legitimacy via the representative political system— hierarchical control answering to legislators, judiciary, and the executive ensures legitimacy	
Source of Legitimacy	Elected representatives	
Responsibility and Accountability	Trusts politics to produce the Good; administrators serve the system through hierarchical procedures and rules; bureaucratic accountability	
Administrative Decision Making Rationality	Deontological: instrumental rationality (administrative)—strict procedural rules ensure the best result (technically or normatively)	
Organizing Style	Bureaucratic hierarchy (deep)	

CHAPTER 5: THE DISCRETIONARY TRADITION

This chapter will describe the elements comprising the Discretionary tradition of public administration, which promotes the ideal type role conceptualization of *Entrepreneur* in its fullest meaning. The research questions considered in this chapter are:

What are the key elements of public administration theory that contribute to role conceptualization?

How do these elements coalesce into varying coherent sets based on the concept of democratic legitimacy?

The reader may jump to a number of conclusions upon seeing the label *entrepreneur*. Many of the terms used in public administration carry intellectual baggage and connotations that can cause premature conclusions (Farmer, 2006; Svara, 1999). Some feel “it is tempting to think that the term *entrepreneur* should be widened and liberated from the notion of financial support and market risk,” while others doubt that this is possible (Farmer, 1995, p. 109; Terry, 1993). Thus, a request is made to place these evaluations on hold for the moment to consider the meaning inferred in this inquiry. To do so, one must accept the notion that “one single term may refer to different concepts, while different terms may refer to one single concept” (Overeem, 2006). Furthermore, meanings do change with time and place: “As a concept, entrepreneurship is now multidimensional with many noneconomic nuances” (Bellone & Goerl, 1993, p. 397). Therefore some believe “public entrepreneurs should not be stereotyped as mean and dangerous wolves” (Bellone & Goerl, 1993, p. 396).

The label used to describe this tradition must illustrate the legitimacy logic of autonomous expertise in public administration, regardless of its specific nature. As has been noted elsewhere, the full meaning of entrepreneurship should include all types of skillful and “vigorous responsible leadership” (Kobrak, 1996, p. 213). Because entrepreneurs have been associated with not just market but public and social bottom lines in a broad literature for nearly three decades, the term *entrepreneur* is considered a reasonable fit.

An alternative label of “professionalism” was considered because one of its principal characteristics is widely thought to be *autonomy based on expertise* (Moore & Rosenblum, 1970). Such expertise might be technical, as in the case of engineers or accountants, or normative, as in the case of religious clergy. However, various other characteristics of professionalism and expertise are shared by *all* traditions of public administration in some formulation or another. Indeed, the traditions of public administration are seen as alternative frameworks used for *professional socialization*. Therefore, a term is needed that reflects the specific *type* of professionalism of this tradition—one that calls for significant autonomy based specifically on expertise beyond that of the laity, whether it be technical or philosophical in nature. One could also use terms like *scientist*, *technician*, *ethicist*, or *virtucrat*. However, any one of these does not infer both technical and normative performance criteria. The term *discretionist* seems to fit quite well, but it emerged in the public administration literature as a term linked specifically to ethical standards and values. Therefore, it carries a similarly truncated meaning to that of entrepreneur. *Autonomous Administrator* is another possibility, however, the characteristics grouped in this inquiry represent an overlapping set from its four-type model source (Svara, 2006b). Elements from both the Autonomous Administrator and the Interactive Administrator are present in the conception used here, still requiring re-interpreted meanings.

In common public administration use, the term *entrepreneur* is associated with the pursuit of efficiency and market models of organization and action because it infers either a capitalist or consumerist approach to seeking profit or self-interest. Furthermore, it is linked to innovation in that it typically refers to new endeavors. In these common uses, an entrepreneur is defined as one who “organizes and manages a business undertaking, assuming the risk for the sake of the profit” (Neufeldt, 1996, p. 454). Therefore, in public administration, *entrepreneurial* is a characteristic typically assigned to the managerial or New Public Management approach to administration, or to the policy sciences approach to public policy. However, from its French

roots, the term means to undertake something of significance (Dees, 1998). Doig and Hargrove (1990) define entrepreneurship as a form of individual leadership. It can be heroic or villainous, but in either case, it is either unique or innovative in nature, and represents an effective manifestation of authority, influence, and power. In recent years, the term has been linked with notions of policy, public, social, moral, and civic entrepreneurship as well (Hart, 1984; Henton et al., 1997; Kingdon, 2003; E. Lewis, 1980; Waddock & Post, 1991). In fact, business and social entrepreneurs have been describes as two species within the genus of entrepreneur (Dees, 1998).

The adaptation of the term entrepreneur to the social arena is often attributed to William Drayton, the 1980 founder of the nonprofit organization Ashoka: Innovators for the Public. The organization's goal-setting and problem-solving arenas for social entrepreneurship include: learning/education, environment, health, human rights, civic participation, and economic development (Drayton, 2002). In its expanded meaning, rather than organizing and managing a *business* undertaking, entrepreneurs are organizing a *public* undertaking of some type—perhaps promoting a specific public policy, forming a voluntary association or nonprofit organization, advocating for socially responsible action on the part of corporations, or another similar activity. Rather than seeking profit, the bottom line becomes another type of community value more commonly associated with the social good than isolated “efficiency.” “In sum, social entrepreneurship extends the definition of entrepreneurship by its emphasis on ethical integrity and maximizing social value rather than private value or profit” (Davis, 2002).

Therefore, despite its cooptation by the field of economics, particularly through the work of Joseph Schumpeter, entrepreneurship can and *has* meant much more. Despite the reservations of others, this inquiry challenges limited meanings of the term *entrepreneurial*, broadening it to mean an *independent, autonomous, discretionary, and consequential approach* to public administration. Indeed, social entrepreneurship has been described as “empowered rather than

passive” action (McConachi & Simpson, 2003, p. 59). The social entrepreneur “exercises influence well beyond economics, helping to shape political, social, environmental and cultural arenas” (Davis, 2002, p. 1).

Such empowerment of the administrative arm of government is often called managerial, but when this term is linked to an efficiency focus alone, it loses the full implications of the legitimacy logic shared with other approaches with differing criteria or end goals. There are actually a host of “discretionist” views on the role of public administration that rely on a variety of performance criteria, including ethics and equity as well as efficiency and effectiveness (Fox & Cochran, 1990; Frederickson, 1997; Lynn, 1996; Ostrom, 1989). Using Isaiah Berlin’s thinking about purposive association as a basis for governance, this pursuit of substantive ends has been called “teleocratic” in nature (Spicer, 2004, p. 358). It has also been described as a new ““results-oriented ethics”” (Caron & Giaouque, 2006, p. 548). Indeed, it is possible to address all democratic values in at least some manner through such a teleological approach.

The Kauffman Center for Entrepreneurial Leadership is a well-recognized sponsor of research on the phenomenon of entrepreneurship in all its manifestations. One of its periodic Entrepreneurs in Residence was Dr. J. Gregory Dees, the Miriam and Peter Haas Centennial Professor in Public Service in the Graduate School of Business at Stanford University. He notes:

The idea of “social entrepreneurship” has struck a responsive cord. It is a phrase well suited to our times. It combines the passion of a social mission with an image of business-like discipline, innovation, and determination.... Many governmental and philanthropic efforts have fallen far short of our expectations. Major social sector institutions are often viewed as inefficient, ineffective, and unresponsive. Social entrepreneurs are needed to develop new models for a new century.... (Dees, 1998, pp. 1-2)

This description references some of the key ideas of entrepreneurship in public administration: social mission, discipline, innovation, determination, efficiency, effectiveness, and responsiveness. The concept of innovation as a stand-alone criterion is problematic, however,

primarily because it “has no normative content until linked with some other concept or objective” (Moe, 1994, p. 119). Moreover, it complicates coherency with outcome measures that are quite established in nature. Essentially all of the outcomes sought by the Discretionary tradition could be characterized as conventional: efficiency, effectiveness, equity, and ethics. Each of these concepts ties back to the Constitution, and are shared with at least one other tradition of public administration. Therefore, to pursue them is *not* innovative. However, to achieve them in unique or new ways that escape rule-bound procedures *is* innovative.

Bringing this variety of values into view is almost certain to lead one’s thinking to the long-standing “dualism” in Public Administration of technical versus normative approaches as well as the fact/value dichotomy. However, when considering the legitimacy logic being used, it becomes evident that *both* are teleological in nature. Whether one uses technical or normative criteria to demonstrate legitimacy does not really matter at this level of analysis. The common denominators are the *independent* and *consequential nature* of these criteria—public administration is freed to set its own goals, which need not be dictated or controlled by the political system. “Resolving” the “dichotomy” in this manner enables the use of one term to accommodate both business/technical and social/normative interpretations of the entrepreneurial spirit. Thus, there are two quite different conceptualizations of entrepreneurship housed within one tradition: one is based on the criterion of efficiency or effectiveness, while the other relies on other criteria of the social good, including ethics and equity. Both the similarities and differences will be explicated in the elements of the tradition that follow.

Assumed Governance Context

The Discretionary tradition assumes that the governance context reaches beyond discrete government agencies. Instead, government opens the doors of the political-administrative system to include outside players and blurs boundaries of both politics/administration functions and public/private sectors. Through expert advice such as the policy sciences and program evaluation,

the line between policy making and implementation has shifted. Policy making activities that were once the purview of elected officials have been delegated to public administrators. Through processes such as privatization and contracting out, sectoral boundaries between the market and government have blurred. Through citizen participation activities, boundaries are also blurring between government and civil society. As a result, governance is a complex endeavor that brings multiple sectors of society into both collective decision making and implementation processes. In fact, it has become so complex that the functions of the political elements of governance have become vague and perhaps even rhetorical in nature, with politicians depending more and more on the guidance and expertise of administrators in the face of competing interests. Furthermore, implementation of public policy is increasingly delegated out to lower levels of government and the private sector through privatization and contracting out to both for-profit and nonprofit contractors. As a result, administrators are left to their own devices to advise lawmakers, interpret the meaning of law, and ensure accountability in implementation. Therefore, a replacement for responsiveness to hierarchy has become necessary, which Putnam calls “responsiveness to purposes” (1975). While the tradition admits its context as formally being the representative democratic system, its emphasis is on its Administrative elements because of the empirical realities and challenges of the pluralist political context.

Political Ontology

As noted by Catlaw (in press), while the Constitutional tradition might be described as *normative* and the Discretionary tradition may be more focused on the *performative*, the two share essentially the same political ontology, with differences being in emphasis rather than fundamentals. Following this line of thinking, this political ontology might be described as an extension or intensification through Modern Liberalism. The principal philosophers of this school of thought include Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832), John Stuart Mill (1806-1873), John Maynard Keynes (1883-1946), and John Rawls (1921-2002) (Clark, 1998). While Conservatism offers elite

authority as a solution to Classical Liberalism's problems of social and economic self-interest, Modern Liberalism seeks solutions through a more pure market economy and market-like system of pluralist politics. It envisions a limited role for government in addressing market failures only, rather than authoritative social control more generally. Minimalist interventions like taxation, subsidization, and regulation can be used to diminish market failures, thus achieving greater public good.

In Modern Liberalism, the theory of government regulated utilitarianism is perfected, showing that because of economic "laws" such as diminishing marginal utility, government intervention to balance individual and social goals is warranted (Bentham, 2000). Furthermore, the notion that utility applies equally to non-economic "pleasures" such as liberty and justice ensures that normative concerns can be addressed alongside more materialistic benefits (Mill, 2000). Modern Liberalism idealizes what Adam Smith described as the social benefit of market exchange. But it should be noted that he initially believed market inequalities must be mitigated by civil society in some manner to ensure appropriate moral sentiments: "Society may subsist, though not in the most comfortable state without beneficence" (Smith, 2000a). This more Conservative notion was later equivocated, when he suggests in *The Wealth of Nations* (1776) that such moral sentiment ultimately reveals itself to be a mere byproduct of social exchange. He asserts that self-interest actually promotes the common good "more effectually than when [man] really intends to promote it" (Smith, 2000b, p. 151). Therefore, interventions from civil society or government are unnecessary. Instead, the metaphorical "invisible hand" that mystically guides free markets will produce the most efficient, and therefore best, outcomes for society.

With this new assumption of inherent equity and fairness through exchange, rationality is reconceived as a process through which *just efficiency* can be achieved (Rawls, 2000a, 2000b). Rawls argues that any rational person would logically arrive at the same conclusion if placing themselves conceptually in the "original position" whereby one knows everything about the

conditions of society, but nothing about his or her place in it. In so doing, the taint of specific self-interest is removed, and a truly rational choice is made. Based on a lack of knowledge of one's actual economic position, policy would be formed in a manner that most benefits the least fortunate. Furthermore, he asserts that over time, human evolution will bring people from narrow self-interest to actions based on universal principles and justice. Thus, the Modern Liberal mix of contract theory, utilitarianism, and social choice is rewoven in a manner consistent with democracy's demands for equity and fairness, while leaving the traditional authority of Conservatism behind.

Modern Liberalism is the fullest expression of Enlightenment ideals; a full-fledged transformation of the political economy to a market-based structure with a strict separation of church and state (MacIntyre, 1988). Individualism is prioritized over an institutionalized, authoritative moral responsibility to the common good. As a result of Modern Liberalism, the supremacy of positivist thought emerges in all spheres of life, promising universal principles and laws by which human nature could be proven uniform and invariant, and therefore predictable and controllable. Indeed, the law of self-interest is thought to provide all that is needed to understand society. One's sense of self is highly individual and social only in light of transactions with other individuals. In fact, both political and economic relationships are interpreted as stemming from self-interest. Individuals express their shared preferences through groups in a pluralist competition that replicates the performance of individuals and firms in markets.

Yet, because of market failures, Modern Liberalism admits that equity and fairness must be measured not only in terms of rights and opportunities, but also as end results (Clark, 1998). To ensure equity, the government should: (1) protect rights and enable the pursuit of the public interest; (2) address market failures to maximize equitable outcomes; (3) provide public goods; and (4) minimize undesirable market outcomes. These are difficult objectives to pursue, because political power is dispersed amongst many interest groups that compete with one another for

control. Yet, it is assumed that all of these interest groups share certain rational values, such as the respect of private property rights and the assurance that basic human needs are fulfilled. These values are considered to represent the public interest, and authority is only legitimized when power is exerted toward those ends. Therefore, efficiency is considered an important element of the public interest itself, and is only superseded by other values when market failures are thought to have occurred.

Modern Liberalism is by far the dominant ideology in Western nations, including the United States (Clark, 1998). Contemporary theorists have produced the idea that interest-group pluralism is adequate as a representative form of government, assuming that interest groups can fully represent their constituents. This notion of pluralism legitimizes the transformation of politics into a battleground for competing interests with no common ground on which to reach consensus. Modern Liberalism lacks a clear and coherent vision of public interest from which to base criteria for either the market or government. At least in terms of the political process, no authoritative resolution is offered for the conflicts between human rights and property rights, between freedom and equality, or between individualism and community. Instead, there is a mere acknowledgement that these tensions are inherent features of human existence that get balanced out through an ongoing pluralist exchange. Modern Liberalism considers the public sphere as merely a place “where bargaining between individuals, each with their own preferences, is conducted” (MacIntyre, 1988, p. 338). In such a context, it is impossible to determine whose claim is right or good.

Ontologically, the politics of pluralism could be described as the Many, as opposed to the One. Everything exists in a bounded and separate manner in which relationship can only occur through transaction or exchange. Because there is no common ground, agreements must be created among individuals as to the manner in which such exchange will occur. Through free exchange in both economic and social spheres, the One will be created through pluralist

negotiation and compromise. Yet, this free market approach fails to achieve empirically the idealized social condition theorized by its political and economic philosophy. Therefore, this political ontology falls back on echoes of Conservatism, but through an approach that obfuscates its use in several ways. First of all, by accepting the continuation of representation through either elected officials or pluralist interest groups, Modern Liberalism perpetuates the notion that there is a One or commonality that legitimately enables the Many to be represented by the Few. It could be said that this condition prevents a desired transcendence of traditional forms of authority (Catlaw, 2006a). More practically, the political ontology skirts this problem entirely by placing much of the exercise of authority outside of the political process. Symbolically, politics honors the individual through the representative and pluralist interest group system. Yet, administration is given the ideologically problematic job of authoritatively mitigating market failures and associated social problems that persist under the Modern Liberal ideal of utilitarianism. In other words, the ideologically mismatched tasks of the welfare state are allocated to administration, symbolically protecting the pluralist political system's legitimacy.

In order to make decisions about the government's role in collective action legitimate under the tenets of Modern Liberalism, as much of the decision making process as possible is moved out of the political sphere and placed into a rational administrative process whereby objectives can be established and the best approach can be determined. Whether characterized as a scientific or professional process, to legitimate state action, authority is given over to values that "any rational person would agree upon." This process removes politicians from responsibility in two ways: (1) physically, through delegation to administration; and (2) rationally, through an administrative process. At the same time, it distances administrators from responsibility by inserting rational, objective criteria as stand-ins for the public interest. For this reason, the Discretionary tradition is described as consequential or teleological—the source of legitimacy is the achievement of desirable objectives.

Through this process, the very same representative system of governance described by the Constitutional tradition acquires a new spin, transferring its emphasis from the political to the administrative state. The Master role of political representatives is in large part devolved to administrators, and by them, to various end-values typically presented as performance criteria or ethical standards that are in the public interest. In this way, the Discretionary tradition envisions the administrator as Master, or in theological terms, Man-the-Maker [*sic*] (Harmon, 1995; Niebuhr, 1963). Man-the-Maker [*sic*] is a self which “understands itself as existing primarily in relation to ideas and ideals. It defines itself as rational, living in the symbiosis of reason with its objects, be they Platonic ideas, Aristotelian entelechies, scientific theories, or common-sense facts” (Niebuhr, 1963, p. 69). He is an agent in the sense of “a being in charge of his conduct” (Niebuhr, 1963, p. 48). The metaphor of *maker* has been used since Aristotle to depict such agency—that human being make themselves toward a desired end. Thomas Aquinas followed this line of thinking—man [*sic*] is a master of his own acts by the use of reason and will (MacIntyre, 1988). “The image of man-the-maker [*sic*] who, acting for an end, gives shape to things is, of course, refined and criticized in the course of its long use, by idealists and utilitarians, hedonists and self-realizationists. But it remains the dominant image” (Niebuhr, 1963, p. 49).

Rather than the Constitutional tradition’s reification of an objective unity through political institutions, tradition, and procedures, legitimacy is derived from the values that are interpreted through rational processes by individual administrators. Yet, the same externalization of authority persists, as do the assumptions that all rational beings would ultimately agree to the same thing, or that competing interests ultimately produce the collective good. However, the Discretionary tradition’s empowerment of public administrators disconnects administrators from legislative oversight and the direct political and moral force of the community. This role reversal with political statesmen in the Constitutional tradition demands a very different approach to political authority and the legitimate scope of action for Discretionary public administration.

Political Authority and Scope of Action

In a nutshell, the Discretionary tradition reflects Kaufman's (1956) doctrine of *executive leadership*, whereby public administration is released from the limitations of *political neutrality* (Constitutional tradition) and political *representativeness* (pre-administrative era), placing legitimacy in the expert role within all government functions. The driving belief behind the Discretionary tradition of public administration is that the political process cannot be trusted to produce the Good. Nor are the masses capable of effective self-governance through direct democracy. A variety of reasons are offered—because politicians are laymen lacking expertise; because politics has been captured by special interests or elitists; or because self-interest is likely to bias decision making (Bachrach, 1967; Buchanan & Tullock, 1969; Jenkins-Smith, 1990; Lindblom & Woodhouse, 1993; Lowi, 1979; W. F. Willoughby, 1927). An alternative view is that the rule-bound nature of the Constitutional bureaucracy has failed to deliver what citizens want. The shared sentiment is that the Constitutional system of bureaucratic administration controlled by political oversight is a failure. Furthermore, whether considering this to be a problem of political failure or the failure of bureaucracy, the Discretionary tradition calls for an *administrative* solution to legitimacy.

In other words, management is good because it will help improve governance (Pollitt, 1990). According to some, “public managers have an obligation to remediate the ‘failures of governance’ that stem from the structure of decision-making processes, human frailties of leaders, politics, ill-informed citizens, and inattentive elected officials” (Kaboolian, 1998, p. 191). Administrators can extend the fundamental logic of checks and balances by becoming the check on the abuse of political power (Spicer & Terry, 1993). Indeed, achieving governmental legitimacy through administration is one of the Discretionary tradition's distinguishing characteristics. If politics is the greatest source of government failure, then the legitimacy logic must essentially bypass this system and place political authority with the administration.

Alternative institutional rules are needed, which are guided by different assumptions (Peters, 1992). If bureaucracy is the source of failure in terms of poor performance on the part of government programs and services, then proof of increased proficiency is the answer to legitimacy (Berman, 1997). As the New Public Management has been described, the Discretionary tradition is “Hamiltonianism in extreme, seeking “to improve the capacity of the administrative machine while downplaying the importance of politics” (Ott & Boonyarak, 2001, p. 489). In fact, the institutions of republican government are seen as barriers to efficient and effective performance.

Often, the discussion about an administrative solution to government failure starts by challenging the politics/administration dichotomy (Appleby, 1949; Dimock, 1937; Waldo, 1984). At one level, the dichotomy’s empirical accuracy is challenged by noting the presence of functional integration in government (R. B. Denhardt, 2000). But perhaps more importantly, such administrative discretion is considered an expression of political authority (Friedrich, 1940; Gulick, 1933). As noted by Rosenbloom (2000a), administration involves legislative functions in the form of delegated rulemaking that serve as extensions of Congress in allocation of burdens and benefits. Over time, discretion has flowed increasingly from the legislature to the judiciary to the administration (Dimock, 1936b). The most common level of administrative discretion occurs in routine duties. They are usually matters of common sense, convenience, or courtesy. The second type occurs in response to an emergency, where there is no time to go through channels. The third type of discretion occurs in control or regulatory situations where decisions regarding enforcement are somewhat subjective. The last type of discretion described deals with social conflict. This is the most controversial use of discretion because the legislative guidance is typically extremely vague. Therefore, administrators themselves are making policy decisions by default.

This view of discretion is widely held by public administration scholars as evident in the literature. For example, Friedrich starts from the assumption that politics and administration cannot be fully separated, and that discretionary decisions occur. To ensure legitimacy, he relies on a combination of expertise, efficiency, initiative, and the fact that administrators can more accurately respond to popular sentiment than political representatives (Friedrich, 1940). Mosher (1968) sees administrators as being those who make up “government by the people” because direct participation by all citizens cannot be realistically accommodated, nor can it be operated by elected representatives alone. The empirical studies in Redford’s edited volume provide a “forceful illustration of the inseparability of policy and administration, dynamics and mechanics, purpose and technique” (Redford, 1956, p. xiv). Our reality is a complex web of interrelationship both within the political-administrative system and between that system and society (Redford, 1969). “Administrators contribute to the lawmaking process, and policy makers share in the execution of programs... Areas of discretion are bound to exist in all stages, and since discretion involves policy determining, all three departments help to make law and construe policy” (Dimock, 1937, p. 234).

Therefore, through discretion, public administrators ethically define the public interest as a regular part of their job (Herring, 1936). Administrators are considered key players who balance the tensions between liberty and equality in public policy, provide a nexus for competing communities of interests, and are empowered to do so in practice under the existing political system by the chief executive (O. F. White & McSwain, 1990). Ongoing empirical studies prove that these functions take place at ever decreasing levels of the bureaucratic hierarchy, thus making independent administrative discretion pervasive. These “street level bureaucrats” are the public administrators through which most citizens experience government (Lipsky, 1983). They either interact directly with citizens or have discretion over significant aspects of their lives by virtue of their ability to interpret policy, and determine access to government rights and benefits.

However, at this front line level of hierarchy within the vast administrative mechanisms of contemporary government, it is not realistic to expect that rules can be crafted to guide them on every decision, thus discretionary judgment must be guided by other means. In other words, administrative discretion is a fact of life, yet because administrators are now involved in what were once matters of either self-governance or elected representation, a new logic of legitimacy is required.

But before discussing this logic, the issue of the politics/administration dichotomy must be clarified. There are really several positions that share the Discretionary legitimacy logic: the first simply ignores the dichotomy, wishing to have greater influence on policy making, even if it is symbolically achieved through the politicians (Simon, 1976). Others seek a similar formal delegation of policy making authority to professional analysts, without regard to the issue of dichotomy (Jenkins-Smith, 1990). Another position would like to abolish the dichotomy in order to allow administration to legitimately take part in policy making as part of the representative governance process (Appleby, 1945; Waldo, 1984). In extreme, it has been characterized as “the assault upon the politics-administration dichotomy” (Sayre, 1958, p. 103). Another view is that the boundary between political and administrative functions within the representative governance process is permeable, thus creating a fluid, mutually complementary whole (Svara, 1999, 2006c).

Some suggest that only those theorists who promote a purely scientific approach to administration would push toward an actual politics/administration dichotomy rather than considering them as merely a distinction of complementary roles (Svara, 1999). In other words, once politics is “correctly” removed from administration, public and private administration are not different in any meaningful way (Allison, 1979) and any differences between public and private administration can be refuted (Waldo, 1984). However, this logic only holds if the line between politics and administration is moved to a position that captures legitimate policy making authority within administration, so that just as in a corporation, administrative leaders could guide

virtually all activities of governance. Not even the most extreme Discretionary theories within public administration envision the abolition of politics from governance.

From any of the Discretionary perspectives, the social roles of politicians and administrators are not abolished, nor are the functions of policy making. Therefore, it might be more accurate to view the Discretionary amendment to the theory of the relationship between politics and administration as either a *shifting of the line of demarcation* or *delegation of policy making authority*, both of which place increased political authority in the hands of administrators. This line is not clearly marked, because to actually claim that administrators are fully autonomous would conflict with the existing system of representative democratic governance. At its most extreme, administrators are seen to be legitimately engaged in all aspects of policy making short of actual partisan politics (Overeem, 2005). Juxtaposed to a Bureaucrat who must meet the demands of hierarchical controls and procedures in all activities, with very little policy making functions of importance being delegated to administration, the Entrepreneur is much closer to complete independence.

The problem of locating the actual limits of authority has been with the field since its founding: “This is not quite the distinction between Will and answering Deed, because the administrator should have and does have a will of his own in the choice of means for accomplishing his work. He is not and ought not to be a mere passive instrument. The distinction is between general plans and special means” (W. Wilson, 1887, p. 212). Increasing the political authority of administration is more aligned with observed reality, and it is an approach to political reform in the tradition of the Progressives. As has been noted elsewhere, theorists who reject the politics/administration dichotomy and support the exercise of administrative discretion view public administration itself as a form of *governance* (Stivers, 1990b). In the end, while there are still politicians within an unchanged representative political system, they are no longer in full

control of policy making or in direct oversight of rigid administrative controls. Thus, administrators assume an increasing amount of political decision making authority and discretion.

This increased level of administrative discretion is the defining feature of the Discretionary tradition. Political authority is increasingly vested in the administrator, and she or he may legitimately wield that authority as an agent of the state. Frederickson “describes and advocates a form of public administration and policy implementation that provides considerable latitude and wide discretion in carrying out the daily affairs of public organization” (Frederickson, 1997, p. 60). However, the “price” of this level of agency comes in the form of responsibility for achieving the social good as the source of legitimacy. The first problem is to determine, “In short, what are the criteria?” (Appleby, 1945, p. 48). Political authority is earned by proving that both the criteria chosen and the administrator’s performance in achieving them serve the public good in an acceptable manner. “This is a pluralization and specification of authority, not a general crisis” (M. Warren, 1996, p. 59).

This approach is illustrated by the National Performance Review during the Clinton administration (Shafritz et al., 2004). Its principles were considered necessary in order to achieve the equal opportunity, justice, diversity, and democracy bureaucracies had failed to produce. The use of criteria as proof of legitimacy is not altogether new. Such principles have been imbued with various forms of authority throughout time. As noted early in the field, both God and Science have been common sources of authority for principles and laws which might refer to either what *ought* to be true (moral) or what is *actually* the case (scientific) (Finer, 1935).

In sum, the Discretionary tradition seeks legitimacy for a public administration that is given a great deal of discretion and independent political authority. One way to conceive of the legitimacy argument is as an extension of the Constitutional view, held by the “traditionalists” who envision discretionary authority as coming from the Executive and is thus politically legitimate (McSwite, 1997). In this view, administrators are empowered through less hierarchical

control as part of the Executive arm of government. However, there are more substantive arguments for why this discretion should be given. There are two distinct rationales given for the legitimacy of this political authority: the first focuses on achieving efficiency; the second relies on achieving Constitutional values and professional virtue. In other words, while professionalism is the path to legitimacy, there are two ideations of the profession: one as a technical managerial profession, and the other as a polity profession (Stever, 1988). These two views exist in often combative tension with one another, challenging one another's rationales for legitimacy, and formulations of responsibility. However, their underlying logic is the same—both seek to claim legitimacy based on expertise (Harmon, 1995; McSwite, 1997; Stever, 1988). “The claim to administrative discretion is the claim to power on the basis of technical, managerial, and moral expertise” (Stivers, 2000b, p. 142).

Delegating political authority to administration eliminates to a large degree the “legal” portion of the legal-rational authority Weber associated with a bureaucratic political-administrative system (Gerth & Mills, 1946). As has been noted, discretion is the opposite of legal stipulation (Dimock, 1937). In its place is inserted a form of charismatic authority that is exercised autocratically. In what might be called a charismatic-rational combination, professional heroes wield expert authority that is further supported by the rational authority of objective performance criteria and standards. This formulation has been described as “the ‘Man of Reason’ theory of governance” (McSwite, 1997, p. 15). This elite group may “rule” legitimately based on their expertise to know both what *is* and what *should be*. “Generally speaking, the civil service is a moral elite in this and in other countries” (L. D. White, 1926, p. 362). In fact, some suggest this role is appropriately given “priestly-learned qualities” (Dimock, 1937, p. 402). Such “sages” of religious, moral, or political origin have historically been the ones set the axiological standards or ends to be pursued (Znaniiecki, 1940). In their worst light, they are autonomous and controlling

“mandarins” shown to be capable of a bureaucratic *coup d’etat* (Riggs, 1998). Here, this charismatic-rational expert is called an *Entrepreneur*.

This Entrepreneur role conceptualization may be inherently attractive to a culture of individualism that claims political sovereignty for all, and a political system based on competition (Thayer, 1981). In the context of liberalism, there is ever a concern about the protection of individual rights and curtailing oppressive institutions (O. F. White, 1990b). This may be an underlying reason why the Discretionary tradition is so attractive to public administrators themselves—it offers a way out of the controlling hierarchy of bureaucracy and legislative oversight. It is further attractive to politicians because it removes them from many charges of government oppression—it enables them to retain political power while “bashing the bureaucrats.” Armed with an increased political authority and scope of action, administrators are saddled with its corollary increase in responsibility (Mascarenhas, 1993). Therefore, Discretionary public administration seeks two principal paths to legitimacy: technical expertise and professional virtue. While both are consequential in nature, the two camps differ in regard to which ends are chosen and assessed. Differing political and social philosophies as well as notions of professionalism influence the values one pursues (Simon et al., 1974). Therefore, the two camps are presented separately, grouping a technical pursuit of efficiency and effectiveness, versus a normative pursuit of equity and ethics. Both are forms of legitimacy through professional expertise, and as so eloquently suggested, “The specialist in his field must be supreme, for who, other than another similarly qualified specialist, can challenge him?” (Moore & Rosenblum, 1970, p. 15-16).

Legitimacy through Technical Expertise

The first rationale for administrative legitimacy is that administrators are scientific and technical experts and therefore above and beyond the average citizen. These “Men of Reason” [*sic*] are made wise through science and rational decision making (McSwite, 1997). This theory

of legitimacy is fairly straightforward and represents an extension of a widely accepted value of efficiency or effectiveness that infers the legitimacy of neutral competence from the Constitutional tradition. “Competence in this sense means the ability to think systematically and clearly about complex or unfamiliar policy or organizational problems, then form an independent and competent view of the issues, alternatives, and likely consequences of different actions” (Lynn, 1996, p. 111). In other words, knowledge for practice means the capacity to analyze and plan *independently*. Those focused on managerial approaches to efficiency and effectiveness believe such analytical independence will produce better performance than will attempts to build “a more admirable character or more enlightened values will not” (Lynn, 1996, p. 112). Therefore, technique should be the goal of universities and professionalization. Common representations of this approach to legitimacy are found in the policy sciences and the New Public Management challenges to the bureaucratic orthodoxy (R. B. Denhardt, 2000).

Technical expertise is considered to be legitimate because it produces efficiency. Because this is sometimes determined as cost-effectiveness, the two ideas of efficiency and effectiveness are often joined. Furthermore, *discretionary* technical expertise is considered more legitimate than neutral competence, because it avoids the rigidity and formalism of bureaucracy that leads to ritualism in the form of technicism or red tape. Rules become absolutes, losing their original meanings as relative to a set of purposes, and efficiency is lost (Merton, 1940). In its most contemporary iteration, efficiency itself is given further legitimacy on the basis of customer satisfaction.

The technical perspective is not concerned about normative issues of accountability beyond efficiency and is therefore considered a truncated view of legitimacy (Terry, 1995). However, it *is* a theory of legitimacy nonetheless. As noted in the discussion of Bureaucracy, during the Progressive reform era, efficiency became a substitute concept for legitimacy based on a syllogistic logic whereby political corruption equaled inefficiency, therefore efficiency equaled

legitimacy. In fact, efficiency became the new symbol for achieving “man’s moral purposes” (Waldo, 1984, p. 53). Efficiency was used to “**define** what is meant by ‘good’ or ‘correct’ administration” (Ostrom, 1989, p. 36). “Actually, the ‘principle’ of efficiency should be considered as a definition rather than a principle: it is a definition of what is meant by ‘good’ or ‘correct’ administrative behavior” (Simon, 1976, p. 39). It was “apotheosized and given a moral content” (Waldo, 1984, p. 58). This phenomenon whereby an instrumental mean is transformed into a terminal value has been widely studied from both an individual psychological perspective in regard to motivation, and as a function of the constraints of social structure (Merton, 1940). While Merton is most concerned about rules becoming inflexible, the process is not such a strange occurrence, and the substitution of efficiency for democratic legitimacy has been supported by many scholars using the logic of the Constitutional tradition as well.

The view of legitimacy through efficiency is supported by the overarching social acceptance of the legitimacy of science. Specifically, there is an aspiration toward positive knowledge that would enable certainty in the ability to describe, predict, and control administrative systems (R. B. Denhardt, 2000; Stivers, 2000a). In public administration, the source of this belief has been identified as the predominantly male members of the research-based municipal reform movement; the “Bureau Men” (Stivers, 2000a). The common bond among these fellows is the shared desire to re-found democratic legitimacy within administration on a basis of science and technical expertise. Indeed, the seeds of the efficiency rationale for legitimacy were noted in the Constitutional tradition’s reliance on neutral competence: “Public administration is the management of men [*sic*] and materials in the accomplishment of the purposes of the state” (L. D. White, 1926, p. 1). Through the ending caveat, administration is not released from the guidance and oversight of the political system. Therefore, in the Constitutional formulation, technical competence was to be in the service of the democratic ethos through the hierarchical political-administrative system.

Alternatively, in the Discretionary ideal, these shackles of hierarchical political oversight are released, or at least significantly loosened. The businessmen [*sic*] reformers described by Jane Addams considered politics as “something off by itself” (1964, p. 222). The focus on better methods of administration is taken out of the public context. For example, early scholars concluded that: (1) administration is a universally uniform process; (2) the basis for study is management, not law; (3) administration should move from art to science; and (4) administration is a principal problem of government (L. D. White, 1926). By considering *only* these ideas, administration is released from the political system of control. This line of thinking was promoted by influential texts in the field from the post World War II era onward: “In actual administration there is often a greater difference between small and large organizations than there is between public and private ones” (Simon et al., 1974, p. 8). While it may have begun with loosely stated caveats about the assumption of political oversight, such references have withered away over time in the extension of scientific approaches.

Scientific management is less interested in authority and power, and more interested in human nature and motivation. Specifically, increased productivity is sought through proven task and management practices, incentives, and motivation (F. Taylor, 1923). This managerial approach focuses on the internal issues of organizational management and technical approaches to increased efficiency. Administration is thus free to develop as a science designed for the pursuit of efficiency, regardless of sector (Allison, 1979; R. B. Denhardt, 2000; Waldo, 1984). More importantly, it can define its own ends in the form of performance measures. Therefore, it no longer must draw from political theory, but may draw from business, economics, sociology, and social psychology. Indeed it has: through the series of movements from scientific management to administrative science, to the policy sciences, to managerialism and New Public Management, men of science have ruled much of public administration thought.

Legitimacy through Professional Virtue

Many public administration theorists agree that “the purpose of government is to extend the protection of regime values to all citizens” (Frederickson, 1997, p. 47). The art of governance should be about the virtuous pursuit of the public interest (Caldwell, 1988). As noted in the discussion of political authority, if this is not assured through the bureaucratic hierarchy which answers to the legislators within the constitutional system, then alternatives must be found to ensure compliance with these regime values both in terms of process and outcomes. “In the new administration, marked by the necessarily wide discretionary power left to the political chief and the professional civil servant, the responsibility of the civil servant to the ideal of professional obligation must now be put alongside political and constitutional responsibility as one of the safeguards of the public interest” (Gaus, 1936, p. 42). This professional obligation is the source of legitimacy through professional virtue.

This logic of legitimacy holds that administrators are more virtuous than the average citizen in some way—the “Men of Reason” [*sic*] are made wise through experience (McSwite, 1997). The virtue-based theory is more controversial, because in its similarity to a role of statesman, it can be more easily perceived as usurping the political authority of elected officials and the Constitutional process. The technical approach can more easily suggest it is not much different from the neutral competency of bureaucracy which answers to the politicians. Nonetheless, in terms of legitimacy logic, the virtuous position is similar to its technical counterpart as a substantive extension of bureaucratic thinking in terms of a merit-based administration freed from an overly controlling political-administrative hierarchy. Again, the difference is the increased amount of discretion or the degree of political authority vested in administration.

The scholars promoting value-based administrative legitimacy have been labeled “discretionists” (Dimock, 1936b; Fox & Cochran, 1990; Friedrich, 1940; Hart, 1984; Kass,

1990b; Wamsley, 1990a). These scholars embrace discretion, believing that public administrators must be virtuous guardians, and that their decisions and actions are legitimated by professional training and representative composition. Taken to the extreme, this argument ultimately argues for a Platonic guardian class composed of public administrators. Such a caricature reveals the approach to be “at best paternalistic and at worst a totalitarian dictatorship” (Fox & Cochran, 1990, p. 93). To the discretionists, the difference hinges on the attitudes and ethics of bureaucrats. If they use their expertise and elite position to empower citizens, then democratic legitimacy is ensured. If they use their position to create exclusive expertise, the result may be technocracy, which discretionists abhor. At core, discretionists feel that if such influence is to be given to anyone in society, it would be best given to people who are most similar to the populace, but with specialized training to be the very best citizens possible. Just as the Guardians envisioned by Plato, public administration “plans, it contrives, it philosophizes, it educates, it builds for the community as a whole” (Dimock, 1936a, p. 133).

Professions often claim that members have a special calling to serve society in such a capacity. “This special calling to service distinguishes the motives of the professional from the nonprofessional. In effect, the professional claims status by virtue of possessing higher motives for action” (Stever, 1988, p. 24). The notion of achieving legitimacy through professional virtue is widely discussed in the field’s ethics literature—ethics meaning systems of criteria used to measure the moral worth of a decision or action. However, I will focus here on those which speak most clearly to the issue of political authority and legitimacy (Cooper, 1991, 1998; Rohr, 1986, 1989, 1990; Terry, 1995; Wamsley, 1990a). To mirror the political notion of demographic representation, a common argument is based on administrative representation (Kelly, 1998; Kingsley, 1944; Krislov, 1974; Long, 1952; Redford, 1969; Rosenbloom, 1983). A slightly more active type of representation, administrator must advocate on behalf of specific interests—which in the democratic system means constituents or the citizenry being represented (Mosher, 1968).

A more robust theory of administrative representation requires a *re-interpretation* of the Constitution to show that political authority flows directly to administrators as representatives of the people. Key exponents of this Constitutional view are often affiliated with Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University at Blacksburg (Goodsell, 1990, 2004; Marshall & White, 1990; Rohr, 1986, 1989, 1990; Wamsley, 1990a; Wamsley et al., 1990a). The well-known “Blacksburg Manifesto” exemplifies this view in which legitimacy is achieved through a complex combination of normative standards founded in the Constitution, law, regulations, history, agency culture and commitment to a wide interpretation of the public interest (Stivers, 1990b). As can be seen, these characteristics straddle both the Constitutional and Discretionary traditions.

Rohr has made a life’s work of exquisitely explicating a convincing constitutional argument for an administrative role in upholding regime values (Rohr, 1986, 1989, 1990). By “regime values,” Rohr means the values of a polity which guide its purpose and provide the normative foundation for the ethical standards of public servants in that regime. In the United States, those values are described in the Constitution, which all public officials take an oath to uphold. Rohr charges administrators with interpreting Constitutional values (using public law as established by the Supreme Court) and applying them in their decision making and actions. He sees this as a pragmatic “middle way” to achieve administrative ethics which demands moral deliberation regarding regime values which often conflict. Similar to the judiciary forming an opinion, administrators must ultimately choose based on what “they find most appealing and persuasive” (Rohr, 1989, p. 84). He suggests this approach relies on neither the “low” ethical standards of bureaucratic rules, nor the unreasonably “high” ethical standards of complex formulations of social equity (Rohr, 1989).

The effect of this theory is that rather than making administrators answerable to the People via the Constitutional institutional hierarchy, administrators are directly answerable to the People by achieving the regime values depicted in their Constitution. He believes that this

approach succeeds as a formulation of democratic legitimacy: “By suggesting a theory of Public Administration that combines constitutional subordination and autonomy, I hope to preserve the enduring insight of the venerable dichotomy without succumbing to its naïve view of administration as apolitical. Administration is political; but, like the judiciary, it has its own style of politics and its distinctive functions within the constitutional order” (Rohr, 1990, p. 82). In this, Rohr refers to the politics of policy making. However, it might be equally argued that his re-interpretation of the Constitutional role of administration is faulty. Although it often sounds very similar to the Constitutional tradition and in fact draws from its logic, legitimacy has been moved out of the electoral representative political system to a set of values (Constitutional law) that can be operationalized as standards of decision making, action, and performance measurement by administrators themselves. Furthermore, by embracing administrative discretion in interpreting legislative and judicial mandates, he has released the administrator from traditional hierarchical supervision and control.

A notable extension of Rohr’s theory is the Agency perspective that was mentioned in the discussion of the Constitutional tradition. Much of what is described as the Agency perspective is Discretionary in nature (Wamsley, 1990a). However, as with Rohr’s ideas, the formulation is conflated in many ways—Wamsley uses the term Agency to refer both to government bureaus as well as the notion of discretionary authority, and using the term Agential to refer to both an empowered and answerable character. Therefore, in some ways, Agents are conservators of the administrative organization and its embodied Constitutional values. However, at its core, the Agency perspective also holds that public administration can be traced to the very founding of the nation through its Constitution. In essence, because the administration is an integral part of the separated powers as conceived, then in the same way that the legislature, judiciary, and executive have discretionary power and serve to check and balance one another, so do the administrative

elements within them. Through this configuration, political authority is delegated to *individual administrators* accordingly.

Associated with the Constitutional arguments is an even more fundamental claim; that legitimacy stems from citizenship itself (Cooper, 1991). In this view, political legitimacy for administration can be traced back to citizenship as “a public office” (Cooper, 1991, p. 137). “The legitimacy of the public administrator is to be derived from his or her prior role as a citizen” (Cooper, 1991, p. 140). In a detailed explication of citizenship, he highlights the tradition of *ethical citizenship*—one which demands a particular set of civic virtues: a devotion to fellow citizens; a sense of duty to participate in governance; a concern for the common good; and an ideal of equality. In our society, such citizens are thought to be an evaporating breed (Pranger, 1968). Therefore, substitutions are made. In the Constitutional tradition, elected representatives and the laws they make supplant ethical citizenship. In the Discretionary tradition, the Constitutional system is replaced with ethical citizen administrators, or “the public administrator as virtuous citizen” (Cooper, 1991, p. 134).

Many of these ideas about citizenship are actually linked to the logic of the Collaborative tradition, and will be discussed further in that section. However, Cooper’s formulations of administrative responsibility for citizenship are aligned with the logic of Discretion. As with most theories of public administration, Cooper’s unique combinations of logic cause him to amend a pure notion of ethical citizenship to fit a specialized social role. He falls back on clear statements of trusteeship: “The virtuous administrator... is also employed by the citizenry to function on its behalf in pursuing the common good...” (Cooper, 1991, p. 160). Thus, while legitimacy comes from citizenship, citizen administrators are a special breed of virtuous citizens who act on our behalf. Trusteeship infers empowered agency, and is therefore Discretionary.

A similar form of virtuous professionalism has been described as conservatorship (Terry, 1995). As noted in the discussion of the Constitutional tradition, conservatorship is envisioned as

embedded within the political-administrative hierarchy. However, Terry admits that control is not perfect, and that principles of conservatorship can be distorted by problems such as abuses of authority, self-interest, loyalty to persons rather than fidelity to the institution, interest group elitism, and tokenism in co-optation. Nonetheless he insists, “Contrary to the views held by many scholars, bureaucratic leaders do not pose a threat to democracy. When guided by constitutional principles, they help maintain stability of the American regime by preserving the integrity of public bureaucracies and, in turn, constitutional processes, values, and beliefs” (Terry, 1995, p. 171). Moreover, “...administrative conservatorship is statesmanship guided by a moral commitment to preserve the constitutional balance of power in support of individual rights” (Terry, 1995, p. 183). It is this sentiment that makes the leap out of the Constitutional tradition and into the *Discretionary tradition*—the legitimacy logic of the former cannot allow this level of discretion, but the legitimacy logic of the *Discretionary tradition* can, given the appropriate use of constitutional values as performance measures.

A final version of virtuous citizenship is conceived of as *stewardship*. This concept draws from the technical side of *Discretionary legitimacy* and *Constitutional administrative legitimacy* as well: “Legitimacy resting in stewardship requires that efficiency and effectiveness be informed by, and subordinated to, the ethical norms of justice and beneficence” (Kass, 1990b, p. 114). Stewardship’s fiduciary norms pertain to the principal-agent relationship. Kass (1990b) believes that it is possible for agents to know the principals’ interests even in a highly pluralist democracy because it relies on assumptions of interdependence, common advantage, and shared political rules of the game. These are the values of the republic as articulated in the Constitution. Thus, the agent serves the social system or an associational consensus of the republic. Any role conceptualization that does not account for the presence of agency or the need for both effectiveness and ethicality will fail to meet the test of legitimacy.

Together, legitimacy through technical expertise and legitimacy through professional virtue call for new formulations of responsibility and accountability. It is important to note that in many views, it is the combination of technical and normative skill that creates professional legitimacy. "The professional's claim to legitimate power, particularly his claim to the autonomous and therefore discretionary exercise of authority based on competence have rested on a combination of normative principals and practices that are virtually unique to that segment of the labor force" (Moore & Rosenblum, 1970, p. 239). In other words, neither stands on its own, and an approach to responsibility and accountability must accommodate both. As noted by participants in the 1968 Minnowbrook conference, a new approach to public administration was called for to be "more responsive to the public, more prescriptive, more client oriented, and more normative; yet still be more scientific" (Shafritz et al., 2004, p. 193).

Formulations of Responsibility and Accountability

Appleby describes separated powers, federalism, and contracting out as "obscuring even while apparently simplifying the problem of responsibility" (Appleby, 1952, p. 200). All of these activities blend clear distinctions between politics and administration, between governmental powers, between jurisdictions, and between public and private sectors. Thus, at base, political responsibility must mean producing the public interest rather than yielding to special influence. In his literature review on the topic, Goodsell (1990) found that the public interest is defined in many ways and is used toward many purposes. E. Pendleton Herring suggests that the public interest is "the verbal symbol designed to introduce unity, order, and objectivity into administration" (Goodsell, 1990, p. 96). Anthony Downs (1962) further contends that just because the content of the symbol is unclear does not mean it cannot serve useful functions. It is a standard against which discretionary action can be measured by forcing the decision-maker to justify the logic used. Goodsell (1990) suggests that there are many values suggested by the symbol "public interest," each of which must be shown to be achieved to prove legitimacy.

This emphasis on measuring achievement of end goals is aligned with entrepreneurship. Furthermore, the need to establish methods of accountability that are not tied to organizational boundaries are needed. “Entrepreneurism describes a mind-set and a kind of behavior that can be manifest anywhere. In a world in which sector boundaries are blurring, this is an advantage” (Dees, 1998, p. 3). As noted by management theorist Peter Drucker, the key evaluative approach of entrepreneurs is “accountability to the constituencies served and for the outcomes created” (Dees, 1998, p. 4). Whether the outcome sought is framed as customer satisfaction or social impact, the Discretionary tradition uses performance measurement to gauge its success and legitimacy:

Because market discipline does not automatically weed out inefficient or ineffective social ventures, social entrepreneurs take steps to assure they are creating value. This means that they seek a sound understanding of the constituencies they are serving. They make sure they have correctly assessed the needs and values of the people they intend to serve and the communities in which they operate... They assess their progress in terms of social, financial, and managerial outcomes, not simply in terms of their size, outputs, or processes. (Dees, 1998, p. 5)

These characteristics are clearly aligned with the “doctrine of New Public Management” (Hood, 1996). But at the level of legitimacy logic, they are shared by other approaches to discretion. In the Discretionary tradition legitimacy is given to administrative agency, in the sense of autonomy earned through expertise. This form of responsibility has been described as professional in nature (Harmon, 1990). It assumes morally responsible intentionality, but there are no clear lines between what elements of agency are voluntary and what may come from outside sources. Furthermore, agency need not include a moral obligation. Therefore, some form of authoritative guidance must be added to agency to ensure moral action. In this tradition, the agent must be responsive to specific values. Accountability therefore means proving that one has achieved one or more of those values.

Moe suggests that reformulating the manner in which accountability functions “represents an intentional break in management philosophy from earlier organizational management studies going back to the Progressive Era and indeed, in a very real sense, back to the founding of the republic” (1994, p. 112). To measure accountability in the Discretionary tradition, both technical and ethical authority must either be translated into operational criteria or eradicated (Gulick, 1937b). While this is particularly simple for the axiom of efficiency, it is not so simple with other measures of performance, such as social equity or ethical action. Thus, new ways of measuring accountability have emerged in response to the blurring of politics/administration boundaries (Harmon, 1995). For example, Harmon & Mayer (1986) identify three normative vectors on which to assess administrative decisions: (1) efficiency and effectiveness; (2) procedural adequacy and the rights of citizens; and (3) democratic representation and the exercise of discretion. These ideas reflect the combined concerns of the technical and ethical approaches to legitimacy described in the discussion above. For the purpose of this essay, these theories will be represented by formulations of responsibility and accountability via efficiency, effectiveness, equity, and ethics. Because these criteria differ in terms of their definitional capacity, they are typically divided into “technical” versus “normative” categories. However, it must be noted that all such criteria, even efficiency, are values and are therefore normative.

The key difference between the two camps within the Discretionary tradition is that one focuses on a simplistic view of efficiency, while the other believes, “There is no true efficiency which is not also social efficiency” (Dimock, 1936a, p. 123). In other words, other values must be included before calculating efficiency. Lynn notes that public management focuses on producing results, with legitimacy coming from after-the-fact accountability through performance evaluation (Lynn, 1996). Both perspectives described in the Discretionary tradition formulate responsibility and accountability in a teleological or consequential manner, as opposed to the deontological,

rule-based approach of the Constitutional tradition. The logic that is shared and that differentiates the tradition is that *administration* is given the privilege of deciding what to pursue and how to proceed. Therefore, the ideal type role conceptualization is the Entrepreneur—one who autonomously acts to achieve the results chosen. One camp promotes a technical approach to such choice making, while another camp promotes an ethical approach to such choice making. Both are described in the following subsections.

Responsibility and Accountability through Efficiency and Effectiveness

Wilson called for a science of administration to determine what government can “properly and successfully do... with the utmost possible efficiency and at the least possible cost either of money or energy” (1887, p. 197). This is the classic utilitarian approach to efficiency and effectiveness. However, the efficiency of the Constitutional tradition that is ensured through procedures and rules is transformed in the Discretionary tradition into a scientific calculation of costs and benefits without regard to the political system (Lynn, 1996; Ostrom, 1989). This approach has been extended by political economists through planning, programming, and budgeting systems (PPBS); new institutional economics and its theories of public choice, transaction cost, and principal-agent theory; and extensions of microeconomic theory (Hood, 1991; Levine, 1978; Ostrom, 1989; Schick, 1966). The perspective holds “explicit concern for managerial roles and their effective performance” (Lynn, 1996, p. 44). Public management is focused on: the organization itself, general management functions, instrumental and pragmatic concerns, and a philosophical link to the scientific management tradition (Garson & Overman, 1983). Its intellectual founders include Simon, Smithburg, and Thompson; Barnard; Wildavsky; Moe; and Bozeman (Lynn, 1996). However, at least in the United States, managerialism is ambiguous “as to what in fact is a political question, how and where political answers should be reached, and the role of the public manager in that process” (Khademian, 1998, p. 272). In some perspectives, public management moves policy making functions into the hands of administrators

(Barzelay, 2001). Discretionary acts at all levels of administration can be considered to be policy decisions (Lipsky, 1983).

Public management is aligned with policy analysis in seeking rational, systematic, scientific solutions to public problems (Bozeman, 1979). Public management shares the microeconomic theories and technical approaches used in the policy sciences and policy analysis (Weimer & Vining, 1999). In general, managerial approaches seek to improve the bureaucratic organizational structure and outcomes by applying business management and market principles to public organizations (R. B. Denhardt, 2000). Techniques such as privatization, total quality management, quality circles, work teams, work redesign, and participative management, reinvention, customer driven approaches, decentralized or flexible decision making, market mechanisms for social choice, and even empowerment of citizens are all examples of strategies used to improve efficiency and productivity (Barzelay & Armajani, 1992; Lynn, 1996; Osborne & Gaebler, 1992). These ideas represent “the imposition of a new set of *values*, specifically a set of values largely drawn from the private sector” (R. B. Denhardt, 2000, p. 149). From these principles, terms like customer, quality, service, results, value, incentives, innovation, empowerment, and flexibility became a part of the public administration lexicon, defining a post-bureaucratic paradigm (Barzelay, 1992).

Both post-bureaucratic movements of reinventing government and the New Public Management (NPM) can be collapsed into a category called “managerialism”—an approach to government reform, change, and adaptation (Kettl, 2000; Lynn, 2006). However, NPM began in other countries, including New Zealand, Britain, and Germany. “American institutions and traditions simply do not fit the requirements of many NPM strategies and tactics. That has not prevented the NPM from heavily influencing the NPR, but they are distinctly different phenomena that require differential analysis” (Kettl, 2000, p. 27). In the United States, NPM was popularized during the “reinvention” movement popularized during the Clinton administration

(Shafritz et al., 2004). Reinventing government has been called a manifestation of NPM (Ricucci, 2001). “Though NPR is different in several ways from NPM, they share a focus on economic, market-based thinking in government” (Box et al., 2001, p. 611). Furthermore, both argue that “to achieve the performance measures for which they are accountable... managers need to be liberated from routines and regulation by the various administrative systems” (Kaboolian, 1998, p. 190).

The reinvention movement draws heavily from NPM, but also from humanistic management reforms such as Total Quality Management (TQM) (Kelly, 1998; Peters & Pierre, 2000). Many feel that these ideas represent conflicting ideologies (R. B. Denhardt & deLeon, 2000). Yet under the political ontology of Modern Liberalism, utilitarian theory is believed to achieve both individual and public interests. Therefore, microeconomic theory is used to pursue both. Specifically, the economic theory of public goods is used to understand how and why collective action is likely to occur (Ostrom & Ostrom, 1971). In NPM, public goods theory was extended to *prescribe* what type of collective action should be public at all, and if so, whether it should be guaranteed or actually provided by government (Donahue, 1989; Moe, 1987; Savas, 2000). The original idea behind NPM was that government could be transformed into small, decentralized boards overseeing private performance-based organizations that actually deliver public goods and services. Actual provision of goods and services by the government would be minimized while maintaining collective decision making and improving performance. As such, it was thought to represent “a new form of governance” (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992, p. xi).

In the United States, actual load shedding is not as common as calls for privatization through contracting out and reinvention reforms of government agencies. The doctrine of NPM can be explained in seven principles, most of which are present to one degree or another in all cases of implementation: (1) empowered, discretionary control by professional managers; (2) explicit performance measures or standards; (3) an emphasis on results and output controls; (4)

disaggregation of activities through various means to improve efficiency; (5) use of competition and contracting out; (6) private sector management styles; and (7) reduction in resource use through discipline and parsimony (Hood, 1991). Similarly, the principles of government reinvention are: (1) eliminate unnecessary regulation and control; (2) put customers first; (3) empower employees to get results; and (4) reorganize and reengineer for increased efficiency and effectiveness (Unknown, 1993). These two sets of ideas can be found in the book *Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit is Transforming the Public Sector* in the form of a checklist of criteria through which to analyze any public organization or social problem to identify action alternatives to a bureaucratic response (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992).

Both approaches to reform clearly share a focus on improving outcomes in a manner aligned with the political ontology of the Discretionary tradition. Legitimacy is assured through utilitarian principles, the primacy of the individual, and the achievement of efficient and effective outcomes.

Responsibility and Accountability through Equity and Ethics

“For all its instrumental emphasis, public administration is also prone to embrace normative imperatives associated with a constitutionally grounded concept of the public interest” (Lynn, 1996, p. 52). Even Simon admits that administrators must make value judgments, and that to do so, “must be responsive to community values, far beyond those that are explicitly enacted into law” (Simon, 1976, p. 58). However, even from this moral perspective, the Discretionary tradition is result-oriented: “Effectiveness is a virtue only if you are effective at accomplishing something of public value” (Reich, 1990, p. 5). In regard to ethics, these results are formulated as benevolence, humanism, constitutional values, and equity (D. F. Morgan, 1990).

Most of the scholars noted in the discussion of legitimacy through professional virtue have been affiliated with the New Public Administration (NPA). A focal point for this set of ideas was a conference sponsored by Syracuse University at the Minnowbrook conference center in

1968 (Marini, 1971; Stillman, 1991). The Minnowbrook perspective can be described as a shift “from improvements in technique and toward the examination of purpose” (Friedland, 1971, p. 49). Many of the discussions under the NPA rubric were reactions against the technical approach to legitimacy as well as calls to increase the consideration of values beyond efficiency and effectiveness (R. B. Denhardt, 2000).

Of particular interest to this group of scholars is the notion of *equity*. Equity embodies constitutional equality and fairness, but also gives form to the ambiguous notion of the public interest. Much argument is made in political and justice theory about what constitutes equity, particularly whether it is an issue of fair opportunity or fair outcomes (Nozick, 2000; Rawls, 2000b). A procedural (or deontological) approach fits within the legitimacy logic of the Constitutional tradition. However, in the consequential (or teleological) Discretionary tradition, the predominant interpretation focuses on equitable social outcomes and the administrator’s responsibility to help produce this social good.

Equity is particularly linked to the legitimacy crisis because a lack of equity in the form of an increasingly skewed income distribution has been noted as a cause of the increasing levels of distrust and the perceived complicity or disregard on the part of government to this situation (C. S. King et al., 1998). Therefore, attention to the regime value of equality and fairness through a consequential interpretation of equity could be very helpful in improving the status of government. Many of the New Public Administration scholars have focused on the criterion of equity (Frederickson, 1997; Hart, 1974). Frederickson offers a quite detailed argument. Because of its obvious contradictions with a free market economy, a commitment to achieving social equity requires a strong administrative government—one that is not unduly influenced by interest group demands (Frederickson, 1971). “Embracing equity as the third normative pillar of public administration requires public servants to seek out and work toward more just allocations of public goods and services, to represent those who do not otherwise have access to public policy

processes, to seek the public interest or greater good, and to respect the dignity of individuals (public employees as well as other citizens) and tirelessly safeguard their rights” (Frederickson, 1997, p. 113).

More generally, ethics pertain to other constitutional values which are not easily translated into measurable factors like equity. The notion of ethical standards as internalized forms of control has been with the field since its inception (Friedrich, 1940; Gaus, 1936). This approach creates an inner sense of responsibility to the moral purpose and professional ethic of public administration. “These attitudes are a genuine form of control, underlying and giving tone and color to the more formal institutional types whose necessity is undoubted” (L. D. White, 1926, p. 602). However, the Discretionary tradition demands accountability to such ethical systems in terms of specific criteria (Cooper, 1991; Rohr, 1989; Wamsley, 1990a). “The administrator as fiduciary of the citizenry is charged with exercising authority on behalf of the political community and its citizens” (Cooper, 1991, p. 161). To ensure accountability, administrators must not only have a mutual obligation to the common good, group process, and egalitarian expertise, but also to penultimate responsibility to functional effectiveness, and even “third level virtues, values, and principles” (Cooper, 1991, p. 170). At this level, a specific code of ethics and “obligations to colleagues, politicians, and the law” all come into play (Cooper, 1991, p. 170).

Discretion based on professional virtue must be guided in some manner to ensure compliance with the democratic ethos. As Waldo (1980) noted, each public administrator has at least a dozen ethical obligations to: the Constitution, the law, the nation, democracy, organizational or bureaucratic norms, professionalism, family and friends, self, middle-range collectivities, the public interest or general welfare, humanity or the world, religion or God. They cannot be ordered or prioritized in any logical manner, and may not be exhaustive. This condition is only exacerbated by the blurring of public and private organization and the loss of hierarchical

authority structures. Therefore, a map and navigational instruments are needed to get around this complex ethical universe and to guide administrative morality and notions of stewardship. In short, “Your own judgments about what the public wants may be wrong” (Reich, 1990, p. 5).

For the purpose of this inquiry, I will not go into the myriad specific formulations of codes of ethics, guides for ethical practice (Cooper, 1998; K. G. Denhardt, 1988; Dobel, 1990; Garofalo & Geuras, 2006; Gutmann & Thompson, 1997; C. W. Lewis, 1991). This literature in itself is rich and robust enough for an independent exploration. My point here is simply that a large number of scholars believe that responsibility can be achieved through an ethics approach, and that systems of accountability can be based on ethical standards, codes, and approaches to practice that are designed to achieve specific values thought to represent the public interest. In this tradition, administrative action is not legitimate because it follows legislative, judicial, or executive orders that come in the form of standards and procedures. Administrative action is legitimate if it is in compliance with ethical standards chosen and interpreted by public administration to represent the public good.

In sum, this inquiry argues that both reinvention and discretionist approaches to responsibility and accountability share the same logic of legitimacy. This is contrary to many critiques of the reinvention movement as well as many prescriptions for virtuous discretionary administration that focus on the substantive differences between the type of values being pursued, the shifting role of politicians and administrators, and the redefinition of citizens. Despite the substantive differences, the end result is the same: legitimacy is thought to be achieved through administrative excellence. Reinvention pursues efficiency and customer satisfaction, while discretionism pursues social good in other forms, but both are measured by outcomes. Reinvention separates itself from high level policy making, while discretionism absorbs much of it into the administrative function. In both cases, many policy decisions are made by administrators or their agents.

Associated Decision Making Rationality

In Hood's typology of administrative values, entrepreneurialism is focused on resources and time (Hood, 1991). Both play into the calculation of efficiency, and are therefore related to the technical approach to rationality in this tradition. Ostrom considers decision making arrangements that are available to collective action, including individual choice and multi-organizational arrangements (Ostrom, 1989). Both of these approaches fit within the Discretionary tradition either through administrator discretion or pluralist competition, both of which are based on rational choice either in its simplistic or strategic forms. The rationality of the Discretionary tradition is based on the administrative logic of management and competition (Considine & Lewis, 1999). As I see it, this logic has two distinct components. The logic of competition can be described either as rational decision making processes in which ideas compete with one another for primacy, or through which organizations compete through market-like action. This is the logic of privatization through both contracting out and load-shedding, as well as reinvention of government agencies. In these types of practices, the decision rules are bargaining and majority rule (Harmon & Mayer, 1986; Redford, 1969).

A managerial approach is likely to pursue efficiency through an instrumental form of rationality—clearly aligned with the consequential rationales given for legitimacy. While it uses the logic of competition, it is a competition of ideas within an instrumental decision making process. Harmon calls those in this teleological pluralist camp “soft-core rationalists” (Harmon, 1995). As noted in the discussion of the Constitutional approach to rationality, this label may be confusing in that both technical and ethical performance criteria are teleological in nature. The criteria of efficiency and effectiveness are consequences measured through highly rational techniques such as cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness calculations, or even calculations of equity outcomes (Weimer & Vining, 1999). Other standards for ethical behavior can also be evaluated through highly rational techniques such as program evaluation (Rossi et al., 2004). It would seem

that teleology suggests a quite “hard-core” rationalism, as opposed to deontological approaches from which rules may be crafted quite arbitrarily.

While much of Simon’s theory on administrative decision making is descriptive in nature, depicting the rationality of the Constitutional tradition, his normative claims are more aligned with the Discretionary tradition: administrative decision making should be formulated to be as rational as possible (Simon, 1976). To achieve this, three steps are recommended for decision making: (1) list all alternative strategies; (2) determine the consequences of each; and (3) comparatively evaluate the predicted consequences. In his view, efficiency is the only trustworthy criterion because it is most clearly operative. However, the key to rationality is in relying upon a previously established system of values with which to judge the facts that present themselves during analysis. This conceptualization is what allows the technical approach to suggest that rationality and decision making are virtually indistinguishable between public and private organizations, because both “must take as their ethical premises the objectives that have been set for the organization” (Simon, 1976, p. 52). Thus, even virtuous professionals steering toward something like equity can utilize rational choice. He notes “the public agency must weigh the decision in terms of some comprehensive system of public or community values” (Simon, 1976, p. 69). He also notes that private organizations are also concerned with “their responsibilities of trusteeship toward the community, even beyond the limits that the law imposes on them” (Simon, 1976, p. 70). Once such issues of value have been settled, the administrator is freed to rely solely on factual premises during decision making, thus producing rational outcomes.

In this manner, Simon creates a bridge between the two teleological approaches within the Discretionary tradition: the virtuous professionals may establish the values sought, while the technical professionals may determine how to achieve them most efficiently. Unfortunately, he provides no technical direction on how to calculate or weight such substantive values beyond efficiency calculations. Thus, practitioners are given an incomplete set of instructions by which to

achieve the goal sought. Sometimes, this means that efficiency moves into the vacuum as the default value objective. Simon himself admits that “in this case the values which are affected by the unit’s activities, but which are not comprehended in the statement of the organizational objective, will be neglected in the decision-making process” (1976, p. 191). However, in other cases, attempts are made to operationalize substantive values. It could be argued that this problem in and of itself has given rise to the entire profession of program evaluation and human resource practice of performance assessment.

In sum, whether basing decisions on criteria of efficiency, effectiveness, equity, or ethics, the Man of Reason uses an autocratic decision making style. In general, it is believed that human affairs can be understood and predicted through broad, generalizable patterns (O. F. White & McSwain, 1990). But because neither science nor moral philosophy can provide clear answers to all social problems and policy choice, *someone* must make the decision. “The Man of Reason [*sic*], then, is a benevolent, even deferential or diffident, *Master*—one who is reluctantly compelled to run the show because the attitude of reason is in such short supply among human beings generally” (McSwite, 1997, p. 232). Too many administrators are merely “human beings who *satisfice* because they have not the wits to *maximize*” (Simon, 1976, p. xxviii). Less pejoratively, it is impractical to engage many people in decision making processes as conceived by the Discretionary tradition. Therefore, to maintain legitimacy, the Master administrator must submit either to objective reality or professional principles to ensure that he is not subjective and therefore potentially illegitimate.

Associated Organizing Style

The key principle of organization in the Discretionary tradition is to create a context for highly empowered professionals. Some note that the assumptions embraced by the technical and managerial camp conflict with more normative approaches, yet both embrace humanistic organizational reforms (Fox, 1996). “New public administration and reinventing government are

somewhat similar in substance regarding their approaches to management and leadership,” albeit different in tone (Frederickson, 1996, p. 267). However, there is a common denominator—both *empower administrators*. In fact, Paul Light (1997) refers to government reinvention as a “liberation management” approach.

As so eloquently represented by the New Public Management proponents, the hierarchical bureaucratic form is not conducive for a liberated, empowered administrator. From either perspective within the Discretionary tradition, bureaucracy is broken. To summarize, in bureaucracy: (1) efficiency becomes a symbol that represents end-values sought, thus moving from a characteristic of means to an end in and of itself; (2) the focus then turns to efficiency, becoming overly concerned with means or technique rather than substantive ends; (3) which is exacerbated by the shunting off of politics, policy formation, and thus much creative and problem-solving thought from administration; and (4) eventually, the focus on technique becomes an end in itself, creating inefficiency through procedural compliance and lack of innovation (Waldo, 1955).

In its extreme, entrepreneurial government “opt[s] to substitute competition for planning and contracts for hierarchies” (Considine & Lewis, 1999, p. 470). Privatization has been discussed in the literature at least since World War II (Macy, 1971). Privatization is certainly an important organizing strategy for government, but this discussion will focus on the organizing style preferred for the remaining public organizations, which begins with the scientific approach to administration. In his seminal article, Simon (1946) challenges commonly held administrative principles of the time as promoted by Luther Gulick, suggesting that concepts such as specialization, unity of command, span of control, and organization by purpose, process, clientele, or place are merely heuristic devices that have many sources of conflict and paradoxes. Rather than assuming that all of these principles are true at face value, Simon calls for a more scientific approach that would consider the various trade-offs involved between these principles,

as well as develop methods by which to assess the best possible combination of characteristics in any given circumstance.

To a great degree, this is precisely what modern management theory proceeded to do. Research found that in a paradoxical manner, technical approaches to organization first called for an increasingly systematized, centralized, and neutralized structure (Gerth & Mills, 1946). However, as the inefficiencies of hierarchy became evident, managerial science began calling for the reverse actions (J. Q. Wilson, 2000). Ongoing study has led to ever-increasing efficiency through myriad organizational reforms and new management approaches. In contemporary organization theory, there is a plethora of organizing styles available to public organizations that reflect these shifts in approach.

Peters (1992) offers four models of governance: market models; participatory models; flexible government; and deregulated government. Market models are meant to address the problems of monopoly, and therefore call for decentralization and competition. Participative models seek to address the problems of hierarchy, so call for flatter organizations. Flexible government attempts to address the static nature of hierarchy, and thus calls for virtual organizations that can easily change as needed. Deregulated government calls for greater managerial discretion without addressing the hierarchy itself. Each has a distinct Entrepreneurial style, however flexible models crossover into the logic of the Collaborative tradition. Of these models, the one that most clearly supports both the technical and normative approaches to discretion are the participative and deregulated models which call for flattened structure and delegated authority. Flatter hierarchies are more easily changed and responsive, if not flexible to the degree of virtual organizations. Thus, this participative model is somewhat of a “middle way” between hierarchy and networks in terms of organizing style.

Many of the managerial concepts associated with challenges to “the orthodoxy” belong to the Discretionary tradition because they are associated with an empowered administration (R. B.

Denhardt, 2000). The bureaucratic form is adapted to meet the needs of empowered workers. Hierarchies are flattened, jobs are redesigned, and work teams become self-directed. While these ideas are clearly linked to the responsibility and accountability formulations of New Public Management, it has been noted that proponents of the New Public Administration also call for more flexible, modified bureaucratic organizational forms, including decentralization, devolution, contracts, and innovative organizational development approaches (Frederickson, 1971). These strategies have the effect of aligning individual and organizational objectives, increasing personal satisfaction, and improving productivity (C. I. Barnard, 1968; Blake & Mouton, 1964; Golembiewski & Eddy, 1978; Maslow, 1943; McGregor, 1957; Trist & Bamforth, 2003).

Many organization theories recommend these types of strategies and structures specifically to improve productivity. Yet, they have humanistic and democratic purposes as well, in keeping with the view of employees as empowered, skilled, valuable individuals. A surprising precursor to this approach is actually found in the scientific management movement—an underlying assumption is that people seek to be cooperative because they come to realize that workers and managers rely on one another for overall success (F. Taylor, 1923).

Accordingly, the most difficult task of the chief executive is not command, it is leadership, that is, the development of the desire and will to work together for a purpose in the minds of those who are associated in any activity. Human beings are comprised of cogitation and emotion and do not function well when treated as though they were merely cogs in motion. Their capacity for great and productive labor, creative co-operative work, and loyal self-sacrifice knows no limits provided the whole man, body-mind-and-spirit, is thrown into the program. (Gulick, 1937a, p. 37)

From this humanistic perspective, authoritarian organization conflicts with the ideals of democratic morality and must therefore be moderated through employee organizing, humanistic management, or rules made through liberal constitutionalism (Redford, 1969). In the human relations approach, people are not viewed as cogs in a machine (R. B. Denhardt, 2000). Rather,

people are active participants in developing the organization and its products or services; their needs, intentions, and self-esteem count (Addams, 1964, 2004; Argyris, 1957; Argyris & Schon, 1978; C. I. Barnard, 1968; Follett, 1995b, 1995d, 1995g; Golembiewski, 1989; Golembiewski & Eddy, 1978). The common trait in these theories is an argument for “injecting human values and individual development into organizational activity” (Harmon & Mayer, 1986, p. 198). As organizations become less autocratic and more empowering, they invite a more participative leadership style and increase personal growth. Democratized workplaces are thus appropriate for the sovereign citizens they employ.

There are five principal propositions reflected in the humanistic approach to organizing: (1) the nature and normative importance of rationality is at issue, both in terms of individual motivation and organizational success; (2) a fundamental tension between the needs of formal organizations and those of healthy adults is recognized as problematic; (3) organizational democracy and participative management are promoted; (4) most perceive the intrinsic virtue of democratic organizations, as opposed to ulterior instrumental purposes; and (5) public administration theorists using later human relations theory to point out the tensions between bureaucratic organization and democracy (Harmon & Mayer, 1986). This last point is of particular concern to those in the virtuous professional camp. Paradoxically, “It is entirely possible that internal administrative democracy might run counter to the principles and objectives of political democracy in which the organizations of government are viewed as instruments of public purpose” (Mosher, 1968, pp. 18-19). Again, this is the problem of administrative discretion. At the level of the *organizational member*, the Discretionary tradition calls for humanistic, empowering approaches. At the level of *society*, such relationship with citizens is by no means guaranteed.

In the professional approach taken by the Discretionary tradition, moral indoctrination comes in the form of training and formal education. These are supported through strategies like

licensure, certifications, and professional codes of ethics. Barnard suggests that any form of organizational cooperation ultimately rests on an ethical ideal: responsibility is “the quality which gives dependability and determination to human conduct, and foresight and ideality to purpose” (C. I. Barnard, 1968, p. 260). This is not much different from the technical approach, wherein expert advice, information, and training are all used to increase the individual’s capacity to make rational decisions (Simon, 1976).

The seeds of the Discretionary approach to professionalism were planted by the “Bureau Men” described earlier (Stivers, 2000a). Responsibility and accountability would be garnered through a combination of superior character and professional training. In all, public organizations relying on professionals “must go further and encourage that kind of professional and personal attitude toward the job that will operate from within the individual person who is the public official, and will help to fuse his private satisfactions with his public duties” (Gaus, 1947, p. 123). This will create a “service state” rather than a “police state.” In other words, these attitudes themselves create a role conception that serves to “*elicit* responsible behavior from them” (McSwite, 1997, p. 36). This organizational reliance on professionalism leads to the final element of the tradition: role conceptualization.

Implications for Role Conceptualization

In sketch, Entrepreneurs view citizens as customers or service recipients to be served according to performance objectives set by administration. Without intending to be demeaning, the laity is not considered to be as capable of determining the public interest as public administrators, nor is the political process itself. Therefore, administrators must make decisions and act to achieve the public interest. Because the Entrepreneur’s role is released from much hierarchical political control, the focus turns from the relationship between politicians and administrators to the relationship between the administrator and society. From this perspective, the Master/Servant relationship becomes reversed: administrators step into the Master role,

displacing both politicians and citizens. In the extreme, administrators take on most all functions once allocated among the Constitution, political representatives, and administrators, simultaneously producing government *of, by, and for* the people. They are expected to interpret law, represent the People, and act as virtuous citizens on their behalf.

A more direct way to describe the Entrepreneur role conceptualization is to envision prescriptions for practice. The topical principles of action considered in the *New Public Service: Serving, Not Steering* can be used to identify key administrative prescriptions by using their generic form (J. V. Denhardt & Denhardt, 2003). Many of these principals have been described in the various elements of the tradition, but are recapitulated in Table 4 in a form that may be more common to role descriptions.

Table 4

Discretionary Tradition Prescriptions for Practice

<i>Administrative Principle</i>	<i>Entrepreneur Ideal Type</i>
Defining the Public Interest	The public interest is best determined through competing criteria, with administrators choosing the best option.
Source of Guidance	Public administrators should display leadership by using their expertise to determine the “best” ways to get things done.
Primary Allegiance	Public administrators are accountable to performance criteria.
Scope of Action	Public policy should be decided and implemented by the most effective resource—political or administrative; public or private.
Accountability Approach	Public administrators are sufficiently accountable to the public when they achieve the most effective outcomes, as measured by efficiency, equity, and ethics.
Path to Productivity	Productivity is best reached by independent decisions and actions on the part of professional administrators that enable innovation and responsiveness.
Principal Task	Public administrators best contribute to the public good by providing expert guidance to policy-makers and meeting the demands of constituents as customers.

A handful of autonomous expert role conceptualizations have been forwarded: *conservator, agent, virtuous administrator, trustee, and steward*. A quick tour through the literature provides eloquent illustrations of why such autonomous expertise is believed to be legitimate. In fact, writing with Ralph Chandler, Frederickson suggests that we must “stop denigrating the role of authority; doing so only debilitates the process of governance. All mature societies have secular ‘priesthoods’ in which institutional wisdom is preserved” (Frederickson, 1997, p. 222). Public administrators are “protectors of our Republic and democratic way of life. They are *administrative conservators*, a distinction and vocation worthy of honor and respect” (Terry, 1995, p. 183). A *virtuous administrator* acts as an expert trustee: “The virtuous administrator is the citizen administrator... He or she is also employed by the citizenry to function on its behalf in pursuing the common good...” (Cooper, 1991, p. 160). In “virtuous performance... there must be care not to confuse one’s professional viewpoint, functional preoccupation, or personal prejudices with the public interest” (Appleby, 1952, p. 176). Public administrators have “a greater responsibility to understand the nature of our society, democracy, and government than do most citizens...” (Box, 2004, p. 4). “Public servants are special because they are deeply involved in a shared project of governance and common endeavor of the society” (Wolf & Bacher, 1990, p. 169). “It appears that new Public Administration is an alignment with good, or possibly God” (Frederickson, 1971, p. 329).

The Discretionary tradition contends that public administration “should build an autonomous agential role based on unique claims for a special role in governance” (Wamsley, 1990a, p. 115). “If public administrators are *representatives* of the people, they are trustees of the public good in the same way that the Roman tribune protected the interests of the citizens of Rome against the patrician class” (Frederickson, 1997, pp. 209-210). As *trustees*, they are “competent to define the public interest on their own authority” (Frederickson, 1997, p. 210). Similarly, a *steward* is a trustee with the “willingness and ability to earn the public trust by being

an effective and ethical agent in carrying out the republic's business" (Kass, 1990b, p. 113). Responsibility and accountability are achieved through "the loyalty, humility, and savvy of expert administrators" (Kass, 1990a). In all of these role conceptualizations, administrators are *agents* acting with authority on behalf of other and lesser citizens. These ideas are clearly different from the role conceptualization of *Bureaucrat* in the Constitutional tradition. Here, it is suggested that the type of autonomy envisioned is more like an *Entrepreneur*.

As noted in the introduction to this tradition, metaphors for the *Entrepreneur* are a mixed bag: (1) the opportunist who is self-interested, goal-seeking, and utility maximizing; (2) the pragmatist who is effective in competing for scarce resources and advancing the programs for which he or she is responsible; and (3) the agent or trustee who acts on behalf of the interests of the public (Catron & Hammond, 1990). The term *entrepreneur* has been given new meanings in recent years by adding an adjective such as *public*, *policy*, *social*, or *civic*. A *public* entrepreneur is "a person who creates or profoundly elaborates a public organization so as to alter greatly the existing pattern of allocation of scarce public resources" (E. Lewis, 1980, p. 9). This is similar to *policy* entrepreneurs, who are actors that seek to affect policy problem identification and definition, agenda setting, development of policy alternatives, and decision making in regard to policy choice (Kingdon, 2003). They are often technical professionals hired to advocate on behalf of special interests. Similarly, "*Social* [italics added] entrepreneurs are private sector citizens who play critical roles in bringing about 'catalytic changes' in the public sector agenda and the perception of certain social issues" (Waddock & Post, 1991, p. 393). "The name civic entrepreneur combines two important American traditions: entrepreneurship (the spirit of enterprise) and civic virtue (the spirit of community)" (Henton et al., 1997, p. 31). All of these roles speak to either an empowered governance actor.

The conflicting meanings of the Entrepreneur identity reflects the long-standing debate between those promoting the technical or managerial role conceptualization versus those

promoting the virtuous professional role conceptualization. Many believe that the nature of public service changes radically if the democratic ethos is replaced with one of free market enterprise in which citizenship is marked only by “active participation in a healthy market economy” (McSwite, 2002, p. 19). The fear is that, as worried de Tocqueville, citizens will become “timid and industrious animals of which government is the shepherd” (Will, 1983, p. 111). However, as has been described throughout the discussion of this tradition, the logic holds for the pursuit of substantive values as well. So long as legitimacy hangs on the measurement of performance, the logic of legitimacy through expertise holds regardless of its nature.

To make this point more clear, it could be argued that those discretionists who seek substantive values beyond efficiency feel that they claim the moral high ground. For example, Box (2004) describes this professional role as one of legitimate administrative discretion in achieving Constitutional goals. As noted in the discussion of political authority, the language of the professional virtue approach is marbled with assertions of a morally superior role. To this camp, public administrators are considered “democratic standard-bearers with responsibility for protecting and promoting both procedural and substantive values of our democratic polity” (D. F. Morgan, 1990, p. 68). As such, “public entrepreneurs of the neo-managerialist persuasion pose a threat to democratic governance” (Terry, 1998, p. 194). Yet, these critiques do not challenge other forms of administrative discretion, as might a view from the Constitutional tradition.

This inquiry challenges this position, suggesting that to link autonomous managerial action focused on efficiency and effectiveness to self-interest, while linking autonomous administrative action focused on ethics and equity to the public interest is a failure in logic. To further assume that to focus on ethics and equity is to ensure Constitutional accountability is an even bigger stretch of legitimacy logic. *All* of these values are associated with constitutional democracy as has been extensively argued by re-readings of the founding discourse, efficiency

and effectiveness perhaps more so than ethics and equity. What is *not* generally associated with Constitutional accountability is administrative or managerial discretion.

In summary, the characteristics of the ideal type role conceptualization of *Entrepreneur* are presented in Table 5.

Table 5

Entrepreneur Role Conceptualization Summary

<i>Role Type</i>	<i>Entrepreneur</i>	
<i>Element</i>	<i>Technical Side</i>	<i>Normative Side</i>
Principal PA Theory	Managerialist or New Public Management	Discretionist or Agential New Public Administration
Legitimacy Problems (within tradition)	Failure to perform efficiently	Failure to achieve democratic outcomes
Key Role Characteristics	Effective and efficient entrepreneur; technician; the American version of NPM—privatization, reinvention, etc.	Discretionary professional; virtuous administrator; Agent; trustee
Administrative Role Conception	Administrator as Man-the-Maker [<i>sic</i>]; the Master role in representative government; Entrepreneur who sees Citizens as active customers or clients—interaction based on principles of competition and exchange	
Assumed Governance Context	Administrative State—representative democracy; governance occurs through a complex blurring of boundaries between public and private sectors and pluralist activity	
Political Ontology	Modern Liberalism; the Administrative elite represent the Many to produce the One	
Political Authority and Scope of Action	Ignore, eliminate, or shift the dichotomy because administrators <i>are</i> involved in policy making—outcomes prove legitimacy (efficiency, effectiveness, equity, or other chosen values in the form of ethics)	
Source of legitimacy	Administrative experts	
Responsibility and Accountability	Does not trust politics to produce the Good; administrators produce the Good through chosen criteria (e.g. efficiency, effectiveness, equity, ethics); performance evaluation	
Administrative Decision Making Rationality	Instrumental rationality (both technical and strategic)—whatever gets the best results given the situation, with “best” defined by expertise (both technical and normative); teleological	
Organizing Style	Humanistic and entrepreneurial hierarchy (flattened; empowered)	

CHAPTER 6: THE COLLABORATIVE TRADITION

This chapter will describe elements comprising the Collaborative tradition of public administration, which promotes the ideal type role conceptualization of *Steward*. The research questions considered in this chapter are:

What are the key elements of public administration theory that contribute to role conceptualization?

How do these elements coalesce into varying coherent sets based on the concept of democratic legitimacy?

Many of the core elements of the Collaborative tradition are emergent, and based on postmodern principles of reflexivity, social construction, and the ambiguity and fluidity that these new understandings of reality entail. Yet, I do not believe that this grouping of ideas necessitates a categorization of being “post-traditional,” suggesting that because of their implications for uncertainty, traditions can no longer be formed (Catlaw, 2006a; Giddens, 1994). Indeed, I see these ideas as forming a new tradition, a “new ethical-political constellation” (Bernstein, 1991) around which theories of public administration cluster. In fact, many of these ideas are not new in terms of chronology. Many ideas in this tradition were put forth by scholars during the Progressive era at the turn of the *last* century, and can be traced to ideas espoused by some Anti-federalist thinking during the founding of the United States.

There are a number of labels attached to many elements of the Collaborative tradition of public administration: transformative, emergent, postmodern, post-traditional, discursive, participative, New Public Service, and even *anti-administrative*. For example, *transformative* administration serves democracy, citizen engagement, and social and economic justice. It is “collaborative, humanistic, emancipatory, inclusive and diverse” (C. S. King & Zanetti, 2005, p. xi). The New Public Service is based on organizational humanism; participative forms of democratic theory; communitarian and social capital theory; and a synthesis of phenomenology, critical theory, and postmodernism (J. V. Denhardt & Denhardt, 2003; R. B. Denhardt, 2000).

Farmer describes his concept of *anti-administration* as radically imaginative, morally reflective, and multi-epistemological (Farmer, 2005b). It is “truly human,” meaning that “each and every individual is treated in her fullest human dimensions (psycho, socio, bio, spiritual, and other dimensions)” (Farmer, 2005b, p. xiv). It is evident in anarchist political theory, ecological and feminist discourses, deliberative democracy, and much of the discourse theory applications to public administration. It is congruent with much communitarian thinking about civil society, volunteerism, trust, and citizen engagement.

As noted in relation to anti-administration (Farmer, 2005b), the elements of the Collaborative tradition are pre-traditional, concurrent, and post-traditional in source. The logic of this tradition of public administration is present in the Declaration of Independence, Articles of Confederation, and the Anti-federalist thought expressed during the debates surrounding the Constitutional adoption (McSwite, 1997; O. F. White, 1990b). Its meanings are expressed in the thinking and writing of noted scholars who held what has been called prophetic vision in terms of political and administrative theory for the contemporary democratic condition (Graham, 1995). Pragmatists like John Dewey, Mary Parker Follett, and Jane Addams could be considered the founders of the Collaborative tradition, as much of their thinking fits its logic (Addams, 1964, 2004; Dewey, 1957; Follett, 1998).

As revealed by a feminist re-reading of the field’s literature and history, this emergent tradition of public administration was in large part absorbed into the field of social work through the “Settlement Women;” the predominantly female members and feminine cultural characteristics of the settlement and charitable movement (Stivers, 2000a). The Settlement Women offered a phenomenological and pragmatic alternative to the more positivist “Bureau Men” discussed in the Discretionary tradition in terms of how to think about public life, democracy, and the place of administration within it. This perspective viewed the city as a home, not a business to be operated by government. They sought new programs to improve living

conditions and promoted a purpose of caring that would humanize governance processes and make government more accessible and connected to the people served. The persona of public administrators would be one of autonomous neighbor—a person with discretionary judgment guided only by caring and participative relationships with fellow citizens. The public interest would be measured pragmatically and collaboratively by quality of life rather than efficiency.

These Collaborative ideas are often present in the theories of those who primarily advocate for Constitutional or Discretionary logics. Therefore, the source is often surprising. This is most clearly expressed by Wilson as the question of how to accommodate direct democracy within a representative system: “How shall our series of governments within governments be so administered that it shall always be to the interest of the public officer to serve, *not his superior alone but the community also*, [italics added] with the best efforts of his talents and the soberest service of his conscience?” (W. Wilson, 1887, p. 221). Unfortunately, ideas like these were in large part counter to the logics of Constitutional and Discretionary approaches to public administration, therefore they were generally considered “largely irrelevant if not perverse” (Waldo, 1984, p. xxviii). Thus, the ideas of the Collaborative tradition were all but lost historically, until resurrected some decades later at the 1968 Minnowbrook conference in some of the principles of New Public Administration (Wamsley, 1990b).

Assumed Governance Context

The Collaborative tradition ultimately seeks a transformation of the governance context by eliminating sectors and making all of life a new form of political action. Rather than viewing life as separated among the market, government, and civil society, each with unique rules of engagement, social life is a cohesive whole which functions under the same principles of human relationship throughout. Theories of social integration are nothing new. John Dewey “envisioned a future democracy in which the political and economic spheres would be joined” (Box et al., 2001, p. 610). As noted in prior discussions of equity in the Discretionary tradition, the public

interest is impacted by all sectors, particularly the market. Therefore, “equity... can be determined only through political dialogue within a political community” (Frederickson, 1997, p. 107). Thus, “public administration” pertains to all institutions that have been formed as “instruments of action in pursuit of the public interest” (Wamsley et al., 1990b, p. 37). This perspective is a notable and defining feature of the “Evergreen Manifesto” (Adams et al., 1990). “When the world is understood in two separate compartments, one politics and another economics, gross (economic) inequality can be accommodated with supposed (political) equality and the achievements of American democracy celebrated. This is what we call *partial democracy*” (Adams et al., 1990, p. 221). Therefore, for people to pursue a fuller expression of democracy, all social activity must come under its rules of engagement.

As noted in the Discretionary assumptions about the governance context, the blurring of sectoral boundaries is increasingly evident in the contemporary postmodern context. But the rules of engagement follow the principles of exchange and *transaction*. For this reason, some look to public choice theory for ways to describe both the emergent empirical and idealized governance context, for example: “self-governing communities of relationships in compound republics” (Ostrom, 1989, p. 19). However, in the Collaborative ideal, all forms of relationship become a complex interwoven web of *shared experience*. Therefore, it is more appropriate to draw from Radicalism or Anarchism to conceptualize the governance context of collaboration.

Ideas such as mutualism, syndicalism, collectivism, and communitarianism figure prominently in visions of the ideal governance context. For example, in Follett’s (1998) vision of the new state, the self-governing mode of association creates a deeply nested federalism that grows out of local associations at the neighborhood level, allowing for autonomy at the same time as unifying ever larger networks of conjoined groups. This creates a governance context of myriad networks of relationships that are connected through “an infinite number of filaments” that “cross and recross and connect all my various allegiances” (1998, p. 312). This requires that

the local groups include all affected actors, with all groups working together in the process of *interpenetration*, a sort of collaborative mutual influence. In this arrangement, modified form of fluid representation is necessary for simple feasibility, as well as to prevent crowd mentality from emerging from groups too large in scale for interpenetration. “There must be representatives from the smallest units to the larger and larger, up to the federal state” (Follett, 1998, p. 251).

However, representation is not formal, and follows a pure delegate structure, ensuring that all those affected are accommodated if so desired. True federalism has permeable boundaries across all groupings.

Some believe that this approach to governance was described in proposals for participative democracy in Anti-Federalist thought (Storing, 1981; O. F. White, 1990b). This philosophy is evident in the Declaration of Independence, the Articles of Confederation, and the Constitution’s Bill of Rights (McSwite, 1997). Box (2004) simplifies the Anti-Federalist argument as calling for small, local, decentralized government to protect individual liberty. This has also been called a Jeffersonian approach to public administration, in which the best government governs the least, instead empowering its citizenry to self-govern (Caldwell, 1988). Indeed, Jefferson promoted a limited public administration closely monitored by the People through very local government (Stillman, 1996). While these descriptions come close to the Collaborative ideal for governance, they remain grounded in a liberal conception of individualism. From the Collaborative perspective, the purpose of a deeply nested federalism must not be to “protect individual liberty” or to enable the monitoring of representatives. It must be to create legitimate governance through *collaborative human relationship*. This requires a very different political ontology to the various formulations of Liberalism used by the other traditions of public administration.

Political Ontology

The political ontology of the Collaborative tradition draws from Radical and Anarchist political philosophy, but in a manner that calls for a transcendence of all tendencies toward unity or the One as conceived by Communism and Communitarianism, as well as tendencies toward an absolute individualist pluralism of the Many as conceived by some theories of anarchy as well as Modern Liberalism. Instead, “We come together in public space both as people who share concerns and perspectives and as beings each of whom is unique. Arendt emphasizes uniqueness in order to offer a picture of the public world as a space that brings people together but does not allow them to merge into a faceless One” (Stivers, in press, ch. 5). In order to fully understand this unique political ontology, the basic tenets of Radicalism can be used as a point of departure.

Radicalism holds that society is a living organism that precedes the individual, and that human beings can only realize their full potential through community (Clark, 1998). Yet, society must be constructed in a manner to enable each individual to fully realize her or his potential as a unique subject. Societies that treat people as objects to be dominated or controlled are considered immoral. Because of this fact, political authority can only be created through direct democratic participation. The political economy must be equal in terms of opportunity, process, and basic results. Abilities and contributions should determine wealth, however everyone should have what they need regardless of production contribution. The role of government is to create these conditions and to facilitate collective action. Such equality will create greater efficiency through less waste of talent, social order without repression, and enhanced human rights and quality of life.

Radicalism is thus attempting to resolve the conflict between the democratic aspirations of the Enlightenment and the dominating power of society. Its principal architects included philosophers Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778), Thomas Paine (1737-1809), and the Marquis de Condorcet (1743-1794) (Clark, 1998). Radicalism seeks to eliminate all sources of human

oppression, such as privilege and inordinate wealth. Such domination is unacceptable from any source, be it government, religion, or market. These thinkers viewed capitalism as a transformation of traditional authority and domination that had once been expressed by the church and the state in various forms of aristocratic rule.

Rousseau (2000) describes an optimistic social contract in which individuals are fundamentally communal, pursuing a general will as *citizens*, rather than as Hobbesian private individuals. Through participation in self government at the smallest increments of community, the general will or public interest can be determined in a manner that will not ultimately become oppression of the many by the few. Rousseau's challenges to self-interest and individualism were extended by George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831), and through him by Friedrich Engels (1820-1895) and Karl Marx (1818-1883). Hegel (2000a) believed that people can only understand themselves within social relationships (G. W. F. Hegel, 2000a). While these relationships are often played out in power struggles between "lords and bondsmen," those who appear to be in control are actually dependent upon those who serve. He used this argument to resolve the Master/Slave dialectic, offering an alternative view of human beings as individuals who are mutually dependent on one another. Individuals can only *become* within the context of community. Rationality and action are not based on individual choice, but are rather embedded within family, civil society, and governance (G. W. F. Hegel, 2000b).

Hegel believed this social process occurs on a historically deterministic path, leading inexorably toward a predetermined utopian endpoint. Engels and Marx extended these ideas in their more detailed critique of capitalism based on the manner in which it prevents the utopia from emerging (Engels, 2000). In a nutshell, the production process in a society exerts a profound influence on all other aspects of life, including politics, religion, and ideas. Marx predicted that capitalism would eventually collapse through proletariat revolution and be replaced by communism: the shared ownership of capital and shared operation of production. Through

socialist markets, productive assets would be controlled by the public, and benefits would be distributed “from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs!” (Marx, 2000). As history shows, implementation departed from this ideal significantly, creating an authoritarian context of state control over most spheres of society.

Post-Marxist thought carries on many of the Radical ideals of socialism and communism. However, in large part because actual implementation of the philosophy reveals authoritarianism, rather than democratic socialism, revisions have been offered. Edward Bernstein (1850-1932) concluded that neither the collapse of capitalism nor a proletarian revolution are inevitable (Clark, 1998). In *Evolutionary Socialism* (1899), he proposes an evolutionary transition from capitalism to socialism through the democratic political process. This revision is the foundation for social democratic and economic theories such as Communitarianism. These theories focus on the effects of markets on culture and quality of life, supporting methods that create greater equality, decentralization, accountability of power, and prioritizing human development over profit. This is purported to be a more integrated, holistic, and evolutionary approach to economics because it considers social, cultural, and political factors. Similarly, Thorstein Veblen (1857-1929), an American political economist who was influenced by Pragmatism as well as critical theory, proposed that the economy should be analyzed as an evolving process embedded in an institutional framework that includes the legal, political, and educational systems, in addition to family, work, customs, and ethics. Veblen’s views formed the basis for the American populist movement, the Democratic and Progressive parties, and Institutional Economics (Clark, 1998).

The contemporary Radical school of thought might better be called critical theory, which seeks emancipation from all oppressive social structures, including both capitalist hierarchies and socialist authoritarianism (Clark, 1998). It is carried forward by philosophers such as Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, Herbert Marcuse, and Jurgen Habermas through the Frankfurt School’s Institution for Social Research. In sum, these theorists seek solutions that minimize the

tension between individual freedom and social order. They do not believe that domination is an inherent or necessary characteristic of society. Indeed, they “argue, to the contrary, that an alternative scenario may be developed, one permitted by the fact that human institutions are socially constructed and, therefore, may be reconstituted by conscious choice and effective action” (R. B. Denhardt, 1981b, p. 630). However, even this school of thought continues to pursue the utopian “unity” described by Hegel, through the coordination of independent and equal spheres of market, government, and civil society. This is more like communitarianism than social democracy. As Clark (1998) suggests, communitarianism seeks to balance the liberal focus on rights, autonomy, and choice against the conservative emphasis on duties, participation, and commitment. Communitarians believe that greater democratic participation and commitment to community will ultimately expand freedom by creating greater civility, trust, and a sense of shared purpose that will guide individuals in the market and government spheres. They seek to revitalize the civic sphere rather than making fundamental changes to either government or the market.

However, the logic of Collaborative thinking transcends the Liberal objective of *unity* achieved either through traditional authority or pluralist exchange. It also transcends the Radical objective of *unity* produced by mutual dependence, replacing it with a more anarchistic notion of interdependent *becoming*. In other words, it is a political ontology that seeks to synthesize the *One and the Many in a never-ending process of mutual emergence*. Niebuhr (1963, 1970) describes this phenomenon as “radical monotheism;” a universal community or force which imbues all and yet is manifested in each uniquely. It is not homogeneity that is achieved, but rather harmonization and integration through what Follett calls *interpenetration* or ongoing co-adaptation. “The test of our progress is neither our likenesses nor our unlikenesses, but what we are going to do with our unlikenesses. Shall I fight whatever is different from me or find the higher synthesis?” (Follett, 1998, p. 96). Follett clearly differentiates between the *unified* state as

an object versus the *unifying* state as a process. A unified state is based on contract, while a unifying state is created by an ongoing process of creative collaboration.

The notion of society as a process of becoming is illustrated by Dewey's approach to ideas like "the public" or "the state" or "society" as problems of interpretation. He believed the principal problem of *the public* is, "What hinders it from finding and identifying itself?" (Dewey, 1957, p. 125). In other words, "the State must always be rediscovered" (Dewey, 1957, p. 34). Indeed, "No state can endure unless the political bond is being forever forged anew" (Follett, 1998, p. 11). Those who support a rebirth of these ideas rely on the idea that the "soul" of government is "the socially constructed community of shared values" (Wamsley, 1990a, p. 154). Thus, "statecraft is soulcraft" at an institutional level (Will, 1983, p. 19). As such, the enterprise of public administration is the enterprise of civilization (Waldo, 1980).

Because shared values are in ongoing flux, the institutions of government "must be animated by constant recurrence to a justifying doctrine" (Will, 1983, p. 18). We must continually revisit the moral basis of our government because its action in turn conditions action and thought. To avoid domination and enable this process of becoming, some call for a new humanistic civic ideology or civic religion that will open up democracy (Farmer, 2005b). "Perhaps our sorest lack is doctrine in the theological sense to govern the flow of cooperative energies in a free commonwealth" (Morstein Marx, 1946, p. 503). Others suggest we must create "a reconfiguration of consciousness, one that produces a new and different sense of subjectivity" (McSwite, 1997, p. 14). This is more openly labeled as an alternative political ontology (Catlaw, in press). Therefore, an attempt is made to describe a political ontology that enables the Collaborative ideal of free, cooperative, mutual becoming.

As noted earlier, theories about democratic legitimacy stem from notions of human nature (Caldwell, 1988). Once we change assumptions about human nature, institutional structures and power distribution will shift to match (Giddens, 1984). As noted in the

Constitutional and Discretionary traditions, their shared political ontology considers human beings to be inherently self-interested and prone to cause society to become out of balance, thus hindering desired progress and stability. Therefore, society requires Masters, whether they are principally in the role of politician or public administrator. In order to achieve the ideal governance context envisioned by the Collaborative tradition, the need for Masters must be eliminated. To trust one another within the social process, we must re-conceive our individuality as other-regarding, situated selves. We must be willing to believe that “strong and respectful relationships are containers for personal growth, are essential to our healthy functioning, and are central to the possibility of practicing transformative work” (C. S. King & Zanetti, 2005, p. vii). We must re-humanize ourselves to eradicate the negative consequences of our assumptions of self interest. Rather than assuming human nature is war-like and self-interested, we must refute the notion that it can be characterized as one thing over another. It must be reconceived as an infinite potentiality. Once we humanize, we can then politicize, collaborate, strategize, and organize in a new manner (Zanetti, 1998).ⁱⁱ

At a fundamental level, the Collaborative ideal does not assume a pre-determined expression of human nature beyond an acceptance of human beings as essentially unique while existing within a condition that is essentially social. While this is essentialist in the strictest sense, it is an attempt to establish an understanding for pragmatic action. For example, Waldo did not believe in a state of nature beyond the human condition as it is in a given time and place, and questioned the usefulness of “arguing from a condition contrary to fact” (Waldo, 1980, p. 19). The Collaborative ideal is similar to this notion in that it views human beings as existing in a social context in a manner that expresses a multitude of unique perspectives, attitudes, and actions. The difference to the liberal view of human nature is that human beings are *not* assumed to be either the same unless they are deviant or lacking in some manner, or fully independent in a manner that requires some type of motivation of purpose to interact with others in society.

Instead, the human condition is one of relationship among unique beings. Unlike Hobbes and Locke, there is no pre-social state of independence that must be given up in exchange for social order and its benefits. Instead, the human condition is a social state of mutual interdependence that is in a constant state of becoming. As the philosopher Martin Heidegger described it, we are born into a social context and because of our fundamental understandings of one another as fellow human beings, forms of social interaction such as language become possible (Hummel, 1987). It is the condition and enables a “sense of the common” (Stivers, in-press, chapter 5). As a result, the individual and society are “forever a-making” one another (Follett, 1995f, p. 256). Indeed, such an ongoing nature of *creation*, of reality always becoming, figures prominently in co-creation and stewardship theology (W. H. King, 1986). “Such a self would be autonomous yet social, individuated yet defined by nonconflicting interests, rational but embodied in numerous different social relations, expressive of individuality yet public in orientation” (M. Warren, 1992a, p. 13).

These assumptions require an alternative understanding of individualism—one that is collectivist in nature, while not succumbing to the authoritarian tendencies of Conservatism and some aspects of Communitarianism. Many attempts have been made to name and understand this form of individualism. Follett calls it the “new individualism” (1998, p. 73). The problem is that such a concept requires a different language from both hierarchical representative culture and competitive pluralist culture. For example, the *situated self* is used to describe the individual within society (Dudley, 1996). It has also been described as “the individual-in-herself in-her-difference in society” (Farmer, 2005b, p. 187). As depicted by Follett, such a being is an individual-in-community rather than an atomistic individual. “The fallacy of self-and-others fades away and there is only self-in-and-through-others” (Follett, 1998, p. 8). Dimock calls this form of individualism “cultural individuality” (1937, p. 418)—a concept of the individual within community that reconciles liberty and equality. It includes responsibility to pursue the happiness

of the collective, as well as for oneself. This type of *ensembled individualism* is expressed in indigenous cultures (Sampson, 1988), and is also a way to interpret de Tocqueville's notion of self-interest rightly understood: "The inhabitants of the United States almost always know how to combine their own well-being with that of their fellow citizens" (2000, p. 501). As discussed by Stivers (in press), this principal of *being with* is evident in Heidegger's approach to ontology (Thiele, 1995).

Based on this inherently social condition and alternative interpretation of individualism, the Collaborative logic reaches beyond the notion of *contract* altogether, referring instead to the social *bond* or other form of common ground that is part of the human condition, if not an essential nature of being. This social bond is fostered and forged through a covenant or a mutual promise made consciously and actively by *actual people*, as noted by Arendt (1977). Contracts among abstractions like the State and the People are completely removed from human experience (Stivers, in press). Furthermore, contracts commodify social relationship by turning it into transaction rather than an authentic sharing of experience (McSwite, 1997, 2006). From this understanding of the social bond, the Collaborative tradition is more apt to assume that humankind is inherently capable of being other-regarding, socially responsible, trustworthy, and cooperative. These assumptions are based on the social character of the human condition, rather than a state of nature in which human beings are atomistic, separate beings that must forge social ties based on instrumental purposes. In other words, the logic is that: (1) if all human beings exist in a social context; (2) they share a common ground from which to relate; (3) which engenders consideration of how others will react to one's actions; (4) which engenders a sense of responsibility to others; (5) which creates the context for trust and cooperation. This does not infer a sense of warmth, affective tie, or inherent agreement. Indeed, descriptions of the Collaborative ideal assume difference and conflict within all social groups (Follett, 1995c, 1998). However, rather than establishing controls to prevent such conflict or mitigate its effects, this

tradition calls for a social process than enables its resolution through interactive synthesis. These processes are further described in the discussions of decision making and organizing style below.

Extending Hegel's (1977) ideas of the Master/Slave dialectical synthesis, Adorno describes this social state as "differentiation without domination" (1998, p. 247). This synthesis offers a foundation for peaceful social relationship that is not based on force or threat (Carr & Zanetti, 1999). In this form of democracy, individuals are empowered and responsible in political dialogue and interaction, but yet are not expected to sacrifice their individuality to community (Benhabib, 1996). In this way, the political ontology of the Collaborative tradition attempts to achieve a dialectical synthesis of Servant/Master or Citizen/Maker. Serving and ruling, following and leading, individual and collectivity must be reunited in a whole of intentionality and answerability within community. In other words, the human being is a Citizen or Servant as noted in the Constitutional tradition *as well as* a Maker or Master as noted in the Discretionary tradition. A dialectical synthesis is envisioned whereby all human beings are both, thus creating an egalitarian context. When this occurs, a form of shared responsibility emerges from "the matrix of social relationships and the dynamics of internal dialogue that enable and inform action" (Harmon, 1995, p. 129). Such resolution is important not only for society, but for the individual psyche as well (Harmon, 1990). Therefore, mutual answerability among unique individuals is the defining feature of the Collaborative political ontology. Some even suggest that this mutual answerability extends to the relationship between human beings and a divine source (Kearney, 2001). Indeed, expression of these ideas often relies on spiritual and transcendent metaphors. "I am one within myself as I encounter the One in all that acts upon me" (Niebuhr, 1963, p. 122). "Collectively, we are stewards of the earth" (Gray, 2001).

In Niebuhr's (1963) terms, a dialectical synthesis of the Citizen/Maker is achieved through Man-the-Answerer [*sic*], a being who is mutually answerable to the divine as well as all of creation. Man-the-Answerer [*sic*] is "the phenomenal self... the self that knows itself as it acts,

defines, decides, chooses, or otherwise moves out from itself, is timefull in ways of which teleology and deontology seem unaware... the self existing always in a now is one that knows itself as having been and as going into existence and into encounter” (Niebuhr, 1963, pp. 92-93). In other words, Man-the-Answerer [*sic*] is always cognizant of his social embeddedness and mutual impact. George Herbert Mead describes this condition as the reflective self (Niebuhr, 1963), while Martin Buber describes it as the *I-Thou* relationship as opposed to the transactional *I-It* relations (Buber, 1937). As Follett describes it, the individual is “at the same time a social factor and a social product” (1998, p. 60). In more common dialectical terms, the Servant/Master dialectic is synthesized or transcended through the role of Human as Co-Creator—an equal among all peers in both the right to self-actualize and in responsibility to the community.

The governance process that fosters this social bond of mutual answerability among autonomous individuals requires an egalitarian understanding of political authority and a transformation of the scope of action given to public administration as a social role or function.

Political Authority and Scope of Action

The overarching concern of the Collaborative tradition is that political authority is not manifested in a manner that will repress either human relationship or individual expression. Sovereign individuals cannot give away, rent, or sell their sovereignty to an individual, institution, or organization. In this way, it calls for a political form of anarchy, meaning that no form of political coercion can be ethically justified (W. W. Willoughby, 1930). Drawing from classical Greek political theory, White (1990b) has called this *isonomy*, suggesting it means the rule of all in relationship. However, a standard definition of *isonomy* means “equality of laws, rights, or privileges” (Neufeldt, 1996, p. 717). This seems to reflect a liberal understanding of individualism rather than a Collaborative perspective. Clearly, to manifest the political ontology of the Collaborative tradition, government *for* the people must be transformed to government *by*

the people: “when citizens control the processes and decisions and citizen expertise reigns” (C. S. King et al., 1998, p. 78).

At core, anarchy is based on the view that the individual human being is the only legitimate holder of sovereignty. This political authority is one of divine right, bestowed on each being by nature, humanity, or whatever higher power that is considered culturally appropriate. This type of divine source of human dignity is claimed in our Declaration of Independence (Gray, 2001). Such divinity is within oneself, as noted by Leo Tolstoy (1984) in his book on Christian anarchy, *The Kingdom of God is Within You*. Such “structured nonhierarchical social interaction” is based on a spiritual belief “that knowledge of God was the same as knowledge of one’s inner self” (Thayer, 1981, p. A-9). This idea is present in the spiritual tenets of many aboriginal peoples, although with differing terms for the divine source (Stone, 1976).

This divine right sanctions each individual as the political ruler in a democratic society. As described in the discussion of political ontology, the human being is a Maker or Master, as noted in the Discretionary tradition. Clearly, such sovereign individuals have a difficult time accepting externalized forms of authority, as has been duly noted in the field’s literature (McSwite, 1997; M. M. Warren, 1996; O. F. White, 1990b). Unlike the Citizen or Servant described in the Constitutional tradition who would accept externally-imposed rules, as in the Discretionary tradition, the individual in the Collaborative ideal expects a higher level of autonomy and agency. However, because of the social nature of the human condition, the Collaborative tradition assumes that mutual answerability exists alongside autonomy, thereby creating a Co-Creator or Steward role for all.

The question that becomes problematic in terms of political authority in an egalitarian context is “Who gets to decide?” The simplistic answer, “everyone,” does not suffice. Drawing from Rousseau’s interpretation of social contract, legitimacy is thought to emerge from the political and moral force of a participative democratic community (W. W. Willoughby, 1930). In

this way, legitimacy is earned and given by active consent among sovereign individuals (Stivers, 1990a). Therefore, political authority is generated through active citizenship. This idea is further supported by notions of stewardship and co-creation, in which responsibility connotes an active role in collective life. This notion of Co-Creation is linked to both Catholic and Protestant Christian stewardship theology, in which humankind is made in God's image (the Creator) and charged with responsibility to care for, sustain, and make better all of creation within its reach (Rhodes, 1987; Thistlethwaite, 2005). "Human beings are God's created co-creators whose purpose is to be the agency, acting in freedom, to birth the future that is most wholesome for the nature that has birthed us" (Hefner, 1993, p. 27).

Some consider direct citizen participation in governance to be an extension of constitutional legitimacy (Stever, 1988). However, prescriptions for direct participation beyond the electoral process cannot be found in the Constitution itself, nor is participation in the Collaborative tradition meant to be simply a control or check and balance on administrators in the same manner as professional standards or bureaucratic rules. Rather, active citizenship is central to a normative theory of administration in a democratic society. To be legitimate, the administrative state must be "*inhabited by active citizens*" (Stivers, 1990a, p. 247). Activity need not be measured in terms of quantity, but rather quality. "The power of the people in a democracy depends on the *importance* of the decisions made by the electorate, not on the *number* of decisions they make" (Schattschneider, 1960, p. 140). This means authentic self-government beyond "mere governmental contrivance" (Addams, 1964, p. 221).

Such involvement is essential for legitimate democratic governance from the Collaborative perspective. Political authority can only be created through the meaningful participation of every individual sovereign that is impacted by the decision or action being taken. Such participation is *not* for the purpose of creating a whole, or a unity, as in the notion that "for a collection of individuals to become **a public**, [bold added] there must be a forum for

deliberation” (Frederickson, 1997, p. 193). Rather, participation is required because political authority cannot be given away through contractual representation or any other form of transfer, because it resides *within the individual* and cannot be transferred to any external position. The very most that can occur is a temporary form of delegation that must remain challengeable at all times, just as the steward does *not* hold ultimate authority as noted in Biblical descriptions: “Stewards who forget their place and begin to assume that they are autonomous, or are at liberty to do as they please... will be severely punished” (Hall, 1990, p. 35). In other words in the case where delegates are necessary for reasons of practicality, they are not authorized in the sense of trustees or agents in the manner allowed by representative government.

In sum, it is direct participation in the collaborative process of governance which manifests the political authority to determine the public interest (Follett, 1995a, 1995e; Forester, 1999; Fox & Miller, 1995; Harmon, 1995). It is only through common experience that a shared social ethic can be determined, and that citizens can pursue “a common life for a noble end” (Addams, 2004, p. 42). To achieve these goals, the Collaborative tradition calls for a direct process of participation in order to bring political authority to the collective decision or action. This accommodates individual sovereignty as well as the responsibility for co-creation through civic participation. Within the process, each participant must submit to its authority in order to honor their mutual obligation, but without externalizing their sovereignty by giving it to another person in any form of subordination. This is a particularly difficult point to even envision, because we have no language for it. We attempt to capture this relationship with ideas like “servant leadership” and “stewardship” and “authority reconceived” (Block, 1993; Greenleaf, 1982; Harmon, 1990; Kouzes & Posner, 2002; O. F. White, 1990b). Yet all of these conceptualizations are at risk of becoming either elitist or dominating in some manner, in that something beyond egalitarianism is suggested. On the flip side, these metaphors are at risk of stripping the democratic dignity of the holder of authority if it requires relinquishing one’s own

agency and moral authority. If leadership is to become a coherent concept within the Collaborative tradition, then it must be at once embodied alongside *followership* (Follett, 1995d). “Leadership is better seen as a capacity of the group, a resource which resides in the group and which must be activated in order for the group to fulfill its potential” (R. B. Denhardt, 1981a, p. 130). In this way, any participant in any group would hold equal “authority” to express leadership as needed.

To protect against either problem of authority, a variety of re-conceptualizations are offered within the Collaborative tradition. The first is based on the notion political authority is a necessary facilitator of maturation and development rather than a mediator of competition or iron fist of hierarchy (O. F. White, 1990b). As such, it plays a crucial role in society in the same manner parenting facilitates the development of a child (Stivers, 2000b). Authority is an “essential and positive part of the maturation process, not only in adolescence but throughout life; and for superiors and subordinates alike” (Wamsley et al., 1990b, p. 39). Authority “plays the fundamental role of managing the paradoxes of personal development, of integrating the tensions between making one’s life and answering for it to others” (Harmon, 1995, p. 158). Mature citizens, as members of a public have the ability to see beyond self-interest and can care *with* one another *for* one another (Frederickson, 1997). The result of this re-conceptualization is that authority is considered to be something that is both necessary to collective life, and possible with active citizenship in a participative democracy (O. F. White, 1990b). Yet, it does not fully transcend the notion of subordination to another *person*, thereby conflicting with the egalitarian Collaborative logic.

The other approach to authority reconceived comes from theories about deliberative democracy in which citizens suspend individual judgment in order to come to shared *understanding and agreement* (M. M. Warren, 1996). Perhaps the most fitting formulation of this type of political authority comes from Follett’s (1995e) “law of the situation.” Follett noted that

the idea of authority is not problematic when people are in accord. It emerges as problematic when there is disagreement, and virtually all collective action entails a struggle for resolution of differences (Follett, 1995b). We must not shy away from this type of conflict, but rather bring it out into the open for re-evaluation and discussion (Follett, 1995c). “Differences develop within the social process and are united through the social process” (Follett, 1995f, p. 257). Thus, “creative conflict” is really a process of confrontation and mutual adaptation (Follett, 1995c; O. F. White, 1971). The only authority that exists over it is the “law of the situation,” which is determined by uniting all concerned “to see what the situation demands” (Follett, 1995e, p. 128). Mutual or circular influence within this social process produces an integration of ideas, which in turn produces legitimate “power-with versus power-over” (Follett, 1995h, p. 103). In a democratic society, authority should be given through cooperative explanation and persuasion, rather than force (Morstein Marx, 1946). Power *with* is the only legitimate source of “genuine authority” (Follett, 1995a, p. 154). Authority can only be constituted through opportunities for discursive challenge and a critical political culture (M. M. Warren, 1996). In fact, the successful response to such challenges and critiques is what constitutes and reinforces authority.

In this view of legitimate political authority, the ideal of governance becomes a “good and no place” (Farmer, 2005b, p. 189). In such a structural position, public administration becomes “the generic name of the group of tactical-support” (Catlaw, 2003, p. 250) for democracy, “if by democracy we mean something generic like self-governing or self-conducting of conduct” (Catlaw, in press, ch. 1). Public administration becomes a convener—an institution that provides “the space and the process for working out understanding across lines of difference” (McSwite, 2002, p. 113). Based this type ideation, one emerging scholar has made the assertion that public administration (as has been previously conceived) is dead (Catlaw, 2003, 2004). Another calls for its execution (Farmer, 2005b). However, it might be more moderately depicted

as a transformation of the scope of action and political authority delegated to something called “public administration.”

In order to find this new social role, there must be a “citizen-ing” of governance that eliminates dominance of all types (Farmer, 2005b, p. 191). We must eliminate the notion that people, citizens, politicians, and public administrators alike, have to either be watched and controlled, or indoctrinated and professionalized to overcome their naturally inappropriate tendencies (McSwite, 1997). This requires a fundamental shift in our thinking about human nature, as described in the Collaborative political ontology. Some believe that at least during the transition to the ideal desired, public administrators must “break down the barriers” and be emancipative facilitators of citizen self-governance (Box, 1998; Box & Sagen, 1998, p. 159). In other words, a transitional hybrid model is recommended to at least achieve “government *with* the people” if not “government *by* the people” (C. S. King et al., 1998, p. 78; Timney, 1998). Such a facilitative role of public administration has been conceived as “legitimate to the extent that it (a) decentralizes authority and responsibility to lay citizens; (b) interprets the public interest in particular situations through determinative interaction with affected stakeholders, including neglected groups and the public at large; and (c) is practiced by self-conscious administrators who are critically aware of the political-economic context” (Adams et al., 1990, p. 233).

I suggest that in order to better understand this role and how it differs from the conceptualizations forwarded by the Constitutional and Discretionary traditions, it is helpful to discuss the transitional role conceptualization designed to achieve the Collaborative ideal. In this case, the various conceptual elements of public administration can still be described in terms of coherence with the Collaborative logic of legitimacy through self-governance. In other words, if public administration continues as a social role for the time being, we can explore its transitional characteristics. Therefore, the remaining elements of this tradition in large part suggest transformational moves used to achieve the ideal type. But it must be noted that a pure

interpretation of the Collaborative ideal type would envision these social functions as being legitimately performed by *anyone* concerned, so long as they exhibit the characteristics prescribed.

Formulations of Responsibility and Accountability

Because the theories describing this tradition are constructed and utilized by the academic and professional field of public administration, it is highly unlikely that propositions to abolish a social role for public administration will be heeded any time soon. Therefore, recommendations for responsible and accountable practice aligned with the legitimacy logic of this tradition are still being put forth by scholars. In the Collaborative tradition, the art and science of legitimate administration fuses all of the elements of practice discussed in this inquiry: responsibility and accountability; decision making rationality; organizing style; and role conceptualization. Therefore, the disaggregation of fact and value offered here is meaningfully artificial. However, in order to generate comparative understandings with the other traditions, these categories remain helpful.

As noted in early formulations of the New Public Service, ideas about responsibility and accountability, decision making rationality, organizing style, and role conceptualization represent an integration of the three fundamental questions in public administration: political theory, organizational theory, and epistemology (R. B. Denhardt, 2000). Rather than defining the specific content of the public interest either in the form of rules overseen by politicians (Constitutional) or substantive criteria chosen by administrators (Discretionary), the Collaborative logic transforms the public interest into a goal to be determined by affected citizens themselves through intersubjective understanding and agreement in participative processes. In this sense, the Collaborative tradition demands a non-administrative approach to responsibility beyond both deontology and teleology.

As described by Niebuhr (1963), neither Man-the-Citizen [*sic*] nor Man-the-Maker [*sic*] consider more inclusive communities and causes than the immediate end or adopted rule. Sin to a deontologist is the breaking of law or lack of obedience to authority. Sin to a teleologist is missing the mark, or of action directed toward an inappropriate end. Man-the-Answerer [*sic*], on the other hand, seeks universal responsibility by responding to the most generalized other conceived—the universal cause. “The responsible self is driven as it were by the movement of the social process to respond and be accountable in nothing less than a universal community” (Niebuhr, 1963, p. 88). While clearly at risk of being interpreted as the pursuit of the One, the “universal cause” is actually conceived as *a relative target for those concerned*. For Man-the-Answerer [*sic*], the “right” or “good” can only be determined by what is fitting to the circumstance, considering the response to one’s actions in an ongoing social process. Therefore, the purpose of accountability and responsibility is to always be reflecting upon the question, “To whom or what am I responsible and in what community of interaction am I myself?” (Niebuhr, 1963, p. 68). It means being responsible to a future into which we go as social beings in this material world. From this position, sin is a fall from responsibility to the whole by being responsible only to a subset through either deontological or teleological forms.

As so well phrased by Farmer (2005b) in his notion of anti-administration, this responsible social process can be described as *justice as seeking*. Legitimacy can only be achieved in a manner that is tentative, particularistic, empathetic, and attentive to cultural principles, traditions, and wisdom. In the United States, universal causes, cultural principles, or ultimate truths include: “ideas of justice, equality, happiness, democracy, property” (Horkheimer, 1947, p. 20). Yet, what these concepts *mean* must be determined in an ongoing fashion. Indeed, “when the idea of reason was conceived, it was intended to achieve more than the mere regulation of the relation between means and ends: it was regarded as the instrument for understanding the ends, *for determining them*” (Horkheimer, 1947, p. 10). Therefore, Collaborative responsibility

and accountability are ensured through an egalitarian *process*. The recommended process utilizes a communication-based form of rationality in a highly decentralized organizing style with a new formulation of authority that is attached to egalitarian roles. The nexus between thought and action becomes practice itself. Fact and value are integrated within intersubjective understanding. Ends and means are inseparable within a collaborative community process.

Accountability in the Collaborative tradition is at once much simpler than in the other two traditions, but much more unfamiliar and frightening for those who hold the competing political ontology. Therefore, its approach to accountability is considered next to impossible by many. At core, responsibility is ensured through the principles of direct democracy—any collective action (or individual action with collective implications) must have the direct participation of all those affected. Because this ideal was expressed in founding documents like The Declaration of Independence, most theories of public administration make at least some mention of responsibility directly to citizens. The key differences are matters scale and of empowerment. In the Constitutional tradition, direct input from citizens is typically garnered through highly formalized processes which remain under the purview of elected representatives. In the Discretionary tradition, the administrator is more focused on responsiveness to citizens in their customer or client role in terms of the outcomes produced by administrative action. Therefore, neither is structure principally on the logic of legitimacy through direct democracy. In the Collaborative tradition, participation moves out of the advisory or consumer position into full partnership within governance, and participation is broadened from formal representatives to those actually impacted by the decision or action.

Ideally, this occurs without proxy, but most formulations admit that so long as everyone is able to participate and those not present have a delegate advocate that is not contested, the criterion of *participation* can be reasonably met. “Full democratic rule (a) ensures that all adults have a genuine opportunity to participate in public discussions of issues that affect the conditions

of their lives and to exercise decisive judgment about public actions that may affect those conditions, and (b) achieves outcomes that are consistent with choices the people collectively make about the public conditions of their lives” (Adams et al., 1990, p. 229). Box (1998) offers similar principles for citizen governance. Practically, such active citizenship requires: time to participate; access to information needed; consensus based on multiple views; agenda setting, framing, alternatives, decisions from discussions; just outcomes; and fair procedure. Others suggest legitimacy is achieved so long as sufficient representation exists, including descriptive, symbolic, and substantive forms of representation (Kelly, 1998).

Beyond these general characteristics, some scholars are working out models for participative practice that use various sources of discourse theory. Accountability is proven through a set of warrants that ensure the quality of participation was responsible. This approach to governance is most completely explicated by Habermas as “communicative action” (Erikson & Weigard, 2003; Forester, 1981, 1999). It has been widely applied in the literatures of public policy, planning, and public administration (R. B. Denhardt, 1981b; Dryzek, 1982; Dryzek & Torgerson, 1993; Fay, 1987; Fischer, 1985, 1992, 1995; Fischer & Forester, 1993; Flyvbjerg, 1998; Forester, 1985a, 1985c, 1989; Fox & Miller, 1995; Healey, 2003; Innes de Neufville, 1975; Yanow, 1993, 1995). Communicative action assumes that communicating and interacting individuals form mutual understanding and consensus for collective action using moral and ethical reasoning (ethics) within a specific procedural context (rationality). As noted by many critical theorists, *discourse frames action* (Bourdieu, 1990; Fischer, 2003). Intersubjective understanding, or *verstehen*, is the type of knowledge produced through communication which in turn underpins cooperative action (deLeon, 1997). In these “cooperative” discourses, controversy is settled through shared inquiry and reflection (Rein & Schon, 1993). Communicative action is similar to MacIntyre’s (2000) idea of social practice, in which values or ends, as well as the processes used to achieve them are continually transformed by cooperative activity. Both social

processes and goals are valued in and of themselves; making and answering are reunited (Harmon, 1995).

Communicative action is based on a combination of communicative *rationality* and communicative *ethics*. Communicative *rationality* is a procedural approach, but it is based on qualitative warrants rather than decision making steps. Communicative rationality requires that communication among participants in the policy making process take place in an “ideal speech situation” in which talk is: (1) truthful and comprehensible; (2) sincere; and (3) right, in terms of group norms of legitimacy (Erikson & Weigard, 2003). First, mutual understanding or consensus is reached through truth, comprehensibility, and sincerity; then agreement is reached through intersubjective perceptions of rightness. In other words, the decision making process must first allow *dialogue* in order to reach mutual understanding and trust, followed by moral *deliberation* to pursue agreement for collective action. Such other-regarding rationality can be found in Weber’s concept of *action* (Kirkhart, 1971). Action is an observable behavior imbued with subjective meaning (Ramos, 1981).

Rather than prescribing outcome values, communicative *ethics* ensure rules of social interaction based on: cooperation; pursuit of the collective good; and fair, inclusive, discursive practice. Communication must occur in a cooperative manner that is not distorted by power, hegemonic ideologies, wealth, or status (Heydebrand, 1983; A. L. Schneider & Ingram, 1997). It requires “that the participants in a discourse are open to be persuaded by the better argument and that relationships of power and social hierarchies recede in the background” (Risse, 2004, p. 294). Communicative ethics are not dissimilar to Harmon’s definition of personal responsibility: an “action that (a) is informed by self-reflexive understanding and (b) emerges from a context of social relationships wherein personal commitments are regarded as valid bases for moral action” (1995, p. 81). Obligations must be *actively created* rather than passively accepted. Based on the socially situated self, communicative ethics combines personal responsibility with social

obligation (Harmon, 1990, 1995). Procedurally or ethically, communication that falls short of these principals is considered to be distorted and therefore not legitimate.

One application of communicative action is called “collaborative planning” (Healey, 1997). According to the theory of communicative action, if dialogue and deliberation are given sufficient time among ethical participants, the results can be deemed legitimate. Therefore, consensus decision rules are an important component of communicative rationality because they “reassuringly assume a harmony of interests.... Consensus rules give minorities power; by holding their ground, the minorities can force the majority to move toward them or prevent a decision. Deliberation may be aggressive, but it will be guided by reason. The end is a caring agreement—no one is a loser, no one is defeated, and no one is shamed” (Baum, 2003, p. 282). Furthermore, “when we achieve consensus, the only legitimate outcome, we have created new knowledge of what we want to do” (Thayer, 1981, p. 138).

Another application is a political discourse model designed to replace the broken “representative democracy accountability feedback loop model” (Fox & Miller, 1995). This model claims to surpass attempts to “fix” government failure offered in the theories described in the Discretionary tradition. Discourse and discursive practice means *authentic dialogue*; communication that comes from lived experience, rather than symbols coming from the hegemonic culture. Fox & Miller (1995) offer a comparative typology to identify when such dialogue is likely occurring. In “few-talk” situations, the powerful elite dominate or manipulate communication. In “many-talk” situations, anarchic debate without focus or resolution ensues. Appropriate circumstances for “some-talk” achieve a balance of self-interest and community interest. In “some-talk” situations, certain warrants for discourse must be met, following Habermasian theory: (1) sincere, honest, earnest, and genuine (in other words, authentic); (2) situation-specific with intention about something contextually relevant; (3) voluntary and active

participative; and (4) substantive, including professional expertise, experience, unique understandings, and an articulation of all represented views.

Associated Decision Making Rationality

As noted in discussion of the other traditions, Ostrom (1989) considers various decision making arrangements that are available to collective action, one of which is self-governing public enterprise. As noted in the prior subsection, the Collaborative tradition relies on communicative rationality, which is a component of communicative action. Rather than referring to the relationship *between* thought and action, the two are fused within one process (Harmon & Mayer, 1986). Furthermore, multiple forms of epistemology or ways of knowing are sought within any given decision making process. This section will describe how this complex form of rationality is being discussed in the public administration literature.

A great deal of discussion in both the study and practice of public administration focuses on the underlying epistemology of the Collaborative tradition, which is a combination of phenomenology, hermeneutics, analytic philosophy of language, and critical theory (R. B. Denhardt, 2000). Pragmatism is also embraced as a philosophy of science and social action that can democratize administration (Waldo, 1984). This combination of theories produces a unique blend of explanatory, interpretive, and critical forms of reasoning (J. D. White, 1999). Denhardt (1981a) notes these new ways of knowing are required as a precursor to new ways of deciding and acting. From a feminist perspective, this broader “repertoire” of rationality is considered necessary to improved practice (Schreurs, 2000). In combination, the epistemological assumptions of the Collaborative tradition are that: rationality is communicative in nature; discourse is the path to understanding reality; facts cannot be separated from values; all ideas are subject to challenge, deconstruction, and reconstruction; all knowledge requires self-reflexivity; all sources of knowledge are of value; knowledge and action are joined in praxis; and praxis can change society. In other words, rather than being either deontological or teleological, rationality is

phenomenological. As early as the 1968 Minnowbrook conference, theorists have sought to link these alternative ontological and epistemological views to public administration (Harmon, 1981; Kirkhart, 1971; O. F. White, 1969, 1971). Rather than a limited view of supposedly objective knowledge for the sake of explaining, predicting, and controlling the world, a new way of understanding the meaning of experience and action must come from intersubjectivity: a condition where knowledge is created by understanding and agreements among social actors within specific environments of culture, time, and place.

From this epistemological foundation, the only form of decision making that can be acceptable is a collaborative approach to collective decision making and action that is flexible and open to critique by all participants. In other words, just as the individual is assumed to be embedded within society, so is social decision. In fact, politics and administration can be integrated through a re-conceptualization of politics as a process of the “*public... definition of social reality*” (O. J. White, 1976, p. 68). One name for this approach to reasoning-in-relationship is “collaborative pragmatism” (Bogason, 2001; McSwite, 1997, p. 261). Collaborative pragmatism offers a “third way” to morality or science, strategy or instrumentalism in the same way that ethical dilemmas among similar dualisms can often be resolved through a creative third position (Kidder, 1995). In this way, the dialectic between objectivity and subjectivity finds synthesis. Collaboration uses both, and in a sense neither. Its “law of the situation” is neither certain nor relativistic. It is tentatively accepted as a basis for action in the spirit of ongoing social experimentation. McSwite (1997) suggests this is not *reason*. However, it can be interpreted as a form of reason based on a different existential stance than technical or strategic instrumental approaches. March & Olsen (1995) describe it as the logic of appropriateness rather than the logic of exchange. It is a “habit of mind” that is established by the social process itself (Wamsley et al., 1990b, p. 40). Again, as so well phrased by Farmer (2005b) in his notion of anti-administration, *thinking is play*: rationality must be contemplative, imaginative, poetic and symbolic, and open.

Through the circular response described by Follett (1995i), this creative habit of mind fosters the pursuit of the common good by virtue of “self-interest rightly understood” (de Tocqueville, 2000). This is described by Farmer as “justice as seeking,” (Farmer, 2005b) and by Thomas Aquinas, as justice as “habitus” (Will, 1983). Unfortunately, these are ways of thinking and being that are in large part foreign to contemporary Western culture. “The reason we haven’t had tremendous success in developing effective participation is much due to the problem of human maturation—a good deal of which is needed for the ideal process... (O. F. White, 1990b, p. 211). Maturation is necessary because morality is thought to follow a developmental path beginning with self-interest, adding certain other-regarding interest (e.g. family and friends), eventually growing into a social morality based on the community’s definition (Addams, 1964).ⁱⁱⁱ “Hence the basic condition of a ‘healthy’ social order is a *dialectical* condition, the two poles of which are (1) effective participative process, and (2) effective authoritative process” (O. F. White, 1990b, p. 212). The keys to balancing this dialectic without domination are appropriate structure and facilitation. Thus, we turn to issues of organizing and role conceptualization.

Associated Organizing Style

Conceptually, any or all of the political and administrative activities of government can be devolved, contracted out, or shed by government altogether: “*setting* policy, *financing* policy, and *administering* policy” (DiIulio & Kettl, 1999, p. 94). In the Collaborative ideal, if the public agency persists at all, it serves only as a consultant in government *by* the people (Timney, 1998). Therefore, it is more appropriate to describe the organizing style for processes of self-governance, rather than the organizational structure of government agencies.^{iv} In sketch, the Collaborative organizing style must accommodate fluidity and change within the law of the situation, as well as provide a milieu for human relationship rather than transaction. There are two important sources of demand for the Collaborative organizing style. One is the normative theory based on the legitimacy of situated individualism as described in its political ontology. The other is the

empirical trend toward globalism in both political and economic forms, and its corollary collapse of sectors and nations and action defining boundaries. From a normative perspective, global governance requires the Collaborative form of political authority because no nation, at least no developed nation, is willing to accept a subordinate position within a hierarchy, just as no corporation wishes to take a subordinate position within any type of partnership or collaborative endeavor. In this way, collectives of individuals carry forward the ideal of democracy they hold as individuals. In fact, much of the literature on organizational alternatives to hierarchy is focused on new notions of governance in the global context. Scholars suggest that “neither hierarchy nor markets are appropriate forms of governance in a world characterized by increasing interdependence between the state and the private sector; to put it another way, they suggest that the distinction between the state and civil society has been dissolved and this change necessitates a new form of governance” (Marsh, 1998, p. 8).

Furthermore, the contemporary context is rife with highly complex or “wicked” problems (Rittel & Webber, 1973) that demand even more than reinvented hierarchy can produce (Bennis, 1967). “Matrix organizations, flexible work groups, and interagency coordinating committees are all structural responses to certain forms of ‘wickedness’” (O’Toole, 1997, p. 46). Governance in the Collaborative tradition is thus considered a process of steering in which both public and private actors participate in a non-hierarchical structure in the creation or allocation of social values and the solving of shared problems.

Combined, the normative and empirical pressures of globalization require voluntary collective action as a function of both moral and rational choice. It is this mode of governance that “provides the link between theories of communicative action, deliberative democracy, and new forms of global governance” (Risse, 2004, p. 293). “Postbureaucratic organizations foster both the open choices of markets and the collaborative choices of community” (Pinchot & Pinchot, 1993). However, they can incorporate either competitive or egalitarian principles of

democracy. This choice is reflected in the differences between the policy studies literature and political economy and organizational studies (Considine & Lewis, 1999). In general, the former focuses on the interest competition element of networks, while the latter focuses more on trust and problem-solving activities (Agranoff, 2003; M. M. Atkinson & Coleman, 1989; Benner et al., 2004; Berry et al., 2004; Blom-Hansen, 1997; Borzel, 1998; Nanz & Steffek, 2004; Provan & Milward, 2001). Based on these two different logics, the network model is meant to either overcome the inefficiencies of hierarchical models of administration or the strategic and negative public implications of market models of administration. The former purpose is aligned with the logic of the Discretionary tradition, while the latter is the concern of the Collaborative tradition. Thus, while policy networks, world trade and financial organizations, global diplomacy groups, regional economic development associations, and other examples of network governance are used as examples for theory building, they may not fit within the Collaborative tradition. The key difference is the attitudes held in regard to political-economic power.

A *democratic* theory of network organizing may have much to teach the world about what it means to be truly collaborative. Perhaps in some of the more theoretical formulations of network governance coming out of public management, there are seeds of such a truly democratic model. For example, Lynn calls network governance “horizontal democracy” (Lynn, 2006, p. 152). In theory, once an organization is freed from controlling bureaucratic form by an entrepreneurial form, it can evolve from competition into cooperation in a sort of organizational “self-interest rightly understood” or egalitarianism. Perhaps a source for understanding this idea would be international experiences wherein New Public Management was a move promoted by labor parties in order to devolve political authority to the most local level.

As noted in the introduction to this tradition, many of the elements of the Collaborative tradition are emergent, and this is perhaps one of the more important emerging ideas—how do we organize collaboratively for direct democratic purposes? We must be ever vigilant in this quest,

so that our theories do not become conflated with or co-opted by a cleverly hidden competitive spirit. As noted in Hood's (1991) typology of administrative values, Collaborative organizing is based on trust. Trust is not fostered through competition, and in fact is diminished by the strategic rationality it employs. Indeed, many argue that "communication and trust distinguish policy networks from other forms of non-hierarchical co-ordination and render them more efficient" (Borzel, 1998, p. 264). Furthermore, networks work well in the public context only if both environmental and institutional norms support cooperation and collaboration (Provan & Milward, 2001). Therefore, Collaborative networks are fundamentally different than networks formed under the Discretionary or Constitutional logics of legitimacy. The characteristics of this type of organization can be identified in more generic organizational theory, if "network" is considered a form of "organization." However, it is more appropriate to describe "networking" as a form of "organizing."

The humanistic and democratic movements in management theory noted in the Discretionary tradition led some public administration scholars to suggest that we must have democratic organizations in order to produce democratic outcomes (Appleby, 1945, 1949; Follett, 1998; Gaus, 1947; Levitan, 1943; Redford, 1969). In sum, "big democracy" requires a delicate balance that must be struck "with the spirit of democracy and administered through democratic techniques..." (Appleby, 1945, p. 119). This follows Levitan's assertion that "a democratic state must not only be based on democratic principles but also democratically administered, the democratic philosophy permeating its administrative machinery" (1943, p. 359). Because hierarchy does not achieve this well, Appleby (1945) recommended that we plan for and encourage occasional reforms or revolutions. The Collaborative tradition calls for such a revolution at both individual and societal levels of analysis.

At the first level of analysis, organizations must be democratic for the sake of their members because in a democratic society, they are sovereign citizens. The impact of hierarchical

structure on personality became a concern early on in management theory, because hierarchy creates dysfunctions in the individual (Appleby, 1952; Merton, 1940). While a review of organizational behavior theory is beyond the scope of this section, it is important to note that “situation-emergent” organizational development strategies emerged based on self-diagnosis, consensus building, and collective decision making were developed in response to the dysfunctions all forms of hierarchy (R. B. Denhardt, 1981a, 1981b; Harmon & Mayer, 1986; Kirkhart, 1971; McSwite, 1997). These transformational approaches focus on personal development and conflict resolution through psychoanalytical understanding. In this way, “organizations enable the expression of our talents and unleash the dignity of co-creation” (Delbecq, 2006). In this way, postmodern and critical theory extensions of humanistic organizational theory add notions such as individual emancipation, de-alienation, and self-actualization (R. B. Denhardt, 2000; Harmon & Mayer, 1986). These ideas are aligned with the logic of the Collaborative tradition.

At the societal level of analysis, organizations of governance must be democratic in relation to their citizenry, because a pure democracy must reside within a *holistic social order* without separate spheres or sectors. As noted in the Evergreen Manifesto, no aspect of the political economy can transfer sovereignty from any individual to another individual, organization, or institutional structure (Adams et al., 1990). No economic or political manifestations of Master and Servant can exist, as they are barriers to the expression of pure democracy. Therefore, the capitalist liberal system and all organizational structures that stem from it are not desired within the Collaborative ideal. All collective action must be democratized, absolutely *refuting* the notion that “every social organization requires, in some measure, inequalities in authority and distinctions in function” (Crozier et al., 1975, p. 162). While the latter is acceptable, attaching authority to function is not.

This ideal requires “a radical reordering of these priorities by suggesting that we give primacy to the growth of the individual rather than the efficiency of the productive process” (R. B. Denhardt, 1981a, p. xiii). Furthermore, “open governance occurs when no individual is subject to a hierarchy of unwanted control or coercion” (Farmer, 2005b, p. 190). Similarly, Addams (1964) believed that hierarchy would have to be “adjusted” in order to achieve a social, rather than individualistic ethic. She believed the industrial system needed amelioration to accommodate democracy. Follett suggested an organic theory of society which envisions society as a unity of distinct but interdependent individual parts: “It is always in unstable equilibrium, always shifting, varying and thereby changing the individual at every moment. But it is always produced and maintained by the individual himself. No external force brings it forth” (1995f, p. 262).

Perhaps the most carefully explicated argument for a completely new organizing style is presented by Thayer (1981) in his book: *An End to Hierarchy and Competition: Administration in the Post-Affluent World*. He suggests that the organizing style of both public organizations and the market must change in order to achieve full democracy. Rather than being opposite poles on a continuum, the centralized authority of hierarchy and the decentralized chaos of competition are actually interrelated in that competition demands hierarchy as a solution to its undemocratic excesses. Hierarchy in turn demands competition as a solution to its own inefficiencies. As a solution, Thayer is searching for an alternative that will replicate the cooperative human organizing strategies of over 6,000 years ago, combining individual autonomy and interdependence which he calls “a formal theory of structured nonhierarchical social interaction” (Thayer, 1981, p. A-38). “When the organizational revolution has run its course, and when societies have been transformed as they must be if we are to survive, the world of organizations will be one of innumerable small face-to-face groups characterized by openness, trust, and intensive interpersonal relations” (Thayer, 1981, p. 5).

This type of network organizing style supports these types of processes and outcomes both within the public organization and between the organization and society. This approach to authority is not completely foreign to our experience as institutional members. Recalling that Weber suggests legitimacy comes from the given type of social order, he found that authority in traditional societies is based on custom and long-standing norms (Gerth & Mills, 1946). This is similar to the Collaborative organizing style in that it relies on norms in the form of a shared democratic ethic. However, it is very different in that neither custom, nor any other external source may impose this ethic. Even the democratic parameters themselves must be intentionally chosen and shared. In terms of this type of voluntary participation, Barnard sought a theory of *cooperation* even in formal organizations based on Follett's notion of the law of the situation and non-economic forms of motivation (C. I. Barnard, 1968). These ideas have been described as a feminist approach to organizing based on empowerment, facilitation, and collaboration (Stivers, 1990b).

In general, these ideas are aligned with contemporary theories that view organization as culture, or symbolic systems (Bolman & Deal, 1997). In fact, the network organization has been found to rely on an administrative logic of *culture* (Considine & Lewis, 1999). In this view, organizational members are thought to be motivated by a sense of belonging, purpose, and self-actualization. They are assumed to: (1) use *communicative rationality*; (2) organize in any manner that fits both the needs of the individual and the organization; and (3) wield legitimate democratic power as defined by that culture. Leadership styles in this type of culture tend toward the transformational or servant leadership type (Block, 1993; Burns, 1978; J. V. Denhardt & Denhardt, 2003; Greenleaf, 1982; Selznick, 1957).

Peters notes that one approach to reinventing government is the creation of a participatory state (Peters, 1992). Its tenets include: participatory management; street-level discretion; discursive practices in decision making; communitarian ideals of individualism; flatter

and more accessible organization; inclusive decision making (both employees and citizens); decentralized, bottom-up policy making; and participatory identification or definition of the public interest as well as co-production in implementation. While these characteristics do not fully escape the flattened hierarchical or flexible style of the Discretionary tradition, it would appear to offer a reasonable transitional form as described in the “hybrid” approaches to responsibility and accountability.

Implications for Role Conceptualization

If the principles of the Collaborative tradition were carried to their logical ends, then all social roles would be collapsed and transformed in the market, government, and civil society. The Collaborative tradition would do away with a specialized social role for government altogether, making all of collective action an integrated process of governance. Indeed, all social action would become democratically political in an effort to reduce the sense of alienation while enhancing personal development, and self-actualization (Berman, 1997; Dewey, 1957; Follett, 1998; Thayer, 1981; M. M. Warren, 1992b). As such, it is envisioned as a “politics of care” (Hummel & Stivers, 1998, p. 36), referring to its understanding of the socially situated self and the social bond this condition engenders.

Clearly, this ideal transforms the role conceptualization of all principal actors in governance as we know them today: politicians, public administrators, and citizens. Most particularly, shifting from Constitutional and Discretionary governance to Collaborative governance transforms the relationship between government and citizens. Because the public administrator’s role is at once released from hierarchical control and can no longer claim the authority of expertise, the focus turns from the relationship between politics and administration to the relationship between the institutions of government and the citizen. In a pure self-governance model, citizens control the decision making process, establish its parameters, articulate the policy, and co-produce outcomes.

In order to maintain the sovereignty of every individual, the problem of alterity must be resolved, eliminating all identities that indicate supremacy of any type. Bernstein describes resolution of the problem of alterity as “*the problem of human living*”—of learning to acknowledge and accept the radical plurality of singularities (1991, p. 75). In essence, all social roles must dissolve into an egalitarian notion of global citizenship. Whether the situation calls for one’s facilitation or substantive knowledge or technical expertise, all involved in the social process are equal participants with equal authority and responsibility to the collective. All functional roles must be temporary and fluid in nature, evolving as the situation requires. In this scenario:

Both administrators and citizens (and superiors and subordinates in any organization) will have to become ‘professional citizens,’ for the creative act of building a consensus can be defined as the *primary act of citizenship* for each individual, wherever he or she is *now*—in schools, families, corporations, public agencies—or wherever affected by the decisions of one or more of them. (Thayer, 1981, p. 38)

All citizens, regardless of social function, become Stewards of self-governance and government becomes purely *of* and *by* the people.

However, as noted in regard to a transitional time in pursuit of this ideal, it may be possible to maintain aspects of government *for*, or more accurately *with* the people if government is transformed into a purely *facilitative* rather than authoritarian concept. In other words, the citizens impacted by a given decision or action come together to make the law, interpret the law, represent themselves, and provide whatever expertise they can to accomplish shared goals. Government would only provide the forum for or facilitation of these co-productive activities. In fact, it has been asserted that “genuine dialogue and unconstrained communication depend on the existence of those social and political institutions that allow for and foster such dialogue” (Bernstein, 1976, p. 199). Therefore, most public administration scholars promoting the logic of

the Collaborative tradition perpetuate a special social role for public administration, even if radically transformed.

Some understandings of the “facilitative state” point toward this type of governmental role: “Facilitative governments, in terms of contemporary ideals, seek to help people and their communities and institutions to achieve their own purposes, as variously determined, within shared frameworks of constitutional democracy” (Newland, 2003, p. 386). These theories seek to transcend all forms of command and control governance to better respond to a call for stronger civil society and smaller but more robust government within an increasingly global governance context. However, they retain optimism about social, economic, and governmental accomplishment through pluralist liberalism and restrained capitalist markets that is not grounded in the political ontology of the Collaborative tradition. Similarly, these theories accept a blend of Constitutional partisan politics and professional expertise to achieve legitimacy. They rely on a “shared culture of self-discipline, civic duty, and public service in search of human dignity and reasonableness” (Newland, 2003, p. 404). In short, “disciplines of constitutional democracy have often been deficient for effective functioning of facilitative state notions of social and economic self-governance and responsible government, but these disciplines have generally worked well” (Newland, 2003, p. 399). Therefore, it is necessary to differentiate the alternative Collaborative ideal of a facilitative *role* for government.

At the societal level of analysis, the role of public administration in the Collaborative tradition is to engender relationships that are emancipatory in nature. “Such an antiadministrative attitude would aim toward a diminishment of the scope and role of administration and the administrator” (Farmer, 1995, p. 228). In other words, the role of administration would be to usher in and facilitate pure democracy. Government would facilitate what Thayer (1981) describes as participative practice, consensus decision rules, and nested global coordination whereby the collective will is generated. Within each nested group, there must be a facilitator and

at least one member participating in two adjoining circles of concern to act as a liaison. Only through this interconnected participation can understanding and agreements be formed across groups without domination of some form. "This means that the primary orientation of the public administrator must be toward creating new, local contexts of meaning that can stand in for the larger social context that is losing or has lost its coherence" (McSwite, 2006, p. 186). "The agency must act as an enclave within which relevant parties can begin a reality-constructing conversation, that is, begin forming an institutional ethos out of which multiple lines of action can emerge" (O. F. White & McSwain, 1990, p. 54). In other words, public organizations become a forum for self-organizing and self-governance, and public administrators become the process facilitators. In this way, "the enterprise of public administration is seen not as a specialized technical function, but as one of many ways to contribute to the development of the human community" (Catron & Hammond, 1990, p. 249).

This social role for government and public administration in particular calls for a new role conceptualization for the public administrator. One popular role conceptualization describes conveners of communicative action; the deliberative practitioner who is at once a skilled facilitator and substantive expert (Forester, 1999). The role of deliberative practitioner is one of responsive participation: "Your relationship is deliberative in the sense that you are honest and direct about your values and tentative goals, but you also listen carefully to how the public responds to your agenda and are willing to make adjustments accordingly" (Reich, 1990, p. 7). Thus, the role is neither manipulative (a risk for the Entrepreneur) nor passive (a risk for the Bureaucrat). Other expert role conceptualizations have been offered from proponents of the Collaborative tradition, including: mediator and negotiator, teacher" (O. F. White & McSwain, 1990; Wolf & Bacher, 1990). Some suggest that this is a covenanting process through which administrators offer prudence and practical wisdom (D. F. Morgan, 1990). However, that specific formulation draws more from the Entrepreneurial logic of virtuous professionalism. In the

Collaborative ideal, the public administrators must “foster a collaborative approach to government, where experts are simply part of a cooperative process in which they have no superior role” (McSwite, 2002, p. 77).

Transforming the professional persona from one of competent servant or superior expert to one of a skilled facilitator is hoped to bring citizens back into the active process of governance (Stivers, 2000b). *Facilitator* refers to the role that supports and makes easier discourse and deliberation among empowered citizens (Box, 2004; Forester, 1999; Stivers, 1990a, 1994, 2000b; Wamsley, 1990a). As such, the administrator’s role is “unique in its centrality, not in its elevation” (Stivers, 1990a, p. 270). In this sense, public administration is unique in its position to foster a social bond grounded in our shared humanity (McSwite, 2002). This idea leads to the metaphor of midwife—public administration as a skilled facilitator of bringing into being (Stivers, 2000b). Altogether, “tomorrow’s public administrators will be facilitators, educators, and co-participants, rather than deference-demanding experts or independently responsible decision makers” (Adams et al., 1990, pp. 235-236).

The Collaborative tradition’s process-oriented approaches to responsibility and accountability, decision-making rationality, and organizing style all point toward this facilitative role for the public administrator within an egalitarian democratic context. This creates the opportunity for a new interpretation of expertise in the form of facilitation skills. The methods of process facilitation are well explicated in the fields of community building and deliberation (Chrislip, 2002; Kaner et al., 1996; Kretzmann & McKnight, 1993; Susskind et al., 1999). In the same vein as the Technology of Participation developed by the Institute of Cultural Affairs (ICA), White points toward the possibility of a “*technology* of administrative politics” (O. F. White, 1971, p. 80). This “technology” would include specific techniques and skills in interpersonal relations, political assessment, and dialectical problem-solving. For example, the ICA ORID process method includes objective, reflective, interpretive, and decisional elements—all the key

components of a focused and purposeful deliberative activity designed to foster action and change.

This participative and facilitative role conceptualization transcends or synthesizes the Servant/Master metaphors of Bureaucrat and Entrepreneur, assuming the role of Co-Creator. It is difficult to find a label or metaphor for the Co-Creator role. It would seem that all in play today are either tainted with contrary logics, or have been commonly defined in such a way as to have that effect. For now, the “placeholder” of *Steward* is offered, based on its theoretical linkage to Co-creation and mutual responsibility. However, stewardship suffers from the same truncations as citizenship in how it has been used in public administration theory, as well as in management literature (Greenleaf, 1982; Kass, 1990b; Terry, 1995).

In its broader meaning, stewardship is a connecting concept between public theology and a social perspective on political economics (Stackhouse, 1987). It is a felt responsibility toward humanity, the earth, and a shared moral purpose (Hall, 1990). Stewardship assumes an attitude of *service*, but not *servitude*. It assumes power *with*, but not power *over*. The shared moral purpose of the community holds the authoritative position; very similar to Follett’s (1995e) law of the situation and Addam’s (1964) social ethic. Rather than being at risk of becoming a disempowered functionary or an overly empowered mandarin, Stewards recognize and embrace the idea of active citizenship as a role of serving self, fellow citizens, communities, and the values shared in a democratic and respectful manner. In this meaning, *citizenship* (in the sense of presence in a given social group, not a legal status) is a central normative basis for stewardship. Its sense of vocation is “the idea of the public administrator as *citizen*, as contributing member of the larger body politic...” (O. F. White, 1990b, p. 233). This meaning shifts the metaphor of Steward as agent or trustee in an authoritative social contract to a mutual obligation relationship which “fits better the communitarian facilitator image” described in the Evergreen Manifesto (Catron & Hammond, 1990, p. 246).

A sense of shared citizenship engenders the egalitarian ideal. It has been suggested that there is no tradition or philosophy of state service in America (Waldo, 1984). Yet, Jefferson believed in public service as a civic duty, and was fond of the idea of citizens serving a tour of duty in public service. He said, “There is a debt of service due from every man [*sic*] to his country, proportioned to the bounties which nature and fortune have measured to him” (Caldwell, 1988, pp. 184-185). From this perspective, specialized expertise is not necessary, but rather a feeling of citizenship or stewardship. “Public service in the spirit of democracy demands an unqualified commitment to the common good. Nothing less will do; nothing more is needed” (Gawthrop, 1998, pp. 100-101). This sense of duty has been likened to a civic religion or a common faith (Bellah, 1967; Dewey, 1934). Borrowing from Carlos Casteneda, Denhardt (1981a) uses the metaphor of a “path with a heart” to describe the ideal relationship between the individual and society: the interaction should be comfortable and mutually supportive. From this perspective, *everyone* shares the vocation of citizenship, which includes an active role in the practice of self-governance (Cooper, 1991, 1998; MacIntyre, 2000; McSwite, 2002). As with civic entrepreneurs, “their task is nothing less than to forge a new collaborative civil society” (Henton et al., 1997, p. xviii).

According to the logic of the Collaborative tradition, governance is clearly not administrative in the sense of managing and directing. In Farmer’s (2005b) notion of anti-administration, associated ideas of governance as technical machine, the cult of the heroic leader, the rhetoric of economics, and the ideal of control and efficiency must be eliminated from practice. Instead, *practice is art*; most particularly an art of love (Farmer, 2005b). This is appropriate to the Collaborative ideal if the social bond itself is conceived of as a type of love (Catlaw, 2006b). In this sense, *love* does not refer to an affective tie, but rather an appreciative regard for others. But this is *not* to say that Bureaucrats and Entrepreneurs do not share a sense of other-regarding benevolence. The difference is that its expression in the Collaborative tradition is

egalitarian in nature; it is not imbued with a form of political authority beyond that of any other citizen, nor is it separated from citizens by other social actors or institutions. Such a vocation of public service demands a specific kind of ethos that prioritizes human relationship, cooperation, and collective action (McSwite, 2002). In the Collaborative ideal, these characteristics are the source of legitimacy.

Therefore, the pursuit of a specialized role for public administration during a transition to the Collaborative ideal—the notion of “ushering in”—is at risk of creeping into the logic of the Discretionary tradition. For example, public administrators have been conceptualized as transformational social critics who monitor social and political processes on behalf of the citizens (Catron & Hammond, 1990). “Democratic public administrators reflect upon their own world views and values as well as those of the agency within which they work... they watch for and, indeed, foster opportunities to advance democratic practices” (Adams et al., 1990, p. 235). Gramsci’s conception of the intellectual provides a similar role for the administrator as a bridge between state and civil society (C. S. King & Zanetti, 2005). A related role conceptualization is that of catalyst or transformative agent (C. S. King & Zanetti, 2005). A catalyst is “a person or thing acting as a stimulus in bringing about or hastening a result” (Neufeldt, 1996). Another metaphor for this role might be the “interventionist” (Argyris, 1970).

This type of role is necessary because “government is always marginally oppressive and sometimes massively so and this force needs a counterforce” (Waldo, 1980, p. 29). Therefore, the enterprise of public administration is viewed as a countervailing effort to make government a positive, creative force. Drawing from Argyris’s principals of organization development, the primary tasks for such a role in society would be to: (1) to help generate valid and useful information; (2) to create conditions in which citizens can make informed and free choices; and (3) to help citizens develop an internal commitment to their choice (R. B. Denhardt, 2000). In this role, “public leadership is exercised by one who (1) helps the group or organization understand its

needs and potential; (2) integrates and articulates the group's vision; and (3) acts as a 'trigger' or stimulus for group action... Leadership, in this view, is educative, concerned primarily with human growth and development" (R. B. Denhardt, 1981a, p. xi).

In this type of transformative role, public administrators act as civic entrepreneurs. "The name civic entrepreneur combines two important American traditions: entrepreneurship (the spirit of enterprise) and civic virtue (the spirit of community)" (Henton et al., 1997, p. 31). Civic entrepreneurs are motivators, networkers, teachers, conveners, integrators, drivers, mentors, and agitators. They extend the tradition of civic activism, and as such are both visionary and pragmatic—capable of collaborative leadership motivated by "enlightened, long-term interest" (Henton et al., 1997, p. 35). They are neither interest advocates (like public, policy, or social entrepreneurs), nor philanthropists giving to humanitarian causes. They engage directly in the process of solving public problems. "Process matters to civic entrepreneurs. Getting people involved in finding solutions to their own problems is the name of their game" (Henton et al., 1997, p. 67). In this way, public administrators use Addams' method of "conduct as a means of propaganda" to promote a new social ethic "based on responsibility to the whole of community" (1964, pp. xxi, xxvi).

To guard against unequal political authority, some suggest a proactive role of any type is best kept in the academy rather than in the governance process itself, ensuring that such philosophical expertise remains on tap, rather than on top. In this way, the scholarly field of public administration could play the role of the public intellectual (Cushman, 1999; McCutcheon, 1997; Posner, 2001; Swartz, 2003). In fact, this has been suggested (Nickel, 2006). Such a new role of government would be to engage the public in an ongoing dialogue about public ideas and offer critical examination of underlying assumptions (Reich, 1988b).

However, each of these conceptualizations clearly places the social role of public administrator or public administration scholar in an expert role beyond that of facilitator. On the

one hand, if this expertise is offered according to the egalitarian tenets of Collaborative process, there is not a problem. On the other hand, if this expertise continues to be imbued with authority beyond that of other citizens, the logic of the Discretionary tradition prevails. Therefore, the risk of sovereignty transfers must be ever guarded against, in the same manner that psychotherapists guard against disempowering their clients (O. F. White, 1976, 1990b). When public administrators offer expertise beyond that of process facilitation, they must undertake these roles with empathy, humility, and tentativeness. Public administrator Randy Scott uses the Native American metaphor of transformational change agent, trickster, or shape shifter to describe this role. “The spirit is usually paradoxical, both change agent and not” (C. S. King & Zanetti, 2005, p. 111). This interpretation is particularly appropriate because the Collaborative tradition requires that public administrators not be experts who “fix” people, but catalysts for citizens to develop themselves. Indeed, “the public administrator of the future must drop the role orientation of professionalism and *move into* (“adopting it” is not feasible) a role posture something like that of the post-analytic subject” (McSwite, 2006, p. 186). This type of “decentered ego allows practitioners of critical theory to see themselves as facilitators... not as experts” (C. S. King & Zanetti, 2005, p. 116).

Whether playing a purely facilitative role or one that includes an egalitarian approach to other types of expertise, as Stewards of co-creation, administrators must adopt very different prescriptions for practice. The topical principles of action considered in the *New Public Service: Serving, Not Steering* can be used to identify key administrative prescriptions by using their generic form (J. V. Denhardt & Denhardt, 2003). Many of these principals have been described in the various elements of the tradition, but are recapitulated in Table 6 in a form that is more common to role descriptions. In sketch, Collaborative public administration views all citizens, including politicians and administrators, as equal and interchangeable participants in the process

of self-governance. If there is a special role for public administrators, it is to function as a facilitator of collaborative efforts.

Table 6

Collaborative Tradition Prescriptions for Practice

<i>Administrative Principle</i>	<i>Steward Ideal Type</i>
Defining the Public Interest	The best way to determine what's in the public interest is to bring all stakeholders together as equals to find shared agreement.
Source of Guidance	Public administrators should use inclusive, deliberative processes to collectively determine the law of the situation.
Primary Allegiance	Public administrators are responsible to citizens and should give them opportunities to participate in governance.
Scope of Action	Responsibility for the implementation of public policy should be shared among all stakeholders.
Accountability Approach	Accountability to the public is complex, but most importantly includes direct participation from affected citizens.
Path to Productivity	Productivity is best achieved through the shared empowerment of politicians, public administrators, and citizens.
Principal Task	Public administrators should act as process facilitators, substantive educators, and expert resources to collective decision making.

As noted in the explication of the Constitutional and Discretionary traditions, Box (1998) has presented an extensive analysis of role types described within public administration theory that consider the societal roles of practitioners, elected officials, and citizens. In this model, the degree to which the actors are empowered in the governance process characterizes the role type. In the Collaborative tradition, elected representatives function like coordinators who, as citizens, may seek to advance a particular view, but they do so in an open and discursive manner through public dialogue. Accordingly, administrators function as “helpers” who are acknowledged for their legitimate expertise, yet function in a facilitative and democratic manner that attends to the

community's values. These facilitative governance roles lead citizens to function as "activists," or more appropriately "active citizens." "Active citizenship is defined as people engaged in deliberation to influence public-sector decision-making, animated, at least in part, by concern for the public interest, a concept that each individual may define in a different way" (Box, 1998, p. 73). This reinforces their treatment as resources or collaborators in both decision making and implementation of collective action (Lofquist, 1989). In this set of role relationships, elected officials, practitioners, and citizens all fully embrace agency. These cooperative role types are reminiscent of the reciprocal relationships between politicians and administrators described as the Interactive Administrator role type (Svara, 2006b). In summary, the characteristics of the ideal type role conceptualization of *Steward* are presented in Table 7.

Table 7

Steward Role Conceptualization Summary

<i>Role Type</i>	<i>Steward</i>
<i>Element</i>	<i>Technical/Normative Synthesis</i>
Principal PA Theory	New Public Service or Emerging Transformational
Key role characteristics	Facilitator of local value formation; technical advisor only; social emancipator; steward of citizen self-governance
Legitimacy Problems (within tradition)	Failure to educate and empower citizens in self-governance; oppression and exclusion based on a specific normative position
Assumed Governance Context	Democratic State—direct democracy; governance occurs through a deeply nested federalism down to the neighborhood level
Political Ontology	Radicalism, Anarchism, and Communitarianism; the Many and the One are co-created
Administrative Role	Administrator as Man-the-Answerer [<i>sic</i>]; the Co-Creator role in direct democratic government; Steward who sees Citizens as collaborators—egalitarian interaction in all political and administrative activity
Political Authority and Scope of Action	Synthesize all dichotomies by bringing administrators, politicians, and citizens together—egalitarian democratic participation from all is the path to legitimacy
Responsibility and Accountability	Trusts all mature individuals to produce the Good together; administrators ensure process and empowerment (e.g. egalitarian)
Decision Making Rationality	Phenomenological: collaborative rationality; intersubjective agreement and communicative action
Organizing Style	Fluid networking

CHAPTER 7: MUTUAL CRITIQUES AMONG TRADITIONS

Chapter 7 presents the second portion of the Findings of this inquiry in the form of critical analyses of the three traditions and their ideal type role conceptualizations. The manner in which each tradition succeeds or fails in achieving legitimacy is considered based on existing critiques made either from within or outside of the tradition. A tradition can be evaluated in terms of its *own* assumptions—that is, whether or not it achieves that which it promotes (MacIntyre, 1988). It can also be evaluated in terms of *competing* assumptions—that is, whether or not what it promotes is considered legitimate and why. In each of these analyses, case vignettes from participant observation of local governance are used for illustration. To emphasize, the purpose of these vignettes is not to prove the validity or desirability of the ideal types. They are meant to show that these competing logics exist in practice, representing the philosophical commitments held by real actors in the governance process. “In the interest of the concrete demonstration of an ideal type or of an ideal-typical *developmental* sequence, one seeks to *make it clear* by the use of concrete illustrative material drawn from empirical-historical reality” (Weber, 1949, p. 102). Therefore, the vignettes used are accentuated or extreme in nature to clearly illustrate the ideal type being critiqued.

As noted in the introductory discussion of the impetus behind this inquiry in Chapter 1, the case vignettes used come from participant observations made over the course of approximately fifteen years in Tempe, Arizona. These observations were not made specifically for the purpose of scholarly inquiry. Indeed, many came long before my enrollment in a doctoral program, but those that followed have been more carefully documented and catalogued in the form of written communication, documents, and televised public hearings. Yet for public administrators, “each conversation, each letter, has to be thought about in terms of possible public agitation, investigation, or judgment” (Appleby, 1945, p. 7). These experiences were part and parcel of practice in a variety of roles, including neighborhood organizer; neighborhood

association and coalition founder; founder and executive director of a community development corporation; subcontractor to the City of Tempe for various planning and program implementation activities; and commissioner serving on a municipal policy advisory body. The governance activities included: policy making, planning, and implementation of neighborhood and land use related initiatives, including citizen participation, urban design, affordable housing, economic development, transportation systems, and City facilities.

A reader may react quite negatively to a particular vignette based on their own philosophical commitments, perhaps feeling that it must be a biased opinion. Certainly, my own philosophical commitments color the phenomena I tend to take notice of, capture, and use as examples. Furthermore, the vignettes are meant to illustrate extreme expressions of a given logic to enhance understanding of why its logic would be challenged by competing logics. Beyond that, I can only say what any ethnographer can say: "I have endeavored to present the events and opinions expressed by various parties as accurately as possible, despite my own opinions." I firmly believe that each and every individual described believe their actions to be appropriate to their understanding of democratic legitimacy. Because theoretical critiques or other people's opinions suggest otherwise does not make this either true or untrue. They are simply competing understandings of legitimacy.

An alternative approach might have chosen to offer competing *defenses* of the competing logics of legitimacy, showing how appropriate applications of a given logic reveal its success. Instead, this inquiry has relied on theoretical descriptions of the traditions to reveal the logic of their approaches to legitimacy. In other words, the information used to support each tradition comes from *theoretical texts* as the unit of analysis.

This step of analysis answers the following research questions of this inquiry:

How do the resulting ideal types and their elements relate to one another in terms of mutual exclusivity and crossover characteristics?

Why are multiple theories of legitimacy offered?

The answers to these questions support consideration of prescribed combinations of traditions offered by various public administration theories, and provide a foundation for analyzing the traditions dialectically, each of which will be considered in Chapter 8.

Critical Analysis of the Traditions and Role Conceptualizations as Ideal Types

By way of a reminder, the three traditions of public administration are presented as promoting mutually exclusive ideal type role conceptualizations on the basis of differing interpretations of democratic legitimacy. However, certain elements within the tradition share crossover meanings. For example, the political ontology, decision making rationalities and organizing styles associated with the Constitutional and Discretionary traditions are very similar, although with differing emphases and resulting manifestations. Furthermore, some notion of professionalism or expertise is shared across all three traditions, albeit quite different in nature within each. That is, the role of public administrator is in some manner differentiated from that of citizen or elected official in a manner associated with some characteristics of the term “professional” (Moore & Rosenblum, 1970). These types of shared characteristics offer grounds for mutual support and agreement on *specific elements*. However, when linked back to underlying assumptions of legitimacy, the traditions and their role conceptualizations disagree fundamentally. Providing a map to these fundamental assumptions in the form of ideal types and their mutual critiques reveals the boundaries of agreement among competing theories.

Mutual disagreements about the nature of legitimacy frame the overall argument for why a given tradition fails to achieve legitimacy according to an alternative preferred by the source of critique. However, implementation can also fail to achieve its own source of legitimacy. For example, the bureaucracy promoted by the Constitutional tradition may ultimately fail to achieve its assumed path to legitimacy because the mechanism of hierarchy fails empirically to achieve its control objectives. This is an internal failure of the tradition on its own terms, as described by

MacIntyre (1988). Alternatively, the Constitutional tradition may ultimately fail to achieve legitimacy because the citizenry demands direct answerability rather than representation by elected officials. This is a failure of the tradition according to external terms. The following sections describe both types of critique for each of the three traditions in the ideal type model presented, while focusing on competitive critiques.

It must be noted in advance that in a triadic model, mutual critiques sometimes overlap. For example, the logics of both the Constitutional and Discretionary traditions underlie critiques of the Collaborative tradition, while the Collaborative logic applies similar critiques to both the Constitutional and Discretionary logics. This is due to the fundamental differences between representative and direct democracy. Similarly, some critiques of the Discretionary and Collaborative logics overlap because both conflict with the Constitutional logic of legitimacy. In short, the critiques are not precisely categorical in nature, and are therefore presented in a manner linked to the most appropriate core logic, with crossover caveats noted.

Critiques of the Constitutional Tradition

While it is the “official” political order in the United States, the Constitutional approach to legitimacy is not without its problems, as has been duly noted in the literature. Indeed, these problems are cited as the impetus behind the formulation of alternate traditions in the first place. Of great concern to democratic legitimacy is how these idealized passive public servants and empowered political representatives relate to citizens as the ultimate sovereign within the governance system. Some of the more prevalent critiques follow.

Representation is Problematic

The most fundamental external critique of the Constitutional tradition challenges the notion of representative government altogether. For this reason, the critique applies equally to the Discretionary tradition. From this perspective, the assumption that politics (and administration) can be trusted to produce the Good is challenged. Therefore, even if administrators serve the

system through hierarchical procedures and rules, thereby achieving bureaucratic accountability, they are answering to representatives who do not legitimately hold political authority. Similarly, if they base decisions and actions on their own criteria and expertise, administrator still fail to claim legitimate political authority. Unfortunately, this problem of representation is not widely addressed as a problem of political theory, let alone a problem of public administration. To challenge representation is to challenge the Constitution as well as pluralism and majority rule. In fact, even when representation is noted as problematic, it is often skipped over as something either too complicated to address, or outside the scope of public administration theory:

Almost nothing in systematic literature deals directly with the phenomenon of representation, but here, too, we must proceed by merely noting the distinctly representative character of responsible political leadership and then considering the discretion and controllability of that leadership. Because leadership is representative in a complicated, institutional way, the approach to responsible public administration begins with consideration of crucial leadership in a pattern of control. (Appleby, 1952, p. 101)

Despite the claim that representation is outside of the bounds of public administration theory, or that it may only come into view when considering the various manners in which administrators can achieve the goals of representation themselves, some theories have problematized the very concept of representation itself based on complex ontological concerns and theories of the self (Catlaw, 2006a; Follett, 1998; Hummel & Stivers, 1998; McSwite, 1997). The “collaborative pragmatists” present throughout the last century and emerging in increasing numbers presently share the critique of the Constitutional tradition’s theory of the state as a mechanism of control directed by elite leaders holding the authority to represent the citizenry. As noted in the explication of the Collaborative tradition, these ideas are linked historically back to the Anti-Federalists and the even more ancient political philosophies they espoused. In essence, this critique challenges the Constitutional order itself. Even when a tradition aligns perfectly with the Constitution and republican form of government, “The still unanswered question is whether

the American people and their elected leaders will agree that this is the kind of government they want and need” (Balfour, 1997, p. 462). However, as noted, this critique actually applies equally to the Discretionary tradition, as in that approach, the function of representation is merely transferred to administrators and the performance criteria they choose—a representation through ideas, more so than through people.

In the case study, it is clear that community activists challenge the ability of either people or ideas to represent their opinions and needs. They wish to be personally empowered in a process of collaborative governance in which they will have a meaningful and effective role in making decisions that will impact them individually and communally. This opinion played a large role in shifting mayoral leadership in the most recent election, but some now believe it may have been the proverbial leap from the frying pan into the fire. Citizens merely traded the “old guard” of elite pluralism for a new, even more autocratic leader.

Theories of elitism abound, describing the many reasons why citizens do not feel represented by elected or appointed officials. In the case study, Council members are elected at large, and do not represent specific geographic regions that might differ according to important demographic characteristics and concerns. For example, there is a great difference between predominantly white, suburban neighborhoods comprised of upper middle class families many miles removed from centers of tourist, business, and university activity and the highly diverse, mixed income neighborhoods adjacent to these commercial centers. Few Council members or Mayors have ever been elected who have not been groomed through the elite network of the Chamber of Commerce and its Tempe Leadership program, the Kiwanis Club, the Tempe Community Council board, or the school districts as either administrators or board members. As in most communities, candidates must have the financial wherewithal to run a successful campaign, or to obtain support from those with wealth. Even fewer live in the neighborhoods

impacted by downtown and university activity. Therefore, socioeconomic representation is clearly lacking, and corollary ideological differences are arguable.

But it may be better to illustrate this phenomenon in the case of *ideas* instead, whereby the tyranny of the majority becomes quite evident. Arizona is a state that prides itself on the use of voter initiatives such as referenda and recall. In fact, by law, all counties and municipalities must obtain voter approval in order to adopt General Plans that guide land use, transportation, and other local concerns. Tempe's General Plan 2030 was developed in a markedly different manner from its predecessor, and includes strikingly different elements. The prior General Plan 2020 was developed through a broad-based citizen committee that included rather equal numbers of development professionals and citizens. After the group developed broad-brush concerns, a smaller visioning group undertook in-depth deliberation that could be depicted as Follett's process of interpenetration. A creative attitude was shared, and objectives were crafted in a manner that often transcended starting positions altogether, and sometimes represented compromises that all could live with. Citizen participants kept neighborhood peers informed through the community network as drafting took place. Nothing was brought forward that anyone could not support. The group as a whole reviewed and discussed the draft proposal, and the resulting revised plan went forward through a smooth public hearing and adoption process.

General Plan 2030, on the other hand, was developed by staff, using a host of open house forums and comment gathering techniques. Opinion polls were taken regarding issues deemed of importance to planning. The process certainly included more individuals, and considered more opinions. The official draft was circulated for review, and in a general election, the plan was adopted by majority rule. The problem with this process is that although it held more meetings, was probably better documented and more inclusive, it failed to allow any dialogue. There was no opportunity for the interpenetration of ideas.

The resulting document holds a much more permissive view on growth and development. All citizen concerns about increased densities shown on projected land use maps were quelled with the assurance that it would in no way affect zoning. This, however, is not the case. General Plan 2030 is, in fact, used as the justification for granting increased zoning entitlements for redevelopment plans. On the one hand, this scenario can be blamed on elected and appointed representative who misrepresented the facts, and therefore the opinions of those whom they represent, or, it can serve to show that aggregated opinions cannot ever hope to *represent* people's feelings about a collective issue when they are made to deliberate and decide in a vacuum. In short, representation of people and their ideas did not necessarily work.

Government is Not Responsive

Because of these problems of representation, the theorists working principally from the logic of the Collaborative tradition call for alternatives to the Constitutional ideal in the form of direct citizen participation and control to ensure responsiveness. From this perspective, neither elected representatives nor public administrators are trusted to be appropriately responsive using Constitutional methods of control. Politicians can only be checked through periodic election cycles, or possibly through arduous recall elections. They tend to be captured by powerful interest groups, as discussed in the problem of market domination below. Unless they are very responsive and willing to take firm control over administration, they are not viewed as having sufficient control over administrative discretion. Therefore, the problems of unresponsive administrative discretion will also be discussed in critiques of the Discretionary tradition. But in the Constitutional system, when administrators lack political oversight, because they are operating under strict rules and procedures, an extreme adherence to neutral competence can lead to *technicism*, or an overly heightened concern for technique over people. This is exacerbated by the limitations of bureaucratic control, which will be discussed below.

For example, in the case study, over a decade ago traffic engineers stated their objective as being “to move vehicles through and around town as efficiently as possible.” At that point in time they did not consider the relationship between land uses and transportation corridors. Nor did they consider multiple modes of transport, including bicyclists and pedestrians, as being of equal concern to the movement of motor vehicles. They simply wished to meet the lowest criterion for traffic congestion possible, as dictated by the type of street under question: arterial, collector, or local. They believed issues like speeding and reckless driving are the domain of the police department, and cut-through traffic is a natural law: just like running water takes the path of least resistance, commuters cut through neighborhoods to keep moving. In short, traffic engineers considered it their job to serve vehicles and engineering standards, not to serve people and the neighborhoods in which they live. Those concerns are to be addressed by other departments and other types of expertise. Without being responsive to political oversight (Constitutional) or the empowerment of affected citizens (Collaborative), these traffic engineers became overly concerned with technique, disregarding the needs of communities affected by cut-through traffic.

Hummel & Stivers suggest that the feeling that “government isn’t us” is deeply rooted in these problems of the representative political system: “American representative government does not require representatives to know their people, only to decide for them” (1998, p. 33).

Those in government do not know us directly, only in representation. We appear to them as abstract citizens, as voters, as bearers of certain rights, or as statistics in an opinion poll or policy study, not as complete human beings. Legislators make laws for us based on such representations and administrators manage policies over us as if we were these representations. (Hummel & Stivers, 1998, p. 29)

Citizens are abstracted and de-individualized, thus becoming alienated from those who are meant to represent them, and even more so from the administrators who are asked to be responsive to

those representatives. This role arrangement is described as “government *for* the people” (Timney, 1998, p. 93).

This structure creates a paradox in governance when considering more than the relationship between politicians and administrators. That is, while the critique of control *within* the Constitutional ideal refers primarily to the lack of responsiveness of administrators to politicians, the *external* critique of Constitutional responsiveness refers to the problem of political responsiveness to citizens. Therefore, it is important to consider the role conceptualization for all three principal political actors: politicians, administrators, and citizens.

A key theorist to provide a triadic role type analysis is Richard Box. In his notion of “citizen governance,” Box (1998) presents an extensive analysis of role types described within public administration theory that consider the societal roles of practitioners, elected officials, and citizens. In this model, the degree to which the actors are empowered in the governance process characterizes the role type. In the Constitutional tradition’s ideal, elected representatives function like “trustees” who take it upon themselves to make policy decisions. In turn, administrators function merely as implementers of public policy. They are value-free actors who follow procedures as dictated by their hierarchical superiors, ultimately answering to elected officials. Bureaucrats have what has been called a universalistic view on people—everyone should be treated the same. Universal decision rules are designed to produce just and fair results (Melchior & Melchior, 2001). However, this often results in citizens being treated as objects (Lofquist, 1989). (This has been described as the problem of *technicism*, as discussed.) This focus on rights rather than responsibilities encourages citizens to function as “free-riders” who fulfill only the minimal responsibilities of citizenship. In this set of role relationships, elected officials are the group most fully embracing agency as democratic sovereigns.

While this is certainly a “worst case scenario” of the Constitutional ideal, this combination of roles can certainly be found in experience. In the case study, during an

administration led by a particularly strong Mayor, public administrators tend to behave like functionaries, and citizens tend to either disengage or fall back on general demands for fair treatment or reminders to elected officials that their trustee role is limited. Indeed, this is the only claim that can stand up to the logic of the Constitutional tradition, other than voicing discontent through the electoral process. Indeed, this pattern is evident in case vignettes particularly in regard to interpretation of the previously mentioned General Plan 2030 according to a property value protection referendum passed at the state level, as well as in a Request for Proposal for arts-related development and interpretation of increased density entitlements. Exemplifying the call for fair treatment along with reminders of electoral responsiveness, this editorialist said:

If Tempe voters become savvy to the tactics being used to entice redevelopment, perhaps they might produce another referendum—a recall. Elected officials might want to take pre-emptive action, now that we're painted into this corner. Let's not benefit developers over homeowners and neighborhood preservation through this virtual up-zoning. Give *all* affected property owners this windfall through *actual zoning* to match depicted General Plan densities. (Stout, 2007)

Market Domination

One of the most commonly cited reasons for a lack of government responsiveness to citizens is the claim that elected and appointed representatives have been captured by market domination. In the Constitutional ideal, even when government bureaucracies answer to the political system as designed, that system may be overly controlled by economically strong interests or conflicting direction from the different arms of government (Simon et al., 1974). Furthermore, agencies must often use discretion in interpreting vague policy direction that seeks compromise among competing political interests, without actually determining how to do so. Therefore, administrators may be faced with dilemmas for which there is no one right answer to ensure responsibility and accountability (Harmon, 1995). Together, there is a concern that neither efficiency nor social justice are guaranteed by neutrality and competently following the rules

handed down from political/legal realm. Therefore, public administration cannot assure the Good if its political rulers fail to do so. Therefore, political change is sought to produce legitimate governance.

Following Molotch (1976), the City of Tempe could be depicted as being under siege by the Growth Machine. As noted in Chapter 1, it is the only land-locked city in the state of Arizona, and has nowhere to grow but in and up. Very rapid policy changes designed to grease the skids of land redevelopment have led to a flurry of activity that is utterly transforming the face of its central commercial district and adjacent Town Lake development, with expansion of Arizona State University following suit. Current community discussions about ongoing development decisions in and around the city's downtown reveal a description of a scenario very different from prior to 2004 when the current Mayor took the helm. This perspective could be summarized as follows. The current Mayor is a patently stronger personality who has ensured the rise of passive or inexperienced administrators to executive staff positions so that he "and" his colleagues on the Council can reclaim their rightful position at the helm of the City's visioning processes, although in practice the Council members rarely challenge his lead. While this may or may not be an accurate depiction of the situation, it is true that ongoing commentary between the Mayor and a newly elected Council member (who previously managed his mayoral campaign) during various public hearings often emphasizes the role of elected leaders to be the final decision makers, based on what they feel is best after hearing from staff and stakeholders. In this, they adopt a rather pure Constitutional logic of legitimacy.

For example, Tempe recently conducted a Request for Proposals (RFP) to develop a parcel of land adjacent to the Tempe Performing Arts Center along the banks of the Salt River and its developing riparian recreational areas. According to the Community Development Director and his Deputy Director, orders regarding the selection process and a clear preference for one of the two proposals received came directly from the Mayor, with acquiescence from the

City Manager. When public claims were made by several community leaders that the process was unprofessional and biased toward the preferred developer despite the wishes of the community, citizens were individually and publicly chastised by the Mayor through broadly distributed e-mail messages suggesting that they were inappropriately attempting to usurp power over development decisions, which should be left up to the Council. As the City Manager depicted it, "The Mayor really flamed you today!" Similarly, the Development Services Director, upon seeing a group of these community leaders out at a local pub, refused to shake hands or greet the residents, stating "I'm not at work. I don't have to talk to you."

However, at the following public hearing before Council, the Mayor led an artfully responsive move in which he and his fellow Council members accepted responsibility for giving staff "unclear direction," turned down both development proposals, and started over by announcing a community visioning process that had been requested by concerned citizens. The elected officials maintained their perceived leadership and denied their role in the politicization of the issue, while protecting administrators from public blame for poor performance. The Mayor's reported behind-the-scenes deal making and political direction of staff remained hidden to most, the staff remained justified in their preferences due to unclear direction, and the community received the increased planning input they desired.

From the perspective of many of the community members who once supported him, the Mayor has reversed a campaign-promised course from one of preserving and revitalizing neighborhoods to one of deal-making with the "big boys" of development, suggesting that in reality, he never had a problem with the Growth Machine itself. They feel his true concerns lay with *who* was in control of the deals, and the use of financial incentives to bring development to Tempe. Others feel that he is being appropriately responsive to citizen concerns over the need for a sustainable economy, even if it means a small subset of the community is negatively affected by changes to property values, traffic congestion, and other issues. The entire community benefits

from the quality of life afforded through increased tax dollars for parks, community services, and ordinance enforcement. Indeed, this is the rationale given by the Mayor in his 2007 address to the Neighborhood Advisory Commission. As noted in many comments during public hearings and letters to the editor in the local paper, some citizens do not believe this line of logic, stating that the increased costs for accommodating this development in terms of infrastructure and service provision will offset any supposed gains from the new projects, which are predominantly condominium towers above office and retail not far beyond what is currently in existence.

These opinions and projections aside, it is true that now, rather than using tax dollars as incentives to promote the specific type of development desired the City now trades what the community considers quality of life for development growth. This comes in the form of enormous density enhancements—value “givings” as opposed to the “takings” of eminent domain—in the central commercial district area. Properties once zoned to build to a height of 50 feet are now *asked* to build at heights in excess of 300 feet, regardless of the developer’s desires, according to one prominent developer/land use attorney. These entitlements are given to properties adjacent to neighborhoods which are predominantly one or two stories; under 30 feet in height. The principal argument given to support these entitlements is the need for more permanent residents to generate a sustainable economy. However, when those projects cannot find financing for promised uses, changes are granted. For example, projects that received community support as condominiums for permanent residents are transformed into hotels, as in the case of the forthcoming Armory project.

The Growth Machine does appear to be a compelling market phenomenon—one that politicians and administrators alike seem unable to resist. Even one long-standing civic volunteer who had been a long-time advocate of neighborhood involvement in development control has left a career as a public attorney to become a land use attorney and developer, winning approvals for massive downtown redevelopment entitlements for his clients and large redevelopment contracts from Tempe for himself, all while still serving as the Chair of the volunteer citizen planning

boards that recommend approval of his peers' downtown redevelopment projects. Of course there are never votes taken with direct self-interest at stake, but the relationships are held in suspicion on principle by many community members, nonetheless.

The perception that market control of government leads to inequalities for citizens summons a call for improved responsibility and accountability. Because elected officials, appointed volunteer advisors, and administrators can be captured by these market interests, critics within the Constitutional tradition call for political reform to ensure that politicians are responsive to the public interest rather than interest group pluralism, along with stronger controls over the administration to ensure its compliance with legislative mandate.

However, those associated with the Discretionary tradition offer reform recommendations that focus on making empowered administrators responsible to independent criteria that ensure social equity. The thinking is that if administrators are responsible for greater areas of policymaking decisions as well as implementation, the corruptions of the political process will fail to ruin the legitimacy of government. Those associated with the Collaborative tradition seek direct responsiveness to the citizens affected, ensuring that their interpretation of social equity is what guides decision making.

Combining these two perspectives in the case study, community leaders ask that their neighborhoods be considered as a *home*, rather than a marketplace. In terms of decision making criteria, neighbors call for performance-based and form-based zoning guidelines. For example, rather than counting on the market, elected officials, or appointed administrators to "make the right choice," the Maple/Ash neighborhood has sought to acquire a Historic District designation, limitations to property assemblage, infill development design criteria, and a variety of other planning tools developed by the community itself that will ensure the perpetuation of the neighborhood's character, even given inevitable infill and redevelopment activities. Form-based

zoning offers prescriptive visions rather than proscriptive controls. All of these proposals seek to establish criteria that will ensure “the right choice.”

However, another issue of legitimacy concerns who will be the principal designers of these guidelines. Will it be the community members themselves or the public administrators as guided by elected officials? Because of market domination, the community leaders are suspicious of the latter approach. They prefer relying on community-led planning processes. Specifically, during the mid 1990s the ten neighborhoods adjacent to the three most intense centers of redevelopment activity joined together to complete specific plans for their area, including all elements of a General Plan, but with more specificity as to design guidelines and location. The adjacent redevelopment areas include the central commercial district or downtown; the Town Lake and Rio Salado development project; and Arizona State University’s main campus. The community-based plans were generated through collaboration among a vast array of residents, local business owners, Tempe departments, key community-based organizations serving the area, and even interested developers. While these plans were years in the making and required a great deal of dialogue and deliberation, they ultimately achieved broad-based consensus with an irresolvable compromise in only a very small, specific area of concern. Given the near feudal conditions of the neighborhood in question, pinpointing disagreement to a handful of properties was a major accomplishment by all accounts.

In addition to the types of development controls and design guidelines described above, the Northwest Tempe Neighborhoods Strategic Plan also calls for a goal of maintaining at least 20 percent of the housing stock at affordable rates to a typical working family, using public employees like teachers, firefighters, and police officers as the financial exemplars. This objective is meant to support housing equity and to curtail gentrification. Through long-term advocacy and the institution of support mechanisms like the Northwest Tempe Neighborhoods Community Development Corporation (NewTowN CDC) and its Tempe Community Land Trust,

affordable housing is now named as a criterion in Requests for Development and development approvals involving an increased land use entitlement. Most projects receiving approval for great intensification of land use are required to give at least a relatively small sum of money to an affordable housing fund.

For example, a recent project approval to build a 30-story mixed use building with 350 condominiums for sale at prices in excess of \$400 per square foot was required to give \$700,000 to the fund—what is equivalent to the construction (not including land) of about three 2,000 square foot homes. However, this is the same project that has recently transformed half of those condominiums into a hotel, which will generate significantly more general revenue for the City in the future. Perhaps increased investment in the affordable housing fund will be requested by the City in approving such change. But the fundamental point remains the same—*the community is seeking ways to bend the market to its own will*, and to one degree or another, the Mayor is responding.

Because the market does not appear to loosen much of its hold over the community as marketplace, those pursuing the Collaborative ideal seek to more fully empower neighborhoods in making development decisions. NewTown CDC was established to provide not only a nonprofit implementation partner, but to coordinate and advocate for community-based plans to guide development and transportation within the ten neighborhoods it represented. The founding board and staff included active community leaders from each of those neighborhoods, and the organization was linked, through them, to the volunteer neighborhood associations recognized by Tempe as the local representative bodies. In order to formalize such a representative function, an experimental Planning Area Advisory Board (PAAB) was formed to work with staff in the development review process, and to take the neighborhoods' plan into the General Plan as an amendment, and from there, to more zoning-oriented tools like district overlay plans and redevelopment/preservation plans. Due to a host of problems, the PAAB was disbanded and

community leaders are now pursuing its replacement in the form of Village Planning & Development Review Committees. Following models like Los Angeles, the hope is to make seats on the committee subject to neighborhood approval, and to give purview of planning and development advisement to the residents most affected.

Failure to Achieve Political Control

Perhaps the most common criticism centers on the various failures of bureaucracy to achieve its own goals for control. The Friedrich/Finer debate is frequently cited as the most informative on the basic problems (Finer, 1941; Friedrich, 1940). In a nutshell, Friedrich noted the need for internal sources of control to augment those extant in the hierarchy because of the ubiquitous problem of discretion. Finer, on the other hand, felt that internal sources of control were too unpredictable, favoring a strict hierarchical order. This perspective is a more pure Constitutional ideal: failures in legitimacy are caused either by the individual administrator not following hierarchical rules and procedures (the technical concern) or when those rules fail to reflect political direction and the authority it holds (the normative concern).

Empirical evidence commonly shows that bureaucracy simply fails to achieve the control ideal explicated by Finer. In terms of administrator failure, a very well-known study and those following show that even at the lowest levels of hierarchy, public administrators wield discretionary authority in a manner that not only affects policy in a manner formally reserved for politicians, but has substantive impact on the citizens with whom they engage (Lipsky, 1983; Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2003). While this is most clearly evident in the case of service workers such as police officers, teachers, and social workers at the individual level of analysis, this phenomenon is crucial for collectivities as well. For example, in the case study, central, open-form neighborhoods in sprawling urban metropolitan areas suffer dramatically from increasing cut-through traffic. Drivers who do not live in the area seek ways to avoid freeway and arterial congestion, cutting through predominantly residential areas to reach their destinations more

quickly. These frustrated drivers tend to speed and drive recklessly, representing a safety hazard to children and the elderly, most particularly.

Tempe elected officials shared the concerns of neighborhood leaders in the Riverside/Sunset neighborhoods, which happened to be “on the way” between the closest freeway exit and Tempe’s downtown business and entertainment district, as well as Arizona State University’s main campus. In fact, the neighborhood collector, Fifth Street, runs from one freeway access point through the heart of the neighborhoods to the center of downtown and on to the campus sports activity centers and parking lots before reaching another arterial street with freeway access. Political leaders handed the problem off to the appropriate administrative staff for resolution. Then, for over a year, the Transportation Manager fended off action of any kind with the exclamation, “I’d rather *be* a speed hump than install one on one of my streets.” He interpreted national engineering standards as being against the use of traffic calming devices, and claimed the City of Tempe would be at risk of lawsuit should they install something that might be considered a hazard to automobiles. He argued with political leaders that they would lose votes not only due to this probability, but for inconveniencing drivers in a city dominated by the automobile. He stressed that in fact, the street was engineered to handle much more traffic than it currently experienced, and if anything, should be widened if experiencing increased congestion. Thus, policy remained unresponsive to political direction to resolve the problem.

The problem administrative discretion presents to the Constitutional ideal is so pervasive that it could be pinpointed as the catalyst for the emergence of alternative logics of legitimacy. From the perspective of the Discretionary tradition, the problem is conceived as making discretion legitimate. As Friedrich noted as early as 1940, the problem of discretion necessitates alternatives to political control via organizational hierarchy to achieve legitimacy. The theorists working principally in the Discretionary tradition call for alternatives in the form of criteria independent of the hierarchical control structure, whether in technical or normative form. Clearly,

the Transportation Manager used a combination of technical and legal expertise to claim legitimacy for his discretionary decision over that of the political leaders or the most impacted citizenry.

Hierarchical Control Creates Inefficiency

The Constitutional solution to the problem of political responsiveness is addressed through the electoral process. Problems of administrative responsiveness are addressed through control over Bureaucrats via the organization hierarchy and its oversight by political representatives. However, this model itself creates other challenges. A common critique is that bureaucracies become inefficient over time based on the very procedural techniques once used to produce technical competence, efficiency, and accountability. The due process of administrative decision making is often critiqued as being less than rational and efficient (Simon, 1976). In fact, in common lexicon, the term *bureaucratic* is paradoxically used as a synonym for both uncaring efficiency (technicism) and unavoidable inefficiency. When the problems under consideration are simple, like public works or accounting, it is possible for agencies to define effectiveness fairly accurately. However, with more complex problems, inefficiencies increase. Therefore, contemporary scholars are often quite critical of the bureaucratic organizing style. For example, it is depicted as placing inordinate emphasis on procedures and control rather than results; being preoccupied with agency perpetuation and positional power; being rigid and hide-bound to poor methods of communication, coordination, and human resource management; and seeking economy rather than efficient effectiveness (Barzelay, 1992). In the National Performance Review report prepared for the Clinton administration, bureaucracy is likened to a cure worse than the disease—an enormous, rigid, wasteful monopoly that has outlived its industrial era roots (Unknown, 1993). The problem is not attributed to Bureaucrats themselves, but rather to the *systems* they inhabit, including the strangling control mechanisms hoped to prevent malfeasance.

These problems of hierarchy and bureaucracy lead to calls for the flattened and empowered organizations envisioned by the Discretionary tradition, as well as the deeply nested federal system of networks that merges all sectors of society promoted by the Collaborative tradition. Both views assert that these organizing styles, along with their associated decision making rationalities and administrative role conceptualizations, will improve efficiency and effectiveness in either the short or long term. Yet, both the normative camp of the Discretionary tradition and the Collaborative tradition scholars further claim that if efficiency is pursued without criteria of equity (in the former) or direct participation by those affected (in the latter), the risk of inequitable outcomes is exacerbated. Both perspectives fear that efficiency will override democratic values if released from hierarchical controls to the contrary.

This set of problems and favored remedies is illustrated in the case study. Like most municipalities, up until very recently, Tempe has operated under what has been called a Euclidian form of planning (Freidmann, 2003). Zoning ordinances are proscriptive in nature, providing vast and detailed rules for how development may proceed, paired with a lengthy and sometimes labyrinth-like formal and quasi-judicial public process. From the perspective of administrators, developers, and citizens alike, this is not the most effective approach for anyone involved. Due to complaints from developers regarding the inordinate difficulties and delays the zoning ordinance presented, administrators were pressured to grant many variances, and to design alternative zoning tools that would nullify or simplify design guidelines, although these opportunities were limited in nature. The reaction from citizens was that these strategies created too great a need to act as vigilant watchdogs over each and every development proposal in their neighborhoods. People began to question the point of having a zoning ordinance at all, if its guidelines were routinely overturned in support of developer preferences.

Therefore, methods were desired that would streamline and make clear procedural matters, and find a better balance between proscription and a prescriptive vision with objectives

to guide what is allowed or disallowed. All parties desired the possibility of a simplified process that allows more creativity to produce better outcomes, and prevents issues from falling into the gaps between types of oversight, such as zoning entitlement and design review. Thus, the production of an entirely new zoning ordinance was undertaken. A task force of development professionals and a few citizens at large (added after community complaints about the committee's composition) supported staff in the project, which was overseen by the volunteer citizen Planning & Zoning Commission through numerous public hearings prior to consideration by the City Council. Through this long and arduous process of negotiation and compromise, a new ordinance was finally adopted nearly three years later.

These revisions have definitely improved the efficiency of the development process. Review bodies and processes have been collapsed and shortened, requiring fewer public hearings and advisory review bodies from whom to seek support. Legal entitlements can be acquired without consideration to site plans or designs. That is, a zoning change can be acquired based on consideration of the General Plan, without consideration of the actual project's merits or lack thereof. The current General Plan depicts densities far in excess of what is allowed in the zoning ordinance, therefore, zoning changes for increased intensity of development is routine. Revisions have also improved the creative capacity of projects. For example, there are opportunities to develop without any design guidelines under what is called a Planned Area Development. Mixed use zoning categories promoted by the community to attain sustainable live/work environments have the effect of increasing the development potential of properties in terms of building density, heights, and setbacks, but no longer require an actual mix of uses beyond various forms of commercial space. All in all, while proponents of the Growth Machine are quite happy with these changes, citizens are left scratching their heads, wondering how this is better for them and their neighborhoods. In short, efficiency may have been bought at a cost to community. This leads into a critique of the Discretionary tradition to be discussed below.

Hierarchical Control Creates Administrative Evil

Other critiques focus on the notion that the issue of control is paradoxical. As noted above, on the one hand, control can fail by not eliminating administrative discretion. On the other hand, control can fail by eliminating individual responsibility, thereby producing various forms of “administrative evil” (Adams & Balfour, 2004). There is much concern over imbuing institutions with agency and moral obligation, because it denies the moral responsibility of personal agency (Harmon, 1995). Yet the individual level of analysis is often where decisions are made and actions are taken. The splitting of agency from personal responsibility is the source of the paradox of accountability. Public servants are answerable to others, and may therefore deny personal responsibility. On the other hand, if they take discretionary action, they undermine the legal and political bases of their legitimacy—their answerability. Thus, the paradox of responsibility emerges.

Referring back to the RFP for arts-related development, a conversation with the lead staff member on the project reveals what could be considered a “mild case” of administrative evil. When asked how he could personally support the tactics being used to manipulate the procurement process and citizens, he simply replied, “I have been directed to do so. Do you think if we were in control of this process it would look *anything* like this? You know better than that—we’ve worked together for years on community planning efforts! I am *not* responsible for this [mess].” When asked if he would advocate for a more professional process, he indicated that it would mean losing his job, of which he is quite fond. He made it clear that he felt fully answerable to the elected officials through his superiors, and therefore completely responsible to their dictates, regardless of outcome or personal opinions. There was definitely not a sense that he personally promoted what was happening. Yet, he legitimately defended his actions according to the logic of the Constitutional tradition—he was being responsive to authorized direction.

Whistle-Blowing and Guerilla Government

This problem of personal responsibility is related to the humanistic concern that those taking the Bureaucrat role must give up the rights and privileges of citizenship in order to be subordinated to the political sovereign (Mosher, 1968). This creates a psychological dysfunction within the individual administrator, not just within society. In essence, many moral and ethical principles may compete within the individual (Waldo, 1980). When those coming from the government hierarchy compete with those held by the individual from other sources, a dissonance occurs that can be untenable. This is exacerbated significantly when the political direction is perceived as being corrupt in some manner, or against the expressed will of the community. One way this dissonance can be eliminated is through whistle-blowing, wherein administrators publicly denounce directives from either appointed or elected superiors, usually losing their job in the process (Brewer & Selden, 1998).

In the case study, several members of voluntary citizen boards and commissions are known to have resigned from their appointments based on misgivings over what they learn about the City's operations. Both staff and elected officials are cited as being unresponsive to citizen needs, concerns, and preferences, as well as "official" ordinances and practices. Similarly, over the course of the recent mayoral administration, several City Clerks and City Attorneys have moved on, in addition to numerous mid to upper level managers. While not publicly announced, rumor has it that at least some of these resignations are due to the untenable nature of moral differences. At least one City Attorney reportedly complained that rather than actually exercising the expertise the position called for, actions were routinely micromanaged by the Mayor, who is a noted contracts attorney. It is true that this can be observed in taped recordings of televised meetings—questions posed by the Mayor and Council members to the City Attorney are often answered by the Mayor instead. Throughout the City's management echelons, many replacements have little experience or training for their positions shown in their career history. However, there

has never been a case of actual whistle-blowing in regard to these types of complaints. The most that occurs is rumor commentary in the various community circles shared by professional staff and civic leaders. In terms of whistle-blowing, the only notable examples would be lawsuits filed and won by employees claiming discriminatory workplace practices.

An alternative to losing or leaving one's job is to engage in less obvious acts of rebellion through administrative discretion. Guerrilla government is O'Leary's term for "the actions of career public servants who work against the wishes—either implicitly or explicitly communicated—of their superiors" (2006, p. xi). The term guerrilla is used because it indicates actions which are irregular or independent from the regular group. It is described as a form of dissent, but one which has many possible motivations or rationales ranging from altruism to petty self-interest. Therefore, this theory is about the relationship between administrators and politicians, and the degree and nature of discretion taken by administrators. It is a Constitutional tradition theory, because it assumes that legitimacy is assured through the representative democratic administrative-political system. When that system breaks down through the actions of guerrilla bureaucrats, this assurance is lost and the necessary judgment of good or bad arises. O'Leary ultimately suggests that a blanket determination cannot be made, and that whether or not the action is in the public interest must be determined on a case-by-case basis. In making these judgments, multiple theories of legitimacy may come into play.

Critiques of the Discretionary Tradition

The Discretionary tradition seeks to respond to the failure of both the Constitutional order and the Collaborative ideal to achieve the public interest based on insufficient reliance on expertise. On the one hand, these ideas respond to empirical evidence that administration is integrally involved in policy making activities that were once considered to be the domain of politics, and are increasingly empowered with decision making authority. Furthermore, hierarchy simply fails to control administrative action through its procedural rules and structures of

authority, and direct citizen participation often fails to achieve effective results. Therefore, if administrative discretion exists, alternatives to political oversight and control and direct democracy are needed to ensure legitimacy. Indeed, these observations are often used to critique the Constitutional and Collaborative traditions, as they are very difficult to refute ideologically. In short, even though legislators and citizens *should* have tighter control, it is infeasible given the size of government and the complexity of public problems. To be practical, administrators must be empowered to make discretionary decisions, and to do so legitimately.

On the other hand, the Discretionary tradition philosophically does not trust politics to produce the Good. It seeks to “insulate administrators from elected officials, allow them to use their knowledge, trust them, defer to their expertise and benevolence...” (Rosenbloom, 2000b, p. 163). It considers the Constitutional system to have been ruined by pluralist competition and various forms of political corruption or incompetence. Direct participation from citizens reflects the same competing self-interest, and therefore the Collaborative ideal is deemed utopian or illusory. Therefore, administrators must produce the Good using some other form of guidance than hierarchical political oversight or direct citizen participation. One of the two camps within this tradition suggests that performance measures of efficiency and effectiveness are the best way to determine the public interest, while the other camp asserts that different democratic outcomes are more important, using equity and other ethical standards as measures of legitimate action. Yet both approaches are deemed problematic to those holding principally to the other two traditions because neither representative nor direct standards of democracy are met.

The Entrepreneur Is Not Democratically Responsive

By way of reminder, the critique of responsiveness is complex, because scholars are apt to place responsibility on the shoulders of politicians who have lost control over the administration just as quickly as laying blame at the feet of unresponsive administrators. In either case, government must be responsive to citizens to meet ideological expectations for democracy.

In the Discretionary logic, citizens are responded to either as customers or as clients expecting particular outcomes in accordance with their individual preferences. Yet as societal role, public administration is held to an expectation of legitimacy that must stand up “in the full glare of public scrutiny” (Macy, 1971, p. 249). In searching for a new interpretation of the meaning of *public* entrepreneur, social responsibility is recast as a responsiveness to the citizenry as a whole (Kobrak, 1996). Therefore, the Discretionary tradition adopts the solution of performance criteria that demonstrate that administrators are acting in the public interest.

The Discretionary approach engenders normative critique from both Constitutional and Collaborative perspectives that neither representative nor direct standards of democracy are being met by virtue of inappropriate political authority, which is discussed below. It also sets up critiques based on empirical evidence that administrators either fail to achieve the outcomes chosen or fail to identify appropriately what is in the public interest. While this tradition may indeed provide more direct responsiveness to citizens than the bureaucracies of the Constitutional tradition, it is not nearly as responsive as that envisioned by advocates of the Collaborative tradition. Even those generally in support of the Discretionary approach call for “maintaining and increasing bottom-up control of all officials, those appointed and hired through contracts as well as those elected” (Kelly, 1998, p. 207).

As noted in the critique of the Constitutional tradition, Box (1998) has presented an extensive analysis of role types described within public administration theory that considers the societal roles of practitioners, elected officials, and citizens. In this model, the degree to which the actors are empowered in the governance process characterizes the role type. In the Discretionary tradition, elected representatives function like “delegates” who seek to know and represent their constituents’ preferences. The principal problem with this approach is the difficulties presented by a pluralist society, and the degree to which the political process can be captured by special interests. To respond to this problem, representatives often turn to

administrators to make decisions based on expertise. Administrators thus function as “controllers” of policy, using their expertise to dictate to policy-makers what is correct, usurping the role of politicians. As a result of this shift, citizens tend to function as “watchdogs;” self-interested constituents or customers that become involved in governance only in key matters of personal import. They tend to deal directly with administrators and politicians alike.

In extreme, technical approaches to discretion consider citizens as customers, while the virtue-oriented discretionism treats them like clients in need of expert service or representation. In both cases, citizens are less than equals as whole social beings. So long as citizens submit to expertise, whether it is technical or ethical in nature, the risk of superiority or domination remains. When citizens function like self-interested watch-dogs (Box, 1998) it reinforces their treatment as recipients of government services rather than citizens (Lofquist, 1989). This one-directional flow has been called a “‘patronage’ position toward citizens” (Vigoda & Golembiewski, 2001, p. 278). In this set of role relationships, administrators are the only group fully embracing agency.

Discretionary public administrators appear to wield the power and authority of government in a position that is superior to citizens. As representatives of the entire organization’s power and prestige, domineering attitudes are of concern. An overly developed *esprit de corps* may lead public administrators to defend their own professional opinions, rather than those of their clients or elected officials (Merton, 1940). This image is only exacerbated when administrators are, in fact, given the political authority to make decisions on many matters of policy making and its implementation. These phenomena are in direct conflict with the conceptualization of governmental personnel as “servants of the people.” Attempts to make administrative discretion accountable have failed to inspire confidence among citizens (Reich, 1988a). The crisis of legitimacy continues because people do not have faith that administrators are genuinely acting in the public interest. Reich proposes that to acquire this legitimacy,

administrators must foster “civic discovery” (1988a, p. 144). In other words, their job is to help the citizens develop shared preferences as described in the Collaborative tradition.

The claim that empowered administrators are not responsive to citizen concerns is reflected in the case study in the vignettes described above. For example, the vignettes describing the strong Mayor’s lack of responsiveness simultaneously illustrate the Constitutional reaction to administrative discretion and citizen empowerment. In regard to the two General Plan processes, the 2020 process involved fewer stakeholders, and yet was more responsive to them as a function of their empowerment and the level of dialogue that was provided. Both the elected officials and citizens reacted very strongly against the actions of a Neighborhood Planner who overstepped her policy making role, assuming too much discretion over land use planning decisions by controlling the citizen Planning Area Advisory Board. By virtually throwing out five years’ of collaborative community work, she displayed more than a lack of responsiveness, acting more in the manner depicted by Merton (1940) above.

However, the problem of responsiveness need not be characterized by what many would judge to be unprofessional behavior. Referring back to the traffic calming vignette described above, a subsequent Transportation Manager sought to demonstrate innovative approaches to traffic calming and pedestrian design. In direct response to the neighborhood’s concerns about traffic on Fifth Street, she worked collaboratively with neighborhood leaders to obtain funds and initiate a street re-design project. While there was broad support for a number of traffic calming techniques that were proposed during the planning process, the Transportation Manager ultimately directed the designers to use the techniques preferred by the experts in completing the Fifth Street Pedestrian and Traffic Calming Redesign Project. Furthermore, elected officials deferred to this expertise when competing claims were presented. Therefore, while policy was generally responsive to citizen concerns, it was constrained by the discretionary use of expertise.

From Mosher's (1968) perspective, not even the most virtuous professional can legitimately claim the representative position, because administrative morality is not *necessarily* achieved through professionalism. Agents can use either technical expertise or virtue to dominate in an undemocratic fashion. Standards or professional codes of ethical behavior are not adequate to guide public decisions. Heymann similarly argues that when government puts normative ideas into action, what he calls "expressive government action" (1988, p. 86) can be very harmful to democracy, particularly where there is either deep divisions or no clear public demand. Something more is required for the public character of decisions and he suggests open governance processes are the best guarantors of administrative morality. Therefore, if there is to be a legitimate role for government, there must be an open public discussion of values to frame and determine what will be expressed through government action. This ensures that administrative discretion is directly responsive to affected citizens.

Those adopting the Collaborative ideal call for more robust guarantees of responsiveness, transforming administrative expertise into an egalitarian form to be exercised by anyone. All forms of substantive expertise, either technical or normative in nature, should be exercised by any participant in the public process. In this way, no source dominates necessarily, but rather rises to prominence as dictated by the law of the situation. However, the road to such a deliberative society is not smooth because debates about basic values are much more divisive than arguments comparing competing instrumental preferences. Furthermore, such transformation ultimately requires a new theory of political economy. Therefore, most critiques of the Discretionary tradition coming from a Collaborative stance seek a transitional role for public administration. Rather than seeking to reform discretion by reasserting the Constitutional oversight, they seek to perpetuate administrative discretion, while transforming it to a purely facilitative, educative, or emancipative form.

A significant problem with the Discretionary tradition is that it does not offer recommendations for building community beyond the principles of empowering citizens as consumers or clients, or representing community values as virtuous administrators. While there is much “how-to” offered in terms of utilizing market mechanisms or ensuring ethical action in lieu of citizens in the Discretionary tradition, a lack of expertise in facilitative governance is problematic to all attempts at citizen engagement. It is very difficult for those in power to relinquish some of it in the interest of collaborating with citizens. Whether they are considered to be impersonal objects or customers or clients, citizens are considered a second-class group to those with expertise, whether it is in the form of technique or virtue, knowledge or wisdom. In either case, it is of great concern that an elite of administrative specialists are usurping the sovereignty of the citizenry (Mosher, 1968). But this concern is more pronounced in the Discretionary tradition, because it cannot even rely on the notion of responsiveness to citizens via control by their political representatives.

Some scholars contest the market-based assumptions about responsiveness in use within the technical formulation of legitimate administrative discretion. Using its own theories to formulate critique as recommended by MacIntyre (1988), transaction cost analysis shows that markets rely on some level of mutual trust. Therefore, as noted in discussion of the Constitutional tradition’s political ontology, successful civil society is necessary as a market context. However, an overextension of utilitarian thought into civil society has eroded this capacity to build trusting relationships (McSwite, 2002). Human relationships themselves have come increasingly commodified by the pervasiveness of market principles in all forms of organization. Some believe that by relying too much on the principles of market capitalism and classical liberalism blurs boundaries between public and private sectors, thus threatening “core public-sector values of citizen self-governance and the administrator as servant of the public interest” (Box, 1999, p. 19).

With the market structure, approach, and values overtaking the public sphere, society loses its hold on democracy.

Even the most spirited proponents of entrepreneurial governance admit that “market mechanisms are only half the equation... To complement the efficiency and effectiveness of market mechanisms, we need the warmth and caring of families and neighborhoods and communities. As entrepreneurial governments move away from administrative bureaucracies, they need to embrace both markets *and* community” (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992, p. 309). When communities are no longer viewed as homes, but as marketplaces, as described in Growth Machine theory and the case study illustrations, the very notion of community withers. When those who seek to preserve the sense of community and place are placed at odds with the market, it is quite predictable who tends to win in a liberal capitalist society.

In the case study, legislators in large part followed the promptings of market forces and the advice of technical experts, providing political support for a pro-growth agenda. In an interview with the immediate predecessor to the current officeholder, the Mayor believed that the sustenance of a municipality was a very complex project. He insisted that so few people “get it,” it is best to empower staff and minimize the ways in which governance can be bogged down by the uninformed laity. He felt that his role was to make certain highly professional staff were hired, and to facilitate them by giving them only broad direction and sufficient interpretive and operational discretion. His principal role was to garner political support for a vision of growth and quality of life, while letting staff sort out the details. Without going into the elitist attitude revealed, it is important to note that the Mayor fully believed that there is only one “it” to “get.” In other words, he fully accepted the story told to him by the experts, depicting the need for constant growth to maintain a community’s quality of life. In this world view, those who imagine alternative ways to maintain community quality of life with neither intensive redevelopment nor steep tax increases, but rather through revitalization, preservation, and increased nonprofit and

government involvement in market forces are labeled as uninformed, naïve, or at worst, ideologically deviant. Therefore, responsiveness to their claims is not deemed necessary. Instead, the Mayor chose to be responsive to the marketplace and technical expertise, along with all those citizens who go along with the shared vision. This pattern has not changed with a change in leadership. In fact, in a broadly distributed e-mail, the new Mayor chastised citizens who “disagree with the direction the community may be moving.”

More generally, the notion that empowered administrators can create democratically legitimate outcomes through transactional relationships with citizens as customers and clients is challenged by both Constitutional and Collaborative logics. From the former perspective, legitimacy is ensured through a representative relationship between elected officials and their constituents. From the latter perspective legitimacy requires egalitarian social relationship and shared experience, not merely transaction. Illustrations of this approach to administrative responsiveness can be found in a variety of scholarly sources exploring applications of communicative action, collaborative planning, and deliberative democracy. In the case study, the community-based planning processes completed by the Northwest Tempe neighborhoods depict this approach well.

There are actually two separate planning processes and resulting plan documents; one for the Riverside/Sunset neighborhoods, and another for their eight other adjacent neighborhoods. Both were merged into a single draft plan by a team from NewTown CDC and Tempe’s community development staff just prior to the hire of the Neighborhood Planner described above. Both planning processes were funded in part by the City of Tempe, with the majority of funding coming from other sources, including the American Institute of Architects, the Local Initiatives Support Corporation, Fannie Mae, and corporate donors. Both were administered by NewTown CDC, facilitated by process experts, and supported by professional teams including land use attorneys, urban planners, architects, and landscape architects. Both had ongoing and active

participation by most Tempe departments, community-based organizations serving the area, and adjacent business district representatives, alongside a host of residents, area business owners, and area land owner/developers. The planning sessions utilized a variety of interactive methods, including educational workshops, visioning, strategic planning, and design charrettes. All visioning, planning, and design processes were deliberative in nature, allowing for excessive amounts of dialogue prior to decision making. As noted above, this resulted in broad-based consensus among ten neighborhoods covering nearly two square miles, narrowing areas of contestation to a matter of three half-block areas. Throughout the process, all participants were responsible for providing substantive expertise. The opinions of citizens and local business owners were weighted above those of developers and outside organizations. Paid consultants and Tempe professional staff alike were considered on tap, and were never allowed to dominate discussion or decisions. And it must be noted that at no time did they attempt to do so. Indeed, the atmosphere was fully creative and collaborative. The only people empowered to direct anything were process facilitators, who co-designed the rules of engagement with participants. Thus, it is quite possible for administrative expertise to be transformed into a facilitative, educative, emancipative form. Unfortunately for the neighborhoods in the case study, a reassertion of power over from market-dominated politicians and professional staff followed close on the heels of this exemplary collaborative success.

Entrepreneurs Wield Inappropriate Political Authority

As noted above, the problem of responsiveness is linked to the underlying problem of delegation of political authority. Based on the existing Constitutional doctrine in the United States, an empowered administration is considered to hold inappropriate political authority. In extreme, the administrative state can become an autocratic system based on expertise. Through a sociological study of numerous military and European state organizations, Weber (1968) offers a strong critique of bureaucracy's potential negative implications for society. Through his ideal

type model of authority, Weber chronicles bureaucracy, noting that in a democratic system where elected officials and their policies can be overturned through votes and referenda, government is more realistically in the hands of expert bureaucrats (Blau & Meyer, 1999). Bureaucracies tend to monopolize information and power and resist change, moving toward autocracy and totalitarianism. They can grow so large “as to be immune from popular control...” and lose legitimacy “by vesting discretionary authority in the hands of a public agency so that the exercise of power is not responsive to the public good” (J. Q. Wilson, 1975, p. 40). Therefore, a common perception of the Constitutional ideal is that citizens believe government is using its power against them, or at least not for them (Berman, 1997).

In response to this problem, the Constitutional tradition calls for bureaucratic reform, reasserting the ideal of political control over the hierarchy, regardless of its mass or complexity (Lowi, 1979, 1987, 1993; Rosenbloom, 2000a). The disconnect between entrepreneurial and discretionary administration and the formal system of legitimacy in republican governments has been called “the paradox of managerialism” (Maor, 1999). In this view, managerialism has been attached to the backlash from political leaders to the empowerment of administrators that leads to the desire for more control over their hiring and firing. In Maor’s understanding, managerialism decreases administrative influence over policy making, while increasing political influence over senior administrators. Therefore, administrators are *less* political because they are moved away from policy making decisions, but are *more* political, because they are being made more responsive to legislators.

A similar dynamic has been observed in the case study. Certainly, the strong Mayor response to strong department heads, clerks, and attorneys is illustrative of the Constitutional reaction to an empowered administration. Furthermore, the prior Mayor’s recommendations to transfer and rein in the Neighborhood Planner displayed a similar reaction to discretion. Using a new vignette to illustrate, during two consecutive mayoral administrations, from 1978 to 2004, a

particular staff member was given a significant amount of control over land use and development policy in the form of long range planning and redevelopment activities, including all federal Community Development Block Grant allocations but those specifically earmarked for human services. Eventually, he was elevated to Director of Development Services, overseeing all forms of development. By the late 1990s, the effects of his long-range planning and what would now likely be considered extremely aggressive use of eminent domain and redevelopment policy, community sentiment began to turn against his leadership and management of various staff members under his purview. Neighborhoods felt “under siege” by the Growth Machine, imagining this Redevelopment Manager to be at the controls. In essence, the community members most directly affected by his redevelopment policies and actions coalesced around the notion that the staff was inordinately strong, while the political leaders were far too weak, refusing to bring him under control. Responding to this sentiment, a mayoral candidate with only four years under his belt as a Council member successfully wrested the seat in 2004 from the “heir apparent,” a beloved long-time Council member who had served the Council for twelve years. Not surprisingly, both the Redevelopment Manager and several of his lead staff resigned in short order, taking advantage of an early retirement package offered early in the new administration.

This is a manifestly powerful political strategy, but when this sort of challenge to administrative discretion is married with a failure to achieve political compromise among competing interests, it is not likely long to last. As noted by Schattschneider (1960), coalitions are apt to shift based on new shared concerns. In the case at hand, alliances once held between political and community leaders against a powerful staff may shift to alliances between staff members and community leaders toward redress of legislative power, even if for different reasons. While staff may wish to reclaim political power through administrative discretion, citizens may wish to reclaim political power through direct democratic responsiveness from

administrators and politicians alike. However, citizens may be willing to accept an increase of administrative power in order to curtail an excess of mayoral power. As an example, during an informal conversation with a Community Development staff member during one such transitional time, he suggested that concerned citizens “start thinking about electing a new Mayor.”

As might seem obvious based on this description of political backlash to strong administrators, those within the Constitutional tradition are highly critical of the notion of legitimate administrative discretion, as it is fundamentally opposed to the tradition’s interpretation of the Constitutional mandate for control by representative government. For example, Carroll suggests that the political objective of the reinvention movement was to shift the balance of political authority to administrators and citizens as customers, ignoring “the fact that many operational assumptions based on customer service have implications for broader systems of values such as the rule of law, representative government, separated and shared powers, and individual liberty” (1995, p. 310). What may not be as obvious is that the Discretionary tradition also fails to meet the standards of direct democracy. In blithely accepting the myth of the politics/administration dichotomy, we risk recognizing and understanding the potential dangers of bureaucratic mandarines and the political role of bureaucracies (Riggs, 1998). In fact, critiques of the reinvention movement, which greatly empowered administrators even while shrinking government, offer an interesting perspective from both the Constitutional and Collaborative traditions on the problems of administrative discretion. Goodsell (1993) offers his “Ten Principles of Rediscovered Government” while Denhardt & Denhardt (2003) offer seven principles of the New Public Service.

Unfortunately, the critiques of reinvention do not directly correspond to Osborne & Gaebler’s (1992) ten principles. But to summarize, other than the notion of empowering citizens to achieve more effective results to collective action, the reinvention movement seeks a high level of discretion whereby government sets broad direction, and then charges administration to

function in a competitive, mission-driven, goal-oriented, efficient, action-oriented, market-like manner in order to meet the expectations of individual citizens and effective stewardship of resources. These characteristics suggest a very technically-oriented, Discretionary position.

As an alternative, Goodsell (1993) envisions a Constitutional system whereby to be effective yet accountable to the citizenry, elected representatives must be in charge of and in control over governance, assuring fairness and due process. Administrators should be in humble service to the public interest in a manner that is bound by the Constitution and its rule of law, but should be respected, even while being held accountable. At no time may resource stewardship or creative action be handled in such a way as to benefit factions rather than the community as a whole. These principles must apply to government agencies as well as their contractors.

These ideas are aligned with Lowi's (1979, 1987) abiding concern about the political consequences of delegated power. Delegation of power is necessary for any form of representation, but there are consequences that have constitutional importance in America. While power is given to government to enable action, it is also limited through various checks and balances in order to fulfill the social contract with democratic citizens. Powers are separated, the rule of law is enacted, and due process is ensured. However, he believes that administrative professionalism has become "deranged" because it is no longer controlled by legislative bodies and the substantive knowledge embedded in law (Lowi, 1979). Therefore, "These specialists have no right to ask for, and must not be given freedom from supervisory control" (Gulick, 2004, p. 96).

Denhardt & Denhardt (2003) describe a more Collaborative alternative that leaves the bulk of political authority with citizens. In their view, government should be humanistic in nature, founding and evaluating action based on shared community values, rather than simply law, professional standards, or the market values (although they do not deny the legitimacy of these as well). The public interest can only be discovered through dialogue, while responsible

effectiveness can only be achieved through collaborative effort and shared responsibility. The relationship between government and its citizens should be one of trust and collaboration, not transaction. Therefore, administrators must be first and foremost, citizens, not independent agents.

Similarly, while Cooper has one foot in the virtuous Discretionary camp with his notion of public administrators as citizens in lieu of the laity, he has made substantive critiques of both representative and professional bases of legitimacy. “The power of technical expertise and specialized knowledge, the complexity of the problems to be faced, and the scale of government have tended to crowd out both the citizenry and their would-be representatives. Single-minded attempts at furthering this kind of professionalism among public administrators cannot but continue to erode the ethical dimensions of citizenship” (Cooper, 1984, p. 147). Therefore, Cooper recommends that the meaning of professionalism and professional identity should be derived from the meaning of ethical citizenship. Public administrators should “view themselves first as citizens in a political community, who are obligated to wield their expertise on behalf of their fellow citizens and under their sovereignty” (Cooper, 1984, p. 149). What he fails to see is that virtuous administrators are merely another form of elite professional that may undermine his ideal of citizen empowerment.

This important difference is captured by Denhardt & deLeon (2000) as the choice between autonomous and collaborative administrative action. While autonomous action allows (but I would argue does not *necessitate*) self-interest, collaborative action *minimizes* it. Collaboration creates a public spirit because it necessitates the consideration of all interests with a goal not to win, but to find common ground and agreement. “The idea of a common undertaking in which all citizens can and must be involved is key. This collective enterprise, which is often called the public interest, is not just the accumulation of private interests, nor even the juxtaposition of ‘enlightened’ self-interests. Indeed, this ideal moves well beyond a politics based

on the self-interest of the individual” (R. B. Denhardt & deLeon, 2000, p. 93). Through collaboration, shared interests are formed: “In the process of bouncing and crashing against others, our ideas and values are polished and their sharp edges rounded. As we learn to know and value others, our internalized idea of the public interest becomes more complex and balanced” (R. B. Denhardt & deLeon, 2000, p. 94).

Ambivalence about administrative discretion of any type is well founded empirically as well, as shown in many cases of “guerilla government” wherein actions are taken for less than altruistic reasons (O’Leary, 2006). An example from the case study can illustrate this concern about the Discretionary tradition of public administration. In the Northwest Tempe Neighborhoods Strategic Plan process described above, the community was assured that the resulting plans, facilitated and advised by planning and land use professionals, would be adopted as amendments to General Plan 2020. However, shortly after their completion, they were accepted as vision documents only, and put on hold until it could be determined how to bring them into alignment with a forthcoming state law. The Growing Smarter legislation was anticipated to bring new control over how municipalities and counties would be allowed to produce and adopt long-range plans, better known as General Plans. However, most community residents chalked the delay up to fierce opposition from one of the most influential local developers to the neighborhoods’ plan, as it had caused a delay and substantive diminution of one of his projects.

To facilitate the process of bringing the neighborhoods’ plan into compliance with the new state law, a new City staff position of Neighborhood Planner was established and a local architect and close personal friend of the disgruntled developer was hired. She was given full rein by the Redevelopment Director, and in short order, she declared the neighborhoods’ plan grossly insufficient, and proceeded to hold another long series of neighborhood meetings and education workshops over the course of about 18 months, none of which had the collaborative design

character of the community-based process. Even though the neighborhoods' plans were generated under the guidance of numerous planners, architects, landscape architects, and a managing land use attorney, not to mention the participation of many City staff across appropriate departments, she insisted that they were technically invalid, requiring significant improvement. She further claimed that the plans were not sufficiently responsive to market conditions, and would therefore cause undesirable conflicts with developers. It is the latter claim that continues to reappear in comments from administrators and elected officials six years later.

At the same time, this Neighborhood Planner was put in charge of staffing the citizen Planning Area Advisory Board (PAAB) described above. Rather than providing support to this volunteer board, she was perceived by its members as controlling the group by changing its charter and appointing members to it from the business community, setting its agenda, refusing to entertain discussion about the group's charge to oversee the advancement of the neighborhoods' plan, and in various ways creating an unwelcoming and combative atmosphere for articulate members. These charges were made during public meetings of the PAAB, as well as in series of newspaper editorials.

After over two years of complaints from citizens about the unnecessary use of community volunteer time to develop a new plan, the Neighborhood Planner unveiled a draft for adoption as an amendment to the General Plan, which was firmly rejected by the community. It had little resemblance to the original neighborhood plans, and had a clear preference for redevelopment and intensification of land use in areas the community did not support. These areas also happened to coincide with the land holdings of the disgruntled developer mentioned. Simultaneously, the PAAB came under fire. The decomposition of this group was chronicled in minute detail by a local columnist with counter-arguments from its members, and the final altercation took the form of flyers being posted in the most contested neighborhood, calling the Neighborhood Planner an "urban terrorist." Following closely on the heels of the 9-11 terrorist

attacks, the entire project came under suspicion and was shut down by the Mayor, followed quickly by the elimination of the Neighborhood Planner position and the individual's reassignment to another department and position that did not involve much citizen contact. A Mayor-appointed Neighborhood Advisory Commission was formed to meet the rhetorical need for policy input from neighborhoods, without making them geographically representative, and without empowering members with decision making or specific project recommendation authority.

Entrepreneurs Choose the Wrong Type of Expertise

In response to the legitimacy crisis in public administration, those promoting the Discretionary tradition place a great deal of focus on the role of public servant as a position of societal respect. Stivers (1990b) links this to the cultural notion of heroes, juxtaposing male notions of warriors to female ideals of consciousness transforming icons. In public administration theory, we find images of the entrepreneur, the advocate, and the decision-maker who achieve legitimacy by virtue of their individual skill or wisdom. This notion of professional expertise is widely accepted in our society. "On this fundamental point the economic and normative bases of public administration agree. In the figure of The Practitioner, public administration, and through it, government generally, has sought to reduce the question of truth to the specifications of scientific exactitude or moral certitude" (Catlaw, 2006b, p. 202). In fact, Stever suggests that for the profession to continue, "Public administration must appear to both elected officials and the public as a crucial function to the maintenance of society. Furthermore, the civil servant must acquire a certain mystique in the performance of these crucial functions" (1988, p. 171). Of course others shrug the problem off as unrealistic. For example, Waldo suggests he would worry about the notion of "mystique" if he thought there was the "slightest chance" of administrators actually acquiring it (1988, p. 932).

Despite much agreement on the value of empowered expertise, it is perhaps *within* the Discretionary tradition that critique is most fierce. In essence, the gender analysis of Bureau Men and Settlement Women offered by Stivers (1990b) represents this pattern of opposing worldviews within public administration. Even if it is difficult to challenge expertise *per se*, debate over its *form* reveals what many feel are important theoretical differences. When expertise alone is the standard bearer of legitimacy, and it is released from strong political oversight by either representatives or citizens collectively, the debate between the technical approach and normative approach to administrative legitimacy becomes quite forceful. Therefore, the dualisms of fact versus value, technique versus virtue, or science versus norm become more extreme and irresolvable. As noted by MacIntyre, “liberalism, which began as an appeal to alleged principles of shared rationality against what was felt to be the tyranny of tradition, has itself been transformed into a tradition whose communities are partly defined by the interminability of the debate over such principles” (1988, p. 335).

Similar to critiques of bureaucracy as conceived by the Constitutional tradition, many critiques of the Discretionary tradition come from those who dislike the notion of science and technique ruling governance, fearing the undemocratic implications of extreme technicism (Waldo, 1955, 1984). While concern over technicism exists in all traditions of public administration, the manner in which it is “controlled” varies. Here, the problem of technicism is exacerbated because political oversight of technical expertise as its countervailing control is not considered necessary. Furthermore, citizens provide a source of control simply as clients or customers, rather than equal partners in self-governance. In other words, having input only to outcomes achieves is a truncated form of active citizenship.

Some scholars favor giving technical expertise to administrators, while subordinating it to the normative expertise of political statesmen, as shown in the Constitutional tradition. In this approach, democratic values trump technical values by virtue of political control, as described in

the section above. Lynn (2001) convincingly argues that in actuality, the bureaucratic tradition better addresses legitimacy within our system of governance than either managerial or direct citizen participation formulations. He believes that it is the only tradition that duly addresses the concerns of Constitutional values, law, and the republican political system. Perhaps because of the unquestionable legitimacy of this political order, many of the scholars who are for the most part aligned with the Discretionary tradition within its “legitimacy through professional virtue” are the most ambivalent about their position. Even the oft-cited “founding” proponent of administrative discretion also insists on the importance of obeying all laws, policies, and directions from superiors in the constitutional hierarchy (Friedrich, 1940). These discretionists are haunted by the paradox of responsibility in which claiming agency denies the traditional Constitutional rationale for political legitimacy (Harmon, 1995). Their concerns are founded in theoretically accurate assertions that elitism of administrative authority replaces the democratic process (O. F. White, 1990b). As Appleby feared, professionals are on *top* instead of on *tap* (Mosher, 1968; Stillman, 1991).

Some scholars are not concerned about administrative discretion, so long as normative criteria supersede technical expertise. The virtue-oriented discretionists are concerned that, “In the freewheeling entrepreneurial spirit of governance, there is little emphasis on responsibility and accountability, both of which are fundamental concepts in representative government” (Frederickson, 1997, p. 88). Yet, they are not similarly concerned about a value-based discretion. If democratic values trump simple measures of efficiency or effectiveness, discretionary administrative action is deemed legitimate. Their response to administrators like the Neighborhood Planner described above would be that this individual had adopted inappropriate professional ethics. Indeed, this is the common commentary among administrators in the case study. However, they fail to imagine that perhaps an administrator should not have been given

that level of discretion in the first place. If anything, they suggest that the community should never have been given such substantive input into the planning and development review process.

The efficiency perspective is highly critical of the “softness” of normative performance criteria that are difficult to quantify. When ethics and equity are used, it is difficult to prove legitimate performance in a manner that is clear to all concerned. Even “worse,” the results-oriented approach to equity whereby political coercion is used to prevent unjust distributions of burdens and benefits leans toward a socialist governance structure (W. W. Willoughby, 1930). This is unacceptable under the tenets of liberalism in both its Constitutional and Discretionary manifestations. Perhaps in part for this reason, the technical Discretionary approach is more commonly used in actual practice, and promoted by popular theories of managerialism, reinvention, and New Public Management.

The reliance on technical expertise to justify administrative discretion is evident in the case vignette above describing traffic engineers. There are many reasons cited for the reliance on technique, science, and facts rather than virtue, norms, and values. For example, in a litigious society as ours, fears of liability are well founded. Facts are used in courts of law to determine responsibility. Also, to avoid political disfavor, it is easier to point to “the facts” as responsible for a decision, rather than personal judgment. Even recent updates to Tempe’s neighborhood traffic management program that was inspired by the Fifth Street issue described above, engineering warrants, specified public processes, and majority vote from immediately affected neighbors are used to avoid discretionary judgment on the part of individual administrators.

Yet ambivalence about discretion can be found within the technical camp as well. Early theorists of public administration believed that democracy could safely adopt the administrative methods of autocracy to become more efficient and effective (L. D. White, 1926; W. Wilson, 1887). Kept within the context of bureaucratic control within the political-administrative systems of government, this may have been an accurate assumption. However, this assumption has held,

even when taking administration in large part out of that system of control. Therefore, some who have fully explored the logic of legitimacy through efficiency turn back to reliance on the politics/administration dichotomy as a safeguard. For example, Osborne & Gaebler insist that they “believe deeply in government” and “believe deeply in equity—in equal opportunity for all Americans” (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992, pp. xviii-xix). However, it should be noted that they also claim political ideologies are not relevant to the administrative problems faced by government.

From the lens of democratic legitimacy, there are several fundamental problems with these dualistic debates between technical and normative expertise: (1) they fail to see that they share a logic of legitimacy through administrative discretion; (2) they fail to see that there are two distinct approaches to democratic legitimacy (representative and direct); and (3) as a result definitions of professionalism and prescriptions for discretionary practice conflate competing logics. For example, it is an error in logic to assume that entrepreneurial, autonomous decision makers measure success only in terms of self-interest, as do Denhardt & deLeon (2000). It is clearly possible for autonomous decision makers to measure success in terms of the public interest. It is also possible for virtuous administrators to use inappropriate ethical values in a given situation. Technique does not necessitate self-interest any more than virtue guarantees the public interest. Both ends are possible when using outcomes as a measure of performance.

The logic of the Constitutional tradition challenges both positions based on the problem of political authority without addressing the differences between the two, as noted in the discussions above. For example, McSwite (1997) sees the key opposition within public administration not of scientific elite versus political elite, but rather as an opposition between an elite of either type of leadership versus collaborative action. Accordingly, the Collaborative tradition challenges the Discretionary logic on two counts: (1) institutions based on an assumed need to control self-interest only serve to perpetuate it; and (2) domination of expert opinion over citizen opinion is undemocratic. In fact, when it comes to the active citizens in the case study

itself, the debate between the technical and normative camps of public administration theory are virtually meaningless. From both Constitutional and Collaborative logics, strong politicians and citizens really do not care if administrators present themselves as being in control because they are more technically proficient or more virtuous and wise. Either type of attitude is rejected and deemed illegitimate when the other actors feel they are the legitimate holders of political authority. As shown in the vignette above about development adjacent to the Tempe Performing Arts Center, the Mayor rejected staff expertise regarding planning and procurement process, while the citizens rejected the staff's support of a specific developer based on their experience and understanding of what is "best" for the community.

Critiques of the Collaborative Tradition

The Collaborative tradition's proponents believe the crux of governance problems is the fact that the political system has erroneously attempted to organize people expecting self-government under a legal structure based on an assumed authoritative relationship of state over subject. To rediscover "substantive democracy," both the republican and prevailing pluralist views must be transcended or replaced with a collaborative model of public practice (Box et al., 2001). The Collaborative tradition trusts neither politicians nor administrators to produce the Good, because no one group of citizens or sector of social activity can be given authority to act on another's behalf. Yet, given a truly egalitarian and democratic governance context, it trusts all mature individuals to produce the Good together. If there is to be a special role for those called "public administrators," it is to be a purely facilitative function that empowers all to participate with full agency. In fact from this perspective, failure to achieve legitimacy stems from failing to educate and empower citizens in self-governance, or from oppression and exclusion based on a specific normative position.

As has been noted, "Empowerment is a positive idea, and permitting individuals and governments to control more of the things that matter to them cannot be easily denigrated as an

abstract idea about democracy” (Peters & Pierre, 2000, p. 25). Yet, the Collaborative perspective flies in the face of both Constitutional and Discretionary approaches to legitimacy. In the case of the former, it replaces representative standards of democratic legitimacy with direct democratic standards, disempowering the “rightful” holders of political authority in the republic as designed—the elected representatives. Some suggest that direct democracy is a Constitutional ideal (McSwite, 2007; Stever, 1988). Others suggest that it is undemocratic or unresponsive not collaborate directly with citizens (R. B. Denhardt & deLeon, 2000). However, this view may require a re-interpretation of the doctrine of equality to mean actual participation rather than opportunity to participate, drawing in the thinking of the Anti-Federalists that was in large part left out of the Constitution itself. “Since neither the word *democracy* nor the word *administration* appears in the Constitution... one must, first of all, admit that the Constitutional Fathers did not intend to establish a democracy in their understanding of the terms and did not give much attention to administration” (Waldo, 1980, p. 54). Therefore, more scholars appear to agree that direct democracy is *not* the formal political order of governance in the United States. For example, Lowi (1979) and Lynn (2001) are quick to point out that proponents of the Collaborative tradition’s approach to direct democracy ignore the role of political and judicial institutions. In the case of Discretionary approaches, collaboration replaces professional standards of performance with potentially irrational and immoral citizens, disempowering the “rightful” holders of political authority—the expert administrators.

Collaboration Is Inefficient and Ineffective

A simplistic but common complaint about any type of participative or discursive practice is that it is too time consuming and lengthy (Bobrow & Dryzek, 1987; Fainstein, 2003). This critique is somewhat comical, given the fact that in the case study, *both* community-based plans were: developed through collaborative processes; approved with only *one* dissenting comment from a community member; presented to pertinent departments and citizen review bodies; and

accepted by the City Council as guiding documents *within a period of three years*. Yet, the processes designed and conducted by professional staff according to legislative directives have not yet produced one plan in a span of *seven years*. In practice, it is often found that participative practices are “cost-effective through *cost avoidance*” (Thayer, 1981, p. 39). In other words, greater up-front investment in participative decision making heads off the need for future adjustments made necessary by unforeseen or unintended consequences. As noted by Follett (1998), true synthesis is infinitely more stable than compromise or aggregated majority rules. However, even it is inefficient it may be the most effective choice for contemporary governance. “Expensive and time-consuming as it is, building synergistic and collaborative frameworks will become essential. The problems that confront us are too complex and diversified for one man or one discipline” (Bennis, 1967, p. 16).

Furthermore, it is important to remember that government institutions were designed specifically to *slow* the process of expanding government’s authority—the system of checks and balances and due process is designed to produce decisions made deliberately, not quickly (Flyvbjerg, 1998; Kraft & Furlong, 2004). In our political value system, deliberation is considered a vital part of a just society. The difference in the Collaborative ideal is the matter of who is authorized to deliberate—affected citizens themselves rather than political or administrative representatives. The whole project of democracy is inherently uncertain, so we must rebuild trust by reconfiguring our institutions to facilitate a different type of relational process among citizens and public servants, both elected and appointed. As Harmon suggests, “governing responsibly requires strengthening the social fabric of government institutions so that, together, public servants and citizens might struggle honestly with the moral uncertainty that inevitably attends government’s work” (1995, p. 11).

Self-Governance Is Not Feasible

The most fundamental critique of the Collaborative tradition is that self-governance is not feasible. Reasons include a self-interested and competitive human nature, the fact that we have not been socialized and trained for success in its attempt, and its impossibility within the existing political economy. For example, nascent attempts at implementation are criticized for not producing agreement where there is deep structural conflict and difference (Fainstein, 2003). Based on one study, collaborative approaches are unlikely to work when: (1) there are deep differences of values and world views; (2) the majority of participants do not trust that the process will be fair; and (3) some participants are focused on substantive issues while others are focused only on symbolic significance (Pollitt, 1999).

Such scenarios clearly reveal long-term patterns of domination and the negative implications of *technical* and *strategic rationality*. Our society simply is not socialized toward participation, and associational activity levels vary greatly. Inequalities of information, education, and socialization converge to hinder political involvement. However some firmly believe “people participate if taught to believe it matters, if helped to acquire verbal and other skills of citizenship, if indoctrinated with aspirations and expectations that stimulate rather than paralyze, and if taught to see themselves as members of the political community” (Lindblom & Woodhouse, 1993, p. 109). In fact, this has been an outcome of required citizen participation programs in the past (Marston, 1993). Therefore, critiques contending that Americans or human beings in general are not ready for self-governance are countered with a challenge to government to lead the way in getting them ready. This has been described in the Collaborative tradition as the educative and emancipative role of public administration.

More practically, claims of infeasibility are linked to the problem of scale. The Collaborative tradition claims that direct democracy is possible through a deeply nested form of federalism (Follett, 1998; Thayer, 1981). De Tocqueville claimed that where self-interest was

rightly understood, voluntary associations could expand out through federalism to a true self-governance at the national level (de Tocqueville, 2000). Weber (1954) critiques such notions of “democratic administration,” which is characterized by: (1) an egalitarian assumption that everyone is qualified to participate in public affairs; (2) the scope of power of command is minimized; and (3) all important decisions are made by common resolution in assemblies or collegial bodies of representatives. The problem he sees with democratic administration is that it is limited to small groups.

Similarly, *On Democracy* (Dahl, 1998) provides a succinct and eloquent discussion of the inherent tensions between political equality versus guardianship, democracy by assembly versus representation, democracy versus republic, and market economies versus democracy. Dahl goes into some detail on the institutions that produce democracy at various jurisdictional levels, in addition to the societal conditions that either foster or hinder its success. While greatly appreciative of the ideal of direct democracy, he believes that it represents an infeasible approach to governing a large and complex society. What he refers to as “assembly democracy” is only feasible at very small units of analysis where all affected stakeholders could actually participate in deliberation. However, his concerns about feasibility extend beyond scale to the problem of how to “maintain a satisfactory degree of political equality, and yet rely on experts and expert knowledge in making public decisions...” (Dahl, 1998, p. 79). Therefore, even if direct democracy became possible through technology, for example, the concern that policy would be made irrational remains.

Referring back to the case study vignettes about the Northwest Tempe Neighborhoods Strategic Plan, it is clear that at least one administrator, the Neighborhood Planner, believed the community had produced an irrational plan. Her principal rationale for this claim was that the plan conflicted with market wishes, and would therefore stymie development efforts in the area. Because redevelopment and infill development are primary goals for many political leaders and

administrative professionals, this depiction was adopted and held through a seven-year battle that has been at times highly political, controversial, and bitter for all involved. However, this claim competes with the rationality of prior planners who had been integrally involved in the collaborative planning process. In their view, the resulting plan represented a feasible vision and prescription for targeted redevelopment and overall neighborhood revitalization and preservation. Many of these administrators were among the voluntary early retirees who supported a higher level of public control over private development.

The case study does not really offer an example where the problem of scale is evident. Because it is a local government and one that tends to use participative practices quite broadly, on most issues, the opportunity has existed for at least some expression of the deeply nested federalism idealized by the Collaborative tradition. Indeed, Tempe is currently exploring implementation of Village Planning Committees that would further devolve at least land use planning decisions to smaller units of organizations. However, this federalist concept breaks down significantly in the face of inter-jurisdictional issues in which the process is not dictated by Tempe alone. For example, there has been a long-standing dilemma of air transportation service and expansion into the principal airport serving the Phoenix metropolitan area: Sky Harbor International. Located in Phoenix on its border with Tempe, flight patterns over neighborhoods and important tourist and recreation destinations cause a great deal of inter-jurisdictional conflict. Phoenix is loathe to curtail expansion due to the vast economic engine the airport represents. This dilemma, however, does not support the logic that the Collaborative ideal of federalism with delegate forms of representation could not work. Instead, it shows that in the current federalist structure, there are no institutional means to ensure its implementation.

Collaboration Fails to Achieve Its Ideal Theoretically and Empirically

A very strong argument can be made that most descriptions of the Collaborative ideal are tainted by a fundamentally similar problem as all other theories of the state. For example, in

suggesting the replacement of assumptions of self-interest with other-regarding self-interest, it merely replaces one pre-determined value set for another. In seeking to transform institutions of governance that channel human relationship in a manner thought to have negative implications, it does not really eliminate the institutions themselves. At best, it might only be characterized as a humanistic form of anarchism. In short, in pursuing *democracy* at all, the Collaborative tradition enforces regime values in the same manner as representative democracy—it assumes the values of equality, liberty, and fraternity, while giving alternative meanings to those values and allowing time and place specific interpretation of how to achieve them. In so doing, an elite position is assumed by anyone who claims the right to determine what those values are, and what they mean fundamentally. For example, who is authorized to say liberty is a positive notion of freedom to participate rather than its opposite of freedom from constraint? This problem is further confounded by the notion that maturation or skill are required to fully participate in the democratic process, or worse yet, to play a facilitative, educative, or emancipative role. This perpetuates the problem of determining who is authorized to judge such capability.

Perhaps because of this problem, those who promote incorporating elements of direct democracy into the representative system admit the difficulty of the proposition. Waldo pointed out: “One enlightened chief administrator with adequate power is all that is necessary, and much easier to secure than hundreds of enlightened legislators or millions of enlightened citizens. The theory of benevolent despotism is often rationalistic and utopian” (1984, p. 35). Therefore, many scholars equivocate on their advancement of direct democracy. For example, Frederickson limits his citizenship approach to the public: “Its strength derives from its potential for an enhanced and ennobled public motivated by a shared concern for the common good. Its weakness is in its failure to recognize the complexity of public issues, the critical need for expertise and leadership, and the problems of motivating the public to participate” (1997, p. 43). Even Fox & Miller’s discourse theory contradicts the egalitarian logic of the Collaborative tradition by claiming an

elitist purpose that “a public sphere, constituted by a deliberately informed public opinion, might be recaptured by the literate, the interested, the informed, and the engaged, augmented mightily by the mass of those now peopling public sector organizations” (1995, p. 74). Therefore, the warrants of the “ideal speech situation” can best function as criteria that provide an analytically useful framework through which to assess transitional action in pursuit of the ideal itself (Forester, 1985b; Kemp, 1985).

Similarly, the Evergreen Manifesto, a quite radical statement of political ontology in many ways asserts: “The virtuous public administration is guided in governance (in the exercise of discretion) by regime values—individual liberty, private property, and procedural equality” (Adams et al., 1990, p. 231). “The role of the virtuous public administrator is not merely to manage the public’s business but to interpret the public interest in particular situations acting for and responsible to the people” (Adams et al., 1990, p. 232). Later, Stivers (2000a) suggests that we might be better off reviving turn of the last century social worker Robert Archey Woods’ vision of a public service profession that would combine statesmanship with professional administration to train citizens to trust the expert and the changes they recommend.

Perhaps because of these types of equivocations and compromises, some theoretical critique of the Collaborative tradition may not actually be directed so much at the *ideal type* presented herein as toward the manner in which it is typically presented by public administration scholars. As noted in the critique of representation, all forms of governance that place political authority in the hands of representatives, be they elected officials, appointed administrators, or ideas, they ultimately share a political ontology that is less than democratic. Catlaw (2003, in press) argues that all attempts to resolve the legitimacy question in public administration are theories of sovereignty. He finds three approaches to sovereignty, all of which ultimately answer to a notion of “The People” that is meaningless due to the impossibility of representation. In the first, politicians and their mandates represent The People, directing the actions of administration.

Therefore, citizens interact with politicians. In the second, all forms of rationality represent The People through the actions of a unified political-administrative state. Therefore, citizens interact with both politicians and administrators. In the third, The People are represented by a rationality that is held in dialectical tension with that which it excludes. Whoever shares the included rationality of The People retains authority. Thus, while the idea of answerability to The People remains, the location of representation is unclear. Catlaw (2003, in press) contends that until the notion of representational sovereignty is successfully challenged or transcended, democracy is in grave danger. Indeed, the accepted political ontology must be displaced, eliminating all attempts at representation because all such attempts will fail to achieve legitimacy. Furthermore, representation impedes the act of collaboration which is desired.

If the Collaborative ideal fails to achieve its goals theoretically, it is even more limited in implementation due to the liberal context in which it must operate. Not only is collaboration difficult within a context of representative governance and discretionary administration, it defies the economic order as well. Indeed, like critical theory more generally, the emancipatory goals of the Collaborative tradition are revolutionary and difficult to achieve (Bernstein, 1976).

The limitations have been duly noted in examples such as the Northwest Tempe Neighborhoods planning process and the Fifth Street Pedestrian and Traffic Calming Redesign Project. Judging from the case study, there is a high level of risk that the existing political system will undermine attempts to implement the Collaborative approach to public administration. As noted in the illustrative vignette about the Northwest Tempe Neighborhoods' community plan, when the results of collaborative action counter the preferences of the powerful, they are easily discredited by experts on the basis of more "acceptable" approaches. Furthermore, elected officials can dismiss them simply by saying, "These results are not in the interest of the community as a whole." An even easier approach is to simply delay decisions or actions until resistance is quelled. In the case study, this is precisely what transpired over the course of seven

years in Northwest Tempe. The first draft of the community-based plan that merged the two Council-accepted plans into one document was first presented to the community in December, 1999. Following this distribution, rather than review and feedback for revision, the Neighborhood Planner's repeat public process took about two years before delivering a new draft plan. During this time, all volunteers, staff, and Council decision makers were told to consider the community-based plans as "statements of preference" or "vision documents." While they had been accepted by the City Council, they would hold no legal weight until they were adopted as amendments to the General Plan.

Following community rejection of the Neighborhood Planner's new plan, many months of delay eventually led to the hiring of a consultant who facilitated public meetings to determine what exactly was wrong with the new plan. When his efforts failed to achieve community agreement to the new plan, another series of months went by, until advocacy within the Tempe Neighborhood Advisory Commission, along with changes in elected and appointed leadership, led to the agreement to hire yet *another* consultant to finish the job. After about a year for drafting a Request for Proposals and the subsequent selection and contracting process, the new consultant began a year-long process that produced a *third* draft plan, reportedly drawing from both the community-based plan and the Neighborhood Planner's draft. Initial community response noted the vast difference between the original community-based plan and this plan. Therefore, neighbors requested that the consultant explain and document the reasons for the differences and revise the draft according to their feedback. At that point, the consultant disappeared, and the process stalled for yet another year. Currently, newly hired City staff are reviewing the document and formulating their own version to be delivered to the public in March, 2007. The community reaction is anticipated to be similar to the reception given the prior draft presented by staff.

Because this illustration is by no means unique, many scholars critique the manner in which collaboration is attempted, but fails. An excellent example of how supposed democratic participation can be procedurally similar, but fail according to ethics is the empirically-derived theory of cooptation (Selznick, 1949). Cooptation is:

a process whereby either power or the burdens of power, or both, are shared. On the one hand, the actual center of authority and decision may be shifted or made more inclusive, with or without any public recognition of the change; on the other hand, public responsibility for and participation in the exercise of authority may be shared with new elements, with or without the actual redistribution of power itself. (Selznick, 1949, pp. 259-260)

In *formal* cooptation, what is shared is administrative responsibility, rather than actual decision making power. As Selznick points out, “a critical analysis cannot overlook that pattern which simply transforms an unorganized citizenry into a reliable instrument for the achievement of administrative goals, and calls it ‘democracy’” (1949, p. 220). These co-opted citizens are used to legitimate the authority of those officials who are actually making decisions, which is not democratic. *Informal* cooptation is a more covert response to political pressures from powerful individuals or interest groups within a community. It can also be used to quell resistance and to normalize outliers by bringing them into status quo groups. To represent a democratizing force, participation must be substantive and given agency, “involving an actual role in the determination of policy” (Selznick, 1949, p. 219).

This problem of cooptation is evident in the case study illustration of the Northwest Tempe planning processes. Over the course of many delays, some members of the community have been quieted through covert threats to their livelihood. They have been told by elected and appointed officials alike that if they hope to garner contracts with the City of Tempe as architects, landscape architects, and planners, they had better tone down their advocacy activities on behalf of the neighborhoods’ plan and its call for sustainable development. Furthermore, one neighborhood leader who opposes the Neighborhood Plan based on a combination of personality

conflicts and having been convinced that an unfettered path of redevelopment is the only future for Tempe has been allowed to wrest control of two neighborhood associations in the planning area without election or other due process for changing organizational charters. Being an active member of the Mayor's campaign and a participant in all manner of policy making activities based on his retired status, he is the point person for media depictions of the "neighborhood's view" on development activity, even though meetings are most typically attended by only three other residents. Thus, the once activist neighborhood association has been informally co-opted by the status quo. Similarly the grassroots community development corporation has been formally co-opted into partnerships with the municipal housing authority and has eliminated its once prevalent advocacy functions as a community mobilizer, organizer, and planner.

Collaboration Means the End of Public Administration

As noted in its explication in Chapter 6, the Collaborative ideal ultimately calls for the elimination of the representative state of any type. In the democratic ideal, a sector or profession cannot be empowered to govern those who must govern themselves. "It is a futile project to attempt to 'legitimize' the enterprise of public administration through reference to a domain of sovereignty, be it facts or People" (Catlaw, 2003, p. 230). As a result, many scholars fear the ending of public administration, both as an academic discipline and as a practice. So long as people continue to display unenlightened self-interest, letting go of control *completely* is a terrifying prospect. Therefore, just as those most aligned with the Discretionary tradition often draw from the legitimacy logic of the Constitutional tradition, those generally aligned with the Collaborative tradition draw from the logic of professionalism in the Discretionary tradition.

While there has been a rejection of any church running the government, never in the history of the United States has there been a rejection of an underlying commitment to a higher law or fundamental moral order (Waldo, 1984). Putting faith in representative democracy is merely another formulation of a predominantly Christian heritage. Replacing that faith with a

faith in science retains this same sense of duty to a higher law. The real challenge is to replace these ideas of external sources of authority altogether with the law of the situation, which includes all which is at effect, be they people or things. This does not eliminate a role for public administration, but rather transforms it. Indeed, the true harbingers of the Collaborative tradition suggest that public administration can become the forum for authentic democracy—if anything, a place where “tactical-support” can be found (Catlaw, 2003, p. 250).

In the case study, such sentiment is exemplified in the completion and successful adoption process of the *Tempe Involving People Manual (TIP Manual)*. This policy and procedures manual provides guidelines for public involvement in all decision making processes for private development, public capital improvement projects and services, and long-range planning. In fact, the involvement policies themselves have been developed in collaboration with a citizen commission and a working group composed of City staff, consultants, and citizens. The manual describes best practices for actualizing the goals of deliberative democracy, collaborative leadership, and sustainable citizen participation. Procedures have been crafted based on leading techniques of participatory decision making and process facilitation. Paired with an intended training program, the *Tempe Involving People Manual* will help municipal staff succeed in the new facilitative role that is being demanded of them, but for which they have been only modestly prepared in the past.

Summing Up

The case study at hand is an exemplar of the tradition’s three normative positions regarding legitimate political authority and their mutual critiques. Strong politicians like the current Mayor envision the Constitutional ideal, typically amending their thinking and actions only based on case-by-case necessity to garner support from either administrators or citizens. Strong administrators like the Redevelopment Director envision the Discretionary ideal, submitting to politicians only when their hand is forced, and then with as little substantive action

as feasible, or with the alternative response of leaving the agency. Strong citizens like the founders of NewTown CDC envision the Collaborative ideal, accepting only grudgingly the control of elected leaders or administrators who do not represent their shared interests, being willing to amend ideas only on an equal ground of deliberation. These competing attitudes are what gave rise to this inquiry itself.

These real-life conflicts are closely reflected in public administration theory via competing prescriptions for practice based on alternative understandings of legitimacy. As illustrated here, scholars point to the various failings of a tradition to achieve legitimacy based on a variety of critiques. As a solution they offer an alternative that is hoped to resolve the particular failures identified; one based on a different approach to legitimacy. In this way, the critiques themselves give rise to multiple theories of legitimacy. In some cases a critique of one tradition is shared by the two other positions, and in other cases a critique from one tradition is lodged against both of the other two. This is a result of shared characteristics that muddy the waters of ideal types. As an example of the former, both the Constitutional and Discretionary traditions deem the Collaborative approach incapable of producing legitimate results because of the irrationality, inefficiency, and general infeasibility. As an example of the latter, the Collaborative tradition charges both Constitutional and Discretionary approaches with an inability to achieve democratic legitimacy due to their shared representative approach.

Clearly, one cannot simply say, “in order to conduct public administration in a legitimate manner, one must...” and fill in the end with a prescription from only one tradition without compelling evidence that the other two are fundamentally flawed and therefore the proposed ideal is better. As it stands today, there are at least two other substantively different positions that will challenge this claim. Because of such pervasive disagreements about achieving legitimacy in governance, many public administration scholars prescribe methods for simultaneously addressing multiple perspectives. These prescriptions are the subject of the next critical analysis.

CHAPTER 8: INTEGRATIONS, CONCILIATIONS, AND DIALECTICAL SYNTHESSES

Chapter 8 presents the third portion of the Findings of this inquiry, considering how key scholars attempt to combine multiple traditions of legitimacy in one theory of public administration, and offering a new interpretation of traditions using the concept of dialectic. The first review ensures that important prescriptions for achieving legitimacy offered in the field thus far are considered prior to offering a new critique. For the most part, these are above and beyond those discussed in Chapter 7. By way of a reminder regarding the approach to inquiry, at this stage, the sentiments of authors are returned to their whole form in order to consider how individual scholars blend ideas from what have been described herein as mutually exclusive logics of legitimacy in prescriptions for practice. Therefore, rather than taking a specific quote as illustrative of a concept, the overall message of a given work is considered.

To propose something new to the field, the possibility that the ideal types represent either a developmental path or dialectical synthesis is explored. A dialectical critique of logical sets of ideas can serve to highlight true paradoxes, rather than characteristics of irony, ambiguity, or conflict (Harmon, 1995). However, a dialectical analysis of *three* such logical sets enables understanding of the whole as a pattern of dialectical synthesis. Therefore, the possibility of dialectical relationship is considered both *within* the traditions as well as *among* traditions.

Together, these analyses answer the following research questions of this inquiry:

How have ideal type role conceptualizations been integrated or conciliated by key theorists of the field to date?

How do the ideal types and their elements relate to one another in terms of dialectical synthesis?

In addition to discussion in Chapter 7, the answers to these questions enable conclusions to be drawn in Chapter 9 about the logical fit of role conceptualizations to the contemporary governance context. That discussion will be the final critical analysis of the inquiry, offering

possible reasons why the ideal type traditions and various combinations of their elements may fail to achieve legitimacy at a conceptual level.

Key Integrations or Conciliations of Traditions

As noted throughout the inquiry, rarely does a given scholar advocate for a tradition of public administration in its ideal type form. A notable exception would be Theodore Lowi's firm defense of the Constitutional tradition throughout his writings. Similarly, Lawrence Lynn offers a quite steadfast defense of public management in the Constitutional formulation. But these cases are rare. The vast majority of scholarly discussion of public administration theory will draw elemental characteristics from two or more traditions in their ideal type formulation as presented here.

It has been suggested that there is a "trinitarian cul-de-sac" of public administration theory in which the end state of the politics/administration relationship places democracy at risk through: (1) over-empowerment of political micromanagement; (2) over-empowerment of administrative discretion; or (3) disempowerment of both politics and administration altogether (Golembiewski, 1996). These conditions can be loosely aligned with the logical ends of the three traditions of legitimacy in public administration. Certainly, a pure theory of legitimacy via the political system could lead to political micromanagement of the administration, as noted in the case illustrations in Chapter 7. An over-empowerment of administrative discretion can lead to similarly undesirable ends, as in the actions of the Redevelopment Director or Neighborhood Planner described in Chapter 7. The logical end of collaboration is resisted by both politicians and administrators alike, as depicted in the Northwest Tempe Neighborhoods planning vignette. As noted in the case illustrations, members of the Northwest Tempe Neighborhoods seem clearly in favor of transferring significant power from politicians and administrators to the citizens concerned, yet those parties representing the Growth Machine are clearly opposed. This is perhaps most frightening to the economic interests that wish to maintain political power in the

hands of either politics or administration where it is more controllable. Because each of these three extremes are unacceptable to at least one group of actors in the governance process (administrators, politicians, citizens, and economic interests), a blend seeking a compromise among them is typically recommended.

It has been suggested that there may be conditions under which differences between rival and apparently incompatible traditions may be resolved (MacIntyre, 1988). In fact, much of the theoretical debate within public administration is related to whether or not any one of these traditions should be primary, or whether two or more can be integrated into some unified, comprehensive theory of public administration in order to improve social outcomes. Most scholarly conversation is held around the middle perspective, as very few theorists take either a “purist” stance on the one hand, or are willing to risk a radical position on the other. In many cases, an integration or blend represents an attempt to reform the Constitutional order without actually bringing it into question or calling for a revolutionary transformation. In other cases, blending is an attempt to accommodate what is observed in empirical reality—neither people nor organizations tend to display pure ideal types of any kind. Rosenbloom (2000b) suggests Lynn’s arguments demonstrate that the “orthodoxy” was actually a “heterodoxy” in which multiple principles coexisted in a complexity that cannot be reduced to a mere caricature that obscures important information. In still other theories, conciliation is attempted among traditions in order to allow dialectical tensions to persist, claiming that awareness of their problematical or paradoxical characteristics is the best that can be hoped. To accommodate the necessary brevity of this inquiry, a small selection of each type has been drawn from the literature to illustrate these various approaches.

Integrationist Approaches

Integrationist approaches attempt to combine or blend logics into one role conceptualization. Appleby attempts to integrate the “best” of all three traditions in his “pattern of

administrative responsibility” which is meant “to nurture moral values peculiar to, and unfolded by, political democracy” (Appleby, 1952, p. 218). This pattern exists within social, political, and Constitutional structure and procedures. Of concern are: (1) popular control; (2) humane practice; (3) pluralist tolerance; and (4) responsible and unifying leadership. To ensure all of these elements, the pattern of responsibility must begin with the moral performance of individual administrators in those tasks delegated to them (Discretionary). Loyalty must be given upward in a hierarchy which ultimately ends with the popular level of citizens (Constitutional). However, responsibility downward demands that multiple points of view are considered in decision making. Furthermore, responsibility must be directed outward to the citizens who exist outside of the organizational hierarchy itself, particularly those publics who are most affected by the decisions or activities at hand (Collaborative). Administrators must also be responsible to the authority vested in laws as well as hierarchical oversight. In the end, democratic public administration is “a process in which facilities of appeal and levels of review are more numerous, various, and open than in any other action-laden process yet devised” (Appleby, 1952, p. 251).

Ostrom’s response to the intellectual crisis in public administration is another example of an attempted integration of all three traditions (Ostrom, 1989). His ideas are clearly Constitutional in that he is a federalist and a constitutionalist who believes that administration should be fully answerable to the democratic representative political process. However, his linkage of Discretionary methods of public choice, economic, and institutional theory along with a service attitude for administration to a somewhat Collaborative associational view of politics is a *very* diverse mix. Even Simon, who is typically held up as the exemplar of Entrepreneurial legitimacy through efficiency and technical rationality vacillates continuously with references to political oversight, organizational control, and purely value-based premises for decision (Simon, 1976).

One scholar makes an ambitious attempt to reconcile the bureaucratic and democratic ethos through the “universalizability of ethical rules” from both utilitarian and deontological theory (Woller, 1998). Woller assigns the label “democratic” to the deontological ethic and “bureaucratic” to the utilitarian ethic, following the common approach to the normative/technical dualism in public administration theory.^v The two ethos exist in a tension in which trade-offs between outcomes and principle are always being negotiated. In theory, however, they must both be reduced to their fundamental characteristics in order to show how they can be reconciled. Deontological systems of rules seek to achieve the universalizability of principles. A rather obscure variant of utilitarianism suggests that the rules can guide or constrain the outcomes of the rational decision making process as shortcuts based on previous experience. This creates the possibility for common ground: “Certain universalizable rules exist that are not subject to situation-specific considerations of relative merit. Ethical behavior, therefore, requires adherence to these rules” (Woller, 1998, p. 97). Thus, the integrated ethos combines the following rules: (1) core democratic values formulate principles which are not subject to utilitarian calculations and limit administrative action; (2) outcomes must be taken into account while adhering to the principles; (3) respect must be given to cultural heritage as reflected in laws, rules, and norms; (4) right must be determined according to the public, rather than case interests; and (5) certain actions are not held to utilitarian rules at all. This is essentially the same compromise many principally Discretionary and Collaborative theories make to “adjust” their ideal typical legitimacy logic to fit into the existing Constitutional structure by referring to democratic principles or assuming their existence in the political sphere of action.

For example, Frederickson is a self-described proponent of administrative discretion who cannot resist equivocating on the point of legitimacy. “At the risk of employing a somewhat sanitized version of the policy-administration dichotomy, public administration is best served when it emphasizes implementation, management, and the day-to-day operations of public

institutions. When circumstances require that we engage in policymaking, we should be a part of governing. But when we do, we must acknowledge that we risk moving past the legitimate scope of our work” (Frederickson, 1997, pp. 227-228). It is this type of ambivalence that often leads discretionists to seek certainty in achieving democratic legitimacy. For Frederickson, this can be achieved by limiting discretion to purely administrative matters of efficiency and economy, with the exception of political decisions and actions for the sole purpose of improving social equity. These three values are chosen because they are relatively settled values of our political regime and are quantifiable and measurable. They can therefore be used to ensure legitimacy without overstepping political authority.

Wamsley’s solution is that the public administrator’s role must be at once: “subordinate, autonomous, agential, responsive, and responsible” (1990a, p. 118). “Principals must see agents as trustworthy, as wise counselors, as experts in pursuing the principal’s ends, and above all as loyally dedicated to their (the principals’) interests” (Wamsley, 1990a, p. 132). Thus, agents can be at once autonomous experts, subordinate to the regime, and answerable to the citizenry as principals. Thus, he wants to blend aspects of the Constitutional, Discretionary, and Collaborative traditions.

Rohr adds to this Discretionary/Collaborative blend the notion that administrators also fulfill a representative function in that the administration functions in a manner similar to that originally intended for the Senate as a more “representative” body. That is, the Senate was “intended to be a part of an executive establishment and not simply a second house of a national legislature” (Rohr, 1990, p. 59). In this addition, he attempts to bridge the legitimacy logics of Discretionary and Constitutional traditions by achieving legitimacy through a reinterpretation of the political system as well as direct administrative interpretation of regime values.

In fact, many of the proponents of the New Public Administration recommend a blend of virtuous administrative discretion and citizen engagement. In their critiques of the technical

approach to legitimate administrative discretion, most scholars in the normative camp produce a blend of virtuous discretion paired with collaborative principals. Denhardt & deLeon (2000) suggest that virtuous administrators collaborating with the citizenry are quite certain to achieve the public interest. In essence, it would seem that an alliance between administrators and citizens is hoped to solve the problems of the political process by in large part bypassing it. In what might be called the “doctrine” of the New Public Service, a combination of political and organizational theory is firmly rooted in phenomenological epistemology as a theory of social change (J. V. Denhardt & Denhardt, 2003). In a response to the principles of “reinvention” held by proponents of the New Public Management, seven principles are offered to guide public administration in a more fully democratic manner. As a method to counteract the undemocratic consequences of the Discretionary approach to governance, these principles represent “a fundamental reordering of values” (J. V. Denhardt & Denhardt, 2003, p. 172).

With minor adjustments to terminology and paraphrasing, the New Public Service values people, not just productivity in a collaborative and humanistic manner. It serves citizens, not customers based on relationships of trust and collaboration. It serves rather than steers in the manner described in shared leadership theory. It seeks the public interest in the form of shared values discovered through public discourse. Its thought process is deliberative and collaborative (rather than strategic and democratic). It values citizenship over entrepreneurship as a role conceptualization. It recognizes that accountability must include law, professional standards, efficiency, community values, political norms, and citizen interests. Other than the last principle which incorporates the logics of the Constitutional and Discretionary traditions, these principles fairly encapsulate the ideas of the Collaborative tradition as presented here. By accommodating approached to accountability from the other two traditions, it offers a viable model for transition, or what has been called the “citizen-ing” of governance (Farmer, 2005b, p. 191).

More closely blending all three role conceptualizations presented in this inquiry, Box (1999) recommends practitioners fulfill all three roles discussed *simultaneously*: the traditional bureaucratic role, the expert advisor, and the citizen discourse facilitator. He suggests, “the open question is how this is to be done in a society that expects nonelected public servants to maintain a position clearly subordinate to elected officials and citizens. This question involves issues of legitimacy and leadership” (Box, 1999, p. 40). As others argue, “legitimacy resides in people’s beliefs that their leaders are competent (experts), are personally compelling and dynamic (entrepreneurial), and are stewards (trustworthy)” (Mitchell & Scott, 1987, p. 450). Based on this line of thinking, it has been suggested that as a functional class of people, public administrators claim legitimacy based on being more expert, more visionary, and more trustworthy than other citizens. It follows that if administrators would just perform and balance these qualities better, attitudes toward government would improve.

Svara and his colleagues identify *four* administrator role models found in public administration theory and empirical studies of the politics-administration relationship (Mouritzen & Svara, 2002; Svara, 2006a, 2006b; Svara & Brunet, 2003). These types are the Isolated or Separate Administrator, the Responsive Administrator, the Autonomous Administrator, and the Interactive Administrator. Each type holds risks for legitimacy if implemented in extreme, and the Isolated or Separate Administrator is noted as a “straw man” [*sic*] bureaucratic ideal type that is not found empirically (Svara, 2006b). All of these role conceptualizations consider forms of legitimacy based on either political or administrative authority. They do not consider how citizens fit into the picture, or the possibility of a third source of legitimacy that does not flow through the state.

Svara’s recommendations for practice blend complementary roles for politicians and administrators, combining the Interactive and Responsive Administrator models, with just a few characteristics of the Autonomous Administrator role in the form of professional independence

and adherence to internal standards. The politics/administration relationship is thus characterized by: distinct functional roles and values; reciprocal influence and respect; political control in the democratic process; adherence to the law; and responsibility to the public interest and the citizenry (Svara, 2006b). This mix has been found to be present in empirical study of top Danish public executives (Kettl et al., 2004). Other than the brief mention of responsibility to the citizenry, the noted characteristics reflect a combination of Constitutional and Discretionary ideals. Similarly, based on decades of observation and research in local government, Svara (2006a) claims the core values of administration are: professionalism (which includes independence, expertise, and ethics); commitment to the public interest, and accountability to elected officials and the public. This indicates a blend of legitimacy logics from the Constitutional and Discretionary traditions of public administration.

Conciliatory Approaches

Conciliation is a notion that allows fundamentally different ideas to be reconciled or at least brought into a state of agreeing to disagree without negative outcomes. Rather than being integrated, they coexist in a separate but related manner. This has been described in the case of the forms of rationality promoted in varying traditions of public administration. Snellen (2002) offers a conciliation of four core decision making approaches: (1) legal-procedural; (2) political; (3) economic; and (4) scientific. These four approaches correspond to four institutionalized aspects of life: legal, political, economic, and professional. He argues that because of the various limitations of each in the contemporary context, a multi-rational approach to public administration is best, creating “a more balanced role” (2002, p. 339). This role for public administrators necessitates familiarity with multiple forms of rationality, an ability to think critically about the tensions between them, and the capacity to use each of them effectively. Thus, conciliation is a sort of mutually respectful condition.

Following this perspective, three competing traditions of public administration have been present since the field's inception, each jockeying for position through ongoing adjustments. In fact, a close reading of Wilson's famous essay shows that he promotes ideas representative of all three perspectives—he is a genuine founder in this sense. But even if the three traditions are considered in chronological development, new formulations do not *overcome* prior views, but rather complement and compete with them (Mosher, 1968). This notion of complementarity and competition show conciliation to be a positive state of dialectical tension in which neither side of a dualism is allowed to dominate the other (Carr & Zanetti, 1999).

From this perspective, dualisms of mostly opposing elements work together through some shared principle. Think of the Taoist symbol wherein yin and yang form a whole by working together but differently. This would be like politics and administration functioning in different ways that together form the whole of government, or values and facts forming the whole of decision-making criteria. This is quite reflective of the notion of politics and administration as creating the whole of governance through complementarity (Svara, 1999). In fact, complementarity is a concept that has been associated with dialectic in the past (Gurvitch, 1962). The dominance of one half of a dichotomy is not the *nature* of dichotomy, but rather a social practice attached to dichotomizing (Rutgers, 2001). However, some feel it is more apt to portray an alternating pattern of dominance and submission, similar to Kaufman's notion of the cyclical relationship in public administration between a focus on private interests and concerns and public action (Kaufman, 1985).

Each conciliatory theory of public administration unifies at least two of the three role conceptualizations described in this inquiry, while maintaining their distinct characteristics. As Kaufman (1956) argues, public administration continually seeks to maximize the attainment of mutually incompatible values. Bellone & Goerl (1992) initiated an interesting conversation about reconciling public entrepreneurship with democracy. Their argument is essentially that so long as

the autonomy, personal vision, secrecy, and risk-taking behavior of entrepreneurship are moderated by stewardship or a strong theory of citizenship, the two can co-exist to the benefit of public administration.^{vi} In other words, the issue of concern is not administrative autonomy, but rather the *type of value* being pursued. This is reminiscent of the integrative blends of the New Public Administration and the New Public Service. However, Bellone & Goerl (1992) directly address the problem of mutual exclusivity and domination in dialectic. In essence, they believe that civic regard must ultimately “trump” market-oriented entrepreneurship, and increased citizen participation will ensure it does. More specifically, they address pairs of opposing concepts, noting how each might be reconciled.

From the ideal type analysis in this inquiry, it becomes clear that what they have artfully done is to place the actions of discretionary administrators under the auspices of direct democratic oversight, with a corollary sense of personal responsibility. In no manner do they link back to the Constitutional form of governance. Therefore, what they are really saying is that administrative discretion is legitimate, so long as it is supervised by the concerned citizenry and guided by the norms of citizenship. They join the call for a transitional, emancipative role for public administration—to “increase the ability of citizens to see, comprehend, criticize, amend, and jointly design...” (Bellone & Goerl, 1992, p. 133). Thus, they present the dialectic of Autonomous State/Collaborative State, which dissolves the Constitutional and Discretionary traditions into one, leaving it in tension with Collaboration.

Another approach to conciliation is based on the three distinct political theories of founding fathers Hamilton, Madison, and Jefferson. It has been suggested that each perspective brings strengths and limits to government, and that an awareness of the trade-offs or consequences of adopting one value over others is perhaps the most important understanding for public administration (Stillman, 1996). Similarly, the reinvention efforts of the 1990s have been

described as an attempt to meld Hamiltonian entrepreneurialism with Jeffersonian democratized organizations to achieve a new Madisonian paradigmatic structure (Lynn, 1996).

Taking a similar diversity-within-unity tack, some believe that the three traditions of public administration follow patterns established by the Constitution's separation of powers, and neither compromise nor dominance by any one is likely to occur because either approach would violate deeply held American values (Rosenbloom, 1983). In fact, attempts to collapse the legal, managerial, and political powers of government into public administration is probably a source of the crisis of legitimacy in the first place. All three must be present to function in a system of checks and balances with one another. The managerial approach is linked to the classic view of bureaucracy in pursuit of efficiency, and its de-personalized view of human beings. The political approach is linked to greater citizen and interest group participation, which demands a less hierarchical organizational structure and a view of citizens as members of interest groups. The legal approach is linked to the procedural approach to administration, which views each individual as unique and possessed of rights and consideration based on the circumstances. Rosenbloom calls for a unified theory of public administration that will maintain all three, each of which "has a respected intellectual tradition, emphasizes different values, promotes different types of organizational structure, and views individuals in markedly distinct terms" (1983, p. 219).

It has also been persuasively argued that multiple bases for democratic legitimacy are necessary, including: constitutional rule of law; efficient and effective organizational and managerial structure; and socially constructed notions of legitimacy (Terry, 1995). Each approach may be considered more relevant and appropriate in differing contexts, including agencies, functions, and policy areas. The choice must be left to the practical wisdom of practitioners who must embody all three value systems at various times (Rosenbloom, 1983). This can be conceived

as a contingency approach, recommending the use of different models for specific purposes (Peters, 1992).

O'Leary (2006) offers a list of questions potential administrative "guerrillas" should ask themselves to ensure their plan of action is legitimate. Some questions reflect the Constitutional tradition: Am I adhering to the rule of law? Is this an area that is purely and legitimately discretionary? Is there a legitimate conflict of laws? Is whistle-blowing a preferable route? Others reflect the Discretionary tradition: Am I correct? Is the feared damage immediate, permanent, and irreversible? Are safety and health issues involved? Or is there time for a longer view and a more open strategy? Were all reasonable alternative avenues pursued? Still others are more Collaborative in nature: Would it be more ethical to promote transparency rather than working clandestinely? Would it be more ethical to work with sympathetic legislators before turning to media and outside groups? In combination, these questions are hoped to cover all three bases of legitimacy as unique but complementary values.

Even proponents of entrepreneurial government promote many communitarian ideals. For example, not only is the empowerment of citizens to self-govern one of the principles of reinvention, but public education is deemed necessary because "this mixing of social classes and races is extremely important in a democracy; without it, we lose our capacity to understand and empathize with those who are different from us. When that happens, it is not long before our society loses its ability to care for those who need help. We become a collection of individuals, not a community" (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992, p. 101). Therefore, the largely transactional approach to entrepreneurial governance must be matched by a relational civil society.

Summation

In the end, theorists associated principally with all three traditions of public administration as well as those straddling the interstices seek to achieve the democratic ideal of individual sovereignty while reducing the negative outcomes of self-interest in both individual

and collective action. All three traditions offer some role for public administration in doing so. Perhaps because of these shared goals, there is crossover between the first two traditions in regard to acceptance of the representative political system, and crossover between the first and last traditions in regard to a prioritization of democratic values over efficiency. A true Discretionary ideal is always challenged by our political system of legitimacy and accountability; a true Constitutional ideal is always challenged by the risk of unresponsiveness and administrative evil; and both of these ideals are challenged by the Collaborative tradition's participative democratic standards.

The notion that these conflicts can be successfully conciliated or eliminated through compromise seems unlikely. It has been noted that empowerment in the contemporary governance context has become problematic, because the Discretionary empowerment of administrators confronts the Collaborative empowerment of citizens, while both conflict with the Constitutional tradition of representative government. In short, all parties cannot be empowered simultaneously (Peters & Pierre, 2000). These conflicts illustrate the mutual exclusivity of their logics. The paradox of empowerment is that in a liberal context, it merely serves to exacerbate the feelings it was in part meant to alleviate:

If, however, these individuals begin to confront others who are also empowered and have to bargain and fight for their rights, just as they had previously, then empowerment is likely to be alienating and disillusioning. Indeed, both clients and workers may perceive themselves being worse off after empowerment than before, simply because they will believe that they were deceived about the brave new world of empowerment that they were entering. (Peters & Pierre, 2000, p. 23)

Therefore, I contend that something more than integration or conciliation is required to achieve legitimacy in public administration. If one legitimacy logic must ultimately trump the others theoretically and is found to do so in empirical cases, then we must find a way to choose which legitimacy logic we wish to rule, and the manner in which the other shall be prioritized.

One way to approach this problem is theoretically and philosophically, in a manner not grounded in empirical time and place. The following critical analysis attempts to develop such a rationale. Another way to approach this problem is to consider normative theory in light of empirical time and place. The critical analysis and discussion in Chapter 9 will provide that type of rationale.

Dialectical Relationship Within and Among Traditions

Remembering that the approach to inquiry includes offering a new critical interpretation, this analysis will use the concept of *dialectic*. A variety of meanings have been attached to dialectic as a method of interpreting social phenomena, particularly those associated with change: (1) an explanation of the problem of unintended consequences as stemming from paradox or ironic reversals in the course of events; (2) a way to understand goal shifts and displacements; (3) a method of revealing how an existing structure prevents transformation to a more effective one, or how its success paradoxically brings about its downfall; and (4) a lens that reveals development or progress through conflict, oppositeness, paradox, contradiction, and dilemma (L. Schneider, 1971). This inquiry uses the last definition.

The dialectical logic that was championed by the critical theorists of the Frankfurt School transcends binary oppositional thinking. As noted in the Approach to Inquiry chapter, one way to conceptualize dialectic is through its source concept, the “yin/yang” symbol, wherein two components are unified into a complementary whole, each having the seed of the other within itself (Capra, 1975). Through ongoing movement, a sort of balance is attained. One component is never able to maintain complete dominance. However, according to the Frankfurt School’s interpretation, dialectical logic has three moments: thesis, antithesis, and synthesis (Adorno, 1973). In short, the notion is that contradictory concepts (thesis and antithesis) exist in essential conflict, rather than complementarity. Awareness of these contradictions promotes the generation of a new unity.

This unity or whole can take one of two forms. It may be an acceptance based on the understanding of how the whole is produced by its apparent opposing parts. In this way, conciliatory public administration theories “let the contradiction stand” (C. S. King & Zanetti, 2005, p. 50). From this perspective, dialectic is useful in catalyzing enlightenment (Carr, 2000). The other interpretation of dialectical unification is that the opposition of the two halves creates a transcendence of the existing whole to a new totality. Many feel this understanding is the true purpose of dialectic: “it implies interaction leading to an improved synthesis” (Stever, 1988, p. 82). In this way, dialectic is useful in catalyzing emancipative change (Carr, 2000). I suggest that the difference between these two manifestations of dialectic may be related to the nature of the component parts. In the framework conceptualized here, dialectic *within* traditions appears to function more to catalyze enlightenment. Dialectic *among* traditions appears to function more to catalyze emancipative change. In either case, it has been suggested that public administration theory is “a dialectic among competing models, ideas, and concepts that ultimately turns on the questions: What is the ideal state? the good society? the purpose of community?” (Stillman, 1991, p. 222).

To clarify my use of the term *developmental*, I take it to mean an evolutionary path that responds to both intention and uncontrollable environmental or unconscious factors. In other words, it is neither a purely programmed action (Bendor, 1976), nor a purely accidental process (Waldo, 1980). As presented in the overview table in Chapter 3, the developmental path moves generally from left to right from Constitutional to Discretionary to Collaborative ideals, remembering that this is not a chronological or linear path. Throughout the history of public administration, ongoing iterative moves and attempts at reconciliation or synthesis by various theorists of the technical and normative dualisms have been present. These are noted as the “technical” and “normative” sides of the Constitutional and Discretionary traditions, and the “technical/normative synthesis” of the Collaborative Tradition. Therefore, I imagine *two*

interwoven developmental paths: the first is the larger picture in which our thinking is moving from bureaucratic to entrepreneurial, to collaborative ideas; the second is the dialectical path within this larger pattern whereby our development is spurred on by alternating and iterative foci on technical, then normative views in the Taoist “yin/yang” symmetrical rotation. The latter will be discussed first.

Dialectic Within Traditions

Within the Constitutional and Discretionary traditions, a dialectical relationship is present between technical and normative emphases. Both formulations of accountability, regardless of how one interprets the relationship between politics and administration or values and facts, carry with them “a moral imperative that is embedded both in the democratic ethos of the broader society and in the value system of public administrators” (Harmon, 1995, p. 166). From the technical perspectives, this ethos may simply be *assumed* and barely mentioned by a given theorist, or be re-formulated through a quantifiable substitute like efficiency or even equity, while in the normative perspectives, argument about the meaning of this ethos is rich and value laden. These two views have been described as standing in support of fact versus value, science versus norm, and technique versus virtue. These dualisms stand in a dialectical tension that is conciliated in a particular manner for each tradition. As described in the ideal type descriptions and analysis in Chapters 4, 5, and 7, the expression of these emphases is similar, yet different in terms of the locus of political authority.

In the Constitutional tradition, one camp may be more focused on technical management issues, while the other camp may be more focused on following legal and legislative mandates, but both camps view administration as fully under the authority of the political leadership. Theories demand on the one hand that administrators focus on being apolitical and competent, following the rules laid out for them through the administrative hierarchy. On the other hand, administrators are told to be certain that they are achieving the normative goals given to them by

the politicians. Yet in both cases, whether they are focused on technical competence or normative adherence, Bureaucrats are answerable to the political order. Therefore, technique and virtue achieve dialectical balance in the form of *accountability*, in Harmon's (1995) terms.

In the Discretionary tradition, one camp may be more focused on efficiency and effectiveness, while the other camp may be more focused on ethical outcomes. Yet both view administrators as authorized to act predominantly based on their expertise. Those in the technical camp ask administrators to achieve their objectives efficiently and effectively, using the best means available to them to do so. Those in the virtue camp demand that they act in a manner that is equitable, using means that are the most ethical and moral according to our societal values. Therefore, technique and virtue achieve dialectical balance in the form of *agency*, in Harmon's (1995) terms.

The dialectical approach employed here thus considers the manner in which opposing emphases work together to create a whole. In either case, the normative path may be more advanced in philosophical development, but rather useless without its technical partner in terms of getting things done. This is similar to Kaufman's (1985) notion of the cyclical relationship in public administration between a focus on private interests and concerns and public action. It takes *both* to maintain governance, but when one becomes too dominant, it spurs the evolution and reassertion of its opposite, improving the capacity of the whole. This process then repeats with the reasserted position becomes too dominant, spurring the evolution and reassertion of the original. The developmental path within a tradition would therefore look like a spiral, in which the tensions between technical and normative emphases move the tradition toward an evolving expression of its ideals.

I suggest that this opposition of technique and normative theory is typically what we are considering when we speak of dialectical tensions in public administration: the opposition of science and virtue, efficiency and equity, fact and value, politics and administration, normative

and performative, etc. Analyses that pit technical, scientific, orthodox, traditional, and hard-core rationalist theories against normative, humanistic, democratic, new, and soft-core rationalist theories obfuscate the overarching issue of democratic legitimacy and theories of public administration that call for a reformulation of its very nature. However, if we merely consider critical and postmodern theories as extensions of the humanistic and democratic challenges to its partnered orthodox scientific approach with its entrepreneurial extensions, we fail to grasp the fundamental differences in political ontology being posed by the Collaborative tradition.

To make matters worse, theories that focus on administrative accountability and responsibility, decision-making rationality, organizing style, or role conceptualizations alone miss the overarching question of democratic legitimacy as well. They merely assume a governance context of representative government or a liberal capitalist political economy, and as Appleby (1952) noted, simply move on to matters of practice. Thus, most explorations of public administration theory do not reveal the larger pattern of political sovereignty in which the dialectical conflict of governance is between Servant and Master. Yet in my mind, these *are* the genuine poles of concern to democratic public administration. In other words, “the problem of contemporary public administration theory is that dialectical interchange occurs *within but not between axes*” (Stever, 1988, p. 82). To me, the axes are not technical versus normative emphases, but rather Servant versus Master theories of legitimacy.

Stever (1988) calls for conversation *across* axes so that polemical dialectics can more successfully move toward synthesis. While I am not claiming my conception of the axes are similar to his, it is my hope that developing coherent sets *across* axial dimensions in the form of the three traditions of public administration may help illuminate the larger dialectical pattern within which these smaller dialectical relationships exist. In this way, we might better hope to transcend the representational “bar of sovereignty” Catlaw (2003, in press) describes, achieving a new form of democracy. In fact, such transcendence is the project of the Collaborative tradition.

It attempts a synthesis of the dialectical dualisms within the other two traditions by melding technical and normative elements in all its functional aspects in order to achieve egalitarian democratic legitimacy. It seeks transcendence of the technical/normative whole to one that is neither and both. For example, in the Collaborative tradition, the dialectical wholes of *accountability* and *agency* themselves achieve dialectical synthesis in the form of mutual responsibility, or *obligation*, in Harmon's (1995) terms. This gives a hint toward the manner in which the Constitutional and Discretionary traditions themselves stand in a dialectical tension for which the Collaborative tradition seeks synthesis—the next analysis to consider.

Dialectic Among Traditions

Attempts to integrate or conciliate ideas that have been described in this inquiry as mutually exclusive traditions mirror the sense of chaos and fragmentation often described as the intellectual crisis of identity in public administration theory (Ostrom, 1989). “The intellectual incoherence of these hybrids notwithstanding, these new paradigms represent bids to transcend and disable the core tension of American democracy” (Lynn, 1996, p. 21). I suggest that all of these attempts fail to achieve either goal. Instead, they merely serve to show that dominance is a problem when either “balance” or “transcendence” is attempted through simple integration or conciliation. As so neatly said by Follett, “Whenever you have balance in your premise, you have anarchy [chaos] in your conclusion” (1998, p. 307). She insists that in a fully democratic context, the only way to actually resolve conflicts is through *synthesis*. Synthesis is a creative process through which a new and better form is attained. For example, Weber considered the technical superiority of bureaucracy and its legal-rational authority as leading inexorably to its primacy over previous forms of social organization and authority, as a dialectical transcendence of traditional and charismatic authority (L. Schneider, 1971). More appropriate for contemporary use, synthesis is the process described by the Collaborative tradition, wherein differences of opinion emerge and are unified through interpenetration and the new understandings and opinions

that result. It can only occur under the law of the situation in which power *with* is exercised. If these rules of engagement held in the culture of public administration, then one of the traditions would transcend the others, emerging as the naturally better fit to the contemporary context.

On the other hand, when several traditions are integrated or two traditions are conciliated in dialectical tension, the balance sought tends always toward dominance. Because of mutually exclusive logics of legitimacy, one tradition must necessarily trump the other(s). In the case where approaches to legitimacy disagree in a fundamental manner that does not allow compromise, one must ultimately rule. Indeed, Mohr (1994) notes that the reconciliation of democracy and expertise hinges on the allocation of authority. One must ultimately trump the other as decision making criteria: "If expertise is the criterion, then the experts will dictate and the nonexperts will simply follow. If democracy is the criterion, then all have a legitimate right to influence and the expert is no more authoritative than the nonexpert. There is much to be said in favor of both these criteria, but each appears to rule out the other" (Mohr, 1994, p. 49).

In application, if politicians, administrators, and citizens fundamentally disagree on what should be done, one must win for collective action to occur. According to the Constitutional tradition, the politicians make the final call. According to the Discretionary tradition, the administrators make the final call. According to the Collaborative tradition, the citizens make the final call, but it should be noted that these "citizens" must necessarily include politicians and administrators alike, if such labels even perpetuate. But because of our existing constitutional political order, the "official" winner must always be the Constitutional tradition. Citizens must subordinate themselves to majority rules and the elected officials chosen to represent them. Administrators must ultimately subordinate themselves to their political masters. And yet, because of the failure of this system to achieve legitimacy in the eyes of at least a significant some, practices continue to empower administrators and citizens alike, seeking the blend that will be, as Baby Bear's chair, porridge, and bed were for Goldilocks, "just right."

Therefore, this inquiry rejects attempts at integration and conciliation as necessary failures, considering the preferable possibility of a true dialectical synthesis *among* traditions. Drawing from both Follett's notion of synthesis discussed in Chapter 6 and critical theory, I understand dialectical synthesis to mean the *unification of mutually exclusive parts into a new whole, resulting in progress*. This is exemplified by autonomy and responsibility uniting in the situated self, which has both characteristics simultaneously, thus transcending the dualism and achieving a new wholeness.

From this perspective, the three traditions of public administration theory can be considered a *developmental path* toward a new social form, but only with an important caveat: the use of this metaphor must *not* infer a historically or hierarchically deterministic view. Rather, the notion of development inferred is one of evolution as fitting to the context. This concept is quite difficult to communicate beyond a political ontology of unity, because it must infer an undetermined activity that allows for movement in any direction without inferring a "better" state than any preceding state of being by virtue of a predetermined criterion. Unfortunately, we do not have sufficient language to describe ideas like development or maturation or progress which do not imply judgment in a manner that can be misused as a rationale for "objective" prescription.

With this warning in mind, a developmental view of the traditions of public administration seeks to address the problem of allowing evolution to fit the needs of humankind. "Perhaps the task we face is one of building a new, and truly different, form of human community, a form consistent with the level of consciousness and individualism that has come to characterize the human race" (O. F. White & McSwain, 1990, p. 57). One way to describe this evolutionary path is that we have transitioned from a regime of law to a "biopolitical" regime, both of which are currently being eclipsed in the postmodern context (Catlaw, in press).

In more familiar terms, this evolutionary process might be compared to Kohlberg's (1981) scheme for moral development, whereby moral maturation is observed to move from pre-

conventional to conventional levels, to post-conventional levels of development. While the representative logics used in the Constitutional and Discretionary traditions might be characterized as conventional, the emerging direct democratic logic of the Collaborative tradition might be considered post-conventional, considering a much broader range of implications in decision making and action. It could also be likened to a Maslowian (1943) evolution in which political forms change in design to meet expanding human needs, imagining a target rather than pyramidal arrangement. Using this metaphor, if governance under the Constitutional and Discretionary tradition models succeed only in partially fulfilling physiological, safety, belonging, esteem, and self-actualization needs, the Collaborative tradition seeks to create more enabling conditions for human development and expression.

Using this idea of development in a large-frame dialectical lens, the Constitutional and Discretionary traditions stand in dialectical tension with one another (thesis/antithesis). The field is seeking some form of transcendent synthesis of these two traditions through the emerging Collaborative tradition. This is the polemical dialectic I refer to above. We desire to be neither Servants nor Masters, but rather equal Co-Creators, and are seeking a way to achieve such a transcendent synthesis. This desire goes back to the Progressive era when combined reform activities and regulatory innovations “offered no less than the potential for synthesizing the dialectic of the Federalist and Anti-Federalist themes into a new mode of governance” (McSwite, 1997, p. 124). This macro-level approach to analysis exposes the problems of democratic legitimacy inherent in both the Constitutional and Discretionary traditions of public administration, and the difficulties in establishing integrated wholes among incoherent dimensions that call for both servant and master characteristics.

I suggest that in keeping the contradictions of Master and Servant in the form of externalized political authority (e.g. representation by politicians and/or administrators), we are allowing ourselves to merely perpetuate the alternating positions of our ambivalence as a field of

study or practice. In other words, we are *not* reaching a new understanding and acceptance of a necessary duality within a whole by letting the contradiction stand (C. S. King & Zanetti, 2005). Nor is the dialectic reaching needed resolution for the field to progress and achieve legitimacy (Stever, 1988). Therefore, perhaps we should be seeking to integrate contradictions within a synthesis that creates *a new totality* that actually *transcends* the ideas that created the contradictions in the first place. As noted in the study of ethics, sometimes an ethical dilemma produces a third way out—a “highly creative course of action that comes to light in the heat of the struggle for resolution” (Kidder, 1995, p. 186).

Following Niebuhr’s (1963) argument, Man-the-Answerer [*sic*] represents an evolutionary transcendence of the dialectic between Man-the-Citizen [*sic*] and Man-the-Maker [*sic*]. While he makes this claim based on the primacy of the divine being only fully and properly present in the notion of Man-the-Answerer [*sic*], the logic holds true to the traditions of public administration as presented in this inquiry. It may be that the Collaborative tradition could not have been formed without the contradictions of dualisms revealing themselves as derivative of a common root of instrumental rationality that is strategic in nature, whether expressed as a competition of ideas or a competition among men (Harmon, 1995). McSwite (1997) suggests that a closer look at the discourse on legitimacy reveals a fundamental view of legitimacy as objective and principled. Neither the Constitutional or Discretionary traditions escape this trap of pitting control against autonomy. No rationalist solution can unify the objective and the subjective (Harmon, 1995). No culturally male view of individualism can develop a political understanding of interconnectedness (Stivers, 1990b). No system that maintains objective representation can achieve legitimacy for human subjects (Catlaw, 2003).

Therefore, it has been suggested that achieving a more fully democratic, “anti-administrative” (Farmer, 2005b) form of governance requires “a political philosophy that isn’t erected around the problem of sovereignty, nor therefore around the problems of law and

prohibition. We need to cut off the King's head; in political theory that has still to be done" (Foucault, 1980, p. 121). I interpret this desire to "kill the king" (Farmer, 2005b) to be based on the notion of sovereignty as conceived by liberalism rather than as a socially-embedded self beyond the administrative state. That is, externalized sovereignty, or the giving over of political authority to an external person, institution, or idea is the target. I argue that a reclaiming of sovereignty within the socially situated self offers a political theory that transcends the problems created by the externalized sovereignty in all forms of representational governance.

To better understand how the Collaborative tradition may ultimately achieve the elimination of the external political sovereign or ruler, the manner in which its elements represent dialectical synthesis of the other two can be explored. First, some Collaborative theorists are attempting to resolve the overall dialectical tensions between the technical and normative camps: the Orthodoxy and its managerialist extensions; and the Traditionalists and their discretionist extensions. Rather than considering either politicians or administrators the legitimate determiners of collective action, some believe that it must be the citizens themselves who make such decisions, noting that the meaning of this label is transformed in the absence of "politicians" and "administrators." Rather than rules of action existing within rules, techniques, or norms, the law of the situation must guide thought and deed. This is neither a deontological nor teleological approach to responsibility. Instead, it is a phenomenological understanding garnered through social interaction: "The responsible self is driven as it were by the movement of the social process to respond and be accountable in nothing less than a universal community" (Niebuhr, 1963, p. 88). Thus, the state is fully democratic, fully participative, and self-governing, rather than either a political or administrative representative republic. Its form of radicalism seeks co-creation of the Many and the One, rather than the One demanded of the Many either through elite authority or pluralist competition. Administrators in such a "state" must necessarily be Co-Creators rather than either Servants or Masters, as would be all citizens with the society. This role abolishes the

assignment of political authority to any given function of the state—neither politics nor administration is empowered. To accommodate this highly egalitarian context, decisions must be made collaboratively using a combination of technical and normative forms of rationality, envisioned by Hegel as intersubjective agreement and by Follett as interpenetration. This type of process can only be accommodated by a fluid form of networking that allows all those concerned to participate and the law of the situation to rule. Networks are meant to transcend hierarchy in all its forms, without resorting to anarchistic pluralism and competition.

But it must be noted that these syntheses must occur at a fundamental level of intent or *praxis*—at the level of political ontology rather than as a matter of ungrounded practice. For example, it was noted in the Collaborative tradition discussion that in some cases, traditions can share idealized visions of particular elements, but for fundamentally different reasons. For example, the Discretionary and Collaborative traditions share a critique of hierarchy, calling for more flexible forms of organizing. However, the Discretionary tradition calls for this based on desires to create more efficient outcomes or a more humanitarian environment for workers within the organization, not to create a more egalitarian society for citizens. The Collaborative tradition critiques hierarchy based on the desire to transform or even eliminate the role of government and to attain egalitarian self-governance within organizations as well as society. It is quite easy to focus on organizational theory and its alternative structural forms, without ever questioning associated assumptions of political ontology or theories of legitimacy. While this may enable broader agreement at a superficial level, such agreements do not represent a true synthesis, which is much more desirable than the compromise and concessions of transactional bargaining. Agreements based on the latter will never last long because the original difference emerges in some other form at a later time. “Nothing will ever truly settle differences but synthesis” (Follett, 1998, p. 114).

As an example of what this means in practice, I was once the Co-Chair of the Human Resources team within the Arizona Strategic Partnership for Economic Development. This was an outgrowth of the noted Arizona Futures Forum (Fox & Miller, 1995). Our consultants were the acclaimed team behind similar efforts in San Jose, California; Collaborative Economics (Henton et al., 1997). After several years of activity, it was taken over by the Governor's office and placed within the Arizona Department of Commerce, becoming the Governor's Strategic Partnership for Economic Development. While this case would make a great study on co-optation, my point is to highlight that while it may have appeared to be a cross-sector, egalitarian network of civic entrepreneurs seeking to improve the quality of life for all Arizonans, its form belied its underlying political ontology. On the surface, it appeared to be equally concerned about the quality of the environment, culture, education, and community life, alongside more traditional economic concerns. Taken at face value, it appeared to be a truly collaborative network.

In truth, the network was primarily designed to improve the economy through what we fondly called "coopetition"—collaboration in order to compete better nationally and internationally as a region. All of the quality of life foundation groups (such as education, culture, and environment) were designed to be in service of that economy, determining how to increase the economic competitiveness of the region as opposed to others. "Moving beyond re-engineering the corporation and reinventing the government, their task is nothing less than to forge a new collaborative civil society that can help build a bridge between business and government" (Henton et al., 1997, p. xviii). Rather than being egalitarian in nature, positioning within this group was very much about who represented the strongest corporation, the highest political office, or the largest chamber of commerce. For example, I was named the Co-Chair primarily because I represented the Arizona chapter of the national Society for Human Resource Management and because I had done some consulting for the group's leader, who was the CEO of the only Fortune 500 company based in Arizona at the time. As such, I was acting as a civic

entrepreneur in “shaping an entirely new business-government-community model for the future” (Henton et al., 1997, p. 22). While some of us were much more interested in the “community” perspective within this unified social sphere, as has been noted, the majority of the group’s focus was firmly on business and government’s facilitation of business in an effort to improve economic competitiveness. Ultimately, Collaborative intentions were trumped by those more Discretionary in nature. Thus, more than form is required to achieve the true Collaborative transcendence—it must be aligned with intent.

In her forthcoming book, Stivers (in press) notes this critical difference between entrepreneurial and collaborative networks. While they may appear to be the same organizational form, they operate under fundamentally different rules of engagement. The members of market-like networks are organizational representatives engaged in a contractual relationship. Alternatively, the members of collaborative networks are citizens who have promised to work with one another toward a shared purpose. In light of this phenomenon, conclusions about what implementation of an authentically Collaborative ideal would mean in the contemporary governance context are considered in the following final chapter.

CHAPTER 9: SEEKING STRUCTURAL AND NORMATIVE FIT

Chapter 9 presents the last portion of the Findings of this inquiry in the form of Conclusions. To summarize the inquiry up to this point, I have drawn broadly from an array of literature in public administration, public policy, organization behavior and management, sociology, and theology. I have analyzed the fundamental assumptions and rationalities of three role conceptualizations for the public administrator: Bureaucrat, Entrepreneur, and Steward. Using a discourse analysis, I have offered a comparative typology that aims to advance our understanding of which public administration role conceptualization might better meet the needs of the contemporary governance context. This role conceptualization considers both what it means to be a public administrator as well as the role of public administration in society.

The Conclusions explore how a reformulated role conceptualization might improve legitimacy within the contemporary governance context through a conceptual exercise. As a reminder, the meanings of legitimacy used throughout this inquiry include: “reasonable; logically correct; justifiable; or conforming to or in accordance with established rules, standards, principles” (Neufeldt, 1996, p. 772). It is *not* meant to infer its legal meaning. Kelly (1998) argues that compatibility between undergirding theory and empirical reality is very important to public administration. Therefore, this chapter offers a final critical analysis: various role conceptualizations presented are assessed in terms of their conceptual fit given the structural and normative demands of the contemporary governance context. A description of this context is drawn from secondary empirical studies exploring network governance, globalization, policy networks, privatization, and the like.

Ultimately, an argument is made regarding which form of democratic legitimacy is most desirable. In this case the use of “evidence” is intended to point toward the possible implications of a normative position. This method of critique is commonly used in typological analysis; “mental experiments” apply the question “*what if?*” to real or hypothetical scenarios (Sjoberg &

Nett, 1968, p. 250). The questions posed in this step of analysis include: What if the chosen role conceptualization is used in this context? Do its characteristics fit? Is it likely to be perceived as democratically legitimate? If the legitimacy logic is incoherent with this context, what is the value or purpose of perpetuating the associated role conceptualization? Is it a realistic model for social change? Specifically, this analysis will answer the following research questions:

What type of role conceptualization should be used and why?

How is the contemporary governance context described in recent empirical research? How is it reflected in case experience?

What is the relative ability of the various ideal type role conceptualizations to achieve administrative legitimacy if defined theoretically as contextual fit?

Do any of the key integrations or conciliations noted achieve a theoretically better contextual fit?

Can a transcendent dialectical synthesis be envisioned to achieve a theoretically better contextual fit?

The Contemporary Governance Context

The contemporary governance context is frequently described as postmodern in nature. *Postmodernity* refers to “two interconnected dimensions: (1) as a new historical period or different social formation and (2) as a specific body of philosophical critique and theory that calls into question basic assumptions of modernity, reason, and the Enlightenment” (Catlaw & Stout, 2007, in press). In sum, this context challenges virtually all social, political, economic, and cultural institutions and hierarchies of power, allowing many previously excluded groups, discourses, and ideas to force their way into mainstream society. Yet at the same time, political and social discourses of all types have increasingly become games of “symbol manipulation” rather than substantive democratic dialogue (Fox & Miller, 1995).

These conditions have led to a philosophical critique based on both pre-modern and postmodern theories. “Confrontation by new situations, engendering new questions, may reveal

within established practices and beliefs a lack of resources for offering or for justifying answers to these new questions” (MacIntyre, 1988). This “epistemological crisis” is considered due to the failure of modernity and its liberal tradition to produce satisfactory universal truths and concepts of both rationality and equality. We are faced with an ineffective pluralism in which incompatible and incommensurate ideologies coexist in a state of conflict that is unsatisfactorily resolved through status quo methods. Classical Liberalism, Modern Liberalism, Conservatism, and state forms of Radicalism all fail to produce a balanced society across the market, government, and community. As MacIntyre points out, “so-called conservatism and so-called radicalism of these contemporary guises are in general mere stalking-horses for liberalism: the contemporary debates within modern political systems are almost exclusively between conservative liberals, liberal liberals, and radical liberals. There is little place in such political systems for the criticism of the system itself, that is, for putting liberalism in question” (MacIntyre, 1988).

Postmodern theory, however, *does* put liberalism and all of modernity into question. Postmodernist thought is fraught with ambiguity because the intellectual paths traveled by its theorists are nearly as diverse as its contributors. Some embrace radical individualism, while others assert that such ideologies do not truly exist. Some postmodern theorists operate under the banner of poststructuralism, some operate under cultural or feminist studies, while others merely claim to offer general critiques of modernity—the boundaries are very unclear. Regardless of this vast diversity of intellectual heritage, most postmodern theorists appear to be concerned with the tensions created between individualism and the social order, although with differing theories of causality and normative conclusions (Clark, 1998). In general, these differences can be characterized as either skeptical or affirmative (Rosenau, 1992).

Theorists have characterized postmodernity as being: commodified, fragmented, hyper-reflexive, and a negation of virtually all modernist assumptions and institutions (C. S. King & Zanetti, 2005). Globalization is another important characteristic of the postmodern context. “First

and above all, of course, globalization means: (a) the more or less complete internationalization of the world's commercial process; (b) a quantum level jump in social diversity in a variety of senses; (c) the emergence of a new postmodern mind. Each of these changes has enormous consequences for social life and governmental process" (McSwite, 2006, p. 184). Postmodern public administration theory must accommodate cultural diversity, non-rational human behavior, and demands for inclusive citizenship beyond consumer choice (Kelly, 1998).

These conditions deny the possibility of objectivity of any kind, ensuring a corollary impossibility of representation of any type (Sarup, 1989). Therefore, modernist notions of rationality, individualism, property rights, truth, and political representation are all challenged by postmodern critique. These highly unstable and relativistic qualities lead at once to a high level of anxiety and the opportunity for transformation (C. S. King & Zanetti, 2005). Habermas describes the contemporary context as a narrowed public sphere dominated by hierarchies of organization and the subjugation of political power by purposive-rational economic intent, all mediated or administered by the mass media (R. B. Denhardt, 1981b). A reclaiming of the public sphere through a re-politicization of citizenship could reinstate normative deliberations about the structure and values of society. Such reclamation requires emancipation from domination and dependence, beginning with a revelation of the false consciousness which binds members of society to existing conditions. In this way, the act of social critique initiates the process of social change, or more pointedly, re-structuration through social processes.

The manner in which this re-structuration occurs is of great import. It seems to me that although we are increasingly freed from the domination of organizational hierarchies, we remain subjugated to the existing political economy. Therefore, while there may be less organizational hierarchy and control within the institutions of society, there is more competition. We have not eliminated the institutions, but rather changed the rules of engagement from what might be described as the authoritarian dictates of conservatism to the pluralist and market-like transactions

of modern liberalism and late capitalism. This shift feeds the sense of fragmentation, hyper-reflexive competition of meanings, and social alienation noted by the postmodern philosophers. As Thayer (1981) might say, we leap from the pan of hierarchy into the fire of competition, not really improving our lot as human beings at all. We may be significantly more autonomous from hierarchical domination, but we are prevented from forming social bonds due to the overwhelming competitive spirit imbuing the political economy. We have not transcended the shared political ontology of the two; that we can be represented by either people or ideas.

The more skeptical postmodern theorists focus on the difficulties of such transcendence, while the more affirmative theorists focus on the opportunities to escape the limitations of modernity to create a new form of social life based on relationship building in a global context. “What needs to be transcended is an entire mode of producing and maintaining social reality and social relationship” (Catlaw, 2006b, p. 199). Indeed, Bernstein suggests that the emerging ethical-political dialectic between modernity and postmodernity “compels us to confront anew the classic Socratic question, ‘How one should live’” (1991, p. 11). Thus, while the foundations of modernity’s “reality” are not desired, a new ethical-political foundation is sought that is fluid and able to accommodate ambiguity and uncertainty, while acknowledging the validity of temporary intersubjective agreement. This new foundation shifts the focus to our *mode* of relating, rather than its content (Catlaw, 2006b).

In the postmodern context, *governments* have in large part been displaced by cross-jurisdictional networks, thus leading to the increased use of the term *governance*. “Government—the State—is no longer the defining ingredient” (Stivers, in press, ch. 6). Government organization “has been replaced by a politico-administrative relationship characterized by more complex patterns of interaction and interdependence” (Maor, 1999, p. 15). New institutionalism suggests that institutions be considered as rules of the game that structure action, rather than agencies or organizations (North, 1990). Thus, the focus can shift to structures and actions

beyond the boundaries of individual organizations or systems of government. This leads back to a classical Greek view of government as “helmsman” or navigator—a definition that is decidedly functional and process-oriented, rather than organizational (Savas, 1987, p. 290).

Most importantly, there has been a loss of stable boundaries between sectors of social activity and a corresponding infiltration and hegemony of market values throughout society. In regard to the blurring and permeation of boundaries, the entire notion of *publicness* has come into question (Emmert & Crow, 1988; Wettenhall, 2001). Some scholars seek approaches to enhance publicness or to identify obstacles to achieving it (M. S. Haque, 1994; Thomas, 1999; Ventriss, 1989). Publicness may be measured by “commitment to the common good and civic involvement” (Carino, 2001, p. 60). This functional view of publicness supports a process-oriented view of *governance* as “the capacity of a democracy to produce public policy that meets the expectations of the society” (A. L. Schneider & Ingram, 1997, p. 4). From this perspective, *publicness* is what legitimates actors as agents of the citizenry (M. S. Haque, 2001). However, it clearly allows actors from all sectors to fulfill the functions of governance, as claimed by those promoting privatization. “Privatization... is not merely another management tool but a basic strategy of societal governance. It is based on a fundamental philosophy of government and of government’s role in relation to the other essential institutions of a free and healthy society. Privatization is a means, not an end; the end is a better government and a better society” (Savas, 2000, p. 328). However, according to critiques of postmodernity, this blurring of sectoral boundaries has enabled the process of commodification, or the “Economization of the World” (Waldo, 1988, p. 931). Through this process, all forms of social relationship become transactions with an economic or market-like character. As a result, the question of the citizen’s role *in government* has almost disappeared—governance has been de-politicized (Stivers, in-press).

Given this trend toward sectoral blurring, public problems in most spheres of governance are now being addressed by “a dizzying array” of approaches that rely on intersectoral networks

for planning, implementation, and evaluation (Salamon, 2005, p. 8). Howard McCurdy has pointed out, “People who work in government agencies practice public administration; so do those who provide public services as members of nonprofit organizations or as corporate employees working on government contracts” (Shafritz et al., 2004, p. ix). In fact, while state and local levels of government still carry out relatively more direct activities, direct provision of goods and services by the federal government now accounts for only five percent of its overall activity (Salamon, 2005). The context is now a “marble cake” not of governmental agencies, but of intersectoral actors including public, private for-profit, private nonprofit, and citizens engaged in the actions of governance (Grodzins, 1966).

“Much public policymaking occurs in less formal settings or venues and involves policy actors within particular issue areas...” (Kraft & Furlong, 2004, p. 50). These informal organizations were once referred to as subgovernments or iron triangles (Hecl, 1978; Lowi, 1969). However, such formal alliances have become less prevalent, giving way to even broader and more flexible sources of membership. As humorously noted in a leading policy text, “many cooks contribute to the policy broth” (Weimer & Vining, 1999, p. 43). “Today... subgovernments are less autonomous and generally operate with more visibility and ‘outside’ participation. More policy actors are involved, sometimes hundreds of different institutions and individuals. Use of the term *issue network* rather than *subgovernment* reflects an evolution in U.S. policymaking” (Kraft & Furlong, 2004, p. 50).

These collaborative approaches to public policy often play through to implementation, not just in the form of contracted privatization, but also through partnerships better characterized as co-production. As noted in the public participation literature, the level of public authority given to a non-government actor in any aspect of the policy process determines the degree of co-production. From this perspective, what is “co-produced” might be: a problem definition; a policy alternative; a decision or recommendation; a program, product, or service; or an evaluation. The

notion that authority must be invested in the public to be considered a co-producer was in large part pioneered by Sherry Arnstein (1969) for the planning profession in her “ladder of participation.” However, a number of others may be referenced as well (Burke, 1979; Fagence, 1977; Hampton, 1977; Milbrath, 1965; Mogulof, 1970; Sharp, 1980; Spiegel & Mittenhal, 1968; Thomas, 1995). In pointing to the issue of decision making power, Arnstein revealed “the central issue of the participation debate...” (Fagence, 1977, p. 122). Empirical studies support this claim (Kathlene & Martin, 1991). “Experiences in the participation process show that the main source of user satisfaction is not the degree to which a person’s needs have been met, but the feeling of having influenced the decisions” (Sanoff, 2000, p. 12). The key characteristic to co-production is that participation efforts must represent a “genuine devolution of authority to local communities” (Carley & Smith, 2001, p. 198). “Participation of the governed in their government is, in theory, the cornerstone of democracy...” (Arnstein, 1969, p. 216). Therefore, authentic co-production requires that “self-awareness *and* communal self-rule are promoted at the same time” (Bachrach and Botwinick, 1992, p. 58). It cannot be repressive, or reflect the negative characteristics of co-optation (Selznick, 1949).

Considering the implications of publicness as a fuzzy concept, and the prevalence of privatization, policy networks, and co-production, the context of public administration is no longer exclusively the government agency, but rather an *intersectoral process* comprised of activities such as agenda setting, policy formulation, decision making, implementation, and evaluation. As noted long ago, “An important distinction is to be made between the *locus of decision* and the *mode of calculation*” (Wildavsky, 1979, p. 123). The sector is not really important—it is *how* decisions are made that is important. This has enormous implications for both theory and practice that have only begun to be explored—in not only public administration, but in business and nonprofit management as well. “The constellation of issues generated by the growth of government contracting spill over onto the most basic questions of American

governance” (Kettl, 1993). Indeed, the implications of these changes to public administration rupture the very foundations of the field:

It is no longer simply the science and art of *public affairs and administration* that we are preoccupied with, as it is a deeper search for mission and purpose, and a new role in the rapidly evolving world where “government,” as we once understood it, has morphed into “governance;” where public service no longer means simply a job working in government; where the lines between public and non-profit, even public and private, are blurring; where the nation-state is being transformed—to what, we are not sure; where public administration fashioned along the lines of the industrial models of 20th century, mostly Western nation models, is being challenged from within, and which faces the Herculean challenge of adapting to meet the public needs and services of the world’s six billion and growing population, particularly in rapidly developing societies. (Mazmanian, 2005)

It has been claimed that “Public administration exists to realize the governance of society” (Raadschelders, 1999, p. 288). Yet what a given society believes governance to be changes over time. Transforming these core disciplinary assumptions means a “basic re-conceptualization of what the nature of public administration has come to be” (Salamon, 2005, pp. 12-13). We must determine “how to design and manage the immensely complex collaborative systems that now form the core of public problem-solving” (Salamon, 2005, pp. 10-11). Most reforms, even those amending the Constitution, are relatively incremental in nature, and the structural form of the political economy is substantively the same as it was at the founding of the nation: republican governance of a capitalist economy and liberal society. Yet as noted by Waldo, the legitimizing question will not easily be resolved, “unless and until the framing circumstances change significantly” (1988, p. 931).

It would appear that the postmodern condition is creating a substantively different framing condition. Reflecting on Frances Fukuyama’s claim that the liberal democratic form is globally accepted as the best way to organize human societies, Nathan asks, “Why... is there so

much frustration with government and such a deep and widespread feeling that Americans who invented the liberal democratic form now need to reinvent it?" (1995, p. 213). To answer this question, I suggest we must ask: How do the three core theories of legitimacy fare in the contemporary governance context? To answer, we must consider apparent trends, structural fit, and normative fit.

However, as noted in Chapter 3, historically previous forms of governance coexist with emerging forms. Similarly, the world characterized as postmodernity has not completely displaced its modernist predecessor. Indeed, the governance context "is" what is generally agreed to in a given society, and the postmodern depiction would not yet fit that category. It would be naïve for this inquiry to ignore this state of affairs. Assuming that the world is in a transitional moment between the modern and the postmodern, it makes quite a bit of sense that not only competing traditions of public administration exist, but that many attempts are made to appropriately integrate or conciliate logics of legitimacy in an effort to match the complexity of the historical moment. Therefore, a choice must be made regarding which depiction of this contemporary context will be considered as that to which a fit is sought. Based on the assumption that trends toward the postmodern condition will not subside entirely (even if events like terrorist attacks or natural disasters may present detours), I suggest it is most beneficial to theorize toward that context, at least at this level of analysis. The following discussion considers this problem, ultimately making recommendations for the role conceptualization that is most promising for the postmodern, contemporary governance context.

Critical Discussion

The following discussion will consider both empirical and theoretical elements in the process of drawing conclusions about which tradition of public administration is most likely to achieve legitimacy in the contemporary governance context. Comparing descriptions of the postmodern condition to the meanings attributed to each of the three traditions of public

administration will help draw conclusions about the structural fit, or logical feasibility. The analyses provided in Chapters 7, 8, and here are considered in order to draw conclusions about the normative fit, or value-based desirability.

Structural Fit

MacIntyre (1988) notes that choices among traditions and traditions themselves change due to confrontation with new situations that reveal the tradition's limitations. This may result in "rejection, emendation, and reformulation of beliefs, the revaluation of authorities, the reinterpretation of texts, the emergence of new forms of authority, and the production of new texts" (MacIntyre, 1988, p. 355). Empirically, the postmodern contemporary governance context appears to be more logically aligned to the Collaborative tradition of public administration than either the Constitutional or Discretionary traditions. To illustrate, let us consider the various elements of the ideal types in light of the description above: the assumed governance context; political ontology; political authority and scope of action; formulations of responsibility and accountability; associated decision making rationality; and associated organizing style. A summary in Table 8 will present the conceptual fit based on a simplistic scoring scale of negative (-1), ambiguous (0), and positive (1).

The Constitutional tradition assumes a governance context characterized as a political state in which governance is conducted through government organizations ruled by political representatives. Yet, empirical observation shows that increasing levels of governance activity occur outside of government organizations. The Discretionary tradition recognizes the blurring of sectoral boundaries, embracing much of its implications. However, it clings to the political power of the administrative state, drawing symbolic legitimation from the representative democracy and regime values. The Collaborative tradition accepts a complete blurring of all boundaries, supporting a deeply nested concept of network federalism starting at the neighborhood and

extending to the global level. Neither of the other traditions accommodates a form that extends beyond the nation state in a seamless fashion.

The Constitutional and Discretionary traditions share the political ontology of liberalism, albeit with differing emphases. Yet, its inability to achieve social equity and egalitarian democratic relationships indicate that it may be a failed project that has little hope of being sufficiently reformed. In a global context with a massive degree of diversity and cultural relativity, an ontology that seeks to produce unity either through authority or pluralist competition does indeed appear to be fruitless. The Collaborative tradition promotes a radical political ontology that matches the need to accommodate the uniqueness of each and every individual, while enabling the co-creation of shared agreements through egalitarian relationship.

In terms of political authority and scope of action, both the Constitutional and Discretionary traditions fail to escape the structural institutions of government. While there is disagreement regarding the distribution of political authority and scope of action between politics and administration, there is agreement that the representative system of governance works. Only the Collaborative tradition escapes this structural limitation, focusing fully on the “rules of the game” rather than defining the playing field. Furthermore, it assumes an egalitarian stance in the formation of those rules. This approach fits well a context where all sectors are engaged in governance in an increasingly global configuration that escapes political jurisdictions and organizational boundaries. If public administration continues to fulfill a special role, it will be as “a coordinator or ‘linking pin’ between various task forces” (Bennis, 1967, p. 12).

Following Harmon (1995), formulations of responsibility and accountability reflect ways of relating and the levels of trust within them: accountability to; responsibility to; and obligation to. The Constitutional tradition engenders an authoritative form of relationship demanding accountability, while the Discretionary tradition fosters a competitive or transactional form of relating calling for responsibility to outcomes. The former disallows ambiguity and uncertainty,

while the latter does not support intersubjectivity. In both, contractarian thought pervades ideology, shaping how people “conceive themselves in relation to other humans, to human structures and institutions, and to the nonhuman or natural environment...” (Gauthier, 2000). Indeed, contract theory is a hegemonic force that both denies trust and disregards problems of inequality (Baier, 2000). Gauthier (2000) suggests that without the social bonds that transcend but are eroded by contract theory, society will eventually destroy itself. Thus, the Collaborative tradition is the only approach that transcends dysfunctional modes of relating.

In terms of decision making rationality, networks require a collaborative approach that accommodates egalitarian participation as well as comprehensive consideration of both instrumental and substantive criteria. In a global context, there can be no absolute rules for a deontological approach. To maintain the requisite levels of trust, a purely utilitarian or teleological approach that rests on the choices of a few cannot work either. Therefore, the Collaborative tradition offers the best approach through its phenomenological, communicative form of rationality and consensus decision making process.

Finally, the organizing style demanded by the contemporary governance context is clearly that of fluid networking. No form of hierarchical organization can accommodate the rate of change and responsiveness required. As Bennis (1967) predicted, organizations will need to create opportunities to integrate individuals, distribute power in a democratic manner, foster collaboration and adaptation, and remain open to change and ongoing revitalization. In short, they will be organic systems that “will evolve in response to a problem rather than to programmed role expectations” (Bennis, 1967, p. 12). While the Discretionary tradition definitely promotes a flattening of hierarchies and an empowerment of organizational members and clients or customers, empirical studies of networks indicate that success depends upon the level of trust and equality produced by its members—competition cannot figure in the rules of engagement.

Therefore the approach that best fits the necessary organizing style for contemporary governance is offered by the Collaborative tradition.

In summary, Table 8 indicates that my analysis of the structural fit between the three traditions and the contemporary governance context finds the Collaborative tradition in the lead, followed by the Discretionary tradition. This pattern hints toward a developmental path that will be considered in the following discussion of normative fit.

Table 8

Summary of Contextual Fit

<i>Element</i>	<i>Constitutional</i>	<i>Discretionary</i>	<i>Collaborative</i>
Assumed governance context	-1	0	1
Political ontology	-1	-1	1
Political authority and scope of action	-1	-1	1
Formulations of responsibility and accountability	-1	-1	1
Associated decision making rationality	-1	-1	1
Associated organizing style	-1	0	1
Overall Fit	-6	-4	6

Normative Fit

If both the jurisdictional (Constitutional) and intersectoral (Discretionary) guarantees of legitimacy are increasingly impractical within the emerging contemporary governance context, should we pursue the Collaborative alternative? The answers to this question are normative in nature.

The democratic public service ethos has been called a “patriotism of benevolence” (Frederickson, 1997, p. 204). From this analysis of the three traditions of public administration, I submit that all theories of public administration seek to manifest this ethos. None can claim a “better” normative approach than the others; they are simply different. In other words, whether the focus is on technique or virtue, all theories of public administration seek to serve democracy. It is the meaning assigned to that concept that differs. These competing meanings have been

depicted as legitimacy logics grounded in differing sources of political authority imbuing the social roles of politician, public administrator, and citizen. These logics correspond respectively to the Constitutional, Discretionary, and Collaborative traditions of public administration, and their corollary role conceptualizations of Bureaucrat, Entrepreneur, and Steward. Scholars argue convincingly for each of these logics as well as particular combinations based on normative preferences and empirical evidence. MacIntyre suggests that traditions and choices among traditions change based on their adherents' confrontations with competing traditions:

They may find themselves compelled to recognize that within this other tradition it is possible to construct from the concepts and theories peculiar to it what they were unable to provide from their own conceptual and theoretical resources, a cogent and illuminating explanation—cogent and illuminating, that is, by their own standards—of why their own intellectual tradition had been unable to solve its problems or restore its coherence. (1988, p. 364).

I suggest that it is just these types of encounters that are revealed by attempts to integrate or conciliate competing logics of legitimacy in public administration theory.

The Failures of Integration and Conciliation

At core, integrations and conciliations attempt to reconcile our democratic ideal with our political and economic reality—an inherently questionable endeavor (Sandel, 1988). We are reticent to recommend an alternative source of political legitimacy because it challenges our existing political economy itself. For example, assuming that the ideals of overhead democracy are no longer realistic in contemporary governance, Redford suggests that administration can be “*most fully legitimized if by all the processes of social control it conforms as fully as man can make it conform with the tenets of democratic morality*” (1969, p. 196). He calls this “workable democracy”—a pragmatic ideal in which

the inclusive representation of interests in the interaction process among strategic organizational centers—a representation resulting from the responsiveness of the interaction process in the totality of its parts and the totality of its decisions to the

demands of men [*sic*] in an open society in which there is universal capacity for participation in meaningful ways. (Redford, 1969, p. 197)

This particular passage clearly illustrates the difficulty with which these conflicting logics combine. It sounds quite convoluted to conciliate representation of interests with meaningful participation; organizations with individuals. Within this “workable democracy” we attempt, we cannot seem to finesse our way out of the problem of democratic legitimacy through combinations of internal and external responsibility and accountability. Box asks, “Is it possible to be an important actor in the creation and implementation of public policy without straying outside the legislative mandate or becoming dominating, self-serving, and causing restriction of public access and freedom to act?” (1999, p. 40). Based on my analyses, I would say that the answer to this question is “No.” This section will seek to explain why.

The challenges of reconciling a democratic ideal with a representative government are found in the conundrums that have faced public administration theory in the United States since its inception as a “self-aware field” (Waldo, 1984). In essence, theorists have been struggling to find just the right balance of administrative Master/Servant to ensure that the democratic sovereign gives away the right type and amount of authority to government in order to get things done without allowing the Steward to run amok. In our ideologically democratic system, political authority is ostensibly held by every citizen, which is why citizens feel they have the right to demand accountability from government agents. This can take several forms according to the three traditions of public administration. Constitutionally, government agents are answerable through the complex system of checks and balances and hierarchical control over accountability to each form of political power—legislative, judicial, and executive. According to the Discretionary tradition, government agents are answerable through various criteria for desired outcomes—they are responsible when they achieve... X. According to the Collaborative tradition, everyone shares a mutual obligation to one another in which answerability must be open

and ongoing among all concerned. There can never be an unchallengeable decision or action on the part of anyone within the society.

Because few scholars prescribe a pure implementation of any one tradition, there are many blends of these role conceptualizations offered up by the field's master scholars. As in most disciplinary arguments, the "devil is in the details" and the debate seems endless over how best to craft this integration or conciliation. Some blends call for more Administrative Master and others call for more Administrative Servant. Some conceptualize Administrative Master legitimacy based on scientific and technical knowledge and expertise; others call for Administrative Master legitimacy based on political wisdom. Some envision political wisdom as coming from elected officials (Administrator as Servant), while others see it coming from the capacity to interpret the Constitution and legislative mandates (Administrator as Master). Some see responsibility being achieved through accountability to external controls (Administrator as Servant) and others see it stemming from responsibility to internalized morals, norms, and ethics (Administrator as Master). Pragmatically, as illustrated in the case vignettes in Chapter 7, these theories are evident in what we *do* in public administration. When government is perceived as illegitimate, we try fixing the problem with strategies such as greater political oversight, more rules and regulations, fewer rules and regulations, new codes of ethics, or (relatively) more public involvement. But if considering the problem as one of legitimacy at the level of political ontology, we are likely trying to fix things that are only symptoms of an underlying problem, thus never really finding success.

Theoretically, from the analyses in Chapters 7 and 8, it would appear that all attempts to adopt either ideal types, integrations, or conciliations seem to fail due to either dialectical tension or domination, some self-admittedly: "I am afraid that even that effort [*To Run a Constitution: The Legitimacy of the Administrative State*] failed to exorcise the demons that torment me with unpatriotic misgivings that we Americans go too far in our commitment to individual rights. At times, we seem to lose sight of our inherently social nature and our need for community" (Rohr,

1989, p. viii). This is described as a “structured ambiguity” in our Constitutional heritage—one in which our commitment to individual rights to equality, freedom, and property compete with our human need for community and governance (Rohr, 1989, p. 291). This view is very much in keeping with Harmon’s (Harmon, 1990, 1995) explication of what he calls the Answerer/Maker dialectic.^{vii} It has been noted that in public administration theory, the choice is to either seek some form of compromise, which likely includes domination by one of the opposing elements, or to “let the contradiction stand” (C. S. King & Zanetti, 2005, p. 50). The value of the latter approach is to ensure that the important conflicts and differences revealed by the thesis and antithesis moments are not obscured (Padgett, 2002). Furthermore, any proposed dialectical synthesis is suspect of actually being a compromise integration resulting in domination or obfuscation (Adorno, 1973).

Another example would be the admission, “This reformulation of the relation of politics and administration does not entail as much a formal or structural alteration of government as a changed understanding of what is appropriate and possible within it. Moreover, it is flexible enough to accommodate two different conceptions of accountability relevant to public servants” (Harmon, 1995, p. 194). Specifically, the reformulation Harmon recommends includes *prioritizing* personal and relational sources of accountability with the caveats “within constraints imposed by political authority” and “assertion of professional detachment, knowledge, and expertise” (Harmon, 1995, p. 187). Thus, politicians and administrators still create authoritative constraints, while taking on a new functional role as enablers of citizens’ social practice. Harmon believes this combination meets the expectations of the rationalists (Constitutional and Discretionary in my terms) as well as the critiques of rationalist dichotomies (Collaborative in my terms). The reformulation *merges* thought and action as well as technical expertise and externalized political authority into a facilitative role. In the end, the dialectic remains, and the solution is that potential abuses of political authority are moderated by professional

responsibility, and problematic administrative discretion is addressed through direct public involvement in dialogue and deliberation. Thus, Harmon offers a conciliatory solution to the dialectic (Bureaucrat/Entrepreneur) along with its potential synthesis (Steward). In this sense, he proposes that the Collaborative ideal dominate rather than replace the other two traditions.

Harmon is not alone in this approach. To recapitulate some of the critiques of the less-than-ideal-type prescriptions for the Collaborative tradition, White and McSwain cling to bureaucratic and discretionary forms of legitimacy as well: "Public administrators must be responsive to political controls, and such controls must be seen as properly resulting in real changes in the behavior of agencies. Those controls that go so far as to impair the capacity of the agency itself, as an element of governance, though, can and must be legitimately resisted" (1990, p. 55). Stivers (2000a) suggests that rather than continuing down the path of scientific legitimacy, we might be better off reviving a quite elitist, albeit socially aware vision of a public service profession offered by a founder of the social work profession. Denhardt and Denhardt (2003) resort to traditional approaches to accountability in their doctrine for the New Public Service in regard to statutory and constitutional law as well as professional standards. Another group of scholars suggest, "Public administration must be a key actor in any effort to rediscover substantive democracy because of the complexity of providing public services in contemporary society" (Box et al., 2001, p. 611).

In this way, despite hearty and detailed critiques of the Constitutional and Discretionary traditions, those making the most compelling arguments for the Collaborative tradition fail to escape the criterion of political authority as conceived by the other traditions and their rationalist, liberal, representative democratic formulations. Just as our culture has reified market principles, our discipline has reified the administrative state, as well as the liberal republican structure it assumes. It seems that scholars inevitably reach back into the logics that define a guardian class made up of either political or administrative members, or some combination thereof. Most

typically, the prescription is that administrators claim the function of upholding regime values as expressed in the Constitution, while facilitating citizens in determining its best implementation. This carries forward the Discretionary tradition's logic of legitimacy and its normative camp's value ordering, while paying homage to the institution of the Constitution, but not the Constitutional tradition's restrictions on Bureaucrats.

In short, these combinations perpetuate a public administration whose "traditions are the high ones of modern society" (O. F. White & McSwain, 1990, p. 57). They fail to transcend these seemingly elitist ideals, preventing a move into a truly Collaborative expression of democracy as self-governance. In other words, while the ideal of the emerging Collaborative tradition attempts to transcend the context of the representative political system, none of its theorists have fully escaped its overarching rationality. This has been described as being caught in the rationalist mode of thought (Harmon, 1995), or the "Men of Reason" approach to legitimacy (McSwite, 1997). However, it might be more productive to understand the barrier as remaining beneath the bar of sovereignty as "The People" rather than each *person*, because we have not yet transcended the constraints of representative democracy and its externalized formulation of political power (Catlaw, 2003). In fact, in later writing, McSwite predicts such attempts will likely "fail because it takes place within the conventional framework set by the legitimacy issue" (1997, p. 18).

This statement suggests that *because* of the existing political ontology, even the theorists who seek to transcend the limits of our Constitutional democracy as traditionally defined as well as its Discretionary alternative continue to resort to calls for externalized forms of political authority and democratic legitimacy. On the one hand, they are attempting to place authority and sovereignty back *within* each individual and their relationships with one another. Yet, they are prevented from fully making this leap by the political and economic system we operate within. They seem *compelled* to add some formulation of representative political authority and administrative control. In Catlaw's (2003, in press) terms, these theorists fail to escape the

overarching bar of sovereignty as conceived of in the representative political system. In essence, they are offering what they see as the best possible approach *given the circumstances* (Harmon, 2006). As a result, whether the arguments made are characterized as diagnostic and descriptive in nature or normative in nature, all of our attempts to either create compromise integrations or intentionally try to maintain a conciliatory and balanced dialectical tension fail to achieve democratic legitimacy in at least some scholar's eyes because once source of legitimacy must ultimately dominate the others due to their mutual exclusivity.

The Problem of Sovereignty: Re-framing the Legitimacy Crisis

Following Foucault (1980), some scholars suggest the problem of legitimacy might better be reconceived as a problem of sovereignty in order to transcend it or resolve it once and for all (Catlaw, 2003, in press; Farmer, 2005b). As suggested in Chapter 8, this may be due to the manner in which sovereignty is conceptualized in our existing political order. Sovereignty is at the heart of governance, because it represents the notion of *authorized political power*—the power to decide and to act not only for oneself, but in a manner that affects others. The sovereign is “above or superior to all others; chief; greatest; supreme... supreme in power, rank, or authority... holding the position of ruler; royal; reigning... independent of all others” (Neufeldt, 1996, p. 1283). All of these definitions create a problem for governance, in one of two ways. The first three definitions create a necessary duality in that if one is sovereign, then all others are not, thereby creating a Master/Servant quality to social relationships. The last definition creates an atomistic environment whereby if everyone is a sovereign, no one can take a superior position of power, authority, or rule over others (all Masters, no Servants).

Sovereign prerogative means that the sovereign is above the law or makes the law (Ostrom, 1989). To assure sovereignty, the law must: (1) be unalterable by government authorities; (2) clearly describe the authority of persons acting on behalf of the government; (3) separate powers to limit authority; (4) place ultimate authority with its jurisdictional members; (5)

provide individuals access to diverse units of government to address various interests; and (6) maintain the ability for members to modify political arrangements. The key difference between what the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution call for hangs in the balance of the second and fourth items in this list. When those with authority to act on behalf of the government, be they elected officials or appointed administrators, are for all intents and purposes the principal authority for the jurisdiction, the jurisdictional members are denied their full sovereignty: they become *represented*. These representative forms of sovereignty are a far cry from the rhetoric of a self-governing “People” described in the Declaration of Independence.

These definitions reveal how the problem of sovereignty is the source of the problem of legitimacy—*sovereignty defines where political power and authority is located*. It has long been noted that the problems of government are ultimately about how authority is formed, vested, and used: “Sovereignty, that is, the attribute of supreme, unlimited, indivisible authority, constitutes, as we have seen, the prime or most important characteristic of the state” (W. F. Willoughby, 1927, p. 57). When sovereignty, or at least some part of it, is delegated to people and institutions, the ideal of democracy is transformed into a representative republic. This is the basis from which both the Constitutional and Discretionary logics argue—the state is delegated political authority. Their mutual argument is therefore over how that political authority is allocated between *politicians and administrators*. Clearly, this is the meaning of sovereignty that public administration cannot seem to escape. Yet, as noted in the quote from E. E. Schattschneider in Chapter 1, to an increasing number of U.S. citizens, the only *legitimate* democratic political authority resides within each equal individual. From this Collaborative logic, any delegation of political authority is challenged.

These opposing logics are reflected in choices of political ontology. The Constitutional and Discretionary tradition share an understanding of the individual as an atomistic self that must create social bonds through contract. Therefore, a state is needed to guarantee that the contract is

upheld. The Collaborative tradition understands the individual as a socially situated self that by virtue of its very context has a social bond to which all are mutually responsible. These two theories of the self—atomistic versus socially embedded—are at the core of competing views of the nature of sovereignty, having been described as *standard liberal* democracy and *expansive* democracy (M. M. Warren, 1992b). Clearly, the ideal of democracy is closer to an expansive definition of sovereignty as *interdependence of all*. The implication for democratic governance is that we have not yet solved the puzzle of how to get things done *collectively* as independent yet social beings with equal political power. As Follett (1998) notes, *we have not yet learned how to live with one another*.

By establishing a representative system of government, we portray sovereignty as resting with the independent individual through an abstraction called The People (Catlaw, 2003, in press). Through the voluntary will of The People and their social contract, their representatives and the institutions of the state are imbued with political authority, thus bearing most expression of sovereignty on behalf of all those independent individuals. Without going into the details of suffrage over time, all those who are considered citizens are able to choose their representatives and temporarily place some of their sovereignty (in the sense of political power) in the hands of those representatives. This political authority is given away at least until the next election. Furthermore, this political authority is delegated at least in some part to public administrators, who are made answerable through various mechanisms. For the citizen, this condition is similar to when a person accepts employment, and in so doing, gives away some level of authority over his or her actions in performance of the job.

Fundamentally, this approach relies on the notion that one can take at least part of one's sovereignty and hand it over to another person. In so doing, the duality is once again created between Master and Servant, and the individual is no longer fully independent. A common question that is often discussed is specifically the type or amount of sovereignty actually being

given over in these types of representative or contractual relationships. However, a better question might be whether this exchange is even *possible*. Thayer (1981) points out that this problem can be traced to differing ontological belief systems. In short, ancient religions conceived of one's connection to the divine source of all biological and social power to be located *within* in a manner that is integral to one's being. This was an egalitarian conception of unified yet unique being. However, contemporary religions placed this divine source *outside* of oneself, thus creating the first duality of Master/Servant, or as Niebuhr (1963) frames it, Maker/Citizen. Co-creation and stewardship ideas transcend and synthesize the Maker/Citizen dialectic with the notion of the Answerer. Because humankind is made in the image of God, and has been given responsibility for the Earth, humankind is therefore a Maker, but one who still answers to: (1) God as the source of power to create; and (2) all of humankind, and in the eyes of many, all of creation. Thus, an obligation of stewardship is incurred at the moment such a mantle is assumed. Stewardship demands a high level of responsibility and discretion, yet never completely assuming the authority of the sovereign who has endowed the steward with such authority. Therefore, everyone is simultaneously autonomous and answerable. Because this seems more congruent to the ideal of People made up of interdependent individuals, it seems that the Collaborative tradition is more normatively reflective of the ideal expressed in the Declaration of Independence, and should therefore be the ideal to pursue.

Where Does This Lead Us?

The critical analyses in this inquiry argue that practitioners and scholars must essentially pick one of the traditional orientations as the dominant identity for the field due to their mutually exclusive legitimacy logics—one must always trump the others. The fundamental problem with choosing one is that it will ultimately fail to achieve legitimacy in the eyes of at least one substantive group. However, trying to integrate or conciliate these logics in the manner recommended by various theorists to date serves only to obfuscate the underlying problem of

sovereignty, not resolving the source tensions created by representative government. In light of contemporary changes in the governance context depicted above, this “choice” can no longer be made if we hope to actually achieve legitimacy. The dynamic political and economic changes of the last three decades have radically called into question both the plausibility and desirability of role conceptualizations that rely on legitimacy being achieved through means other than the tenets of participative democracy. Intersectoral and global policy networks, public-private partnerships, civic entrepreneurship and co-production, and the various other manifestations of contemporary governance demand a different understanding of both the individual public administrator and the position of public administration within society.

Given the postmodern social milieu, the preferred way to conceive of the public administrative role is as a transcendent synthesis of the dialectical tension between ideal types of Master and Servant. A full formulation of Steward promises to avoid the problems of both Master and Servant role conceptions. This role assumes that sovereignty cannot be externalized or exchanged, even in a voluntary manner. Only a fully democratic political economy can achieve legitimacy in the eyes of all, regardless of what social role or position they hold. While risking falling into the trap of the “original position” conceived of by Rawls (2000b), I believe that he is correct in noting that the only way to choose the rules of society is to empathize fully with those who are the least powerful in forming those rules and least benefited by their implementation. I suggest that neither political leaders nor public administrators would want to live by the rules of our society if they felt what it is like to be the poorest, least influential, most vulnerable person, with little hope of escaping the many forms of political and economic domination present in our society.

To enable a more pure democratic social process, sovereignty cannot be placed outside of an individual, representation of all types must be challengeable on an ongoing basis, and authoritative roles based on either expertise or political wisdom must be ended along with all

hierarchical and competitive forms of organization. This notion literally wipes the slate clean from reality as we know it. As McSwite (1997, 2002) points out, when such fundamental assumptions are challenged, the stakes are as high as they can possibly get. This may likely be why those fostering the emergence of the Collaborative tradition still cling to prior traditions of representative political authority and legitimacy in some manner.

As noted by Lynn, no reform effort will ever be successful “unless it can be shown to be part of a coherent model of political economy...” (1996, p. 24). The standards of pure democracy include: complete devolvement to affected citizens; collaborative determination of the public interest; and a critical awareness of and emancipation from a dominating political economy (Adams et al., 1990). Any conceptualization of public administration that attempts to maintain a special social role and authoritative position while still being answerable to the sovereign will ultimately fail to achieve legitimacy because no person or idea can adequately *represent* a human being. In order to change the nature of political legitimacy, the entire system must change. So, the real paradox confronting us is the same one that has been with us since the founding of our country: the dialectical tension between the sovereign individual and a representative state.

It must be recognized that any attempt at such cultural transformation will be difficult, because conflicts are ever present in regard to “extremely different fundamental beliefs about the role of government, the most effective ways to manage organizations, and the role of the civil service in providing governance. Attempting to reconcile these disparate internal views and still make an organization function will be a continuing challenge for public managers in the foreseeable future, and probably forever” (Peters, 1992, p. 131). If the Collaborative framework is so radically different, public administration can only hope to catalyze its emergence as a facilitative or emancipative social agent (Adams et al., 1990; Box et al., 2001; Catlaw, 2006b; J. V. Denhardt & Denhardt, 2003; Farmer, 2005b; Golembiewski, 1996; C. S. King & Zanetti, 2005; McSwite, 2002; Nickel, 2006; Stivers, 2000b; Witt, 2006; Zanetti, 1998). In this

transitional role expertise is transformed from technical or normative formulations to facilitation and relationship skills. This facilitative role can be conceived of as midwifery at both the small and large scale. In specific situations, the midwife helps deliver agreement and collective action among those impacted by a given issue or decision. As Catlaw (2006c) notes, public administrators become “good for nothing” in that they merely facilitate rather than direct toward a specific goal. Writ large, this approach creates a new approach to self-governance among sovereign individuals. In this way, public administration becomes “a good and no place” (Farmer, 2005b, p. 189).

However, it must be noted that even this transitional role conceptualization is fraught with challenges. First, being “good for nothing” takes away the facilitator’s capacity to be substantively involved as a sovereign by not transcending the “neutrality” proscription. This takes away from the facilitator’s own sovereignty. Therefore, this role conceptualization is at risk of simply dressing the Servant in a different mantle. Thus, a specific approach to facilitation must be used—one that allows for equal participative action as a legitimate role function. It is probably best to look to action theory and critical theory rather than simply to facilitation technique.

Second, there is still a vestige of special status or social authority remaining in the emancipative role conception. Part of this difficulty is that our language itself is imbued with Master/Servant assumptions. It is difficult to imagine roles beyond this duality. Nonetheless, using the meaning of Steward as Co-Creator, such re-conceptualization becomes possible through mutual answerability. Social relationship assumes the characteristic of *interdependence* among unique individuals (Dudley, 1996; Farmer, 2005b; Follett, 1998). From this perspective, all individuals must have both the *right* and *responsibility* to play the facilitative role among their peers based on the law of the situation, rather than any pre-determined role assignment. This is absolutely necessary in order to transcend the dilemma of “making a great effort to educate

everyone to the point where they (1) know enough to make these decisions nor (2) by restricting participation to the people who know all about these matters” (Schattschneider, 1960, p. 136).

But there is yet another problem to be handled in this re-conceptualized role: what to do about individuals without the *capacity* to play a facilitative or participative role. It is questionable that sovereignty can be expressed by just any individual. At some level, there is the problem of maturation and capacity to decide for oneself, with consideration of others. Perhaps similar to the notion of midwife, the Steward role concept must include an aspect of parenting, or at least *mothering* (Stivers, 2000b). It may be that sovereignty is increasingly expressed through growth and development, and that those who are not yet sufficiently mature cannot be expected to assume this responsibility (Frederickson, 1997; O. F. White, 1990b). This problem thus leads to the corollary of who is authorized to make this judgment. From the Collaborative perspective, such judgments must be arrived at via communicative practices.

Together, the Steward role conceptualization becomes a Midwife/Parent/Citizen that is responsible for facilitating, participating, catalyzing, educating, and emancipating. Yet, it is not a permanent social role taken by individuals by virtue of election or appointment, but rather a *function* that any citizen can fulfill and should fulfill based on the particular needs of the situation. This role conceptualization then fits within the logic of the fully democratic framework. It does not insert a political representational role into social relationship. It does not give away economic autonomy. It does not require a hierarchical organization. It is “answerable” only to the law of the situation and the situated self.

As it turns out, this really is not such a radical role conception for governance. Besides the fact that it has been theorized at least as far back as the field of public administration has existed by the progressive and pragmatist scholars discussed in Chapter 6, there are nascent forms of this approach emerging in governance practices around the world. As depicted in the case vignettes in Chapter 7, the Northwest Tempe Neighborhoods community-based planning process

provides an example. In these situations, self-organizing collective action has transcended traditional political, economic, and organizational structures. Perhaps what really holds public administration back from embracing this role conceptualization is that we risk losing differentiation as a field of practice as well as academic study. We desperately cling to our place in the world as we've known it, fearing loss of everything. We legitimize this attitude with the notion that government exists "precisely for the reason that there is a need to have special persons in society charged with the function of promoting and protecting the public interest" (Appleby, 1945, p. 5). We fear the chaos that might ensue should no one be "minding the store." But as philosophers such as Lau Tzu and Nietzsche remind us, there is great opportunity in such chaos. As an emancipative academic discipline, public administration has the opportunity to become a central location for understanding what it means to be a citizen of the world; how to become effective in collective visioning, deciding, and acting; and how to live in a manner that is more fully democratic in all social activities. In the same manner that organizational change teams regularly redesign themselves out of a job, to achieve the transformation called for by the Collaborative ideal, we must design ourselves out of a position from which to *prescribe*. Furthermore, as practitioners, in giving away our claims to power and authority, we become participants in a wholly new way. We are freed to be whole beings; participants in collective life as co-creators. What could be more attractive?

Summation

To sum up the argument being made, the analyses presented suggest that the emerging Collaborative tradition provides at least a path toward a paradigmatic transformation of both political and administrative theory. It attempts to *reframe* the legitimacy issue itself according to a different set of standards—a different system of sovereignty and governance based on pure democracy among interdependent individuals. Indeed, McSwite suggests that "if we want to find a truly legitimate place for the public administrator, we must find an alternative image of

governance itself, an image that derives from a different model of society, one grounded in community...” (1997, p. 50). Without such a transformation, I worry that we are stuck in a holding pattern whereby our understanding is limited to oppositional trade-offs between things like Master and Servant, efficiency and democracy, self-interest and public interest, politics and administration, or fact and value. Instead, public administration must face head on and reconcile “the central contradiction posed to human beings by collective life: the dual, conflicting necessities of control and freedom” (McSwite, 2002, p. 96). We must become the Co-Creators that we wish to be. Otherwise, we doom ourselves to an “existential posture” that is characterized by “*a commitment to a permanent sense of irresolvable problem and a willingness to live with the inevitable interpersonal distress that this sense of intractable problem generates*” (McSwite, 1997, p. 6).

Looking to the future of public administration theory, a transcendent approach is recommended as opposed to more common claims for the “one best formulation” to achieve democratic legitimacy through some type of integration or conciliation of the ideal types described within a representative framework. To recapitulate, the reason that transcendence is needed is because any combination of the three traditions ultimately fails the test of *democratic* legitimacy because there is always some degree of sovereignty given away either to public administrators, elected representatives, or through them, to the Constitution and its legal structure. This characteristic will always be contested, because we each challenge the right of any other person or institution to wield authority over us as sovereign individuals (Ortega Y Gasset, 1932). Therefore, a way must be found to transcend this barrier. Rather than trying to tweak the representative system to make it more democratic and more effective in pursuing the collective interest, we must transform these failed approaches to democratic legitimacy and pursue self-governance.

The normative discussions within all three traditions assume a democratic ethos is in place and is assured through: (1) the bureaucratic hierarchy answerable to the elected officials; (2) the inner moral or professional compass of the individual; or (3) the overarching democratic ethos guiding *all* citizens in our society. All of these forms of accountability are relied upon to protect against abuses of power and ensure pursuit of the public interest (Gaus, 1947). The defining difference is that in the Constitutional and Discretionary traditions, assumptions of self-interested human nature continue to structure activities, while in the Collaborative tradition, a sense of *mutual interest* is assumed. When functioning with worst-case scenarios in mind, the solutions are always some form of *control*: via contract, judicial guidance, legislative guidance, regime values, or a professionalized ethic. Paradoxically, these controls function as self-fulfilling prophecies, becoming the sources of failure to achieve the desired concern for the collective (Harmon & Mayer, 1986; McSwite, 1997; Schuman & Waterman, 1986; Will, 1983).

This leads me to speculate that what the Constitutional and Discretionary traditions are *really* doing is not at all about *pursuing* the public interest. Instead, we are seeking to control human behavior to *prevent* that which is not in the public's interest. The bottom line is that, empirically, *we have already lost control* in the sense of governance occurring outside the jurisdiction of any of our formulated controls anyway. Governance happens through a complex collaboration among all sectors and all types of actors. In many cases, it escapes jurisdictional boundaries of local, state, and national levels. There is no "state" to oversee and control behavior. Thus, we have no real choice but to find an alternative to organizational, professional, or regime value control dictated by the Constitution or a profession.

Taking a cue from the Collaborative tradition, we must adopt a theory of human nature which is based the notion of becoming. Rather than assuming that it *is* or will become one thing versus another, we must trust it to produce what is right for the time and place. While many link the source of this trust to an assumption that some type of "fellow feeling" is necessary, it need

not be some type of affective tie, but rather one's recognition of parity. The manner in which such trust is manifested has been described as fully egalitarian rules of engagement that facilitate social relationships. Such an institution requires that we be willing to relinquish an elite or expert position for public administration and politics alike, allowing facilitative leadership to emerge in any person. Like the Progressives of the last century understood, we must "now see that democracy is a spirit more than a mere form of either government or society. It is a stage in the evolution of the social mind and of social control—that stage which is characterized by the liberty and equality which spring from fraternalism, the recognition of the social worth and brotherhood of all men [*sic*]" (Ellwood, 1918, p. 522). We must be willing to allow the law of *each* situation to guide *each* affected group toward the most appropriate outcome. We must be brave enough to "jump into the abyss" of the unknown, trusting that it will, indeed, work out well (Castaneda, 1971).

While this does not do away with the notion of some type of predetermined value system, neither is it meant to. The starting assumption of the Collaborative tradition is that this society is seeking *democracy*. Democracy is interpreted to mean self-governance. While there is not a call to eliminate the institution or organizations of government necessarily, there *is* a call to fully transform them to enable or facilitate human relationship and voluntary collective action. In this way, values such as liberty, equality, and fraternity continue forward, while the manner in which they are interpreted and pursued is transformed. This notion of spontaneous and fluid collective action within a political state is more likely described as democratic socialism, while the same form of order without a political state would be described as some form of anarchy. But these labels are loaded with meaning, and tend to deter focus from the fundamental characteristics being described as *democratic self-governance*.

Pursuit of these "regime values" through egalitarian rules of engagement may very well be the project of democracy in the first place. Through these objectives, it seeks to resolve the

tension between the individual and the group. The goal of at least some of our founding revolutionaries was to dissolve Master and Servant into an individual sovereign with responsibility to the community—what I have labeled as Co-Creator. The only power that can “control” such a sovereign is the “law of the situation”—that which is needed in the particular time and place to achieve the collective purpose. In combination, these two principles create the foundation for full democracy and demand an assumption of a benevolent or other-regarding human nature.

After giving long thought to what metaphor might be most appropriate for this transcendent model of governance, I can come up with none better than *Democracy*—rule by the citizens, meaning mature adults who are “capable of both ruling and obeying” (Frederickson, 1997, p. 210). If there is to be a social role in the process of collective action, it must be one that is temporarily taken on by all participants in a given scenario, reflecting an egalitarian and mutually responsible relationship. Such a role might be possible in an egalitarian division of society into functional classes that do not impart more or less political or moral authority, but rather enable coordinated action (Ellwood, 1918). For this role, I have chosen the term *Steward*. These are the terms that carry our hope of achieving an ideal that manifests individual sovereignty and equality *within* the human collective. The Steward carries both rights and responsibilities, and the law of the situation rather than any individual or institution holds power and authority. How these principles form a system of collaborative governance may be largely unforeseeable to us. However, the configuration offered by the emerging Collaborative tradition is perhaps the best we have.

Even though the ideals of the Collaborative tradition ultimately demand a new form of political economy, I submit that these transformations can occur without revolution, because as Oxford University’s Ralf Dahrendorf suggests, democracy is flexible, maintaining “the ability to rethink assumptions—the ability to react to new problems in new ways—the ability to develop

institutions rather than change them all the time—the ability to keep the lines of communication open between the leaders and the led—the ability to make individuals count above all” (Crozier et al., 1975, p. 194). Democracy has this ability because it is a process undertaken by autonomous individuals who are seeking creative opportunities for expression and growth (R. B. Denhardt, 1981a). Therefore, we are ever driven to seek new social forms that support rather than hinder our process of *becoming*. As suggested by Follett (1998), the project of democracy may indeed be to facilitate the simultaneous process of individual and social becoming *in and through* human relationship. The Collaborative tradition holds the greatest promise in helping us to do so.

CHAPTER 10: IMPLICATIONS

Chapter 10 presents the Implications of the findings and conclusions drawn from this inquiry. Implications for public administration theory, empirical research, pedagogy, and practice are considered. This chapter addresses the final research question:

How might the results of this inquiry impact theory, research, pedagogy, and practice?

By way of introduction, it must be noted that the findings of this inquiry are not in any way imagined to be the end-all of theorizing in public administration. Indeed, theory must remain emergent throughout time, just as governance itself must be fluid and responsive. Paraphrasing from Stivers: “The founding dialogue of the meaning and purpose of governance must be thought of as a conversation that continues throughout the life of the state [discipline], one requiring the involvement of both bureaucrats [scholars] and other citizens [practitioners] so that they share an understanding of its meaning” (1990a, p. 252). Therefore, the implications of this inquiry to theory, research, pedagogy, and practice are considered to be tentative and flexible.

As noted in the Introduction to this inquiry, if members of the public judge democratic legitimacy based at least in part on the combined attitudes and actions of public administrators, then the issue of role conception is very important in terms of: the theories that construct role conceptualization; the pedagogy that instills role conceptualization; the research that evaluates resulting role-taking and performance; and the modification of theories based on the findings of research. At present, this is extremely problematic because there are competing conceptualizations of the role of public administration in society and the role of public administrator.

Because the most common point of role conception *articulation* is scholarly in nature, this inquiry focused on the theoretical foundations of public administrator role conceptualization. Clarifying the essential elements of role conceptualization associated with varying theories of

legitimacy has value to both scholarship and practice—a highly desirable characteristic in public administration research. In its broadest implications, the results of this inquiry point toward a new view of public administration as a field of both scholarship and practice. In the contemporary context, the field of *public administration* becomes *governance* and a new role conceptualization beyond Bureaucrat or Entrepreneur is necessary for reasons both normative and practical in nature. Rather than conceptualizing or being “government” or even “public” workers, we must theorize and become *governance actors* from any sector, including citizens, businesses, nonprofits, and government agencies. The term Steward has been used to capture this role.

Given this overarching implication, it might seem at odds to revert back to discussion about the implications for *public administration* theory, research, pedagogy, and practice. Indeed, it is somewhat incongruent. However, as noted by most scholars in pursuit of the Collaborative ideal that this inquiry ultimately embraces, it is quite valid to suggest that there is a transitional role in the process of moving from representative to direct expressions of democracy. Doing so requires a bit of “unlearning” if you will, shifting gears in socialization over what may be a fairly long timeline. Therefore, the implications described below must be taken as recommendations for a *transitional process*, rather than a desired *end state*.

Implications for Theory

As noted in the Approach to Inquiry chapter, theory serves a variety of purposes. New knowledge can be discovered, existing knowledge can be systematized, knowledge can be incrementally advanced, particular perspectives can be advocated, and knowledge can be chronicled or assembled in a new fashion (Znaniecki, 1940). This inquiry provides a novel systematization of the public administration theory literature, offers some new insights to the field using dialectical analysis, and advocates for a particular theoretical perspective based on consideration of the empirical context as well as theoretical analyses.

The ideal type model, analyses, and critique produced in this inquiry contribute to theory

building. At a very general level, clarification is needed on the problem of legitimacy because when various scholars of the field assert that there is a “crisis of legitimacy” in governance, they mean quite different things. This complexity of meaning may also be implicated in the issue of public perception of legitimacy as well. Therefore, this inquiry helps clarify what it is that we are talking about when we refer to “the problem of legitimacy” by identifying the essential characteristics being promoted in various theories of legitimacy and public administrator role conceptualization. The ideal types generated by this inquiry offer a method to understand public administration theories and ideas in light of underlying assumptions about legitimacy. In revealing the philosophical commitments related to specific prescriptions for practice, the ideal types may imply the need for more conscientious selections. In other words, theorists may choose, as a result of such awareness, to be more careful in the claims they make or the integrations and conciliations they attempt. It is one thing to say, “In my prescription for practice, I believe public administrators should be innovative in using their expertise to achieve efficiency, while responding to the desires of the citizenry they serve.” It is another to say, “Although I believe public administrators should be innovative in the use of their expertise, their decisions and actions should ultimately respond to the desires of the citizens impacted.” The former statement does not prioritize among two competing interpretations of legitimate action, while the latter clearly does. Therefore, the latter provides a clearer prescription for practice.

Stever (1988) asserts that a new ideation of the public administration role is needed that will: (1) bring diverse occupations into a common sense of purpose, professional identity, and trust; (2) establish standards for professional action; and (3) provide legitimacy to the public. Indeed, theories about a legitimate role conception in public administration have been under serious debate for over twenty years (Kass & Catron, 1990). This inquiry builds on prior theorizing in several ways. In offering a trichotomous ideal type model, this inquiry offers a third way out of the dualisms so prominent in the field. Furthermore, it offers an alternative triptych to

those linked to the three arms of government. This is an important difference, as the others do not challenge the legitimacy of that system of governance itself. It also offers a view of legitimacy that aligns the interpretation of many important elements of public administration theory in coherent sets. This helps scholars and practitioners alike better recognize the legitimacy logics being adopted. As such, it works toward answering the call to “provide a richer intellectual context to help scholars and practitioners evaluate administrative ideas and reforms” (Spicer, 2004, p. 361).

The ideal type model produced by this inquiry contributes to the growing theoretical literature on *governance* and the role of public administrators within this process. In light of the shifting locus of governance beyond the boundaries of the public sector and increasing global relationships, a new understanding of administrative legitimacy is needed. While the problem of legitimacy in the context of privatization and policy networks has been identified, it has not been widely linked to role conceptualizations, or the notion that a role conceptualization that transcends *government* is necessary. Therefore, the findings about administrative legitimacy are applicable to other sectors of society as well. Even considering separate sectors, nonprofit organizations are held to similar standards of responsibility and accountability to the citizenry as the political sovereign by virtue of their tax exempt status. Nonprofit organizations are typically expected to pursue the public good, and this is why they are given favored tax status. Furthermore, as evidenced in recent corporate ethics debacles and the increasing push for social responsibility, expectations of democratic legitimacy are even increasing in the for-profit sector.

In a special issue of *Public Administration Review* on the Minnowbrook II, it was noted that the conference brought what could be called a more skeptical or even cynical view of the postmodern condition of society, and the call for a new approach to science to understand that condition (Timney Bailey, 1989). Due to the fragmented state of theory in public administration regarding contemporary governance, administrative legitimacy, and role conception, integrative

conceptual models are needed for theory building and empirical research that will help illuminate postmodern challenges. The inquiry produced a rather comprehensive model, pulling together sufficient concepts from which to build testable hypotheses for empirical research. That is, role conceptualization is presented as a summative result of: assumptions about the governance context; political ontology; political authority and scope of action; formulations of responsibility and accountability; and associated decision making rationalities and organizing styles.

Furthermore, the critical analyses of this inquiry pointed out the limitations of theories that do not consider the mutual exclusivity of the legitimacy logics at play in public administration.

Analyses further argued that attempts to acknowledge mutual exclusivity without attempting to transcend the resulting dialectical tensions fail to achieve legitimacy, as do the attempts of one type of logic to dominate others in some form of integration or conciliation.

These critical analyses extend public administration in a meaningful way. It has been noted that critical theory must do more than inform internal organizational change and improvements to the manner in which policy is made. These are indeed vast improvements to the conditions of public administrators themselves and their relationship to citizens, in addition to likely improvements to the effects of public policy (R. B. Denhardt, 1981b). However, we must acknowledge that our goal extends beyond the reach of our field of practice. If we are to function as catalysts of change in our centralized social position, we must do more than make “specific moves, where, as it happens, we have the power to act” (Kariel, 1977, p. 101). As noted by LaPorte, many conditions are imposed on public administration “by the socioeconomic environment, with little possibility that they could be changed rapidly through the efforts of ruling parties or executive action” (1994, p. 9). Public administration must reveal the ways in which our endeavor is constrained by the broader political economy, and reach out to other disciplines and other fields of practice that can help us achieve our broadest goals. In essence, we must put the collaborative principle into action in theory as well as practice. At the same time,

we must also stop evaluating collaborative practice without considering this larger context. To imagine that the goal of emancipation can be achieved so readily through the efforts of one field of study or social practice is simply naïve. Transformation of the political economy is a much bigger project than public administration can theorize on its own.

The conclusions of this inquiry propose that the real problem for democratic legitimacy is our fear of releasing control. This has been suggested before: the pursuit of rationalism is rooted in “deep-seated fears of contingency, uncertainty, and perhaps most of all of genuine human contact” (Harmon, 1995, p. 205). From this perspective, our entire rationalized political economy is structured around a basic psychological dysfunction. If this is the case, then we might be better served by identifying that which underlies our fear of releasing control. It could be the paradoxical fear of intimacy that requires mutual interdependence and fear of independence that requires personal responsibility for oneself. In this case, perhaps psychoanalysis and social psychology will become the most important contributors to the public administration theory of the future. This is already emerging in the work of theorists who suggest that a path of personal change is linked to social change, and thus apply psychoanalytic theory in their work (Carr, 2000; Catlaw, 2004; R. B. Denhardt, 1981a; Harmon, 1995; C. S. King & Zanetti, 2005; McSwite, 1997; O. F. White, 1969, 1971, 1990b; O. F. White & McSwain, 1990; Zanetti & Carr, 1997).

Implications for Research

While this inquiry has been theoretical in nature, and was designed primarily to have an impact on theory and the pedagogy it engenders, it also has important implications for future research. In a reflexive manner, the practice of any role conceptualization should provide feedback to theory for ongoing refinement and even more profound changes. For example, Rosenbloom (1983) notes that theory might learn a lot from the practitioners who are called upon to integrate varying approaches to public administration. This feedback can be obtained through empirical research. By producing a Weberian ideal type model, this inquiry offers a rigorous

theoretical foundation for such future empirical research. There are several different approaches to research the ideal type model could support. Several research questions that come to mind based on the findings here include:

1. How do role conceptualizations reveal themselves in case study of public administrators, elected officials, and citizens?
2. Which role conceptualization is deemed most legitimate by public administrators, elected officials, and citizens? What are the perceived barriers to its realization?
3. Are role conceptualizations contingent to the specific type of social problem or opportunity being addressed?

The first question offers the logical starting point to test the empirical strength of the ideal type model. The ideal type role conceptualizations could be used to identify the prevalence of various role conceptions in the attitudes and self-reported behaviors of administrators themselves, as well as their perceived legitimacy in the eyes of citizens involved in the governance process. This question lends itself well to the Q-methodology approach (Stephenson, 1953). Q-methodology combines qualitative and quantitative methods to increase the understanding of an issue by eliciting, comparing, and evaluating the subjective perspectives of the individuals involved. It is an interpretive methodology that measures subjective perceptions and interactions; engages participants in instrument design; and analyzes results in an iterative manner with a view toward action. Unlike most survey research, Q-methodology analyzes *individuals* as the variables, with the *meanings* they ascribe to statements as the observations. These statements can be generated either through empirical or theoretical research. This inquiry provides the latter.

Statements are created which reflect anticipated attitudes about important issues and ideas. These statements are then grouped into categories or “concourses” and appropriately named. Either all or a random sample of the statements are placed into a written instrument

called a “Q-sort.” The Q-sort is administered to participants who sort the statements based on their levels of agreement or disagreement. The resulting prioritized list represents an individual’s subjective orientation to the issue. Factor analysis is then used to identify patterns across individuals. Finally, the results are considered in light of relevant theory to better understand the categories and individuals involved. Key interpretive questions include: Are theories coherently linked to patterns, or are there surprises? Do the results make sense to the participants? Do the results suggest any course of action?

This approach is currently used in public policy and planning to define and understand the policy context, stakeholder interests, problem definitions, and value criteria such as “fairness” (Durning, 1999). If the characteristics of a given ideal type tend to load heavily on individuals of particular social groupings, the findings would be most interesting. For example, it would be informative to know whether the prescribed Collaborative tradition role conceptualization is acceptable to individuals randomly, versus patterns based on specific social roles, such as politician, administrator, or citizen.

In this way, the research question could be further explored using a more standard survey method to inform role conception and public service motivation research. For example, an attitudinal index could be generated based on the three role conceptualizations, and preliminary findings from the Q-sorts of administrators, politicians, and citizens. Such an inventory could be used by public administrators to reflect upon their own attitudes and actions, or those generally found in their organization. Citizens could use the inventory by reflecting upon how they experience interactions with an individual public administrator, or the organization as a whole, in addition to their own attitudes as a citizen. All perspectives would be valuable in assessing the effectiveness of the public administrator/citizen relationship in policy planning, implementation, and evaluation. As such, it would be of value to human resources management in terms of recruitment, professional training and development, and performance evaluation in helping

individuals to find a better fit for themselves in regard to the role they are expected to fulfill.

An example could be taken from the field of social work, in an attitude scale developed for youth and community development work. In the Lofquist's (1989) Spectrum of Attitudes model, three ideal types are again placed on a continuum with many gradients between the three focal points where citizens are viewed and treated as: (1) objects; (2) recipients; and (3) resources. To facilitate assessment of where an individual or organization falls on this continuum, Lofquist (1989) developed an Inventory of Attitudes and Behaviors to help practitioners reflect upon their own values and actions in working with youth. The Inventory was conceived as: (1) a consciousness-raising activity; (2) a foundation for training activities, and; (3) as a framework for developing performance evaluation, in particular, self-assessments. The value of attitude assessments for such purposes was popularized in the 1970s, as evidenced in various practice-oriented fields (Knapp, 1975). This approach links theory to practice in the manner envisioned in this inquiry.

In regard to the second set of research questions, this model could be useful in developing public opinion survey tools. As is evident in a host of literature on performance appraisal in public administration, public opinions on governance and administrative performance are very important for feedback on matters related to: scope of service, quality, efficiency and effectiveness, equity, responsiveness, sensitivity to special populations, citizen trust in both institutions and individuals, and management style (Vigoda-Gadot & Yuval, 2004). The organizing concept of legitimacy pertains specifically to the issue of citizen trust, but also has implications for other issues of concern, as noted in the broad array of elements within each tradition.

In regard to the third research question, the ideal type model could be used in studies across jurisdictions or functions within public administration. This would most likely take the form of comparative case study. It may be that different contexts call for different role

conceptualizations in a manner similar to how individuals differ (as measured through Q-sorts), or as demographics differ (as measured through opinion surveys). It may be that in these different contexts, particular ideal types are more prevalent, or that normatively, one might be more desirable for specific reasons.

Implications for Practice

The claims that public administrators are more expert, more visionary, and more trustworthy than other citizens have been characterized as “the three great moral fictions of our age” (Mitchell & Scott, 1987, p. 450). Through a growing critical awareness, Americans are urged take a deeper look at the *institutional status quo*, rather than continuing to accept “a situation in which abuses of power and corruption are tolerated in exchange for goods and services” (Mitchell & Scott, 1987, p. 451). This inquiry is meant to shed light on that status quo, as well as on a possible alternative. By making clear the underlying philosophical and political assumptions attached to these various legitimizing myths, decisions about preferences are made more fruitful. It is meant to help those in public service decide which view of reality will help them to find or create the most meaning in public life (Stivers, in press). The way is opened to question not which form of administrative professionalism we prefer, but rather, which political institutions (e.g. rules of engagement) we wish to guide our collective lives. Indeed, as opposed to changing a simple causal variable, a change in the logical organizing idea or mental bias of an integrated system like an ideal type has a profound impact throughout a culture (Sorokin, 1957).

It has been noted that contemporary members of the critical school of social theory, including Habermas and Marcuse, do not believe that domination is an inherent or necessary characteristic of society. Indeed, they “argue, to the contrary, that an alternative scenario may be developed, one permitted by the fact that human institutions are socially constructed and, therefore, may be reconstituted by conscious choice and effective action” (R. B. Denhardt, 1981b, p. 630). The Collaborative ideal for practice imagines a societal role for a function, rather than a

structure of public administration. As a locus of activity, public administration may be able to serve the transitional process toward its manifestation (McSwite, 2006). For example, in a special issue of *Public Administration Review* on the Minnowbrook II conference, it was noted that “public administration offers the best hope for developing policies that ameliorate problems because it operates at the margins of many disciplines, and it is the only institution that interacts with all other institutions and individuals within the society” (Timney Bailey, 1989, p. 224). This is similar to the idea that the function of public administration can be “unique in its centrality, not in its elevation” (Stivers, 1990a, p. 270).

Recalling from the Introduction, professions are typically believed to have a number of characteristics: (1) it is a full time *occupation* or principal source of income; (2) it requires a commitment to a *calling* or enduring set of normative and behavioral expectations; (3) various signs and symbols differentiate the *profession* from the laity; (4) it requires specialized training or *education*, including both esoteric and useful knowledge; (5) it *serves* clients competently; and (6) its members proceed by their own judgment and authority, enjoying *autonomy* restrained by responsibility to the other characteristics of professionalism (Moore & Rosenblum, 1970). “A qualified professional is supposed to be an *authority* on his subject as a body of knowledge and an *expert* on its application to the solution of particular problems presented by clients. This places the professional in a superordinate position in the role relationship with the client, even if the latter is the employer” (Moore & Rosenblum, 1970, p. 106). This is particularly problematic when professional authority also carries administrative or legal sanctions.

At this point in the inquiry, it is possible to see that the first five characteristics are part of the role conceptualization of both the Constitutional and Discretionary traditions. The last characteristic of autonomy only holds true in the Discretionary tradition in public administration. However, the Collaborative ideal denies the notion of professionalism in total, because any type of professional status hinders a fully democratic relationship. Indeed, it heralds the “Death of the

Practitioner” (Catlaw, 2006b). At most, it might allow for a “transitional” approach that accepts differentiation from the laity only in terms of facilitative skills.

The conclusions of this inquiry suggest that in the contemporary context, anyone who is engaged in any activity affecting the common good can be logically conceived of as a “public administrator.” Furthermore, all such citizens *should* consider themselves to be stewards of the common good, and governance should occur through fluid networks of collaborative action. These types of recommendations completely transform not only the role of public administration, but its complementary social roles of politician and citizen. It assumes a radical reordering of the entire political economy that is far beyond the scope of one discipline.

Yet, such a transformation must start *somewhere*, and this is a role that most scholars promoting elements of the Collaborative tradition have assigned to the field of public administration, while guarding against the familiar trap of “vanguard parties.” Similar to the notion that political ideology cannot be foisted upon any culture, no advocates for any tradition of public administration can effectively *demand* changes to practice: “These new ways of practice, however, will not be imposed upon administrators and citizens by mandates; rather, they will emerge out of an enlightened, aware discourse and the process of experimentation” (C. S. King, 1999, p. 261). This is in perfect alignment with the pragmatist spirit of the Collaborative tradition: “Our ideals must evolve from day to day, and it is upon those who can fearlessly embrace the doctrine of ‘becoming’ that the life of the future waits” (Follett, 1998, p. 99). As Ghandi so eloquently recommended, we must become the change we wish to see in the world. As in the case of transformational leadership and the practice of stewardship, “There is artwork to be done, internal seeing and reevaluation of our own wants, longings, and expectations. If there is no transformation inside each of us, all the structural change in the world will have no impact on our institutions” (Block, 1993).

In all, the implication for practice is that we must embrace our demise, trusting that like

the mythical Phoenix, we will rise from the ashes of our past. “In this embrace of its death, one ceases to see The Practitioner as the hero of the ‘PA story.’ He [*sic*] is radically decentered and no longer viewed as the originator and narrator of PA or the authoritative, privileged *position* from which to speak in public administration” (Catlaw, 2006b, p. 200). The Steward role conceptualization offers an alternative for all actors who wish to be in service to the common good without becoming either a servant or a master. One might say the Collaborative tradition of public administration seeks the *praxis* of stewardship—a mindful way of being in service to community (Englehart, 2001; MacIntyre, 2000; Miller & King, 1998). Such *praxis* can be considered a form of spirituality, “the process of living out a set of deeply held personal values, of honoring forces or a presence greater than ourselves. It expresses our desire to find meaning in, and to treat as an offering, what we do” (Block, 1993, p. 48). However, *praxis* can also be described more secularly as thoughtful action in which active agents deliberate about the ethical meanings and consequences of their conduct (Ramos, 1981). This has also been called purposive action or “conduct,” which differs from behavior in that motives and conscious choices are involved (Merton, 1936). In this sense, thoughtfulness frames deeds and deeds evoke reflection (Hall, 1990; M. R. Warren, 2001). This description of practice is clearly different from what is promoted by the Constitutional and Discretionary traditions, even in their more normative manifestations. In those role conceptualizations, the vocation of public service is either one in which the individual self is lost, or in which the administrator is held apart and above the citizens of whom they stand in lieu.

Should the discipline of public administration begin to adopt elements of the Collaborative tradition, it would need to be “operationalized” in a way that could guide all phases of human resource management, including job descriptions, recruitment and selection, orientation, professional training and development, and performance evaluation. That is, we must answer the question, “How can we frame and foster public service attitudes that are linked to

desired actions in a manner that is useful in achieving legitimacy?” In fact, such a call to operationalize these principles was recently made:

The need to develop new ways of steering society requires us to consider new standards of assessing administrative performance... ultimately the most important criterion for assessing administrative performance would be to ask how effectively our work has advanced the public interest... it is imperative that we place at the center of our work a concept of the public service based on and fully integrated with citizen discourse and the public interest. We should put democracy first. (R. B. Denhardt & Denhardt, 2001, p. 400)

In this sense, recommendations for practice link back to the implications for future research and theory building. Clarification of how the attitudes and characteristics associated with the Collaborative tradition manifest in experience will help guide the operationalization of principals for practice.

If we are to put into practice a new political ontology within the existing political economy, it would mean attempting to change the rules of the game without eliminating the structures of the playing field. In other words, despite a transformational ideal, it may only be feasible to change the world by changing ourselves and the “specific moves, where, as it happens, we have the power to act” (Kariel, 1977, p. 101). More important is the fact that these moves represent a fundamentally different political ontology, even if it is manifested within the same institutional structures. As Stivers suggests, “We must find some way of strengthening the bonds between us, even within the confines of a government system that offers few chances for public dialogue. It can only be done by means of countless small interactions in daily life over long periods of time, interactions that build the sense that we are all in this together” (Stivers, in press, ch. 4). “Imagine the difference between a representative system grounded in discussions and public-spirited work among neighbors and the one we know so well, where each isolated individual goes into a voting booth, closes the curtain, and in privacy exercises the only public responsibility and duty open to him or her” (Stivers, in press, ch. 6). She calls this “governance

of the common ground... the result of many, many small steps—discussions, actions, stories, practices, shared understandings—in the direction of democracy” (Stivers, in press, ch. 6). If this is the best transitional approach we can hope for, then the implications of putting the Collaborative tradition’s Steward role conceptualization into practice can be summed up simply as this: “Think Revolutionarily, Act Incrementally.”

Implications for Pedagogy

Of course, one might ask, “How do we get there? How do we replace Bureaucrats and Entrepreneurs with Stewards?” Interestingly, proponents of the civic entrepreneurship model are calling for a new type of educational preparation for civic entrepreneurs (Henton et al., 1997). Just as new ways of knowing are needed for new ways of acting, new ways of acting are needed for new ways of organizing. “Handlers of artifacts we have in abundance, but we have a desperate and growing need in our day for men and women who can deal in relationships” (Appleby, 1945, p. 66). “It is precisely this science of association and the art of associating together that is the critical issue in the study of public administration. Those who study, teach, and practice public administration must come to some basic resolutions about the essential relationship between conditions and consequences for constituting and reforming human associations” (Ostrom, 1989, p. 94).

This would not be incoherent with the logic of the Collaborative tradition if civic education were a part of everyone’s educational process. In fact, this idea points to the potential for a vast expansion of public administration academic programs to prepare all for “citizen governance” (Box, 1998). If the Collaborative ideal were implemented in full, the pedagogical implications reach beyond the discipline itself. In the contemporary context of governance where public policy and administration are not necessarily limited to public agencies, professional education may need to become something very different indeed (Brewer et al., 2000). The scope may need to include “educating students to perform administrative and policy functions while at

the same time articulating an active social and political philosophy that leaders must ponder... public administration must begin by preparing citizens for a variety of public roles” (Ventriss, 1991, pp. 7-8). As a result, it is quite difficult to answer the question posed during the presidential address at the 2005 NASPAA annual conference: “How best do we ensure through experiential learning and our own good example that we instill in the next generation of leaders and managers fidelity to the democratic impulse and democratic institutions, which are at the heart of our culture and civic society?” (Mazmanian, 2005).

Dimock suggests that “the same forces which produce the public-service philosophy produce also good citizenship. The aim of democratic education should be to produce ‘public persons,’ that is, individuals who put the common good above their own immediate advantage” (Dimock, 1937, pp. 404-405). He believed this effort was worth the investment of large sums of money. In this case, it is appropriate to remember that the two oldest schools of public administration, Syracuse University and University of Southern California, were both originally schools of *citizenship* (Cooper, 1991). In this Collaborative ideal, public administrators are invited to “foster a collaborative approach to government, where experts are simply part of a cooperative process in which they have no superior role” (McSwite, 2002, p. 77).

Such a vocation of public service demands a specific kind of ethos that values human relationship, cooperation, and collective action (McSwite, 2002). “The hallmark of the sense of vocation is that it symbolically connects one’s individual activities directly to something transcendent or larger than oneself and thereby imbues the individual’s life work with a sense of *intrinsic* meaning. The idea of the public administrator as *citizen*, as contributing member of the larger body politic, adds to this sense of groundedness” (O. F. White, 1990b, p. 233). However, it must be noted that neither citizens nor administrators are trained and experienced in the Collaborative approach. It is quite easy to shift from authentic dialogue and deliberation into a pluralist, self-interested debate. Therefore, training across the board is required.

As noted in the Introduction, the idealized approach to preparation for public service includes formal education through a graduate program of public administration. These programs offer an approach to professional socialization. To express the Collaborative ideal, processes of socialization become suspect, in that they are attempts from external sources to channel individual expression into a specific form. When the source holds some type of special political authority, it becomes doubly suspect as ideological indoctrination, for example. However, for the purpose of this discussion, it is assumed that pedagogy currently exists, professional socialization occurs, and to even pursue the transformation sought by the Collaborative tradition, pedagogy must change to produce an evolving administrative role. Indeed, it has been noted that to empower citizens in self-governance, the administrator role must evolve, with corollary adjustments to curricula, including training in facilitation, team-building, organizational development, egalitarian discourse, and interpersonal skills (C. S. King, 1998). Here, the focus is primarily on formal pedagogy. Inculcation of role conception is an important element of professional education and training, whether it is through academic or workplace models. An increased understanding of the differences among role conceptualizations and a critique of their logical fit to the contemporary governance context should impact how public administrators, policy analysts, and planners are educated and prepared for work roles.

An article on public administration education from one leading scholar does not broach the notion that the field is designed to instill a particular professional identity (R. B. Denhardt, 2001). However, it does suggest that “the teaching/learning process in public administration is deeply bound up with issues of personal development both for students and faculty; consequently, our answers to the big questions of public administration education must reflect both the intellectual and psychological needs and interests of our students—and our own” (R. B. Denhardt, 2001, p. 529). Cognitive learning is one part of human development, and thus the formation of identity. “Those who are secure in their own identity (the result of personal development

processes) are more likely to act in accord with their knowledge and principles (both of which are the result of learning), even under pressures not to do so” (R. B. Denhardt, 2001, p. 530). This is the recipe for acting with integrity, and ultimately leads to the ability to form “independently derived perspectives concerning organizational and environmental relations and the role of public organizations in the governance system” (R. B. Denhardt, 2001, p. 530).

I suggest that this self-reflective capacity is critical in the postmodern condition in which the very legitimacy of one’s professional role within society is being questioned. If we do not give individuals the tools needed for the deepest levels of reflection, we are asking them to make choices unconsciously. If we do not give them a way to organize and link specific prescriptions for practice to various theories of legitimacy, we are asking them to haphazardly choose actions that are likely conflicting in logic. Indeed, most academic programs seek a diverse faculty to provide a broad range of theoretical perspectives to their students. As a result, students are encouraged to adopt competing ideals and approaches from schools of thought like Traditional Public Administration, New Public Administration, New Public Management, New Public Service, and all the various hybrids that integrate or conciliate them. Yet, we do not give students tools to help them recognize and organize these varying ideations of the field, leaving them to “fend for themselves” to choose among competing ideas using whatever method happens to be at hand.

Alternatively, formal academic programs may be conscientiously designed to promote a specific tradition of public administration. In *PA Times*, the monthly newspaper of the American Society for Public Administration, Bourgon (2004) presents a case for unifying public service around a central, underlying philosophy about the role of the state in society. She describes the traditional approach to public administration as well as the paradigm emerging under the New Public Management, citing many of the same shortcomings and negative consequences noted by the normative camps within both the Constitutional and Discretionary traditions. Rather than

unifying public service around the authority of the state or the marketization of the state, she suggests that the public service unite around “a common mission, a common sense of purpose, and common values” (Bourgon, 2004, p. 6). She reflects back on a time when mandatory training was used to ensure that public administrators share a common understanding of the values of the public service. These orientations supported collective values, cooperation, political consensus, democratic outcomes, individual rights, fairness, and the rule of law. She suggests that the field has experienced a great loss because this type of training has been laid by the wayside.

This claim would appear to be evident in empirical studies. In Paul Light’s study of graduates from professional public administration and public policy degree programs, one participant suggested, “there is always an overlay of public service and the spirit and the ethic of public service that the school didn’t really have to try too hard to instill” (P. Light, 1999, p. 95). But the preponderance of empirical observations suggest otherwise. For example, another graduate admitted, “There are some who came through the Kennedy School who really wanted to be in the business school across the river, and didn’t get in or whatever. So they used the Kennedy School as a way to take a lot of business classes. And they were very antigovernment” (P. Light, 1999, p. 94). The vast majority of graduates felt that maintaining ethical standards was the top skill considered very important for success. No other skills (including influencing policymakers, policy analysis, and budgeting and public finance) ranked consistently in the 80 percentile range, followed by leadership in the 70 percentile range. Yet, a content analysis of the core curriculum of these graduates’ schools, 13 of the top 20 public administration and public policy programs in the United States, on average, only 0.4 courses in ethics and 0.2 courses in leadership were required. This gap was supported by the survey responses where graduates reported less satisfaction with these elements of their programs than with policy analysis and budgeting and finance. Thus, “as a general rule, these graduates would have closed the gaps identified above on their own, through on-the-job training, personal experience, and their own

reading throughout career” (P. Light, 1999, p. 118).

These perspectives on public administration pedagogy suggest that a particular substantive content is desired from professional socialization. To be congruent with the Collaborative tradition, this content would have to become very process-oriented rather than substantive content-oriented. As was noted in the Introduction to this inquiry, the normative models informing professional socialization do make a difference in the attitudes and actions of the role-takers. If we anticipate public administrators acting in accordance with these models when they become part of one’s identity, it will benefit the field to be cognizant and conscientious about which model we are prescribing. It is clear from this inquiry that at least three models with substantively different approaches to legitimacy are being promoted in various blends either by individual scholars or in combination across scholars during the course of a professional program of study. Therefore, students of public administration are receiving mixed messages that are incoherent when linked back to associated legitimacy logics.

Yet, we seem to deny that this type of normative socialization is occurring. For example, MPA (master of public administration) programs in China are roundly criticized for intentionally imparting a uniform approach to legitimacy according to Marxist and socialist theory: “The Chinese government is clearly unwilling to give up political indoctrination in the MPA program” (Tong & Straussman, 2003, p. 112). This is done in order to ensure professional characteristics appropriate to China’s political, historical, and cultural attributes. Comparatively, it is reasonable to assert that MPA students in the United States are similarly indoctrinated with liberal political economy as a part of their program of study. Yet, it occurs much more covertly and haphazardly due to our pluralist tendencies. Not considering the very few who might transcend liberalism altogether, individual scholars tend to profess liberalism in any of its classical, modern, conservative, or radical manifestations (MacIntyre, 1988).

To be more precise, we frown not on socialization, but on conscious and responsible control of it. In fact, our organizations are magnificent, if undeliberate, vehicles of socialization. They teach values, inculcate ethics, create norms, dictate right and wrong, influence attitudes necessary for success and all the rest.... Taking conscious responsibility for the socialization process will become imperative in tomorrow's organizations. (Bennis, 1967, p. 15)

To own up to the fact that we are, in a very real sense, indoctrinating students of public administration in competing political philosophies and to combat the confusion created in its wake, I suggest that professional socialization and role-taking become a more conscious choice-making activity. I believe "when we take on the mantle of public service, it is important to know not only who we serve, but to which tradition we are committed, what moral principles this tradition upholds, and what attitudes it engenders" (Stout, 2006, p. 620). As one of my professors suggests, the various theories in our field "present important choices for students trying to develop a personal philosophy of public administration" (R. B. Denhardt, 2000, p. iii). These theories help clarify the *normative ethos* at play in the field, in a given organization, and in an administrator's own organizational experience (Harmon & Mayer, 1986). The metaphor of tradition provides a structure through which students can organize competing ideas. They provide a framework for reflexive attempts to *understand* and endeavors to *act* effectively (Arendt, 1978; Stivers, 2000c, 2003).

Applying the model proposed here, the traditions offer an organizing framework for many topics in the field that keeps the question of legitimacy visible through coherent sets. This is quite obviously applicable to foundation courses in public administration theory, but perhaps not so clearly in others. Using the NASPAA (2007) guidelines of typical coursework, let us consider in brief the most likely applicable topics:

- Public policy formulation, implementation, and evaluation
- Decision-making and problem-solving
- Political and legal institutions and processes
- Economic and social institutions and processes

- Organization and management concepts and behavior
- Human resources management
- Quantitative and qualitative techniques of analysis
- Budgeting and financial processes
- Information management, technology applications, and policy

In regard to public policy, many of the elements noted in the traditions proposed have important application to its formulation, implementation, and evaluation, which include decision-making and problem-solving methods. In general, the role of the policy analyst would be patently different. In the Constitutional tradition, the analyst puts expertise to work specifically as guided by the bureaucratic hierarchy, as dictated by the separated powers of government. In the Discretionary tradition, the analyst uses expertise to guide and interpret policy in large part independent from the political system. In the Collaborative tradition, the analyst offers substantive expertise as an equal participant in a self-governing network, being fully on tap but never on top. In terms of decision-making and problem-solving, the traditions offer different blends of instrumental and political rationalities. The Constitutional approach is deontological with procedural rules being handed down through the bureaucracy. The Discretionary approach is teleological, with outcome objectives being in large part defined by analysts themselves. In the Collaborative approach, decision-making and problem-solving occur phenomenologically through communicative action and consensus (or intersubjective agreement) among all those affected. Combined, just these two elements represent three very different ways to approach public policy in regard to its formulation, its implementation, and its evaluation.

In regard to political, legal, economic, and social institutions and processes, the three traditions have fundamentally different interpretations of what is most appropriate. The Constitutional tradition assumes a Representative Political State guided by a conservative version of classical liberalism. It envisions a mixed economy in which capitalism is constrained by government in order to achieve the common good. Governance occurs through government

institutions, which are controlled through hierarchal authority, procedures, and a functional differentiation in which administrators serve the representative political system. The Discretionary tradition assumes an Administrative State guided by modern liberalism, which makes the political system to a large degree symbolic in nature. It envisions free market capitalism that is minimally constrained by government. In fact, government is relieved of as many responsibilities as possible, shifting activity to the marketplace, while leaving remaining government functions in large part in the hands of public administrators. This discretion and outsourcing is made accountable through the use of outcome objectives, including ideals of efficiency, effectiveness, equity, and ethics. The Collaborative tradition calls for a radical, fully democratic political economy, in which political and market activities are self-governing in nature. Governance thus occurs through fluid, egalitarian networks of concerned individuals, regardless of social sector or role. Ultimately, roles such as politician and public administrator would be dissolved into the role of citizen. Again, there are many possible interpretations of what these social institutions and rules of engagement look like or should look like.

Accordingly, the manner in which social structures and relationships are envisioned shifts dramatically from tradition to tradition, offering varying views on organization and management concepts and behavior, and the practice of human resources management. In the Constitutional tradition, people are considered to be self-interested beings who accept the constraints of the political system in exchange for the benefits citizenship brings. Therefore, bureaucratic hierarchy is the most effective organizing style. On the one hand, it offers the methods of control needed to mitigate self-interest. On the other hand, such control is accepted because it is authorized by the political system. In the Discretionary tradition, however, people are considered to be self-interested beings who need very little constraint, because liberal transactions of both economic and social types produce the most efficient and effective results. Furthermore, each individual is deemed sovereign and expectant of the fullest degree of liberty possible while maintaining social

equilibrium. Therefore, organizations that are freed of inordinate controls are desired. Yet, because the Administrative State still draws on the legitimacy of representative government, it cannot recommend doing away with organizational authority altogether. Therefore, flattened, organizations are envisioned to support empowered administrators and outsourcing to the market. The Collaborative tradition draws from direct democratic authority, therefore it eliminates the need for hierarchical organization altogether. Instead, it calls for network forms of organizing through which all are concerned or affected by a given issue participate in addressing it. The only authority resides in the law of the situation. Once again, these are demonstrably different approaches to organizational behavior and theory that are linked to many specific prescriptions for practice.

These recommendations apply to other curricular recommendations, such as budgeting and financial processes and information management, technology applications, and policy. Clearly, these activities are vastly different in contexts of discrete government organizations, public-private partnerships, and cross-jurisdictional networks. While we may be teaching toward a past of bureaucratic hierarchies where control over finances and information was possible and desirable, these conditions no longer hold. Therefore, students receive mixed messages that are better linked to Discretionary or Collaborative approaches to legitimacy. They would be best served to understand how these prescriptions for practice are thus linked, because networks under the assumption of entrepreneurial discretion are quite different from collaborative networks. Finally, research methods more broadly conceived are related to varying traditions based on their ontological assumptions and the manner in which they are manifested in epistemology. Both the Constitutional and Discretionary traditions are linked to positivism or perhaps some post-positivist extensions, while the Collaborative tradition is linked to a clearly postmodern understanding of knowledge. Both perspectives can be represented in courses on quantitative and qualitative research. The notion of varying traditions helps clarify the full meaning of multi-

epistemological approaches or methodological pluralism—an understanding that ultimately rests on ontological foundations.

In conclusion, I assert that it will behoove not only the field of public administration, but individual students of the discipline to use the metaphor of tradition to organize their understanding of its competing philosophical foundations and recommendations for practice. When one has a framework from which to reflect and act, external chaos is calmed and put into a perspective that supports choice making. No sector of society is immune from the legitimacy challenge in a context where the principles of democracy are increasingly expected to prevail. Therefore, traditions that are designed to attend to the issue of legitimacy will likely be most successful in calming the storm of discontent. While I have offered one possible interpretation of varying traditions of legitimacy in governance and a normative argument to promote one in particular, what I feel is most important and compelling for pedagogy is the use of the metaphor of tradition itself.

ENDNOTES

ⁱ This is from personal communication from Dr. Thomas Catlaw; see for example (Catlaw, in press), although not specifically mentioned.

ⁱⁱ The need for such transformation is eloquently depicted in a popular song by The Police: "...A policeman put on his uniform; He'd like to have a gun just to keep him warm; Because violence here is a social norm; You've got to humanize yourself. Re-humanize yourself, re-humanize yourself.... I work all day at the factory; I'm building a machine that's not for me; There must be a reason that I can't see; You've got to humanize yourself..." (Sting, 1981).

ⁱⁱⁱ See also Kohlberg's (1981) theory of moral development.

^{iv} This characteristic influenced the naming of this ideal type element. Because *organization* derives from the Greek *organon*, meaning tool or instrument, to move away from the notion of organization as only a purposive means, new language is needed to accommodate Collaborative collective action. We must be free to imagine creative ways to structure our collaborative thinking, dialogue, and action. The term *imaginization* has been offered (G. Morgan, 1986). However, this term also suggests a fixedness that is incongruent with the Collaborative political ontology. Therefore, I chose the active form of *organizing* in order to connote the fact that collective action is an ongoing process of choice.

^v This conflation of utilitarian and teleological ethos obscures the shared legitimacy logic of both technical and normative teleological approaches. Just because a value is *not* utilitarian or technical does not necessarily mean it is deontological. Rule-based ethics are deontological because behavior is based on duty to a principle or law coming from a higher power. Indeed, "deontology does not look beyond the act itself to weigh it against a purpose or aim; it simply regards the act itself as duty, regardless of the imputed consequences" (Woller, 1998, p. 90). In

this inquiry, the democratic, deontological ethic would be Constitutional, while the teleological, utilitarian ethic would be Discretionary.

^{vi} Due to this inquiry's specific use of the term *stewardship*, it must be noted that in their use, *stewardship* means "concern for the long-term public good" (Bellone & Goerl, 1992, p. 131).

^{vii} I suggest it is more accurate to depict this as the Citizen/Maker dialectic, given Niebuhr's own interpretation of his triadic model.

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